Trends in Christianity.

The most public face of Christianity is Catholic, Russian Orthodox, Evangelical, Left Wing Protestant with is apathetic Protestant (with social justice warriors) and Emergent Protestant, Evangelical Protestant.
Evangelical is actually a euphemism for Pentecostal, it is basically the same thing without the theatrics.

So outside of the general constant spitting of Protestant we see a more fundamental splinting along these lines.  Apathetic Protestant, Social Justice politically militant Protestant, Emergent (post modern) Protestant. Apathetic and Evangelical are actually pretty close in doctrine, but differ in amounts of fervor.

All go with Paul, who was as distorting the message of Jesus. (See  the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions.] (There is plenty evidence that Simon Magus in the Clementine Recognitions is Paul.)   I can see in the NT itself an obvious difference between what Peter and James were saying was the message of Jesus, and what Paul was saying. Paul was  saying antinomianism (anti-law), and people that got his letters acted on that principle to forsake all moral constraints. When news of that got back to Paul he backtracked. Thus you can prove from Paul's letters anything you want to. See here  about Paul ]

Paul's  message is at odds with what was reported in the name of Jesus. It takes intellectual gymnastics to ignore Jesus, and claim that Paul understood him better that his actual words say. 

Paul had to contradict himself also because of circumstances that arose due to his original letters. The original letters supported "No Laws" [antinomianism]. Then as we see in latter letters people acted on what he wrote. Then he had to go back to the ''Eeny Meeni Miny Moe'' method about which laws of Moses to keep and which not. So Paul ends up being incoherent at best. To Peter and James, that would be the least of his problems. 

Since all historical Christianity comes from Paul who had enormous success in planting churches all throughout the Roman world which even after he was gone kept on spreading like wild fire, thus the problems in Paul keep on being played out every day. What one person wants to prove from one letter, someone else can always find an opposite statement in another letter.
Luther put the antinomian [anti law of Moses] into this explicit phrase: "We do not want to hear about Moses." {See rejection of Moses}
The whole quote is this: "Now then, let us get to the bottom of it all and say these teachers of sin and Mosaic prophets are not to confuse us with Moses. We don’t want to see or hear Moses. How do you like that, my dear rebels? We say further, that all such Mosaic teachers deny the gospel, banish Christ, and annul the whole New Testament. For Moses is given to the Jewish people alone, and does not concern us Gentiles and Christians. We have our gospel and New Testament." (1967b:170) 

Also from that PhD Thesis: "Nevertheless, we cannot escape Luther’s negative expressions against Moses, for example, “beat Moses to death and throw many stones at him”; “we shall make new Decalogues,” and, “Moses is nothing to us” (Avis 1975:152, 154, 156). 
Luther's sermon on Moses

"But we will not have this sort of thing. We would rather not preach again for the rest of our life than to let Moses return and to let Christ be torn out of our hearts. We will not have Moses as ruler or lawgiver any longer. Indeed God himself will not have it either. Moses was an intermediary solely for the Jewish people. It was to them that he gave the law. We must therefore silence the mouths of those factious spirits who say, "Thus says Moses," etc. Here you simply reply: Moses has nothing to do with us. If I were to accept Moses in one commandment, I would have to accept the entire Moses. Thus the consequence would be that if I accept Moses as master, then I must have myself circumcised, (3) wash my clothes in the Jewish way, eat and drink and dress thus and so, and observe all that stuff. So, then, we will neither observe nor accept Moses. Moses is dead. His rule ended when Christ came. He is of no further service."


In any case the Law of Moses is forever as is stated many times about particular commandments, and about the whole law itself in Deuteronomy 6 and also at the very end of the Torah in Haazinu, and at the end of the prophets זכרו תורת משה Remember the Law of Moses. 

So my approach is to say that Paul, Luther, and Calvin, while intending to do well, were mistaken in their approaches and also did not pay much attention to the Law of Moses  in the first place. Their views are simply incoherent and make opposing statements all the time. At least, I have to admit Aquinas and Hegel tried hard to make sense out of it all.

I should add that as many people have noticed, "What does it matter?" For attachment with God, sincere service to God surely is not dependent on doctrines? I have to agree with that, but to understand right from wrong is not possible without the Law of Moses.

See the Rambam's approach to natural law and the law of Moses in the Guide. 
There is an any case an argument between R. Shimon Ben Yochai and R. Yehuda and the sages about if a mizvah applies when the reason for it does not apply. R. Shimon said ''no.'' It is famous that the law is like R Yehuda, but Rav Shach noted that this is  a mistake. The actual Law is like the sages that hold with R. Shimon in certain cases (when both the reason and the law are given together).  



But does the Rambam allow hidden reasons for commandments? Clearly he must as we see in the Guide about the difference between natural Law and Torah Law. He says Natural law was a needed stage before Torah Law. So he obviously sees some difference even in essence. So we have to say like this to R Shimon and the Rambam when the open reason for the law does not apply so the hidden reason also vanishes.

t23 A Flat Major  t23 in midi  t23 in nwc

Attachment with God, The excommunication that was signed by the Gra.

Attachment with God is not given much emphasis in the Lithuanian Yeshiva World--and for good reason. That is an area of value that is liable to deterioration and delusions and eventually insanity.

You can see this in the Talmud itself where the commandment of being attached to God is understood to mean being associated with  true Torah scholars. However I did see R. Eliezer from Mitz [a disciple of Rabbainu Tam] that counts attachment in  itself as one of the Taryag 613 commandments. (Deuteronomy ch. 11)
This tendency you see in the Rambam where in the Guide where he says the commandments to love and fear God are fulfilled by learning Physics and Metaphysics as these subjects were understood by the ancient Greeks. [He hinted to this in the Mishne Torah, the יד החזקה, but his hints there usually go unnoticed.]


 I discovered that attachment to God can come through the straight Litvak path of simply learning and keeping the Oral and Written Law of Moses. There is a path that leads from simple Gemara, Rashi, Topshot that leads to attachment with God. That is not the same as the kind of feeling of holiness you feel when you  learn. It is rather a kind of settling of the Divine presence on you. [שכינה והאור אין סוף. ]


On the other hand there are Torah scholars that are demons.  The excommunication that was signed by the Gra, tried to deal with this problem but if the Gra was ignored, there is no chance that my warnings will be heeded. 

In any case, for the sake of information, I would like to go into this phenomenon. Part of being attached to God I think is dependent on God. I think it is  from God, and but also from a person's state of being prepared. 

There are different aspects of it. Thus with the ancient prophets, it manifested itself in prophecy. During the Middle Ages, it as considered that revelations of knowledge were also gifts from God as you can see in the  חובות לבבות [Obligations of the Heart] and the Guide of the Rambam. In my own case the basic steps that lead me, were learning Gemara and Musar (Reb Israel Salanter' Ethics),  in the Mir Yeshiva in NY,  then arriving in Israel, and then living in Safed.

[I should mention that there is a kind of philosophy behind this Lithvak idea of "learning Torah" which is this: The Written Law of Moses was given by God and that it will never be replaced and is obligatory for all time, and the Oral Law or Talmud is the proper explanation of it. Also the Torah is God centered. There is no room for worship of corpses or any human beings. 

Thus is it clear that the religious world is demon filled and only uses Torah as camouflage. So anyone that is sincere must run from the religious at all cost. The religious synagogues are dwelling places of the Devil. Run for your life. The  best option is either to learn Torah at home or if you have a Litvak yeshiva in the area then to go there.
Authentic means Mir in NY, Brisk, Ponovitch, Chaim Berlin, Torah Vedaat.--or branches or off shoots of these places.[I might mention that Rv Montag's yeshiva in Netivot I found filled with the spirit of Torah.] 


In any case I want to mention that I am not coming from place of superior knowledge or intuition. Rather from the evidence of the common sense approach to Torah of my parents and Rav Shach and the Gra and the Rambam. I am as liable as anyone to religious deception and manipulation. Especially at the hands of cults that have the accumulated knowledge of generations of how to manipulate native people like myself. That I why I spend the time and energy to warn others to avoid the mind traps I have fallen into.

The four point system of Maimonides [Rambam]

  My idea of education is mainly based on the four point system of Maimonides [Rambam] with a few additions based on my parents.
With Maimonides we already know his four point system (1) the Written Law (the Law of Moses) (2) the Oral Law (the two Talmuds) (even just to read them in English with the Soncino edition is also good. I have heard from Rav Zilverman in the Old City about one good Torah scholar that went through the whole Talmud a bunch of times in that way.) (3) Physics [i.e. Field Theory]. (4) Metaphysics (Aristotle). (He did say he was talking about the Metaphysics of the ancient Greeks. I think he included Plato and Plotinus. I would  have to include Kant and Hegel, both sadly misused. In any case Hegel was trying to do what the Rambam was doing. To create a synthesis Reason and Revelation.

