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10.9.17

Reason and Faith and outside books. ספרים חיצוניים

Outside books. ספרים חיצוניים The  approach of the Rif and Rosh is these are books that explain the Torah in ways not based on the way the Chazal [the sages] explain the Torah. I wrote about this in short in my little book on Shas.
The issue comes up in Sanhedrin: These are the people that have no portion in the next world...R. Akiva added those who read "outside books."

The trouble that I see is that most books in the religious world explain the Torah not based on דרשות חז''ל the way the sages understood it.
But I have avoided this subject for the very fact that it to me is ambiguous. I have no idea how far to take this. In any case, I am allergic to all books in the religious world. But those are easy. The Gra already made this clear by his signature on the letter of excommunication. But how far to go with this?

After you get to yeshiva a lot of these books are considered OK. No one ever takes the Gra seriously expect the Silverman Yeshivas.

What I think the Chazal [Sages] were referring to were the books of the schools of Alexandria. You can see that basic approach in the books of Philo and you can also see what the Chazal thought was wrong.
It is not the synthesis of Torah with Plato but the way Philo was going about it.
The Rambam and Saadia Gaon had no problem making a synthesis between Reason and Faith based on Aristotle and the neo-Platonic School.

[The fact that Gedolai Litva did learn the books of Reb Nachman is not relevant to this since he was never in the category of the excommunication in the first place. ]

8.9.17

Devakut [attachment with God]

You can not make a scientific study of devakut [attachment with God]. But you can examine it.
The first time I was aware of this fact was when a friend in Safed offered to me  a shiduch and I mentioned to her my experience in Safed of devukut. She mentioned that she had seen a study on this subject. [It probably was in Germany where she had been before that.]

I myself was not aware of this, and my education in high school never got up to Kant, and in yeshiva I had been discouraged from learning Kant. But if I had been aware of Kant, I might very well have been aware right at the beginning of how to deal with this subject. [Reason can not penetrate into the realm of the Ding An Sich--the thing in itself. ]

Later I had a chance to read a lot about Eastern cults which also gave me a certain perspective.
[I might mention there were people there that  had powerful connection with the Dark Side which gave them awesome powers. The failing of the religious is that they think they are immune from this kind of thing because of their exactitude in rituals. From what I have seen the more exacting in rituals they are the more they get caught in this--because of the very fact that they think they are immune.]
An even when the religious are not in religious delusions at least they have the cult of personality--worship of deluded leaders. The best approach to avoid these problems in my opinion is to learn Torah in a Lithuanian type of yeshiva where both phenomena are discouraged (both religious delusions and the cult of personality).


I might as well mention right up front my basic conclusions. [To expand on this I would recommend doing the same readings that I did.]

(1) Devakut is desirable, and in fact one of the 613 mitzvot. [It is mentioned I think twice in Deuteronomy.] One place to see this also is in the Musar book by Isaac Blazer [a prime disiple of Reb Israel Salanter] who brings down the idea from a commentary on the first four chapters of the Rambam.

(2) It is far too easy to imagine one has devakut with God when in fact it is devekut of the Sitra Achra [the Dark Side]. I have seen this all the time. There is just too much religious delusion out there, but that does not mean that authentic devekut is impossible. [Reb Nachman actually mentions on a related note the idea of trust of the Sitra Achra that people mistake for real trust in God.]

(3) I believe the path to real devekut is through Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot--even though this learning does not always bring abut this result.


These are my simple conclusions without expanding on it. But at least I ought to mention that I consider it is one of my primary sins that I rejected devekut after about 7 years in Safed. I do not expect to make up for that mistake, but I do hope to bring about awareness of this important subject.

I am not saying that Litvak yeshivas are wrong for discouraging this. From what I have seen interest in spiritual enlightenment never leads to real enlightenment but delusions that just are well hidden until eventually they are revealed. I have never seen an exception to this.  My own attachment with God never came because I was trying to get it. It was a total surprise. I only mean to bring out the fact that if one that has it, he  ought to appreciate it.

[Further reading: I found Aurobindo and his treatment of the Intermediate Zone very insightful:
"For this intermediate zone is a region of half-truths - and that by itself would not matter, for there is no complete truth below the supermind; but the half-truth here is often so partial or else ambiguous in its application that it leaves a wide field for confusion, delusion and error.  The sadhak thinks that he is no longer in the old small consciousness at all, because he feels in contact with something larger or more powerful, and yet the old consciousness is still there, not really abolished. He feels the control or influence of some Power, Being or Force greater than himself, aspires to be its instrument and thinks he has got rid of ego; but this delusion of egolessness often covers an exaggerated ego. Ideas seize upon him and drive his mind which are only partially true and by over-confident misapplication are turned into falsehoods; this vitiates the movements of the consciousness and opens the door to delusion. Suggestions are made, sometimes of a romantic character, which flatter the importance of the sadhak or are agreeable to his wishes and he accepts them without examination or discriminating control. Even what is true, is so exalted or extended beyond its true pitch and limit and measure that it becomes the parent of error. This is a zone which many sadhaks have to cross, in which many wander for a long time and out of which a great many never emerge."
 He is referring to people that supposed themselves perfect gurus but I can think of others to whom this characterization would apply.







Litvak yeshiva

When I was in Shar Yashuv [Rav Freifeld's yeshiva in Far Rockaway] and in the Mir in Brooklyn I did not want to hear about secular learning. This was in spite of the fact that Rav Freifeld told to me to take classes in Brooklyn College.
This was as you can see not a matter of my belief system, but rather I felt I had found something amazing, awesome, powerful and full of holiness in the Litvak {Lithuanian} Yeshiva.

I had already had a full stomach of secular learning for the past 12 years from kindergarten until 12th grade.
But this was more of a matter of finding a kind of synthesis between learning Torah and keeping Torah. These two things were tightly bonded in the Litvak Yeshiva environment.

[I have not been recently a strong advocate of the Litvak yeshiva in recent years because of later experiences as I have hinted to a few times. But I have not gone into these later experiences for a few reasons. The main thing is: "Abuse does not cancel use." The fact that people can misuse an institution does not invalidate its proper use.]

This applies to institutions as much as anything else. Maybe even more.

Nowadays the religious world is against the secular learning not from any kind of involvement in Torah. The religious world sadlly gives a great living example of everything wrong with religious fanaticism. The religious world has external rituals but not the essence. [But they do have the "cult of personality" which  is not really any different than any other groups that do the same.]



[I should mention that after the few years at the Mir I did not do much learning Torah. So to me it is clear that without those few concentrated years of learning Torah I would not have gotten very far.

The fact is the Enlightenment was an attack on religious values. But was motivated by much of the kind of behavior I have seen in the religious world. So what I try to do is to keep a sense of balance.

[This aspect of balance in keeping Torah I saw in my parents, and in Musar. But Musar is generally misinterpreted to mean religious fanaticism. But then I also saw it in the Guide for the Perplexed of the Rambam and that book is harder for people to willfully misinterpret.

Reb Freifeld I should mention stressed lots of review. To a large degree I have to agree with this.It i just hard to find the right balance. Recently in learning gemara and Rav Shach I have found review to be the only way to make progress. And now I am seeing this in Physics also.

I have to mention that Rav Freifeld held so strongly about review that even for beginners like myself he was very firm about it. Ten times review for anything you learned. That was his "thing."

I should mention that in spite of all I have written, one must keep in mind to have loyalty to Torah, --not towards any yeshiva. If a yeshiva helps provide an environment where you can learn, then by all means support it. But if it is just a private country club [as so many are] for some supposedly elite group, then do not go near it.


[I did not ignore Rav Freifeld. It as rare to get to ten times review but I tried. And recently I would take one basic page of Gemara or chapter of Rav Shach and just read it through every day --which is not exactly what Rav Freifeld was saying to do but I have found this to be workable. [My learning partner David Bronson was extremely stubborn to stay on every word in Tosphot until we would get it-as you can see from my notes I wrote on the subjects in Bava Metzia we learned together.





7.9.17

Music for the glory of God

רמב''ם הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד.

רמב''ם הלכות גניבה א' הלכה י''ד The רשב''ם holds in פרק השואל the גנב can pay back שווה כסף not just money, but rather anything that is worth money.

