Bava Metzia page 97B

I wanted to mention that in a previous essay I suggested that what Tosphot meant in Bava Metzia page 97B is that the law of Rav Yehuda even without Abyee would have to come from Shmuel means the statement of Shmuel in Ketubot.
This was based on the idea of Rav Shach that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from Tosphot in Nida page 2b.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that Shmuel does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that Tosphot is saying that in Bava Kama when Shmuel says the Mishna there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain even with a weak certainty that would overthrow even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in Ketubot. This mean Tosphot is throwing out his previous answer to the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does Tosphot do with the first Mishna in the chapter 10 הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak ברי which is a contradiction to the first answer of Tosphot. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that Tosphot is holding that we go by a weak ברי even in a case of חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what Tosphot is saying over there about the law in Ketubot that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in Bava Kama the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in Ketubot we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is weak because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.

Now Tosphot in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So Tosphot does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak Bari and we do go by a strong bari. Still I think we can see this is a argument in Tosphot itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel.
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 בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב תוספות said  that the law of רב יהודה would have to come from שמואל even without אביי means the statement of שמואל in כתובות.This was based on the idea of רב שך that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from תוספות in נדה דף ב' ע''ב.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that שמואל does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that תוספות is saying that in בבא קמא when שמואל says the משנה there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain, even with a weak certainty, that would defeat even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in כתובות. This means תוספות is rejecting  his previous answer to the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל, and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does תוספות do with the first משנה  in the tenth chapter של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak certainty  which is a contradiction to the first answer of תוספות. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that תוספות is holding by the opinion  that we go by a weak certainty  even against  חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what תוספות is saying over there about the law in כתובות that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in בבא קמא the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in כתובות we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is a weak certainty because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.Now תוספות in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So תוספות does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak certainty and we do go by a strong certainty. Still I think we can see this is a argument in תוספות itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל.


 בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב תוספות אמר כי החוק של רב יהודה יצטרך לבא משמואל אפילו בלי אביי. רציתי לומר זה  מכוון שמואל בכתובות. זו התבססה על הרעיון של רב שך כי חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא מבטלות זו את זו שהוא מביא מן תוספות בנדה דף ב' ע''ב. אבל עכשיו אני רוצה להיכנס להשלכות של הרעיון הזה. זה אומר שמואל אכן מחזיק מברי גרוע, ודאות חלשה. זה אומר  כי בבבא קמא כאשר שמואל אומר המשנה שם כמו סומכוס אבל חכמים אומרים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, כי הוא לא בשל ודאות חלשה. במקום זאת הסיבה היא ששני הצדדים אומרים את אותו סוג של ודאות. אבל אם  יהיה מקרה שבו אחד בטוח, אפילו עם ודאות חלשה, כי זה יביס גם חזקת ממון כפי שקורה הלכה למעשה במקרה בכתובות. משמעות הדבר תוספות דוחה התשובה הקודמת שלו לסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל, ונותן תשובה חדשה לגמרי. והתשובה החדשה הזאת גם עונה על השאלה ששאלתי לפני כמה שנים על מה עושה תוספות  עם המשנה הראשונה בפרק העשירי של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. שם אנחנו אומרים ברי עדיף למרות שיש בו ודאות חלשה וזו סתירה לתשובה הראשונה של תוספות. אבל עכשיו עם התשובה החדשה הזו הכל טוב. ואנחנו גם לומדים דין חדש. זה הוא כי תוספות מחזיק  בסברה כי נלך לפי ודאות חלשה אפילו נגד חזקת ממון. הסיבה לכך היא כי זה בדיוק מה שתוספות אומר שם על החוק הכתוב שאנחנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות חלשה אפילו להיות מוציא ממון. עכשיו אני רק רציתי להסביר למה אני מתכוון כי בבא קמא הסיבה שאנחנו אומרים מוציא מחבירו עליו ריאה היא לא בגלל שאנחנו מתעלמים מברי גרוע (חלש). בכלל לא. הסיבה היא דווקא בגלל הוודאויות הם שווות. אדם לא היה שם. אז זה לא משנה איך  כל אחד הוא בטוח בטענתו. ודאויות שניהם שווות. אז בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות למרות שזה ודאות חלשה כי היא יודעת שבעלה לא היה שם כדי להיות מסוגל לתת גירסה שונה של האירועים. עכשיו תוספות בסופו של הדבר אכן מרמז כי אין לנו להגיד את זה. אז תוספות אינו חוזר מן התשובה הקודמת שלו שאנחנו לא הולכים לפי ודאות חלשה וכן אנחנו הולכים לפי ודאות חזקה. ובכל זאת אני חושב שאנחנו יכולים לראות את זה הוא כטיעון בתוספות עצמו בין שתי תשובות אפשריות שונות עבור הסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל


There is a lot to think about how this applies to our Mishna in Bava Metzia 97a and later on page 100 but this is as far as I got today. I mean it seems there is a lot to think about in terms of why Rav Yehuda says what he says about our Mishna. I do not have the Gemara but from what I remember he is deriving his law from the part of our Mishna in which there is certainty and doubt in which case certainty wins. But what about the סומכוס part where there are two doubts and so they divide. Still this seems about as far as I can figure this all out for today.

I should add that the thoughts I have on this subject are mainly concerned with the types of חזקות in each case and how that question affects what Tosphot is saying. Further the fact that the Mishna is like Sumchos might make some important differences, but no one on the page seems concerned with that. They do bring it up on page 100 but what I would like to think about is how the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot there might affects things over here in page 97.

If you are wondering what I mean, it is this: In Bava Kama there is חזקת ממון-and that seems to be the only kind of חזקה over there with the events there. Later there are different kinds of חזקה that the Geara brings up. חזקת מרא קמא וחזקת רשות. I guess you might say that I am wondering how far Tosphot wants to take this idea of a certainty that can defeat a חזקה. We do see he is thinking of חזקת ממון but what about the later type in the mishna in page 100?--[It is for these reasons that people learn a learning partner. To be able to go through the details. But when that i not possible like with me, I guess I just have to try to figure out what Tosphot is thinking here  by myself.]
In any case you can see what the Musar book אורחות צדיקים meant that originally the Tosphot were a lot larger and later they were edited down. Clearly here Tosphot was dealing with a completely different answer than his first answer but apparently  a lot was edited out by the editors.

That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public, and there is no further prohibition to repeat it.

There is a famous law about באפי תלתא "in front of three." That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public,  and there is no further prohibition to repeat it. The question on this is simple. Who is asking?  One of the three. He is asking "Can I repeat it, since it was said in front of three?"  Then just tell him, "No," and then there will no longer be three people making it known.

A similar situation arises in Gitin also in הלכות מכירה.

הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תנשאי לפלוני "This is your divorce, if you do not get married to Smith." If she gets married to Smith, there is no divorce-- and so she can't get married to Smith. That is--the marriage is not valid. So only if it is a valid divorce, can it be invalid.

Secular readers already know this as the "Liar's Paradox." It comes up in mathematics. The set of all sets. The Liar' Paradox was answered well by Dr. Kelley Ross based on the Kantian idea of the ground of validity.  The math thing I forget.

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On a side note: In my mind the best Halacha book is the Tur with the Beit Joseph (טור בית יוסף). Also the Hayee Adam (חיי אדם) by a disciple of the Gra. The Aruch Hashulchan (ערוך השלחן) is  a great halacah book also.
In the long run the only real halacha book is the Gemara itself because, that is in the final analysis the only thing that determines halacha. This is obvious to anyone who has ever learned even one word of the Shach, Taz, or Beit Joseph.The approach of all baali halacha is to find out what the Gemara holds. As Reb Chaim from Voloshin puts it "אין לנו אלא דינא דגמרא" ''We only are concerned about the Law of the Gemara.'' Nothing else matters. {That was in a letter he wrote about why he disagreed with some decision of some famous person. He said as I mentioned, that it does not matter how great or smart someone is. All that matters is what the Gemara says.  And he also said over what the Gra said "לא לישא פנים בהלכה" ''not recognize faces in halacah.'' That is a phrase used for a judge to decide a case on its own merits, not on who is being represented.}
[But of course, it matters what Rishonim thought. Obviously they were better at Gemara than we are. But we respect what they say  only because we believe they understood the Gemara better than we do.- which is perfectly true.]
The Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo is a short version of his Beit Yoseph and I think the Tur Beit Yoseph is better. Still there is one way to do the Shulchan Aruch itself which makes a lot of sense that is to do it with the Beer Heteiv and Shaari Teshuva. I did not learn the whole Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yoseph Karo in that way, but I did do a lot of Choshen Mishpat in that way --with the Beer Heteiv and Pischei Teshuva right on the page and  I found that a really great way of doing it.--Short and sweet and to the point.