  Based on what I understood from my parents and brothers I would have to add a few things to this list. (5) Gaining a real skill that people will pay cold hard cash for. Not a fake skill and may make money but in reality does nothing for anyone. (6) Survival skills.(7) Some aspect of the Quadrivium  and Trivium (What the Gra and books of Musar call the seven wisdoms). (8) Musar. (Medieval Ethics plus the basic approach to ethics of the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter ) Musar was considered by Reb Israel Salanter to be the most important because it gets one to the two most essential aspects of Torah--good character and fear of God. Musar means the four classical books אורחות צדיקים חובות לבבות מסילת ישרים שערי תשובה plus the major works by the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter מדרגת האדם כוכבי אור . That is Joseph Horvitz from Navardok (that in trust in God should be the main emphasis), Isaac Blazer (that is fear of God and good character). 

  This approach more or less defines what I think people ought to learn in order come to what a person ought to be. It is a balanced approach and thus hard to fit into a daily schedule.   

  There are people that feel they can not be in between Torah and other studies and for a time I was like that. This reminds me of Reb Israel Salanter that דעת תורה is to be an איש מדיני but because of the difficulty in doing that one must concentrate on Torah alone. 

  
  I can see the point in the Torah alone approach, but in general I was not very impressed with the people involved in that path. Instead of coming to attachment with God, they seemed to be sanctimonious, and desperate for money of secular Jews. But in the religious world, even balancing values I saw did not work very well. Instead of balance, I usually saw pretty bad character traits combined with attitudes of imagined superiority.
  A lot of the religious world sees Reform and Conservative and Religious Zionism as bad things, but these last three I found a lot closer to actually keeping the Torah which include obligations between man and his fellow man. I would have to say the Religious Zionism and Conservative are closest to Torah. Reform seems a bit too far into "social justice." My brother thinks Temple Israel in Hollywood [where our family went to pray] is Conservative. It is true it had an aspect that was conservative. But at the time we were gong there, I thought it is Reform. Anyway it is a great place. Mount Sinai in Westwood, we also went from time to time [which is conservative].

  [I should mention that I found doing the Talmud in Aramaic was better for me, I did not understand the Soncino translation at all without doing the Gemara also in its regular Aramaic.]
Still the only aspect of the religious world that seemed kosher at all were the Litvak yeshivas in NY (Mir, Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, Shar Yashuv). The rest of the religious world seems to be a disaster zone full with cults, שדיין of the Dark Side that were just lurking outside the walls of the yeshiva just hoping to catch some innocent unsuspecting yeshiva bachur [student].

Survival skills deserves a whole essay. My Dad's motto  was self sufficiency. He taught us boys and lived this way himself. 

Bava Metzia page 100

The ר''י holds  we have חזקה מעיקרא that pushes the time forwards along with חזקת רשות thus it belongs to the buyer. What works against this is חזקת השתא since the cow gave birth, we push that back in time and that helps חזקת מרא קמא.

ר''י מחזיק יש לנו חזקה מעיקרא שדוחפת את הזמן קדימה יחד עם חזקת רשות ובכך הולד שייך לקונה. מה שעובד נגד זה חזקת השתא מאז שפרה ילדה, אנחנו דוחפים בחזרה הזמן וזה עוזר חזקת מרא קמא
In Ketuboth page 9 where this all comes up in Tosphot. The basic issue there is the fact that a Cohen finds his bride not to be a virgin, she is forbidden to him. The reason is we do not know if the act of sex happened before the kidushin or afterwards [in those days there was a long wait between kidushin and  Hupa]. If it was after Kidushin then she is forbidden even if it was rape. Tosphot asks why not go with חזקת כשרות? Answer: On the contrary חזקת הגוף
The truth is I am not sure what Tosphot means here. I think he means חזקת הגוף is what we normally call חזקא מעיקרא and that just like the mikve in Nida page 2 we would put חזקה דהשתא together with and another חזקה and together they have the power to defeat a חזקה מעיקרא. Thus she would be permitted to her husband. 

But if so what is Tosphot answering? That חזקה מעיקרא can defeat both חזקה דהשתא along with חזקת כשרות? That is I think not what Tosphot means. Rather I think he means that those two חזקות can not defeat חזקה מעיקרא but they can make the whole situation into a doubt. And after all that is all we are looking for in Ketubot.

 Rav Shach says when there is a doubt the חזקת השתא and חזקה מעיקרא cancel each other, and if you combine some other חזקה  with חזקת השתא then you get  a וודאי. But when there is no reason to start doubting anything in the first place, then you only look at חזקה מעיקרא and not at חזקת השתא at all. He also ties this with an argument between Rav and Shmuel. 

I am not sure if this change anything in our case here in Bava Metzia.

What I mean is that Rav Shach and R.Akiva Eigger disagree about the reason the wife of the cohen is forbidden to him. Tosphot brings two contrary חזקות and R Akiva Eiger asks why not add חזקה דהשתא to the חזקת כשרות to allow her? He answers צירוף חזקות only works if they both indicate the same thing. Rav Shach answers a different answer as I mentioned up above. You need to start with a doubt when the crucial event took place. How doe this relate to the way I look at Bava Metzia page 100? There we have 4 חזקות, two against two.
The way I think we can look at this is this. The Gemara puts the calf into an alley. Then the חזקה that determines ownership should be מרא קמא. And to the Gemara that would work except for the fact that the mishna is Sumchos. So I wonder why not bring in חזקה מעיקרא here to tell us the birth came later and to make ownership a doubt so the mishna could be the sages also? The way I have been thinking for about 24 hours is that this is the argument between the Ri and the Rashbam. The Ri holds we  have a doubt about when the calf was born and so חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא mutually cancel. The Rashba holds until the animal was born there was no reason to doubt when it will be born. It is not like the mikve that is constantly getting less over a period of time and thus we have a doubt when it go to be less that 40 seah.
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ר''י מחזיק יש לנו חזקה מעיקרא שדוחפת את הזמן קדימה יחד עם חזקת רשות ובכך הולד שייך לקונה. מה שעובד נגד זה חזקת השתא מאז שפרה ילדה, אנחנו דוחפים בחזרה הזמן וזה עוזר חזקת מרא קמא. In כתובות דף ט  this all comes up in תוספות. The basic issue there is the fact that a כהן finds his bride not to be a virgin, she is forbidden to him. The reason is we do not know if the act of sex happened before the קידושין or afterwards. In those days there was a long wait between קידושין and  חופה. If it was after קידושין then she is forbidden, even if it was rape. תוספות asks why not go with חזקת כשרות? Answer, on the contrary, חזקת הגוף works against it. What does תוספות mean here? I think he means חזקת הגוף is what we normally call חזקא מעיקרא and that just like the מקוה in נדה גף ב' ע''א we would put חזקה דהשתא together with and another חזקה and together they have the power to defeat a חזקה מעיקרא. Thus she would be permitted to her husband. But if so what is תוספות answering? That חזקה מעיקרא can defeat both חזקה דהשתא along with חזקת כשרות? That is I think not what תוספות means. Rather I think he means that those two חזקות can not defeat חזקה מעיקרא but they can make the whole situation into a doubt. And after all that is all we are looking for in כתובות. רב שך says when there is a doubt the חזקת השתא and חזקה מעיקרא cancel each other, and if you combine some other חזקה  with חזקת השתא then you get  a וודאי. But when there is no reason to start doubting anything in the first place, then you only look at חזקה מעיקרא and not at חזקת השתא at all. He also ties this with an argument between רב and שמואל. How does this relate to our case here in בבא מציעא. What I mean is that רב שך and ר' עקיבא אייגר disagree about the reason the wife of the כהן is forbidden to him. תוספות brings two contrary חזקות and ר' אקיבא אייגר  asks why not add חזקה דהשתא to the חזקת כשרות to allow her? He answers צירוף חזקות only works if they both indicate the same thing. רב שך answers a different answer as I mentioned up above. You need to start with a doubt when the  event took place. How does this relate to the way I look at בבא מציעא  דך ק' ע''א? There we have 4 חזקות, two against two.The way I think we can look at this is this. The גמרא puts the calf into an alley. Then the חזקה that determines ownership should be מרא קמא. And to the גמרא that would work except for the fact that the משנה is סומכוס. So I wonder why not bring in חזקה מעיקרא here to tell us cow gave bith came later and to make ownership a doubt so the משנה could be the sages also? The way I have been thinking for about 24 hours is that this is the argument between the ר''י and the רשב''ם. The ר''י holds we  have a doubt about when the calf was born and so חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cause mutual cancellation. So in an alley when there are only three חזקות the מרא קמא has ownerhip. The רשב''ם holds until the animal was born there was no reason to doubt when it will be born. It is not like the מקוה that is constantly getting less over a period of time and thus we have a doubt when it got to be less than a volume of  forty סאה