The proof of רב שך that the רמב''ם hold by the רשב''םis hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the רמב''ם would be holding like רש''י and the רא''ש that the גנב must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the רשב''ם. If he can pay back any שווה כסף anything that is worth money, אhen what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

That is one way or the other we need to find some reason the owner can ask for the pieces back. But what ever that reason is, it can not have anything to do with the argument between the Rashbam and Rashi and the Rosh.

רמב''ם הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הרשב''ם מחזיק בפרק השואל  שהגנב יכול להחזיר שווה כסף ולא רק כלים שלמים אלא כל דבר שהוא שווה כסף. ההוכחה של רב שך כי הרמב''ם מחזיק עם הרשב''ם קשה להבין. הנקודה העיקרית שלו היא העובדה כי הבעלים של האובייקט יכולים לבקש בחזרה את שברים. הנקודה היא שאם רמב''ם היה מחזיק כמו רש''י והרא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלים שלמים או כסף, אז לשלם בחזרה את השברים לא מסתדר עם זה. אבל כמו שאני רואה את זה, זה אינו מתאים עם הרשב''ם. אם הוא יכול להחזיר כל דבר שווה כסף , מה שנותן לבעלים זכות לבקש את השברים דווקא.  דרך אחת או אחרת אנחנו צריכים למצוא סיבה שהבעלים יכולים לבקש בחזרה את החלקים. אבל מה שתהיה הסיבה, לא יכולה להיות עמה שום קשר עם הטיעון בין רשב"ם רש"י והרא"ש.

The State of Israel and the statement of Shmuel in the Talmud: The Law of the State is the law.



The law is quite simple is understand.  It is that men have  common goals which are the objects of their rational will, that the state is a contrivance that they have worked out to help them realize that end, and that its authority over them rests on its being necessary for that end.  If it is politically obligatory at times to obey a law that one regards as bad, that is because the state could not be run at all if the citizens could pick and choose which laws they would obey. Ultimately, therefore, political obligation, even that of obeying a morally bad law, is a moral obligation; and when, as occasionally happens, it becomes a duty to disobey, the ground is still the same.  I believe that this simple doctrine is what the Gemara and all the rishonim [medieval authorities] are saying. [Credit goes to Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler who both pointed out the connection between the State of Israel the statement of  Shmuel in the Talmud.]


The religious world assumes if they were in charge then everything would be peachy. This is not true. I have never seen any situation in which religious people got involved in that they did not make it a thousand times worse. Whatever Torah they think they are keeping it is certainly not the Torah from the realm of Holiness.




Does it follow that since the state is a necessary means to our major ends, we should in all circumstances obey it, that we never have the right to rebel?  Not at all.  Our view would not only justify disobedience in some cases; it would require it.  If the state is regarded, not as sacrosanct or an end in itself, but as an instrument to certain great ends, then when it becomes so corrupt as to cut us off from those ends rather than further them, when it serves its purpose so badly that it is better to risk chaos for the sake of a better order than continue to suffer under the old, then resistance becomes a right and a duty.  

  This will be an extreme and desperate case, since it will obviously be better as a rule to obey what we regard as a bad law and try by persuasion to get it amended than to seek the overthrow of the power which supports all laws alike.  
  But there is no doubt that when government has ceased to serve its major ends, the people who have fashioned it to serve those ends have a right to replace it with something that serves these better. 

6.9.17

The argument between Dr. Kelley Ross [the Kant Fries school] and Hegel.

I admit I am profoundly disturbed by the argument between Dr. Kelley Ross [the Kant Fries school] and Hegel. [This argument is an inheritance from the differences between Hegel and Fries. Also there is the fact that the Marxists made extensive use (and still make extensive use) of Hegel though they reject more than they accept.]

It does not help much the fact that Hegel himself says on occasion outrageous things like his treatment of Newton.
My own feeling about this is that Both Hegel and the Kant Fries School have  a lot to say that is valuable and important.[This is like the difference between Plato and Aristotle. There also it is hard to decide.]

The truth be told is that if you would whittle down the argument to looking simply at the difference between the two systems--the differences would not be great and almost complementary.


The normal thing to do in this case would be to learn Kant and Hegel thoroughly, and yet I have time constraints that make this impractical today.


Both Hegel and Dr Ross are important for two reasons, rigorous logic and scope of vision.
Today philosophy has sunk into deep meaninglessness as Allan Bloom already noted in his Closing of the American Mind. You need a certain scope in philosophy because that is the very essence of what it is--to make sense of the world. But also you need logic and reason, because otherwise anyone can say anything that appeals to people. If one is not constrained by reason, then he can say anything, and the only limit is what people like to hear, not what is true.


The reason all this s important is that the defend Torah by means of the medieval books e.g. the Rambam and Saadia Gaon is difficult when the make use of axioms that no longer seem valid.

To actually defend Torah seems a lot easier by means of Kant and Kelley Ross.





4.9.17

The major source of evil is the refusal to leave a cult once one realizes its true nature.

סור מרע in Psalms it says to "go away from evil". Not the term you would expect  לא לעשות רע--not to do evil. The reason is  the main evil people do is because they refuse to leave some cult that they joined and now recognize as evil, but refuse to leave it. This is the constant temptation of all mankind. This is major source of  evil. The refusal to leave  a cult once one realizes its true nature.

This is easy to see in real life and also in the Rambam who says it is the nature of people to be drawn in their opinions after the people they associate with. See Howard Bloom in The Lucifer Principle  concerning the power of the super-organism. 

my decision making process

I can believe that there is something wrong with my decision making process. It is not just a lack of "street smarts". I have thought this for a long time after finding myself in one predicament after the other. I did not start learning Musar to answer this dilemma but after I was learning at at the Mir I thought it would help solve this problem.

[My original reason for learning Musar is I felt my poor soul drying up without learning about the Fear of God].
This is related to another question about the proper approach towards education that comes up in Laches where Socrates discusses this with two generals. The discussion notices that great men often have children that do not seem so great.

My basic impression is that in fact Musar [Medieval Ethics] helps to answer this problem to a very great degree. There are people like me that we find our decisions in life often seem flawed and sometimes there even seems to be some reaction from Heaven as if telling us that something is wrong --but we do not know what it is. I think for them and for me, Musar helps to a very large degree.  But there still seems to be plenty of areas of doubt.


I should mention that we ask forgiveness in the confession of Yom Kippur for not listening to our parents and teachers and to me it seems clear that this is the source of my difficulty. I had great and amazing parents and teachers in high school and in yeshiva but somehow I though I was better than them.

The Israeli Supreme Court decided it is allowed to deport illegal immigrants involved in criminal activity.

The Israeli Supreme Court decided it is allowed to deport illegal immigrants involved in criminal activity.


I heard about the problem surrounding the Ben Gurion airport. [Criminal activity by people from Africa]  I was warned not to leave the airport grounds at night for that reason.--by Tel Aviv people! That was something like 7 years ago. It took them long enough to come to a decision.


Nationalism has some support from Hegel and Howard Bloom. The main thing I think is important to remember about Hegel is he not thinking of every state that ever was or will be. He is thinking of an ideal state.
\
There are some people you just do not want to be part of your state. It is as simple as that.

It is not that I am against illegal immigration. Rather I think a lot depends on what kind of people you are dealing with. Perhaps Europe might take a hint from the Israeli Supreme Court and do the same with people that are in Europe mainly in order to destroy European Civilization.


Israel's inability to deal with elements in its enemy population whose ultimate goal is the destruction of Israel to a large degree comes from Leftist attitudes that refuse to recognize  people can be evil and enemies


Objective morality needs to be awakened and it not known automatically. You can see the Rambam goes through great pains to emphasize the fact that faith {Torah} needs Reason {Aristotle} and Reason needs Faith.

The idea of learning Torah is made simple and concise by the Rambam. He goes about explaining it in a fashion that you need to put the different strands and threads together. But the end result is clear. To learn the entire Tenach [Old Testament], the Mishna {of R. Yehuda Hanasi}, Physics and Metaphysics or Aristotle. [Physics I would say based on subject matter is today's String Theory.]
The reason for the Rambam is clear. He goes to great effort to show that people have no inherent moral intuitions. Whatever morality we have has to be reawakened. And that can only happen in this way.