For the Glory of God, a new song.

T29 A Minor [T29 in midi] A28  [A28 in midi format]

The Sitra Achra, the Dark Side

The problem with the Sitra Achra is the more you try to avoid it the more it runs after you.

Some people think there is not such concept as demons in the Torah even though they are quite well documented in the Ari and Zohar and the Talmud itself.
The trouble is people in  the religious world tend to think they are immune by the very fact of their being religious.

The dark side, evil, teachers of Torah are in fact devils in disguise. This is a serious problem in the religious world much more than in the secular world.

The reason is to a large degree is that there is a close connection between good character and holiness. Since the Jewish secular world, with all its flaws, tends to stress good character above all, therefore they tend to be more protected from the Dark Side than the religious who stress rituals at the expense of human decency.

[I am no expert on this subject and in fact I have no idea how to avoid the Dark Side at all. All I can say is all the supposed solutions seems to be in fact traps.]

Teshuva repentance in a practical sense seems impossible. For when one  tries to undo something he has done wrong the general result is to make things worse-as we see in the Torah by the people that tried to go to Israel after the events of the spies when it was decreed the generation of the desert should not enter the Land of Israel.

[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement

I do not have an essay about this in mind. But just for my own sake I wanted to jot down some quicke ideas about how Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement [{Learning the Ethics  of the Medieval Sages}, ]come to answer a problem that most people have not heard of but still is very much a part of the modern world. Enlightenment versus Counter Enlightenment.
If I would have energy to expand on this I would try to show briefly the two streams of enlightenment thought. It all started with Hobbes, but Enlightenment thought branched out into John Locke versus Rousseau. [And Kant and Hegel tried to bridge the gap between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment.] But Counter Enlightenment also branched out into two streams, the secular counter enlightenment (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pagan) and religious counter enlightenment Meistre, Hamann. Pentecostal.
My basic approach is to say that the Musar (Litvak) yeshiva movement which more or less was based on the Rambam and Saadia Gaon's approaches combine the best of both approaches.[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]

It would be hard to go into this in detail, but the basic idea is that in learning Musar one internalizes the ethics of the Law of Moses, that is the Oral and Written Law. 

Rambam הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הלכה ד'

You buy 50 crates of wine from Joe. [and you did משיכה and or הגבהה-you lifted  them if that was possible and if not then you pulled them.]  You owe him 50 dollars. Then you are taking with him and he finds out you have 50 sheep you want to sell.  The surprising thing is he can tell you I absolve you of your debt if you sell to me the 50 sheep, and if you agree then he acquires the sheep without doing any action.

So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.


In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind,  And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.

Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.

(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])


The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.

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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים  from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה.  הלוקח lifted  them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them.  The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell.  נמוכר  can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין

So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.



The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

רב שך  says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

 I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at. 
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.


The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from  loan, not a different kind of משכון

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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין  מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה.  (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין  שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק.  עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה  מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas





I hope  the above is clear. We can  see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are  monsters שדין יהודאיים, the so called teachers of Torah,  scourges sent by the Lord to punish a nation that had departed from the true faith,  drunk with lunacy and insanity.  They are best described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs. [Reb Nachman was a great tzadik, but he was not infallible, and he definitely opened to door to the kind of tzadik worship that is pure idolatry that infects his supposed followers. His emphasis of Shmirat Habrit mainly leads to more sin that it helps. Still if a tzadik should be judged by the misuse he is put to, then no tzadik would come out OK.]

The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.

As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform,  and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.

The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.

Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.

The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.

They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.

In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.