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ר''י מחזיק יש לנו חזקה מעיקרא שדוחפת את הזמן קדימה יחד עם חזקת רשות ובכך הולד שייך לקונה . מה שעובד נגד זה חזקה דהשתא מאז שפרה הולידה, אנחנו דוחפים בחזרה הזמן וזה עוזר חזקא דמרא קמא . בכתובות דף ט' זה עולה בתוספות. הסוגיה הבסיסית: יש את העובדה כי כהן מוצא כלתו לא להיות בתולה, היא אסורה לו. הסיבה לכך היא שאנחנו לא יודעים אם קיום יחסי המין קרה לפני הקידושין או לאחר מכן. בימים ההם  היתה המתנה ארוכה בין הקידושין והחופה. אם זה היה אחרי קידושין ואז היא אסורה, גם אם זה היה אונס. תוספות שואל למה לא ללכת עם חזקה דכשרות? תשובה, להיפך, חזקת הגוף עובד נגדה.  מה תוספות מתכוון כאן? אני חושב שהוא מתכוון חזקת הגוף היא מה שאנחנו בדרך כלל קוראים חזקא מעיקרא וכי בדיוק כמו מקוה בנדה דף ב' ע''א  שמים חזקה דהשתא יחד עם עוד חזקה ויחד יש להן את הכוח להביס חזקה מעיקרא. כך בכתובות היא תהיה מותרת לבעלה. אבל אם כך מה הוא תוספות מענה? כי חזקה מעיקרא יכולה להביס הן חזקה דהשתא יחד עם חזקת כשרות? כלומר אני חושב שזה  לא מה שתוספות מתכוון. במקום זאת אני חושב שהוא מתכוון ששתי אלו החזקות לא יכולות להביס חזקה מעיקרא אבל הן יכולות לעשות את כל המצב לספק. ואחרי הכל זה הוא כל מה שאנחנו מחפשים בכתובות.  רב שך אומר כשיש ספק חזקת השתא וחזקא מעיקרא אחת מבטלת זו את זו, ואם אתה משלב עוד חזקה עם חזקת השתא אז אתה מקבל וודאי. אבל כאשר אין שום סיבה להתחיל לפקפק את הדבר מלכתחילה, אז אתה רק מסתכל על חזקה מעיקרא ולא השתא בכלל. הוא גם קושר את זה עם הויכוח בין רב ואת שמואל.  איך זה מתקשר לענייננו כאן בבא מציעא. כוונתי היא כי רב שך ור' עקיבא אייגר חלוקים בנוגע לסיבה שאשתו של כהן אסורה לו. תוספות מביא שתי חזקות נוגדות  ור' אקיבא אייגר שואל למה לא להוסיף חזקת דהשתא אל החזקה של כשרות על מנת להתיר לה? הוא עונה צירוף חזקות עובד רק אם שתיהן מצביעות אותו דבר. רב שך עונה תשובה אחרת כפי שציינתי למעלה. אתה צריך להתחיל עם ספק כאשר האירוע התרחש. איך זה מתקשר אל בבא מציעא דך ק' ע''א? יש לנו 4 חזקות, שתיים נגד שתיים. הדרך אני חושב שאנחנו יכולים להסתכל על זה היא זו. הגמרא מעמידה את העגל לתוך סמטה. ואז החזקה הקובעת בעלות צריך להיות מרא קמא. וכדי שהגמרא יכולה למעט את זה היא לומר כי המשנה היא כסומכוס. אז אני תוהה למה לא להביא חזקה מעיקרא כאן כדי לספר לנו הפרה הולידה מאוחר יותר כדי להפוך את בעלות לספק כך שהמשנה יכולה להיות כחכמים גם? הדרך שבה אני כבר חושב על כ -24 שעות היא שזהו הטיעון בין ר''י ואת רשב''ם. ר''י מחזיק יש לנו ספק לגבי כאשר העגל נולד וכך חזקא דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא גורמות לביטול הדדית. אז בסמטה כאשר יש רק שלוש חזקות למרא קמא יש בעלות. רשב''ם מחזיק עד שהחיה נולדה אין כל סיבה להטיל ספק כשזה ייולד. זה לא כמו מקוה כי הוא מקבל כמעט באופן קבוע פיחות על פני תקופה של זמן ולכן יש לנו ספק כשזה התחיל להיות פחות נפח של ארבעים סאה


Appendix: background information. If one dips in a river or ocean that is fine as a mikve. But if the rain water is collected in one spot you need a few things. 40 seah volume which is not much. I forget the actual amount about it is around 1^1^1.5 meters. Also it can't be a swimming pool because it can be lifted whole and stick together since it is made of concrete. It also has plastic under it which separates it from the ground. The best thing I think is to go to a nearby ocean--and loose garments are not a separation.At any rate, the issue here is if a mikveh is measured and found less than 40 seah. The question is do we push the present state back in time?  
The other issue is the wife of the cohen. She was found not to be a virgin. The kidushin makes a woman married but she does not live with her husband until Hupa and in ancient times there was a long wait. So the question is when did the act of sex happen? If after kidushin then she is forbidden to her husband because even if it was against her will she is forbidden. If we would be talking about a Israel, not a Cohen then there would be two questions, If it was before or after kidushin and if it was after if the act of sex was willingly or not. So it is a ספק ספקא  a doubt of a doubt and so she is permitted.

End chapter nine in Bava Metzia בבא מציעא.

End chapter nine in בבא מציעא. There ר' יהודה holds we are not  דורשים טעמא דקרא. Against that opinion is ר' שמעון בן יוחאי holds we go by the reason for the law דורשים טעמא דקרא.  When there is an argument between ר' יהודה and ר' שמעון  the הלכה is like ר' יהודה. In a פסוק in the Torah it says not to marry any of the seven nations. Or more exactly do not give your children in marriage to them so they will not turn the heart of your children towards idolatry. ר' יהודה who does not look at the reason for a verse says we go by the literal meaning. It forbids only the seven (Canaanite) nations. ר' שמעון says it forbids all nations that do idolatry because we go by at the reason for the verse, not by its literal meaning. So why does the רמב''ם decide marriage with all nations that do idolatry is forbidden? The key factor to notice is the case of a king. The פסוק says he should not have many wives "לא ירבה לו נשים". The  חכמים, say that means not to have more than שמנה עשרה 18 wives. ר' יהודה says, he can have as many as he  wants as long as they do not tilt his heart. ר' שמעון says even one that tilts his heart he must not marry. So when it says "לא ירבה לו נשים" it means even like Abigail. רב שך points out that here the חכמים and ר' שמעון agree.  The  sages obviously agree with ר' יהודה that we do not go by the reason for the law.  But here we see ר' יהודה does go by the reason for the law because the reason is written explicitly. So what does ר' שמעון do when the reason is given openly? He  learns from both the regular פסוק, and he learns something extra from the reason. So even though in general the חכמים go with ר' יהודה, but in  a case when the reason for the law is given openly, then they go like ר' שמעון.  This now gives us enough information to explain the  רמב''ם. That is this. When the reason for the law is given openly in the פסוק the חכמים agree with ר' שמעון. And that is exactly the case with intermarriage. So in that case the חכמים will agree with ר' שמעון that all nations that serve idols are forbidden, not just the seven nations. And that is how the  רמב''ם decides. He decides this not because it is the opinion of ר' שמעון but because it is the reason of the חכמים