I mean to say the Rambam is neo Platonic--that we have access to the forms by some process of "remembering", but not by regress of reasons. That is objective morality needs to be awakened and it not known automatically.

The basic idea here is contained in Mishne Torah where the Rambam says to divide one time into three parts the Oral Law, the Written Law, and Gemara. [The Oral Law is the Mishna and Talmud as the Rambam makes clear in many places. One such place is where he talks about mistakes in legal decisions. He says any legal decision that goes against things that are openly stated in the Mishna or Talmud have no validity. He definitely puts the final authority of judgement in the Mishna and Talmud.]
[Gemara he says includes the subjects discussed in the first four chapters of Mishne Torah which are what the Rambam says are the Physics and Metaphysics of the ancient Greeks.]

You can see the Rambam goes through great pains to emphasize the fact that faith {Torah} needs Reason {Aristotle} and Reason needs Faith.

[My own personal experience with the Mishna was to learn every day about two mishnas with the Rav from Bartenura that is printed with the mishna and also to learn some of the other commentaries. Every mishna I did about twice. That is once I just read the words straight an then the Rav Ovadiah from Bartenura and not understand at all. Then I would do that again a second time and by that time I usually understood the basic idea.
  I should mention the commentary of the Tiferet Israel is really great but it is time consuming and I wanted to make progress. After I got to Israel I spent time just going through the Mishna straight with no commentaries at all which is also a great way to go about doing the Mishna.

[Here is one case in which Hegel and Dr Kelley Ross are not so far apart.  To Kelley Ross the end of the regress of reason ends in immediate non intuitive knowledge. With Hegel this knowledge also comes from outside of one's self. [The Divine Mind of the Neo Platonists even though Hegel would not have put it in that way.]



3.9.17

"search for Truth"

Secular USA lacked numinous value. You could look for it yourself and many thus went into Eastern religions. But the general experience of life in the USA tends to feel empty.
Later I think people looking for numinous value became part of the evangelicals. The later seems to me to be a lot better than the Eastern thing. The Evangelicals seem to find value in doing acts of kindness. That seems better than sitting around and doing nothing. [There are more serious complaints about Eastern religions but they still have some good points as Schopenhauer noted.]


Though at the time I would not have put it in this way but the search for numinous value led me to two Litvak Yeshivas in NY and later to Israel. But I certainly did not think of it in that sense. At best I would have said it was the "search for Truth" in capital letters.

Without a doubt I was influenced by my environment in which the search for "Truth" was a current theme. But I also think that I took it more seriously than most of my peers.

Though the search for truth I think is admirable, it does not take into account the problem of "religious delusions." This is a problem for two groups. The newly religious  who almost invariably have this problem. But more so with people born religious. The trouble there is there is an assumed superiority (moral and spiritual and intellectual) by reason of birth, and where pride is there comes a fall into serious religious delusions. These delusions  have no cure since the people born religious assume they are immune from delusions.
As long as their religious leaders are in externals keeping rituals, they assume there is no chance that they are possessed by the Sitra Achra [Demons] . A greater mistake or more serious delusion is hard to imagine.
[I am not saying I have all this down pat myself. But the Middle Ages were amazing in this regard because it was assumed that reason was needed for faith and faith for reason for many different reasons but among them must certainly have been this one.]

To cut away reason from faith is inevitably going to lead to this.

If you consider what I have written here you can see the exact reasons the Litvak yeshivas strive to walk this middle ground between faith and reason

It is true however the general rule that the baali teshuva [newly religious] are infected with religious delusions. The religious world is right on that account. But they do not see that they have the exact same problem in different forms-- and much more serious ones. It is they who lead the baal teshuva into their delusions.











Hegel and Dr. Kelley Ross

The biggest problem I see in philosophy today is the difference between Hegel and Dr. Kelly Ross of the Kant-Friesian School. Each one has amazing points, but if there is any way to reconcile them seems impossible. And personally I think both are outstanding for their scope of vision.
And the only justification for the basic approach of Torah from Sinai seems to be from the Kant-Friesian School with the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge. [Knowledge that you know but not by reason and not by any of the senses.]

Both Hegel and Kelley Ross are important for their rigorous thought, but also for the scope of their vision. And scope is important because the world is not disconnected pieces.

It is one of the failures of philosophy of the twentieth century to be incredibly trivial and self contradicting. [If only they could come out and say openly their opinion of  meaningless existence.]

One thing I would like to mention in terms of the Kant-Friesian school is that causality is in fact existing among things in themselves. That is to say Locality but not reality.  [Things  have only possible values in space and time until measured, but locality still is true. There is no action at a distance. So Schopenhauer's complaint that Kant had not proved causality seems to me a little weak. But here is where Hegel come in useful with grades  of being. One level of causality and yet there being levels beyond that.


Hegel says (Introduction to Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) Part One): Thus the knowledge of God, as of every supersensible reality, is in its true character an exaltation above sensations or perceptions: it consequently involves a negative attitude to the initial data of sense, and to that extent implies mediation. [Is that all that different from Kelley Ross? Well yes because Hegel can not hold of any knowledge that is "immediate". But with Kelley Ross it is knowledge but not through reason. To Hegel the knowledge of God is also not through Reason or senses but a combination of both. perceptions and sensations provide data. Then Reason works on that data.

2.9.17

What destroyed marriage?

What destroyed marriage?

Judith Reisman goes deeply into this problem and its sources. http://www.drjudithreisman.com/reisman_articles.html

The idea according to her was to change people's conceptions and present perversity in the guise of normalcy and scientific respectability.  That is,-- if you change people's thoughts and attitudes then everything else follows.

My feeling about this is people are not familiar enough with science to be able to distinguish authentic science from fake science. I do not think rejection of science is much of  a good option.

I am not saying this is the reason to learn Physics and Mathematics. The best reason to learn these subjects is the Rambam and my parents.
That is the basic medieval attitude of a synthesis between Reason and Revelation. [That really started before the Middle Ages, but it took a long time to find the right balance.] If you look at the classical period you will see this balance was by no means obvious.



But a side benefit is that when you know real science, it is harder for pretenders to fool you.

But the way I suggest going about science is to find  a balance between Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot and Science.
[That is the best thing is to translate the Mediaeval ideal into a reality in every day life by learning a little bit of Physics, a little bit of Mathematics and a little Gemara Rashi Tosphot [or Mishna or the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach].] [I tend to think the Avi Ezri is the best because it already contains everything else good.]



In any case I am very happy that I got a chance to see what a real marriage ought to be like in my parents and I think that this will return.  My optimism knows no bounds at this point.











1.9.17

Music for the Glory of God

To know when to doubt oneself and one's motives and when to be bold seems to still be an unanswered question.

My general approach when  have problems is to look for my own sins. I think few people do this because few people have learned Musar-Ethical works from the Middle Ages.. Musar instills this attitude. The trouble is how to find out what in fact one is doing wrong.
This issue comes up in Charmides in a conversation between Socrates  and Charmides. The issue was "What is temperance?". The talk focused on when does one know that he does not know what he thinks he knows. That is how does one go about finding out if he has hubris? That talk did not end well for Socrates. He admitted in the end that he did not know. But that lesson passed over Charmides. Charmides was part of the group that tried to overthrow the Athenian Democracy by armed rebellion..
To know when to doubt oneself and one's motives and when to be bold seems to still be an unanswered question.

Sparta had won the war with Athens in 404.  Then there was a group of  "thirty tyrants" among whom was Critias (one of the leaders) and  in the inner group  of ten was Charmides. They seized power and were supported by the Spartan troops that were stationed in Athens. The leaders of the democratic constitution fought back and won in 403 and Critias and Charmides were killed in battle

[I wanted to mention that the purpose of the war between Sparta and Athens was to dismantle the Athenian Empire--not Athens itself.]



After what I have been going through recently this issue seems to come up again.  The best I have been able to come up with is to listen to my parents  and teachers.
Reb Israel Salanter came up with the best answer to this problem that I have heard of so far. To learn Musar [Ethics] one comes face to face with one's flaws. That does not mean one corrects them but at least it makes it harder to ignore them.