סוף פרק תשעה בבא מציעא. יש ר' יהודה מחזיק אנחנו לא דורשים טעמא דקרא. נגד הדעת הזאת הוא ר' שמעון בן יוחאי שמחזיק שהולכים לפי סיבת החוק, דורשים טעמא דקרא. כשיש ויכוח בין ר' יהודה ור' שמעון, הלכה היא כמו ר' יהודה. בתוך פסוק בתורה כתוב לא להתחתן עם מישהו שבעת העמים. או לייתר דיוק לא לתת לילדים שלך בנישואים להם כדי שהם לא יהפכו את לב ילדיך כלפי עבודה זרה. ר' יהודה שאינו מהסתכל על הסיבה של פסוק אומר נלך לפי המשמעות המילולית. הוא אוסר רק את שבעת העמים. ר' שמעון אומר שזה אוסר כל הגוים אשר עושים עבודה זרה, כי נלך לפי הסיבה של הפסוק, לא לפי המשמעות המילולית שלו. אז למה עושה את רמב''ם מחליט נישואים עם כל העמים שעושים עבודה זרה אסורה? הגורם המרכזי הוא לשים לב במקרה של מלך. הפסוק אומר שהוא "לא ירבה לו נשים". החכמים אומרים לא יותר משמנה עשר נשים. ר' יהודה אומר שהוא יכול להרבות ככל שהוא רוצה, כל עוד שהן לא נוטות את לבו. ר' שמעון אומר אפילו אחת  שמטה את לבו אסור לו לשאת. אז כאשר הוא אומר לא ירבה לו נשים זה אומר אפילו כמו אביגיל. רב שך מציין שכאן חכמים ור ' שמעון מסכימים. החכמים ברור שמסכימים עם ר' יהודה כי אנחנו לא הולכים לפי הטעם של החוק. אבל כאן אנו רואים ר' יהודה אימו מתחמק מסיבת החוק כי הסיבה כתובה במפורש. אז מה עושה ר' שמעון כאשר הסיבה ניתנת בגלוי? הוא לומד גם את הפסוק הרגיל, והוא לומד משהו נוסף מן הסיבה. אז למרות באופן כללי החכמים אומרים ללכת עם ר' יהודה, אולם במקרה כאשר סיבת החוק ניתנת בגלוי, ואז הם הולכים כמו ר' שמעון. זה עכשיו נותן לנו מספיק מידע כדי להסביר את רמב''ם. כלומר זה. כאשר סיבת החוק ניתנת בגלוי בפסוק החכמים מסכימים עם ר' שמעון. וזה בדיוק המקרה עם נישואי תערובת. אז במקרה זה חכמים  מסכימים עם ר' שמעון כי כל העמים אשר משרתים אלילים אסורים, לא רק שבעת העמים. וזה איך שרמב''ם מחליט. הוא מחליט זה לא בגלל כי זו הוא דעתו של ר' שמעון, אלא משום שזו הדעת של חכמים.


I should mention the Tur says simply only the seven nations are forbidden as the simple explanation of the sages is. That is we do not go by the reason for any verse but by what its says openly. Therefore only the seven (Canaanite) nations are forbidden. No other nations.
I can not say that my answer here is what Rav Eleazar  Shach meant in his essay. In any case that is what I thought makes sense based on ideas that were triggered in me when I read his essay.

Take a look yourself at Rav Shach's essay on the Rambam in הלכות אסורי ביאה. Maybe what I wrote here is what he means, but so far I cannot tell.

I am not trying here to go into all the issues. I am simply trying to understand the Rambam. And  I believe the answer here is right. The answer I had before I saw the essay of Rav Shach was really crummy. And other answers I have seen did not hold much water.

Musar (Ethics) from the Middle Ages. Musar pours ice cold water on people's illusions of grandeur and obsessions.

By nature I have always been interested in worldview kinds of issues more so that more practically minded people.  I have tended to see human affairs as downstream from people's world views.
So to understand the basic world view of the Torah is feel is important. The clearest statement of the way the Torah looks at the world I found is best given in books of Musar (books on Ethics) from the Middle Ages and the later classics by the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter.
The reason is the same reason why people get package deals at the supermarket. You could buy all the ingredients of cold cereal in the morning and make it all by yourself, but you would rather that someone else do most of the work of preparation and leave you just to pour the milk. You could in the same way go through the whole Tenach (Old Testament)  and the entire Oral Law, the two Talmuds, the Midrashei Hagada and Midrashei Halacaha until you are about 90 years old and then maybe get a clear enough idea, or you can trust the judgment of the Rishonim, [Mediaeval sages] to have done that work and to offer the same result in simple form. That is Musar.

The importance of the Rishonim [Medieval sages] in this regard is because their view of Torah was without alternative agendas. The problem with achronim [books on world view of Torah written after the Rav Joseph Karo after around 1520] is the trouble of agenda. The purpose is usually not to understand the world view of Torah but to change it into some form more palatable to their tastes and to convince others of their mistakes.
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You actually see this clearly in practice. Yeshivas that have Musar as art of their seder [schedule] are light years apart from place that do not learn Musar. You only need to walk into a real authentic Litvak yeshiva at in the morning and you get blown away by the powerful spirit of Torah that is there.

One thing Musar is definitely right about, Torah is the religion of good character. {Menschlichkeit.} People of Type A personalities of schizoid personalities are definitely not gong to be drawn towards Musar and will in fact actively oppose it.  Musar pours ice cold water on people's illusions of grandeur and obsessions.  

The trouble with the Jewish religious world is that it is full of demons that infest the teachers.

The trouble with the religious world is that it is full of demons and demons spirits that infest it and especially the teachers. It does not take a genius to see this. If they would be keeping Torah plain and simple like it says, I would have nothing to complain about but the trouble is not just that it is a scam but positively evil.  There are a few exceptions however like the NY Litvak yeshivas and Ponovicth and the religious Zionist yeshivas. But as a rule I think the religious would is just way too much demon possessed.  I might mention that Reb Nachman to his great credit brought up this issue quite often in his Lekutai Moharan and so I am not the only one to notice this problem.

Clearly Reb Nachman had a great vision of what Torah is supposed to be about and his great advice is not confined to just pointing out the evils of תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאיים. {Demonic Torah Scholars}. Still still the fact that the movement based on him got absorbed in the movement the Gra put in Cherem reduces the effectiveness of his advice to almost nothing.  

People do not give enough credit to the Dark Side almost to the degree of denying its existence. Thus that leave them all the more open to it. In the Jewish this is particular common. People always decide their particular leaders has powers from the Bright Side of Holiness. They never consider the opposite. 

vision of the Rambam

I have mentioned the vision of the Rambam, that is to learn every day the Oral Law (the Two Talmuds), the Written Law (the Law of Moses plus the prophets), Physics and Metaphysics.
I want to add to this list, Musar (mediaeval Ethics) plus survival skills.
And to mention that this is to bring to human perfection, but there is no guarantee. You can notice the lacks of each discipline, and think to yourself that the right combination would work wonders and make up for all the lacks.  But that to me does not seem realistic. There still is going to be free will. As Steven Dutch puts it: "I am completely unable to conceive of any legal or social system that can’t be subverted or abused. People who crave power or status will gravitate toward whatever confers those rewards. And they will always discover ways to get the rewards without paying their dues." 

I think the amazing thing about the Rambam is he combined several traits-the visionary prophet, the scholastic attention to detail, the Socratic Critic of logical fallacies he saw in the Kalm and the Warrior against abuses he saw in the religious world.

[The trouble the Rambam saw in the religious world of his time is described in detail in his commentary to Pikei Avot in ch 4. Mainly he saw that the people that invariably go to use the Torah to make money are the types that are incapable of accurately understanding any Gemara or Halacha. They are the most dull, the most stupid, and the most morally depraved. Thus there is no profession open to them except to to use Torah as a means to money, power, and influence. See the Rambam there in Pirkei Avot where he goes into detail, but he also mention this briefly in the Mishne Torah. His description is as accurate now as it was when he wrote it. The bad name they give to Torah makes it almost impossible for anyone to learn Torah sincerely. The religious world is a crooked racket, a fraud, and scam, and invites comparisons to the Mafia. Any sincere believer in Torah would be well advice to stay away from the religious, insane world as far as possible unless he happens to be near an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva, Mir Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, Ponovitch.

I wanted to go into the basic idea of the Rambam in terms of learning. Mainly his program starts as simple as possible. The Mishne Torah itself. [Metaphysics means Aristotle's book called the Metaphysics. Physics also. However I hold modern Physics is included [i.e.Quantum Mechanics, String Theory, Quantum Field Theory]. Similarly in terms of Metaphysics I hold Kant and Hegel are included. Preferably Hegel.] In terms of Torah the main thing after  a basic introduction in Gemara I think Rav Shach's Avi Ezri is the most important thing. 
[If I could complement the religious world for adhering to the Torah I would do so gladly. The trouble is I have found it to be highly inimical to Torah values. They do everything possible to destroy your family and children while at the same time claiming to support family values. See the excommunication that the Gra signed for further information. The problem seems to be the flawed vision of themselves as super human beings gives them a flawed idea of what other people are like. They see the rest of humanity as fit only for servile beasts of burden.]

Concerning the previous essay I would like to say that I think Rav Shach was forced into a difficult position because he had to defend the Rambam and the Rambam equates ערירי and כרת.
I was going to the nearby river to go to the mikve and it occurred to me that I am not forced to answer for the Rambam. Rather based on Rav Shach's insights and the Rashba that he brings, I have a much better answer for the braita in the beginning of Yevamot. That is, that it is going like שמואל ורב אסי and in fact hold עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת.
So my answer would be thus. Just like the Rashba says Shmuel and Rav Assi that hold הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה would be holding that עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת and even for אשת אח מאביו the איסור of אשת אח continues but simply is pushed off by the עשה של יבום. But the הלכה is like רב ור' חנינא that הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. and this is going like the opinion אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. This makes the most sense because normally we understand יבום to be like נדה in the way that after the time of the איסור there is no איסור at all, not that it is pushed away.
\ Rav Shach had available to him a much better answer, but ignored it because he felt the need to make the Rambam fit with everything. But that forced Rav Shach into a position that seems to me to be untenable. When a positive mitzvah pushes off a negative mitavah we do not say the negative mitvah has a time limit. If Rav Shach had not been forced to answer for the Rambam, he could easily have said what I have written here.


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My answer for the ברייתא in the beginning of יבמות. That is,  it is going like שמואל ורב אסי and  holds עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת.
So my answer would be thus. Just like the רשב''א says שמואל and רב אסי that hold הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה would be holding that עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת and even for אשת אח מאביו the איסור of אשת אח continues but simply is pushed off by the עשה של יבום. But the הלכה is like רב ור' חנינא that הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. and this is going like the opinion אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. This makes the most sense because normally we understand יבום to be like נדה in the way that after the time of the איסור there is no איסור at all, not that it is pushed away.

תשובתי על הברייתא בתחילת יבמות. , זו הולכת כמו שמואל ורב אסי שמחזיקים עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. אז התשובה שלי תהיה בכך בדיוק כמו שהרשב''א אמר ששמואל ורב אסי מחזיקים הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה וזה יהיה בגלל שקבעו כי עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת ואפילו אשת אח מאביו איסור של אשת אח נמשך, אבל פשוט נדחף על ידי עשה של יבום. אבל הלכה היא כמו רב ור' חנינא כי הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. וזה הולך כדעת אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. זה הכי הגיוני כי בדרך כלל אנחנו מבינים יבום להיות כמו נדה באופן שבו לאחר הזמן של האיסור אין איסור כלל, לא כי הוא נדחף משם.

So the basic idea of the braita in Torah Kohanim I am leaving exactly as it sounds that there is a difference between the brother from the mother and the brother from the father and that both their wives are in כרת but the wife of the brother from the mother is not in ערירי. So in essence  the Rambam comes out OK also. That is the Rambam holds that both on the wife from the brother from the mother and the wife of the brother from the father have כרת and thus both are required a sin offering.
In any case I have never felt I had to answer for the Rambam at all cost. And we do not need to say he disagrees with the Braita in Torat Kohanim anyway.  And in any case I believe Rav Shach answers the Rambam somewhere else in the Avi Ezri in a different fashion.

The basic thing is this. Though the whole kind of learning of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik to justify the Rambam is great and amazing, still my orientation from the beginning of yeshiva in Shar Yashuv in NY and also my books on Bava Metzia and Shas have mainly been to concentrate on understanding Tosphot.  If an answer for the Rambam comes up--as it has often, then I am happy. But I am not aiming for that.
However when it comes to the Guide for the Perplexed, I think that was the Rambam's best work and led the way to synthesizing Faith and Reason. Clearly Aquinas owes to him and to Saadia Gaon a great debt, and so does all Western Civilization. Aquinas, I should mention, did not always quote Maimonides by name, for example in his proof of the existence of God [which I think is accepted he derived from Maimonides] he does not quote his name. But he does quote his name in other cases, as when giving the reasons for the commandments of the Torah. In any case, clearly the Rambam was able to bring Aristotle into the mainstream, and not just as a side note to Plato.

Maimonides and Saadia Gaon are the founders of a balance between Faith and Reason. Before that one approach of the other was over emphasized. And often they were considered incompatible.
The vision of the Rambam is still far beyond the sight of this generation. His four fold approach of learning the Written Law of Moses, the Two Talmuds, Physics and Metaphysics is still too radical for anyone to accept. I fear it will take a long time --if ever--for people to catch up with his vision

So all together the actual question that Tosphot raises on that Braita in the beginning of Yevamot along with my answer here would be this:

I wanted to introduce a famous subject that comes up in the beginning of Yevamot. This will help to answer a question I asked in the beginning of Yevamot that I wrote in my little booklet חידושי הש''ס


It is the question of אשת אחיו מאמו the wife of a brother from the mother, not from the father. The Rambam says simply that אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering. [I mean if one slept with her.]  he does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת [being cut off from one's people if done on purpose and required a sin offering if done by accident.] This is clearly not like the Torah Kohanim that Tosphot brings in the beginning of Yevamot. That statement from the book reads thus, The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא"[she is a  woman that has seen blood.] Torah Kohanim asks why compare her to a נדה?  Because just like a נדה  has a time of permission so does she--that is if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother.
So the Rambam obviously rejects this braita/teaching.

Rav Shach suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the Gemara that was rejected. [Yevamot 41]
הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה (like Shmuel and Rav Assi) The reason for this the Rashba says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off. But the Halacha in the Gemara itself is הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת (Rav and R. Chanina) and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to Yibum there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the mitzvah of yibum never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory so the prohibition has a time limit.   Therefore the Braita of Torat Kohanim that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no permission does not apply. Thus we see that braita is going like a rejected opinion in the Gemara.

Thus my question in the beginning of yevamot also has an answer.
That is that original braita there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the Gemara of Shmuel and Rav Assi 
{I wanted to introduce a  subject that comes up in the beginning of יבמות. This will help to answer a question I asked in the beginning of יבמות.[Mainly what I am doing here is simply saying that braita at the beginning of yevamot is not the halacha and in fact it hold עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת as Tosphot and the Old Tosphot both point out. So in stead of answering the question I simply say that braita is rejected. It is the question of אשת אחיו מאמו. The רמב''ם says simply that אשת אחיו the wife of a brother is required to bring a sin offering. [I mean if one slept with her.]  he does not make any distinction between the wife of a brother from the father or mother. That means both are in כרת,  and required a sin offering if done by accident. This is clearly not like the law in תורת כהנים that תוספות brings in the beginning of יבמות. That statement from the book reads thus, The the verse about not to marry one's brother's wife says "נדה היא". The תורת כהנים  asks why compare her to a נדה?  Because just like a נדה  has a time of permission, so does she, that is if the  brother dies without children. So the verse can not be talking about a brother from the mother.So the רמב''ם obviously rejects this teaching. רב שך suggests the reason is that it is going like an opinion in the גמרא that was rejected, יבמות מ''א. That is הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה like שמואל and רב אסי. The reason for this the רשב''א says is that opinion holds the יבמה is an איסור כרת  but the עשה of יבום pushes it off. But the הלכה in the גמרא itself is הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת like רב and ר' חנינא and that opinion holds the איסור of אשת אח has a time limit and after she falls to יבום there no longer is any כרת involved.  Thus the same goes for the wife of the brother from the mother that also has a time limit. But the actual prohibition never falls off because the מצוה of יבום never arrives. But since it could arrive in theory, so the prohibition has a time limit.  Therefore, the law of תורת כהנים that takes the wife of the brother from the mother out of כרת because she has no היתר does not apply. Thus we see that law of תורת כהנים is going like a rejected opinion in the גמרא.
Thus my question in the beginning of יבמות also has an answer. That is that original teaching there that would be holding עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת  would also be going like this rejected opinion in the גמרא of שמואל and רב אסי.}