31.8.17

during surgery

I do not expect favors from people, but if anyone actually learned Mishna or the Avi Ezri or Gemara as I went into the operation I want to thank you.

I also want to thank all the amazing nurses and especially the doctor Alexander Sergevitch. And in particular the nurse Ira, who talked to me before and during surgery and called me Avraham Philipovitch. An amazing thing. Words of kindness and respect when I am certain I could not have looked very respectable.

The surgery was Thursday. August 31.

I am very pleased with the doctor Alexander Sergevitch  and the whole group of nurses. Uman does not have much of a reputation in terms of doctors, but this one is excellent.

(What I heard here in the hospital was there was a doctor in the unit left over from the USSR in Uman who was really bad and that gave Uman a bad reputation. But this doctor is different.)

Music for the glory of GOD

T99 T 97 D Major  t99 in midi
t97 in midi t99 nwc  t97 nwc

I need God's help today. I broke my leg and am having an operation called osteo synthesis. Prayers for me would be appreciated and learning Mishna. Learning Mishna should be with any of the basic commentaries. The Tiferet Israel is great but it is really a matter of taste. The Rav from Bartenura is also good.
If anyone could learn the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach for me today that would be even better. [Or better yet-to accept on themselves to learn the whole Avi Ezri from cover to cover.]

Another thing I would appreciate is if someone would learn a  little  Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot and Maharsha for me. {My name: Avraham Ben Leila and Philip].


I am very nervous and so my thoughts are not settled. I see I published the T99 without making sure it was finished. I see there are still a few parts that need finishing.  [a hour later I just added the missing parts.]

T97 might not be finished. Actually the end of T97 suggests to go a second and third movement. This is the kin of thing you see at the end of the first movement of the 40th symphony by Mozart where the ending in itself suggests a continuation.

30.8.17

Uman for Rosh Hashanah

I think it is important to know for people coming to Uman for Rosh Hashanah is there is a new criminal group that is going around beating up people seriously and robbing them. This is mainly at night or early morning in the city center and near to bus station.

I myself was victim but they do not care who it is. I do not know why the police have not put a stop to it. Just yesterday I saw another victim. A regular fellow [not Jewish] who was simply walking around in the city center early in the morning, and they beat him so severely that he might have internal head injuries. [It was light. Not nighttime.]
[He was coming out of a 24 hour a day store called "ATB". That is one place where this groups is waiting for people. They are very sophisticated and have night vision equipment. They also come up out of  car with masks so the nearby cameras can not see them.

[This comes up all the time in Uman. There is a new criminal group with new tactics every year or so.]



I do not think the police are even aware of the problem yet. In any case, please please please--people coming for Rosh Hashanah please stay near the Ziun of Reb Nachman and only go to the city in broad daylight.

[Though I am a thorough Litvak, I still have a lot of confidence in Reb Nachman's ideas (but not Breslov). The excommunication of the Gra simply did not apply to him as you can see from the wording the excommunication that the Gra signed. [There is an historical book that brings down the details and recently some people published a very thorough biography of the Gra which got people so mad that it must be accurate. I was there in Netivot around 7 years ago when it came out. But  I did not buy it. Mainly I have no doubt to what it must be saying--that the Gra was serious. And no doubt the Gra was right. But I still think because of Reb Nachman' personal service towards God he merited to deep insights that are important to listen to.]
In any case this new group might be so sophisticated that the police might be having a hard time keeping up. In any case this is not at all directed towards Jewish people. In fact the centre of activity seems to be ATB stores.


I should also mention that at Sofia Park are wandering vicious dogs so care should be  taken in visiting all these places. In fact it is better not to go to Sofia at all but rather the public river called Ostashivka on the other side of Uman where there is boating and swimming and no dogs


I should mention also that the subgroup of Na Nach people seems to me to be fairly good. At least it is the best of all the other groups.


There are times when thought does not help.

On the eve of  a battle between the Spartans and Athenians, the general Demosthenes, told them, "Let no man try to display his wits by summing up the dangers, because there are times when thinking does not help anything. Just face the enemy with a lively hope that you will succeed." [He won.]

The truth of the matter is just like that. There are times when thought does not help.
This was an idea I heard from someone who was getting married in Israel and he had spent a few years going through the entire Shas every month. [That is the whole Gemara. That is a little more than 100 pages every day].
He said not to even think if you are understanding your learning or not. This to many people may sound ridiculous but in  fact it contains a deep insight. There are times when thought does not help.
I found this to be the case in yeshiva. I would go through a small section of gemara--just saying the words. Then the Rashi on that Gemara. At that point I understood nothing. But then after a few more readings of the same gemara I would get the idea. Thus I got the idea that even when I think I am not understanding, something is being absorbed.

There are other areas of learning that I find it better just to read the material straight with no review until I have finished the entire book. That is, just to say the words and go on. Math and Physics I find to be more amenable to that kind of learning.

I should mention that Reb Freifeld of Yeshivat Shar Yashuv held by review.  That is specifically 10 times. Whether it was a chapter of Gemara or Tosphot, his main thing was to do review. I never got past this problem that I needed to make progress and yet the Rosh Yeshiva was emphasizing review. I still have no idea how to deal with this problem except to mention that in the Mir it was the accepted path to do in depth learning in the morning and to make progress in the afternoon. That does not really answer the question but at least it is  a kind of middle path.

[I must mention also that without Rav Freifeld's emphasis on in depth learning I am sure I would not be able to learn. To "know how to learn" is something I have seen that people need to get when they are young or they never get it. But it should be said that very few people understood what Rav Freifeld was doing. I felt very frustrated on his emphasis on learning in depth and I am sure a lot of other people felt the same way. Only later I realized the fact that when people do not get this right away in their first years in yeshiva, they never get it.
In the Mir yeshiva the whole question became mute,- because anyway the morning was for in depth learning and the afternoon for fast learning. That more or less answered the whole issue simply.




29.8.17

Learning Gemara opened the door into transcendence.

Reading Cleaving by Albert the Great just reconfirms what i already said   that the basic idea of the Middle Ages is to be attached to Hashem directly. The whole goal and orientation is completely different from the later Reformation.  


Personally, I have to say that I found learning Gemara opened the door into transcendence. It was just that that transcendence did not come to fruition until I got to Israel. I never really could put my finger, on it but there was some aspect of Gemara got me connected with the Divine.

What I mean to say is this:  at first learning Gemara was just that. Learning Gemara. The only thing different about it was my tremendous desire to learn Gemara. But there never was any thought about transcendence at all. It was just that while at the Mir in NY, I could feel the Divine presence. But that was all. It was only in Israel that the Light hit me with full power. But clearly it was because of the door that the Gemara opened. [Though I admit it might have been  learning Gemara in the Mir Yeshiva specifically or some kind Litvak yeshiva.]




The temporary romance has to precede the permanent one.

I have have not even heard of situations where this was not the case.
That is how love works. You have an intense love early in life, but for some reason it does not last, and then you find the next one which does last. In Litvak yeshivas they say every shiduch [date] that does not work  is one step towards the right one the "beshert." [The destined one.]
 Going through this  means one is one step towards finding the right one.
That is to say often people would go on endless shiduchim and never find the right one and the attitude was that each failed shiduch was one step toward the right one


The first one however must be real. It does not count if it is only immature love. Still there is something about it that makes it temporary.


Can virtue be taught?

The thing is that traditional American values were a delicate balance of values.  It was known to be hard to keep stable. I believe high school education was actually geared towards instilling those values. This all goes back to the conclusion of Socrates at the very end of Protagoras where  he decided that virtue can be taught.
Probably a lot of people in programs that are directly towards special ends [goal directed programs] do not see this. But when I was in high school I definitely got this impression.
 That was before the Frankfurt school [that came to the USA and changed education in the USA to become socialist] changed the very essence of USA education.

To me it seems that there is a lot of value in what could be called classical education.

 There also were Bible based organizations in the USA that explicitly had this as their goal [but combined these goals along with outdoor skills--being aware that virtue is best achieved in an indirect fashion.]