_____________________________________________________ So all together the actual question that Tosphot raises on that Braita in the beginning of Yevamot along with my answer here would be this:
 יבמות ג: הברייתא שואלת איך יודעים שאחות אשתו אסורה ביבום? והיא מתרצת שכתוב בויקרא אצל עריות "עליה" וכתוב בדברים אצל יבום "עליה". זה נראה כמו גזרה שווה. [גזרה שווה בדרך כלל היא שיש אותה מילה בשני מקומות, ולכן שמים את הדינים של מקום אחד למקום השני.] תוספות שואל, למה לא להפוך את הגזרה שווה לכיוון השני? והוא מתרץ, שהתנא של הברייתא אוחז בשיטה שעשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. זאת אומרת שבלי הגזרה שווה היינו אומרים שיבום דוחה איסור אחות אשתו. אם כן למה צריכים את הגזרה שווה? אלא על כורחך היא באה לומר את החידוש שאין יבום דוחה אחות אשתו.
עכשיו שמסקנת הגמרא היא (לקמן) שעשה אינו דוחה לא תעשה הסברה הייתה צריכה ללכת בכיוון השני. זאת אומרת שאין לנו מקום ללמוד ממנו שעריות אסורות ביבום. (אולי יש לומר שבאמת זאת היא סברת בית שמאי.) אופן שני להסתכל בברייתא הוא זה: אין הברייתא מזכירה גזרה שווה. יכול להיות היא חושבת על "מה מצינו". והיא חושבת כך: אנחנו מוציאים שאשת אחיו אסורה אפילו אם אחיו אינו בעולם. רק במקום יבום היא מותרת. באופן דומה היינו צריכים להתיר את כל העריות במקום יבום. ולכן אנחנו צריכים את המילה "עליה" לומר לנו שאחות אשתו וכל העריות אסורות. הקושיא כאן היא שזה היה עובד אפילו אם היתה לנו את המילה "עליה" רק במקום אחד. והברייתא אומרת שהדין שלה באה מן העובדה שאותה מילה נמצאת בשני המקומות. עוד קושיא גדולה כאן היא שאם הברייתא מכוונת לגזרה שווה יש כאן אי הבנה. גזרה שווה רגילה נותנת את הדינים של מקום אחד למקום השני וממקום השני למקום הראשון. אם זאת היא גזרה שווה, אזי התוצאה של זו היא שמילת "עליה" בעריות מדברת רק במקום יבום, ואז כל העריות תהיינה אסורות רק במקום יבום. וזה אי אפשר. ולכן צריכים לומר שכוונת התנא היא שזה מה מצינו. 
במילים אחרות. הברייתא אומרת איך אנחנו יודעים שאחותו של אשתו אסורה היבום? והיא עונה שהפסוק אומר "עליה" בויקרא ועליה בדברים בנוגע ליבום. זה נראה כמו גזירה שווה. גזירה שווה פירושו  המילה  זהה משמשת בשני מקומות שונים. אז אנחנו מיישמים את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, אלא אם כן קיים טעם ספציפי כי לפחות את כח הגזירה השווה. דרך חלופית אחת להסתכל על ברייתא זו היא לומר שזה לא קשור עם גזירה שווה.  די לחשוב ככה. אנו מוצאים כי אשתו של אחיו (של אחד) אסורה אפילו אחרי שהוא  נפטר. ובכל זאת אנו מוצאים כי במקרה הספציפי של יבום היא מותרת. אז אנחנו צריכים לאפשר לכל היחסים האסורים במקרה של יבום להיות מותרים. אז עכשיו אנחנו צריכים את מילה אחת מיותרת "עליה" לספר לנו שהיא אסורה. כלומר כי ברייתא הוא חושב על מה מצינו מה אנו מוצאים במקום אחד אנו מרחיבים באופן אוטומטי למקומות אחרים, אם לא נצליח למצוא סיבה ספציפית להגביל את תחולתו, לא גזירה שווה. הבעיה עם זה היא כי זה יעבוד גם אם רק הייתה המילה "עליה" לבדה.  את ברייתא בהחלט מתייחס לעובדה כי אותה המילה משמשת בשני המקומות לגזור את  החוק שלה. אז זה בהחלט אומר שזה גזירה שווה. ואם זה גזירה שווה, אז התוצאה היא קשה. הגזירה שווה הרגילה מעמידה את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, ולהיפך. זה היה גורם לשים את "עליה" של יבום לתוך היחסים ולעשות את כולם אסורים רק במקרה של יבום! כלומר יש לנו שאלה משום גזירה שווה הולכת לשני הכיוונים. תשובה. למעשה אם גזירה שווה הולכת בשני הכיוונים הוא ויכוח. כאן נראה שהברייתא  בדעת שהגזירה השווה סובבת רק לכיוון אחד.

רציתי להציג נושא שעולה בתחילת יבמות. זה יעזור לענות על שאלה ששאלתי בתחילת יבמות. זוהי שאלת אשת אחיו מאמו. רמב''ם אומר בפשטות כי אשת אחיו (אשת אח) מחוייב להביא חטאת. אני מתכוון אם אחד שכב איתה. הוא לא עושה הבחנה בין אשת אח מן האב או האם. כלומר, שניהם נמצאים בכרת, ונזקק לחטאת אם נעשה בטעות. זה ברור לא כמו החוק בתורת כהנים שתוספות מביא בתחילת יבמות. משפט זה מובא על הפסוק  שלא לישא אשת אחיו של שאומר "נדה היא". תורת הכהנים שואלת למה להשוות אותה לנדה? מכיוון שבדיוק כמו נדה יש ​​זמן של רשות, כך גם היא, כלומר אם אחיו מת ללא ילדים. אז הפסוק לא ניתן לדבר על אח מהאם. אז רמב''ם ברור מוקיע את ההוראה הזאת. רב שך אומר הסיבה היא שהחוק הזה הולך כמו דעה בגמרא  שנדחתה,  יבמות מ''א. כלומר  הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה כמו שמואל ורב אסי. הסיבה לזה הרשב''א אומר היא הדעה שמכילה את היבמה באיסור כרת אבל עשה של יבום דוחף אותו. אבל הלכה בגמרא עצמה היא הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת כמו רב ור' חנינא וכי הדעה מחזיקה האיסור של אשת האח יש מגבלת זמן ואחרי שהיא נופלת יבום שאין עוד כל כרת מעורב. לכן כנ"ל לגבי אשת אחיו מהאם כי גם יש מגבלת זמן. אבל האיסור בפועל לא נופל משום מצוה של יבום לא מגיעה. אבל כיוון שהיא עלולה להגיע בתיאוריה, ולכן האיסור יש מגבלת זמן. לכן, החוק של  תורת כהנים שלוקח את אשתו של אחיו מהאם מתוך כרת כי אין לה היתר אינו חל.  עינינו רואות, כי החוק של תורת כהנים הולך כמו דעה שנדחתה הגמרא. לכן לשאלה שלי בתחילת יבמות גם יש תשובה.  לכן השאלה שלי בתחילת יבמות גם יש תשובה. לכן כנ"ל לגבי אשת אחיו מהאם כי גם יש מגבלת זמן. אבל האיסור בפועל לא נופל משום מצוה של יבום לא מגיעה. אבל כיוון שהיא עלולה להגיע בתיאוריה, ולכן האיסור יש מגבלת זמן. לכן, החוק של כהני תורה שלוקח את אשתו של אחיו מהאם מתוך כרת כי אין לה יתר אינו חל. עינינו רואות, כי החוק של תורת כהנים הולך כמו דעה שנדחתה הגמרא. לכן השאלה שלי בתחילת יבמות גם יש תשובה. כי ההוראה המקורית שם זה  מחזיק בשיטה שעשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת וזו תהיה גם כמו הדעה שנדחתה בגמרא , הדעה של שמואל ואת רב אסי.

What a human being ought to be?

It was pointed out to me by several people that the religious world seems to be afflicted with a tremendous amount of קטנות המוחין. Small mindedness. Pettiness.  After my learning partner pointed this out and then someone else that was in Uman for Rosh Hashanah I began to wonder why this is the case?

I do not have any answer for this but this very question leads me to wonder what a human being ought to be? To my mind the Rambam and my parents dealt with this question in the best way. 
That is with the Rambam we know one's education ought be in four areas: (1) תנ''ך Old Testament (2) the Entire Oral Law-the Two Talmuds, Sifra, Sifri, Tosephta, Midrash Raba etc. (3) Physics (4) Metaphysics. This we already know from the Rambam. What my parents add to this picture is the idea of Menchlichtkeit and balance. That is hard to describe but mainly it means at it basic level good wholesome character traits. But on a higher level it means being everything a person ought to be. To see beyond the cave. [I have to add to this the basic books of the Musar Movement  which are the books of Musar from the Middle Ages and the books of the disciples of Reb Israel Salanter]

I any case let me say what I think about the Rambam. To get through that material I think what the Talmud says is the idea idea לגמור והדר ליסבר to finish the material and then to go back and do it in more depth. So every time you finish let's say for example the Talmud you add one commentary. Lets say you did it once with Rashi. So the next time you add Tosphot. The third time you do the Maharsha. etc. 
[That is more or less what I do anyway. The first time doing Shas i have to admit I had to do Tosphot because that was part of the basic learning in Shar Yashuv and the Mir. But I found Tosphot very hard to understand. On the other hand I can not say to skip Tosphot because I can see that unless people at at struggle with Tosphot when they are 18-22 years old, they will never get it otherwise. It has to be embedded at early ages.]

intermarriage

When Pinchas saw a Israeli sleeping with a Midianite woman, he killed them both as is related in Parshat Pinchas 
[In that place God agreed with Pinchas and gave him an everlasting covenant.]
The major problem there I think is that of idolatry, not DNA or nationalism. I mean to say that intermarriage seems to be subject to an argument between Shimon ben Yochai and the Sages. To Shimon Ben Yochai the problem is with anyone that serves idols.  That is because he goes by the reason for a verse, not the literal meaning. But the sages confine the verses that forbid intermarriage  to their literal meaning --that is the seven Canaanite nations and any other that are mentioned. The verses about Pinchas I think are related to this issue. But it is hard to tell because of the censors.  
In any case, after thinking about it I would have to say that the Bible is mainly interested in the problem of idolatry in that place, not so much nationalism. [There is another issue which is if the children are counted as one's own--even if marriage is permitted. After all a Jewish slave is allowed to sleep with a non Jewish slave woman as it says in Exodus in Parshat Mishpatim, but the children are not counted as his.]
I mention this because the blog http://amerika.org brought this up about nationalism. However  a friend of mine who learns in a kollel in Jerusalem mentioned to me that Rav Kook defends nationalism.\
[This came up because he was in a mixed kollel in which some people were more on the Religious Zionist side, and others on the reverse side. He asked me about this.  I said the nationalism side had support from the Zohar.}

[I have heard a defense of nationalism from Hegel and that makes sense to me. He was not thinking of every state or every nation, but one that had a kind of higher ideal. That is his kind of combination of  Platonic forms that participate in the particulars. 