Can virtue be taught? Apparently not so easily. There is no question that the traditional Litvak yeshiva with its balance between Gemara Rashi and Tosphot with Musar/Ethics strove to achieve exactly that purpose. To me it seems clear that the gedolai Litva [sages of Torah in Lithuania] thought this balance was the best way to achieve this. Heads of the yeshivas in Lithuania  definitely did not think hours of Musar {books of Ethics} would bring to virtue. But neither did they think ignoring Musar was right. So they also sought this balance.

The Silverman yeshivas I think do the best job since their approach is modeled on the path of the  Gra which has in it an implicit balance of values.[I do not mean just Silverman. There are other yeshivas which have adopted the Silverman approach]
 I think it is clear that wickedness can be taught. I can see lots of systems out there that definitely instill evil in people. Does it makes sense to say the virtue can be instilled? Maybe. In any case my impression is that the general Litvak yeshiva approach ought to be modified into the Silverman approach which goes with the Gra and a great deal of Tenach [Old Testament] and Mishna. This is based on the Gra and from what I can see, the results are excellent.

[I might mention that I did try to do Mishna on my own time in yeshiva--mainly Taharot with the commentaries.]



So it seems the general conclusion is that virtue can be taught but not directly but as a by product of some other process. Why should this be so?




28.8.17

time itself is a creation

Causality I think is more fundamental than time. This comes from Bell's inequality which shows that things do not have values in time or space until they are measured.
The fact that nature violates Bell's inequality shows that one of two things needs to be thrown out: (1) Reality, or (1) Causality (Also known as locality). We know causality from GPS satellites which would be off by 11 kilometers !!! every day if either special Relativity or General Relativity were wrong. [The have to be calibrated to account for the effect of GR that is to go faster than clocks on earth by 45 micro seconds and to go slower by 7 microseconds. Thus to be made to go slower each day by 38 micro seconds in order to correspond with clocks in Earth] Therefore it is the assumption of Reality which has to be thrown out--that is that things have objective time or space before being measured. But they do exist --because otherwise there would be nothing to measure. [Not like Bohr.][Thanks to Dr Kelley Ross for bringing this fact up about Bohr.]]
[This treatment of the subject I owe to Motl Reference Frame and a a book on Quantum Mechanics from Beer Sheva University by  דורון כהן

[All popular science books claim locality is the thing which needs to be thrown out which does not speak well for their level of understanding.]






This fits in well with the idea that time itself is a creation. [Reb Nachman brings this in Sefer Hamidot, but it comes from Augustine of Hippo.]
This also fits well with the idea that God is the First Cause and He created time. Human reason has a hard time imagining how there can be causality without time, but there are plenty of other things   people can not picture. [A 4-d sphere]

The Sexual Revolution was begun by pseudo science

A great deal of the problems arise when pseudo sciences are substituted for actual science.
My own feeling is that this was inevitable after the Enlightenment when "Science" gained some kind of godlike status. The Sexual Revolution was begun by pseudo science. See this link
and here Judith Reisman

It just takes time until it gets into people's minds.

 Political "Science"? Social "Science"?  Thrown in a few equations and people get fooled by the simple word "science". What a joke.

[All of these stupid sciences are just a simple result of Physics -Envy. People too stupid to do the real thing.]


In other words, when the Rambam picks out Physics and Metaphysics to learn, I think he was being exact and very particular. He could easily have picked out other subjects in Aristotle. Why did he pick those two? I suggest he was being as exact and careful as much (and even more so) than he was being in the Mishne Torah as Rav Shach and Reb Chaim Soloveitchik constantly point out.

My feeling about the problem with the sexual revolution is that since it permeates society it gets into one's head--  just because one is automatically drawn after the opinions of people around him.

27.8.17

A synthesis balance between Reason and the Revelation at Sinai.

It is well known that the Rishonim (Medieval authorities)  had an approach based on a synthesis and balance between Reason and the Revelation at Sinai. This you see in Saadia Gaon also.
I did not pay much attention to this while in yeshiva- even though I definitely saw this in most of  the Medieval Musar books. This forms the basis for my approach about the importance of learning Physics and Metaphysics as the Rambam put it so bluntly.
The problem is obviously that these subjects tend to be hard. For that reason use the approach (I also saw in Musar books) of learning דרך גירסה just saying the words and going on with faith that eventually I will understand.
[Though I had seen this in only one Musar book [אורחות צדיקים] in California, later in NY I saw a book about learning [בניין עולם] from Bnei Brak that brought down a lot of Musar books that said the same thing. ]


The direction of the Rambam and Saadia Gaon was changed almost immediately after the Zohar was published. From then on this Rambam approach was relegated to the periphery, while mysticism took first place. My own approach is to accept the Ari and the Remak [Rav Moshe of Cordoba] but not to the degree of ignoring Saadia Gaon and the Rambam.
The main thing about the Ari is that whole thing has basically fallen into the Sitra Achra (Dark Side). It is almost impossible to get to the Ari without getting a fatal dose of the Dark Side along with him. It is for that reason I mention that anyone wanting to learn the Ari should only go to a descendant of Rav Yaakov Abuchatzaeira in order to avoid the Dark Side. [Or Rav Shalom Sharabi.]


The reasons are more or less because I saw plenty of people that took the mystic approach and was never impressed. I can't even think of one person I knew that was into mystic stuff that was not filled with religious delusions.

25.8.17

Music for the glory of God

The Six Days of Creation. The Revolt against Reason.

The idea of six eons I saw in the Ari and heard in the name Isaac of Aco. The Ari say the the six eons is not even time but rather higher realities that are above time. This really all goes back to Plato who postulates two levels of reality the unchanging world of forms and the changing world of phenomena. This scheme I see also in Kant.




I am however not taking this idea of Kant to its ultimate end. I more or less agree with Hegel that even the realm of the Dinge An Sich ["the things in themselves"] is accessible to reason by means of some kind of process of dialectics.
[The idea of raising Torah truths beyond reason to make it immune to critique seems to backfire. In any case, this is a debate between Kant and Hegel and until I have gone through the three critiques and the published works of Hegel in their original language I do not feel qualified to put myself between tall and high mountains.

And as one great person put it:


Now the result of this line of defense is not really to save  morality, but to throw all morality into confusion.  No common obligation will any more be binding.  The obligations of man to man, of father to son, of trying to produce the greatest good, of obeying conscience—were pronounced unreliable and flouted.  And that means moral nihilism.  Natural men, that is the great majority of us, are asked to believe this about ourselves: that the very ideals we have always followed are condemnable; that the better way of life is being deliberately withheld from us, but we shall be condemned nevertheless if we do not find it; and that it is our duty to hold such an arrangement in reverence as perfectly just.  If this is true, our appropriate attitude is not only one of despair, as Kierkegaard noted, but one of moral skepticism, as he did not.  We can rely neither on reason, for that is corrupted, nor on divine direction, for that is beyond our reach.  The right inference from this is that nothing open to us is certainly better or worse than anything else.  Once the compass of natural reason is discredited, what is left?  Inspiration from omniscience?  But with the appeal to reason and sanity no longer available, how are we to tell true prophets from false?  What, one wonders, would be the ground rules in a debate between Kierkegaard and Dr. Leary?



[The way of protecting faith by attacking reason has a long history going back as far as you could want to take it.  This appears in the Middle Ages with the arguments against the Rambam.

In Hegel a process of reasoning through things leads to knowledge about areas that Kant says are inaccessible to reason. And it seems that is in fact exactly the case.

[Judging by the amount of modifications that Dr Kelley Ross makes to Kant, I wonder how close he is actually getting to the same things that Hegel was. How far is Numinous value from Absolute Spirit? Are these really all that different? Why make disagreement where perhaps none really exists? I think it all comes from Popper's unwillingness to see anything original or of value in Hegel-or simply his justified hatred of totalitarian systems that were using Hegel as justification. Popper was wrong about the Nazis but he was right that the Left was certainly using Hegel for their own un-Hegelian purposes.


But in essence I just do not see Hegel to blame for all that. And some of the critiques are just as much applicable in the reverse direction.  Hegel like Kant believed Reason generates self contradictions when it gets into the area of the Dinge An Sich. Hegel uses this idea as way that an idea sublimates itself. Dr Kelley Ross also has the idea of Ur Contingency [Ultra Contingency in the area of the Divine where two opposites can both be true.]