From the aspect of Darwin,  there is a kind of process of Nature which begins to separate races into different species-- and that is more based on biology more than nationalism.]

[I am not really sure what to say about Christians. The prohibition of intermarriage is an argument between R. Shimon Ben Yohai and the Sages but in that argument the only question that comes up is either just the seven Canaanite Nations [That is the opinion of the Tur ] or all idol worshipers (that is the opinion of the Rambam). In the context it is clear that the issue is idolatry. And Christianity itself is subject to debate on this issue. The opinions range all the way from the Rambam to most strict until the Meiri and the Abravanel. Tosphot I once tried to work on  with David Bronson, but in the exact same Tospot [In Avoda Zara I forget the page number] there seems to have been a few opinions.  I never got very far with the issues of idolatry. The most I can say is that Christianity does not seem to be idolatry to me. In terms of a legal decision all I can say is I usually go by the most lenient opinions of the Rishonim or opinions in the Gemara which are not pushed out of Halacha. [That is to say in the Gemara itself we have a few different ways of deciding. The Rambam and Rif always go by the לישנא בתרא. Other Rishonim go by לישנא קמא. That is to say to make a decision anywhere it is needed to know the actual sugia in the Gemara itself. In any case I am usually lenient a long as there is at least one Rishon that backs me. (A Rishon means Tosphot, Rif Rosh, Tur, Rambam etc.)   

Someone sent to me a few volumes of the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and I see he has an essay on this subject of the argument between R. Shimon Ben Yochai and the Sages.  I have not figured out what he is saying exactly but he does have away of getting the decision of the Rambam to fit with the Sages {that are not דורשים טעמה דקרא}
The Tur goes with the simple way of understanding the halacaha that since in deciding a law we do not look at the reason for the law לא דורשים טעמה דקרא;--  so only the seven Canaanite nations are forbidden. [That is the Tur decides plain and simple like R. Yehuda. The Rambam decides like the sages  in the law of the king not to have wives above number 18. That is like R. Shimon when the reason for the law is stated in the verse, and like R. Yehuda when it is not. ]

Nationalism I should mention is best dealt with with Richard Epstein -who is a kind of Libertarian. Thus he has a similar problem as does the Talmud which is this: what is the status of a nation? Obviously the Talmud does not deal with that. At most it gets up to the collective level of the Sanhedrin. The most it can do is דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the country is the law. Obviously libertarians have a great deal of trouble also in recognizing the existence of any state. As far as they are considered, it is a non existing entity. Richard Epstein does deal with this problem.   Mainly he does this by means of the Constitution which is more or less the approach of the Rashbam in Bava Batra חזקת הבתים where he considers government to a kind of contract.  Thus Richard Epstein agrees with the existence of government, and it is not the same thing as a collection of individuals, but he puts limits on its power because of the Constitution. See  for example this review.
Also look right at the beginning of the Tur חושן משפט the argument between Rav Joseph Karo and the Bach concerning שותפות. Joining. Partnership. That is a bunch of people put together a collective "purse"  of money to do business with. Is it nothing more than a collection of individuals, or is a new entity created?
This is relevant to the State of Israel.  Halacha has had for a long time great difficulty in dealing with any State. So people that learn Gemara as a rule have great difficulty in seeing any validity in the rules created by any state.  All the more so in the USA where Richard Epstein believes every piece of legislation from 1937 [the New Deal] until now is invalid. 

See this debate between Epstein and Huemer  Epstein you will notice does  justify the existence of government and recognizes it as a separate entity. But he does believe in limited government. That is Epstein is not depending on the Constitution.  As far as he is concerned even a monarchy or any kind of government needs to be limited.
How does he justify government? Epstein says contract does not help unless there is a force to enforce contract. It is a Kantian idea of a "ground" of validity.
A libertarian state is by definition unstable and a gang will automatically take over in which a small group of elites enslave everyone else. This is not an a posteriori argument but a a priori argument and thus Epstein wins the debate. Epstein depends of the Just restitution clause a lot. Not restitution but just restitution--the amount the person would be willing to sell his property for to another individual not the government.

t21 A flat major [t21 in midi]  t22 F Major [t22 in mp3] [t22 in midi]

a law in the Rambam

Just some fast information about this essay. A woman that is married and sleeps with another man is forbidden to her husband from then on of if was by her desire. If she is the wife of a cohen (priest) even if it as rape she is forbidden to her husband because of the prohibition of prostitute. The word "zona" which in general means prostitute in the Torah means a woman that slept with anyone who is forbidden to her. [that is by a prohibition of the Torah or close relations]
A Sota (unfaithful wife) is a woman who was warned by her husband not to be alone with a certain man, and she was alone with him after  that. She drinks the water as mentioned in the book of Numbers right before the section on being a Nazir. At that before she drinks the waters she is forbidden to her husband. If a witness says he saw her sleep with that other man, then she does not drink the waters and must be divorced. [Almost anything can cause her not to drink. It does not have to be a witness. Even a bird flying by that says she was unfaithful.]


Here the Rambam deals with the question is she was warned and was alone and a witness says he saw her with the other man in the act and her husband is  a kohen from the seed of Aaron the high priest and her husband did sleep with her after that.







I wanted to share some thoughts about a law in the Rambam. (הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב) Sleeping with a woman who has seen blood and not waited seven days and gone down to to the river gets lashes. Even though it is ערווה it is still is only lashes. If she is known to her neighbors as being a nida (seeing blood) he also gets lashes. The reason: the Rambam uses the words הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same Halacha the Rambam goes on  to say this hard thing to understand: She is a Sota (There was קינוי וסתירה [warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with] and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed (she slept with another man -not her husband) and then her husband who is a Kohen sleeps with her, he gets lashes for sleeping with a זונה.

The Raavad says for טומאה not זונה.
A "Zona" זונה is generally translated prostitute  but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with  from either a לאו negative commandment or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a kohen from the Torah itself,

Now in any case once there is a warning (קינוי) and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה  and he can not sleep with her and if a witness comes ad says he say her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the Sota. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the Rambam come from that she is a זונה?  --as the Raavad so rightly asks.Here we believe the one witness so the lashes have to be because of טומאה not זונה

Reb Chaim Soloveitchik answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few Gemaras [like קידושין דף ע''ז] There it says a kohen that sleeps with his sister makes her a זונה. If he sleeps  with her again he makes her a חללה. Thus we see the act that makes her a זונה does not confer that status until after the act.] Rav Shach answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here Rav Shach suggest the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד  makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly  with the beginning of the halacah in which case the Rambam is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of Nida with the famous case of the Mikve there that lacks the volume 40 Seah. Here we have a חזקה to start with,- חזקת כשרות which means חזקת הגוף

What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband.  But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this because the idea of עד אחד and קיניו וסתירה  to make a חזקה  does not seem to work here, because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגןף.  But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state.
What I am getting at is that in Nida the Gemara only uses חזקת השתא to go against  חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא  has another חזקה working with it. But here  we have a previous חזקה going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in Nida page 2 Tosphot says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.
After writing the above essay I noticed that Rav Shach might be meaning what my answer is.That it is simply a case of believing one witness.
Now even later I think that Rav Shach did not mean my answer. He specially mention חזקה/ And my answer is rather that the Torah believes עד אחד period.


_________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א:כ''ב. The law is ביאה with a נידה and not waited seven days and טבלה בנהר או מעין gets מכות. Even though she is an ערווה it is still is only מלקות. If she is known to her neighbors as being a נידה he  gets lashes. The reason is  הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה.
In the same הלכה the רמב''ם goes on  to say this hard thing to understand: There is a case in which she is a סוטה. That is there was קינוי וסתירה warning  and she was alone with the man her husband told her not to be alone with, and then one witness comes and says he saw the actual deed  and then her husband who is a כהן slept with her. He gets מכות for sleeping with a זונה.