Divine protection and light

I broke my leg. I went to the nearby park to go to the mikveh [at night] and on the way out of the park the dogs attacked me and as I was fending them off with a stick, I feel on something.  could not see very well what I was doing because I lost my glasses in the deep water of the river.

It seems I have lost a large degree of the protection and grace of God but I fear to make future commitments to improve myself -- because past commitments I have not kept. And even when I do make some commitment to improve in some area of sin or personal character flaw, I find it never seems to work.

The whole idea really comes from Musar: אין יסורים בלי עוון. ''There are no problems without sin.'' [This brought by Rabbainu Yona in the Shaari Tehuva from the Gemara in tractate Shabat.]
Of course, that does not mean sins are the causes of the problems as Job, and King David and Schopenhauer noticed. But rather it means that when one is truly keeping the holy Torah like Rav Yaakov Abuchatzaira or the Gra there is a special level of Divine protection.

I actually believe sincerely that I had this Divine protection and light for all the years I was in Safed but now it is quite lost.

24.8.17

תוספות says the argument between רב and שמואל on בבא מציעא י''ד is the same as their argument on page ק''א.
The גמרא on page ק''א there is no argument. One is talking about a field that usually planted and the other is a field that is not usually planted.
Though the simple way to understand this is that רב that say the לוקח gets back both the קרן ושבח that means for a field that is usually planted.
However it could be that תוספות means to take this even further. That is he might mean that רב and שמואל do not disagree even about the fundamental law. They both agree when the לוקח is the one that did the work and the improvements , then the owner pays him. And that is the law of רב. And when the גנב did the improvements the owner pays the גנב and not the buyer. The לוקח in any case is getting back what he paid for the property because the improvements the גנב did are included in קרן and that he gets back from the גנב.


תוספות אומר הטיעון בין רב לבין שמואל בבבא מציעא י''ד זהה הטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. הגמרא בעמוד ק''א אומרת אין ויכוח. אחד  מדבר על שדה שבדרך כלל נוטעים והשני הוא שדה אשר בדרך כלל לא נטוע. למרות הדרך הפשוטה ביותר להבין זאת היא כי רב כי אומר ללוקח חוזר הן הקרן והשבח זה עבור שדה נטוע בדרך כלל. עם זאת זה יכול להיות כי תוספות רוצה לקחת את זה עוד יותר. כלומר הוא מכווין לכך שרב ושמואל  מסכימים אפילו על החוק הבסיסי. שניהם מסכימים כאשר לוקח הוא זה עשה את העבודה ואת השיפורים, אז הבעלים משלמים לו. וזה החוק של רב. וכאשר הגנב עשה השיפור, הבעלים משלמים לגנב ולא לקונה. לוקח בכל מקרה הוא מקבל בחזרה את מה שהוא שילם עבור הנכס משום שהשיפורים שעשה הגנב כלולים בקרן והקרן חוזר מן ללוקח.

I broke my leg last night going to the mikve. On the way there and now as I lay in the hospital waiting for an operation the doctor here says I need I am wondering about this last new idea. I would not have said anything before and I think just to leave it, but still I think it is important to take note that this does not seem like the simple explanation of the argument on page 14 and furthermore it is not how I explained it before!  up until yesterday I was saying the argument is exactly like that on page 101 where the entire difference between Rav and Shmuel is what kind of field it is עשוי לנטוע or not. And before that I was saying it depends on who did the work the thief or the buyer from the thief.  Right now I have to admit that Tosphot here is hard to firgure out.







the argument between Rav and Shmuel on Bava Metzia 14b

Tosphot says the argument between Rav and Shmuel on Bava Metzia 14b is the same as their argument on page 101.
The gemara on page 101 there is no argument. One is talking about a field that usually planted and the other is a field that is not usually planted.
Though the simple way to understand this is that Rav that say the buyer gets back both the קרן ושבח that means for a field that is usually planted.
However it could be that Tosphot mean to take this even further. That is he might mean that Rav and Shmuel do not disagree even about the fundamental law. They both agree when the buyer is the one that did the work and the improvements , then the owner pays him. And that is the law of Rav. And when the thief did the improvements the owner pays the thief  and not the buyer. The buyer in any case is getting back what he paid for the property because the improvements the thief did are included in the price that he paid for the field and that he gets back from the thief.


But who did the work on the field can not be the difference between the higher or lower price on page 101 (ידו על העליונה) That was a thought I had that I put into the my little book on Shas but I realized while sitting here in the hospital that that can not be right because the gemara itself states the difference is only dependent on one thing,-if the field is usually planted or not. 

Trust without effort

Trust without effort is my conclusion of the right approach. That is to say I do not want to leave this question as being simply  a debate between the Obligations of the Heart as opposed to the Ramban and the Gra. Rather drawing upon my own experience I believe that the Gra an the Ramban were right. That is there is no need to learn a vocation or to do a vocation until that very day when it I needed. Until then it is best to sit and learn Torah.
Though I do not claim the ability to decide between the rishonim that argued on this question, still I see the point of the Ramban and the Gra.

First I should mention that this was also more or less manifested in the Mir Yeshiva in NY. There it was the rule that the students would learn Torah all day and going to university was not an option.

I was in Safed for seven years and did not do much learning,  but still I was doing some learning, and God provided. It was when I decided to go out and find work everything fell apart. Without going into the gory details, it ought to be clear that as long as I could manage to sit and learn Torah I ought to have done so.

The problem is that the Ramban states this idea of trust without effort in only one place --where he says this in reference to doctors.  And there are plenty of routine procedures that are well known.
[This issue I do not hope to resolve, but I have heard from people that left the kollel system regrets about doing so. When I left it and consciously went about trying to find work people consistently complained about me that I was not working. The very same people who never put in an honest day's work in their lives. So if you simply look at the facts-the truth is cloudy. Lots of unworthy and insincere people take advantage of the kollel system. But does that take away all its positive aspects? I guess not. Where is any system that can't be abused?












The Ramban [Nachmanides ] Trust in God is without effort.

The Ramban [Nachmanides ] explains that though there is permission for the doctor to cure oneself, but people should not go to doctors. He writes one that goes to a doctor has no portion  the next world. אין לו חלק בארץ החיים. My impression of this is it has to refer to non standard procedures.
[He brings this from the verse about the king of Israel that got sick and did not go ask God כי אם ברופאים rather he went to inquire from doctors.]



Whether you agree with this or not is not the issue. The point is we have found a source for  Israel Salanter that says the trust in God is without effort [בטחון בלי השתדלות].
This has long been a mystery from where  Israel Salanter got this from. It later formed the entire basis of Navardok [Joseph Jozel Horvitz]. But Navardok just quotes  Israel Salanter from the Tvuna [a magazine he published ]article. The fact is Navardok quotes the Gra also and that is clearly what the Gra is saying. But the Rambam was  a mystery. David Bronson discovered this fact. He was learning the Ramban and saw the whole treatment of the Rambam on the issue of כאן ניתן רשות לרופא לרפאת. Everyone just reads that first line and thinks the Ramban is saying to do effort is OK. Only if you read the whole piece in detail do you see otherwise.

[The Obligations of the Heart however does have trust with effort.]

Accepting the yoke of Torah and Trust in God were the two pillars of the Mir Yeshiva in NY when I was learning there. These two lessons I never absorbed very well but I hope to get back to them.
Litvak yeshiva represent Torah in it purest most unadulterated form. But they have to walk a fine thin line. They need to keep out bad influences. This leads often to too much caution on the side of error to throw out sincere good people. Often they let in people by mistake that are bad influences. They are human institutions that have plenty of failings. But at least in principle they are advocating a truth and important set of ideals--to learn and keep Torah and trust in God.






23.8.17

Kelley Ross as a philosopher has a thoroughness that surprised me. I had been aware of problems in Torah for a long while. One major problem was: "The difference has to make  a difference." If this one system is true and holy, and everything else is completely false and evil, then that ought to be seen in the traits and nature of people following the true system. If good and evil are simply divided along the normal bell curve, then that is a question. There were personal reasons also. I had encountered enough evil in many religious  people, and their leaders in particular, to raise doubts.
There were also intellectual questions, but these did not seem as serious as the others.
It was right at that time I discovered Kelley Ross's essay on Spinoza. 
That was a shock when I saw the depth. I never saw a modern writer on philosophy come anywhere near it.
But then I saw his major four essays on value, and that was enough to answer all my questions.
[There are other very good philosophers nowadays, but none that get anywhere near Kelley Ross.]
The only thing that bothers me is that he does not seem to have much of  a liking for Hegel.
That never bothered me as long as I never really read Hegel. [I did a drop in NY, but I did not know then what Hegel was talking about. Later with a little more background, I could read Hegel, and see what he was getting at,- and then I started to realize he has a lot that is really amazing ideas. ]
In a nutshell, Kelley Ross is a continuation of Plato, and Hegel is a continuation and deepening of Aristotle.

Even very good philosophers like Edward Feser and Michael Huemer tend to have a certain weakness when it comes to Physics. And that makes a lot of difference.

The most simple way to justify Torah in two words is objective morality. Moral principles are universals that can be known by reason. The Torah simply reveals what objective morality is. It does not claim to make people moral. And Objective Morality has a lot to do with midot (-character). Though it goes into areas of service of God also. But the starting point is midot (-character). If people have bad midot/character, that is a question on them and on human nature. not on Torah.


The main thing in terms of Reb Nachman is to decide what was a reaction as opposed to what was an essential principle.

The path of reaction is not a bad path. That is to identify one's own faults and to strive to correct them. In the absence of some tzadik  that could guide people, this seems like the closest one can get to figuring out in what areas he of she needs to do the most work

You use your best judgement to see what kinds of actions seem to be the direct and immediate causes of bad things to happen to you and you try to work on those areas.

This is I admit a kind of בדיעבד ad hoc [after the fact] kind of scheme. It is not a Pro-Active Approach. But it seems the best thing to do in the absence of any other kind of reliable guide.
Reb Nachman seems to have taken this approach in his being against doctors. It is clear that he was reacting to the dismal state of medicine in his days [though it is arguable if there really has been much progress since then.] Reacting to  a bad situation and making some kind of corrective measure is clearly the idea behind measures taken by the sages to make laws to safeguard the Torah.

The Rambam in the Guide says many of the Laws of the Torah are in fact Divine safeguards against flaws in human nature.

The main thing in terms of Reb Nachman is to decide what was a reaction  as opposed to what was an essential principle.







בבא מציעא י''ד:ב תוספות says the argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד is the same as their argument as on page ק''א. But on page ק''א the גמרא concludes that there really is no argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page ק''א there is no argument and on page י''ד there is, how can תוספות say it is the same law in both places?


בבא מציעא י''ד: ב תוספות אומר הטיעון בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד זהה לטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. אבל בעמוד ק''א הגמרא מסכמת כי באמת אין שום טיעון כי הם דברו על מצבים שונים. אז אם בעמוד ק''א אין ויכוח ובעמוד י''ד קיים ויכוח, איך תוספות יכול להגיד שזה אותו דבר ואותו החוק בשני המקומות?

To answer this question, it is possible to answer that תוספות holds there is no argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד  and that that is the exact explanation of their argument on page ק''א. That is  in the שיטת תוספות  ידו על העליונה means he gets the קרן ושבח and ידו על התחתונה means  he gets only the קרן and the first case is when the שדה is עשוי לטעת and the other case is when it is not.


כדי לענות על שאלה זו, אפשר לענות  שתוספות מחזיק שאין ויכוח בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד, וכי זהו ההסבר המדויק של הטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. כלומר לפי שיטת התוספות ידו על העליונה אומר שהוא יקבל את הקרן ושבח, וידו על התחתונה אומר שהוא מקבל רק את הקרן.  המקרה הראשון הוא כאשר השדה הוא עשוי לטוע והמקרה השני הוא כאשר הוא לא.

Bava Metzia page 14b Tosphot says the argument between Rav and Shmuel on page 14 is the same as their argument as on page 101. But on page 101 the gemara concludes that there really is not argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page 101 there is no argument and on page 14 there is how can Tosphot say it is the same law in both places?


22.8.17

I think that there have been others that have thought the idea of a synthesis between Torah and Reason is in some need a revision after the 800 years since the Guide for the Perplexed. The basic problem starts with the fact that 20th century philosophy is obviously false and based on mistaken ideas. The ideas starts out innocuously enough with some good  suggestions from Frege about expanding the category  of a priori. But then it devolved into pure incoherent nonsense. The Ari [Isaac Luria] did not fare much better.
So the first task is to identify what needs to be rejected.

The Nefesh HaChaim of Reb Chaim from Volloshin certainly does a great job in terms of one half of this problem. And The Rambam in the Guide does a great job with the other half. The problem is really how to put both together.
The point almost all religious people are affected by the delusion of moral superiority along with a assortment of various fantasies.. Non religious people have their own set of different kinds of delusions. Finding the right balance is essential,- along with some way of safeguarding that balance.

21.8.17

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. The רשב''ם holds  בפרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף

The proof of רב שך that the רמב''ם hold by the רשב''ם is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the רמב''ם would be holding like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the רשב''ם. If he can pay back any שווה כסף Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

Besides that to seems to me that the רמב''ם states the הלכה openly like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back money. If he could also pay back שווה כסף I think the רמב''ם would have to state that.

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הרשב''ם מחזיק בפרק השואל שהגנב יכול להחזיר שווה כסף. ההוכחה של רב שך כי הרמב''ם מהחזיק כהרשב''ם קשה להבין. הנקודה העיקרית שלו היא העובדה כי הבעלים של האובייקט יכולים לבקש בחזרה את החלקים. הנקודה היא שאם הרמב''ם  מחזיק כמו רש''י והרא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלי שלם או כסף, אז לשלם בחזרה את השברים לא מסתדר עם זה. אבל כמו שאני רואה את זה,  זה גם אינו מתאים עם הרשב''ם. אם הוא יכול להחזיר שווה כסף אז מה נותן לבעל הזכות לבקש אלה דווקא? חוץ מזה  נראה לי כי הרמב''ם קובע הלכה בגלוי כמו רש''י ואת רא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כסף [דמים] . אם הוא יכול גם להחזיר שווה כסף אני חושב שהרמב''ם יצטרך להצהיר על זה.

Rambam laws of theft. Chapter 1, law 14.

Rambam laws of theft 1:14. The Rashbam holds Bava Metzia פרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף [not just money, but rather anything that is worth money.]

The proof of Rav Shach that the Rambam hold by the Rashbam is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the Rambam would be holding like Rashi and the Rosh that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the Rashbam. If he can pay back any שווה כסף (anything that is worth money). Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

That is one way or the other we need to find some reason the owner can ask for the pieces back. But what ever that reason is can not have anything to do with the argument between the Rashbam and Rashi and the Rosh.

This was the last idea I had before I broke my leg. [I called for help and some people called an ambulance and took me to the local hospital.] ]
It would be a worth while project to defend the basic Litvak path of straight Torah based on the insights of my predecessors. That would mean making full use of  Ari and the Kant and Hegel while not drifting off into mysticism nor sterile philosophy..
This would not be all that different than the Rambam's Guide. But it would need someone of that kind of stature to do this.[I mean to say I would come out with a neo Platonic approach anyway just like the Rambam did.]

My own personal defense of Torah really began with Dr Kelley Ross's web site where he has an approach based on Kant, Schopenhauer, and Fries. It of course did not hurt that I was aware of the Ari's  interpretations of Torah based on the Talmud and his own insights.
But this has all been personal, and rarely do I ever share insights in this regard.
And any serious effort in this regard would have to take into account the important results of Hegel. So even to get the philosophical part of this project worked out could not be easy as it would have to plow a middle path between the Kant School of Dr. Ross and Hegel.--no easy task.

Or one could  just simply depend on the Rambam's Guide which is a perfectly valid approach. But it seems that after the Ari and Kant and Hegel there is considerable work to be done. 

fear and love of God

In terms of coming to fear and love of God, the Rambam's position is not usually considered. It seems paradoxical of the face of it. No one that I have heard of ever thought that learning physics and metaphysics of Aristotle brings to fear and love of God.  No one except the Rambam that is.