The ראב''ד says for טומאה, not זונה.
A זונה is generally translated prostitute  but that does not convey the actual meaning.
A זונה is a woman who has slept with a person that she is forbidden to sleep with  from either a לאו  or an איסור עשה and thus forbidden to a כהן from the Torah itself,

Now in any case once there is a warning קינוי and she was alone with the guy her husband told her not to be alone with she is in any case a סוטה  and he can not sleep with her, and if a witness comes and says he saw her sleep together with that guy, then she can not drink the מי סוטה waters of the סוטה. So she is anyway forbidden to her husband but from where does this idea of the רמב''ם come from that she is a זונה? as the ראב''ד so rightly asks.

רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם answers she becomes a זונה by her husband sleeping with her. This answer is obviously unsatisfactory and goes against a few גמרות. Instead רב שך answers an answer that is much better. That is one witness is usually believed in איסורים. That is the famous statement עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. So we would usually believe one witness in a case like this except that here the woman is married which is the one exception when we do not believe a single witness. But here רב שך suggests the combination of קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד  makes a חזקה and that would fit perfectly  with the beginning of the הלכה in which case the רמב''ם is talking about establishing a presumed state חזקה.
What I think is that here we have a case similar to the beginning of נדה ב' ע''ב  with the famous case of the מקוה there that lacks the volume ארבעים סאה. Here we have two חזקות to start with. חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף and we have a חזקה  with a witness. What is the normal law of one witness and  a חזקה? Is this the reason the רמב''ם gives her a חזקת זונה? Or what else might be going on here? I really do not know.

What seems right to me is this. That normally we always believe one witness in איסורים. It is just in the particular case of a woman living with her husband we do not believe one witness to forbid her to her husband.  But here after there has already been קינוי וסתירה we no longer want to make an exception and we return to the original rule of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים.
I also think you have to say this, because the idea of one witness and קיניו וסתירה  to make a חזקה  does not seem to work here because even if it would work, it would be going against two other חזקות, חזקת כשרות וחזקת הגוף.  But also there does not seem to be any reason to say there is a חזקה now of זונה. That is חזקת השתא usually means we know the state of affairs now and we work למפרע to establish a previous state.  But in our case it is exactly the state now that is in doubt.
What I am getting at is that in נדה ב' ע''ב the גמרא only uses חזקת השת to go against  חזקה מעיקרא if the חזקה דהשתא  has another חזקה working with it. But here on the contrary we have two previous חזקות going against a חזקה דהשתא. Now in נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות says that חזקה דהשתא can also work against חזקה מעיקרא by itself to make a doubt. But here with the סוטה we consider it definite so as to give lashes to her husband.

רמב''ם הלכות איסורי ביאה א: כ''ב. החוק הוא ביאה עם נידה ולא חיכה שבעה ימים וטבלה בנהר או מעין מקבל מכות. למרות שהיא מהווה ערווה זה עדיין רק מלקות. אם היא ידועה לשכניה כנידה הוא מקבל מלקות. הסיבה היא הוחזקה נדה בשכינותיה. באותה הלכה רמב''ם ממשיך ואומר דבר קשה זה להבין: יש מקרה שבו היא היא סוטה. כלומר היה קינוי (אזהרה) וסתירה, ולאחר מכן עד אחד  בא ואמר שראה את המעשה בפועל ולאחר מכן בעלה שהוא כהן שכב איתה. הוא מקבל מכות  בגלל זונה.ראב''ד אומר עבור טומאה, לא זונה.זונה מתורגמת זונה בדרך כלל אבל זה לא מעביר את המשמעות בפועל.זונה היא אישה ששכבה עם מי שהיא אסורה לישון אתו בגלל לאו או איסור עשה ובכך אסורה לכהן מן התורה. עכשיו בכל מקרה פעם יש אזהרה קינוי וסתירה. היא בכל מקרה סוטה והוא לא יכול לישון איתה. ואם עד בא ואמר שראה את המעשה, אז היא לא יכולה לשתות את מי סוטה. אז היא אסורה בכל מקרה לבעלה אבל מהיכן הרעיון הזה של רמב''ם  כי היא זונה? כמו ראב''ד בצדק שואל. רב חיים הלוי בחידושי הרמב''ם השיב שהיא הופכת זונה על ידי בעלה ששוכב איתה. תשובה זו היא ללא ספק אינה משביעת רצון ונוגדת כמה גמרות. במקום זה רב שך עונה תשובה  הרבה יותר טובה. כלומר עד אחד בדרך כלל הוא נאמן באיסורים. זוהי ההצהרה המפורסמת עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אז אנחנו בדרך כלל  מאמינים עד אחד במקרה כזה אלא שכאן האישה נשואה ובמצב כזה  אנחנו לא מאמינים לעד אחד. אבל כאן רב שך מציע ששילוב של קינוי וסתירה ועד אחד עושה חזקה. וזה מתאימן באופן מושלם עם תחילת ההלכה במקרה שהרמב''ם מדבר על חזקה. מה שאני חושב הוא כי כאן יש לנו מקרה דומה לתחילת נדה ב' ע''ב עם המקרה המפורסם של מקוה שהוא חסר את נפח ארבעים סאה. כאן עם סוטה יש לנו שתי חזקות. חזקת כשרות ואת חזקת הגוף ויש גם עד עד.  האם זו הסיבה שרמב''ם נותן לה חזקת זונה? או מה עוד יכול להיות קורה כאן? אני באמת לא יודע. מה שנראה לי נכון הוא זה. כי בדרך כלל אנחנו תמיד מאמינים עד אחד באיסורים. רק במקרה מסוים של אישה החיה עם בעלה אנחנו לא מאמינים עד אחד שיאסור עליה בעלה. אבל כאן אחרי שיש כבר קינוי וסתירה אנחנו כבר לא רוצים לנהוג לפנים משורת הדין, ונשוב לכלל המקורי של עד אחד נאמן באיסורים. אני גם חושב כי  עד אחד וקינוי וסתירה אינה עושה חזקה. לא נראה שזה עובד כאן, כי גם אם זה יעבוד, זה יהיה הולך נגד השתי  חזקות אחרות,  חזקת כשרות וחזקה הגןף. אבל גם כאן לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקת השתא של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומרת שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע למצב  קודם. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק השאלה,המצב עכשיו מוטל בספק. מה שאני מנסה לומר כי נדה ב' ע''ב הגמרא רק משתמשת עם חזקת השתא ללכת נגד חזקא מעיקרא אם לחזקת דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עמה. אבל כאן להפך, יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות שהולכות נגד חזקת השתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב' ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את האיזה כוודאי זונה על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה. אבל גם שם לא נראה שיש סיבה לומר קיימת חזקה עכשיו של זונה. כלומר חזקת השתא בדרך כלל אומר שאנחנו יודעים את מצב העניינים עכשיו ואנחנו עובדים למפרע להקים מדינה קודמת. אבל במקרה שלנו זה בדיוק המדינה עכשיו מוטלת בספק. מה אני מנסה לומר כי נדתי ב 'ע''ב גמרא רק משתמש חזק השת ללכת נגד חזקת מעיקרא אם חזק דהשתא יש עוד חזקה לעבוד עם זה. אבל כאן להפך יש לנו שתי חזקות קודמות הולכות נגד חזקת דהשתא. עכשיו ב נדה ב 'ע''ב תוספות אומר כי חזקה דהשתא גם יכול לעבוד נגד חזקה מעיקרא מעצמו לעשות ספק. אבל כאן עם סוטה אנו רואים את זה מובהק על מנת לתת מלקות לבעלה.


[On a side note I think in general the law is like Rabainu Tam that Shabat starts 72 minutes after sunset but that is only of you go by the 18 minute "mil". A 24 minute mil puts the night at 96 minutes after sunset. And the disciple of Rabbainu Tam goes Eliezer from Mitz goes by five mil, not four mil which means 2 hours.
I had to write that essay fast before Shabat started. In any case I hope it is clear that my difference with Rav Shach is very minor. I basically accept his answer, but with slight twist.Instead of "Hazaka" I go with the idea of "one witness is believed.' And for all I know this might have been exactly what he was getting at.

The religious world is a mess as is well known and yet it came as a shock to me to realize this.
I was really in love heads over heels in love with Torah in the most powerful way possible. But it was like getting a bucket of ice cold water poured over my head to realize how corrupt and dishonest and unholy and unclean the religious world is. The world that claims to be keeping the Torah is not the same as the people that actually keep the Torah. 

If the authentic Lithuanian yeshivas are overly cautious about whom they let in their doors it is because they have been burnt too many times and thus err on the side of caution.  [Of course the trouble is they end up most often throwing out the sincere people and leaving the hypocrites that have rich parents.  Still I think it is obvious that the religious world needs a thorough Chametz cleaning. Throw out every single last bit of chametz leaven is my recommendation.

n11 mp3 n11 midi  n11 nwc