They way people usually translate him in the religious world is that he meant something like mysticism even though he refers specifically to the physics and metaphysics of the ancient Greeks which clearly is not the same thing.

I have usually defended the Rambam's based on the idea of the hidden Torah that is concealed in the work of Creation which you do find in the Ari. But that does not mean the Rambam is referring to the Ari.
[The hidden holiness in creation is a fairly big subject mentioned by Reb Nachman.]

And even though I do hold the Rambam was right, I still feel the learning "Musar" the ethical works written during the Middle Ages is important in order to come to fear of God.--

Reb Nachman's own objections to what is called secular learning has to be understood as a reaction to the over-sided emphasis on on secular learning that the enlightenment had. Both the gentile enlightenment and later the Jewish one. As a reaction to that, Reb Nachman's ideas can be understood. Certainly the Enlightenment was not aiming towards fear of God of learning Torah.
My own emphasis of Physics and Metaphysics can also be seen in the light of my experiences in the religious world where I saw over religiosity does not bring to fear of God. Just the opposite. Over religiosity often  comes with exaggerated degrees of wickedness as anyone in the religious world can bear witness to.


[Using Reb Nachman as a source and an authority seems to be an venerable Litvak practice. I never even heard of any Litvak gadol  in Torah claim otherwise. Though there is an an awareness that Breslov is a cult, still people freely borrow and make use of the ideas of Reb Nachman pretty much all the time and I approve of that

The truth is my history with Reb Nachman is long. But the sum total of my observations is easy to sum up. People that become Breslov go downhill very fast. People that stay Litvak and simply learn Reb Nachman privately gain a lot. Nothing could be simpler.




20.8.17

כי הרשב''ם מחזיק אין שמין לגנב אומר לנו שאנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין כאשר כלי נשבר.

In other words, in my way of understanding, הלכה י''ד is complete. The first part deals with the case the כלי went down in value whether it was broken of not and then we go by the time of העמדה בדין. And that is not like the רשב''ם. For the רשב''ם holds אין שמין לגנב tells us one thing that we go by שעת העמדה בדין when the כלי  was broken. It matters not if it went up or down in value before that.

במילים אחרות, בהבנתי, הלכה י''ד שלמה. החלק הראשון עוסק במקרה שהכלי ירד ערך, אם הוא נשבר או לא, ואז אנחנו הולכים לפי זמן של העמדה בדין. וזה לא כמו הרשב''ם. כי הרשב''ם מחזיק אין שמין לגנב אומר לנו שאנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין כאשר כלי נשבר. זה לא משנה אם זה עלה או ירד בערך לפני זה.

And therefore the Rambam can not hold by the opinion of the Rashbam. Then we still are stuck because Rav Shach brings  a proof of the exact opposite.

I am really not sure what to make of all this.[I went on later to write about this in Ideas in Bava Metzia, but I do not recall if I was ever able to resolve this issue.] 

A proof that the Rambam holds like Rashi and the Rosh that a thief must pay either money or whole vessels, not שווה כסף [Things that are worth money]

 I think there is a proof that the רמב''ם does not hold like the רשב''ם but that אין שמין לגנב means he must pay כלים שלמים or כסף.
רב חיים הלוי says there is  a doubt about this, and רב שך brings a proof that the רמב''ם does hold with the רשב''ם that the גנב can pay שווה כסף
The proof I have that the רמב''ם does not hold by the רשב''ם is from הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד.
My reason is simple. If the רמב''ם would hold by the רשב''ם then why does he not write simply if the גנב broke the כלי we evaluate it according to the time of העמדה בדין? Why does he divide הלכה י''ד into two parts? One is which the value of the כלי went down and we go by שעת הגניבה and part two is where it went up in value and then he broke it and we go by שעת העמדה בדין?
Part one  by itself is not a question on the idea that that רמב''ם hold from the רשב''ם because it only is referring to a case where the כלי was not broken. But if we look at הלכה י''ד  in its entirely it is obvious something is missing in part one. That is the case where the כלי went down in value and then it was broken. If the רמב''ם really would be holding from the רשב''ם then he would say if the vessel went down or up in value and then it was broken we go by שעת העמדה בדין.
So instead according to the way I see it, אין שמין  has nothing to do with the time of evaluation but the fact that the thief must give back כלים שלמים or כסף.


אני חושב שיש הוכחה שהרמב''ם לא מחזיק  כמו הרשב''ם, אלא אין שמין לגנב אומר שהוא צריך לשלם כלים שלמים או כסף. הרב חיים הלוי אומר שיש ספק לגבי זה, ועוד רב שך מביא הוכחה שהרמב''ם מחזיק כרשב''ם שהגנב יכול לשלם שווה כסף. ההוכחה שיש לי שהרמב''ם אינו מחזיק כרשב''ם היא מתוך הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הסיבה שלי היא פשוטה. אם הרמב"ם יחזיק כרשב''ם אז למה הוא לא כותב פשוט אם הגנב שבר את הכלי אנו מעריכים אותו לפי שעת העמדה בדין? מדוע הוא מחלק את ההלכה לשני חלקים? אחד הוא מצב שערך של הכלי ירד למטה ואנחנו הולכים לפי שעת הגניבה וחלק שני הוא כאשר הוא עלה בערך ואז הוא שבר אותו ואנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין. החלק הראשון, כשלעצמו, אינו שאלה לגבי הרעיון שהרמב"ם מחזיק כרשב''ם משום שהוא מתייחס רק למקרה שבו הכלי לא נשבר. אבל אם נתבונן  בה בכלל, ברור שמשהו חסר בחלקו הראשון. זה המקרה שבו הכלי נפל בערך, ולאחר מכן נשבר. אם הרמב''ם באמת מחזיק כרשב''ם, אז הוא צריך להגיד אם כלי ירד או עלה, ואז הוא נשבר, אנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין. אז על פי הדרך שאני רואה את זה, לדין אין שמין אין שום קשר עם הזמן של הערכה, אבל אלא כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלים שלמים או כסף.

Right before I broke my leg, I was thinking that Rav Shach's proof that the Rambam hold like the Rashbam is not a strong proof. I do not know if I wrote my thoughts down anywhere but as far as I recall Rav Shach was building on the idea that the owner of the broken vessel can ask for the pieces back. If the Rambam would hold like Rashi how could that make sense? But the way I see it even if the Rambam hold like the Rashbam this still makes is a problem. If after all the thief owns the broken object, what gives the owner the right to ask for the pieces back? So you have to say this is just a special thing to allow the owner to ask for the pieces back.

I might just mention the important fact that the Rambam does say the thief pays back דמים money. If he would be holding like the Rashbam that at least  seems curious.






I am not sure how to say this simply but basically I think there is some proof that the Rambam does not hold like the Rashbam but that אין שמין לגנב means he must pay כלים שלמים or כסף.
Reb Chaim says there is  a doubt about this and Rav Shach brings a proof that the Ramabm does hold with the Rashbam that the גנב can pay שווה כסף
The proof I have that the Rambam does not hold by the Rashbam is from הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד.
My reason is simple. If the Rambam would hold by the Rashbam then why does he not write simply if the thief broke the vessel we evaluate it according to the time of העמדה בדין? Why does he divide halacha 14 into two parts? One is which the value of the vessel went down and we go by שעת הגניבה and part two is where it went up in value and then he broke it and we go by שעת העמדה בדין?
Part one  by itself is not a question on the idea that that Rambam hold from the Rashbam because it only is referring to a case where the vessel was not broken. But if we look at halacha 14 in its entirely it is obvious something is missing in part one--then case where the vessel went down in value and then it was broken. If the Rambam really would be holding from the Rashbam then he would say if the vessel went down or up in value and then it was broken we go by שעת העמדה בדין.
So instead according to the way I see it, אין שמין  has nothing to do with the time of evaluation but the fact that the thief must give back כלים שלמים or כסף.
However Rav Shach's proof is also valid. Thus we are left with a doubt about what the Rabam really holds.