Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
30.1.25
אם אתה מסתכל על רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח של בבא בתרא אז הנושא נראה ברור. רבא הולך כמו החכמים שמחייבים את הגורם לנזק להוציא את חפצו מהמקום. ואף על פי שכל הפוסקים מחזיקים בדין כר' יוסי שגורס שמי שיכול להינזק צריך להוציא את חפצו מהמקום, וכמעט אוניברסליים המחזיקים בדעת שרבא חזר בו, וחל רק במקרה של חפירת בור ליד גבול, עדיין אני חושב שהפוסקים נמשכו לשני כיוונים מנוגדים. מצד אחד הגמרא אומרת אחר כך שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי. מאידך, הדין תמיד כרבא חוץ ביע''ל כג''ם. הדרך היחידה להחזיק בשני הניגודים הללו היא ללכת עם רבינו תם ולקבוע שר' יוסי מסכים כאשר מדובר ב"החצים שלו גורמים נזק ישיר" ולומר שלזה רבא מתכוון. ולי נראה שהכי טוב ללכת עם רבינו יצחק שמסביר את הנושא בצורה פשוטה יותר. לפיכך, הנושא יהיה כזה. "אם רבא צודק, אז איך נמצא מקרה של הדבורים ליד הגבול כפי ר' יוסי? עונה רב פפא "מדובר במכירה", [והדבורים אינן גורמות נזק לדעת החכמים, אבל לר' יוסי כן והדבורים באו אחר החרדל. ובנקודה זו, כיון שר' יוסי סובר שהדבורים גורמות נזק, היה אומר גם אם היו שם קודם, יש להרחיקן]. אז למה שהחכמים יקבעו שיש להרחיק את פשתן(משרה) מהירקות? תשובה: על כל מה שגורם לנזק שיילקח מהמקום. ורבא הוא כמו החכמים. אם היית הולך עם רבינו תם, קשה לראות מדוע, ובאיזה נקודה בגמרא שהוא אמור לחזור בו מגישתו, זה מלבד שאר השאלות שהרמב''ן מביא נגד הדרך של רוב ראשונים מבינים ר' תם ור' חננאל. איך לענות על הסתירה בהלכה? הייתי אומר סוגיות חלוקות
If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra
If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the poskim hold the law is like R. Yose who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of Rava was retracted and only applies in the case of the of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the poskim were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand, the Gemara says later that the law is like R. Yose. On the other hand, the law is always like Rava except in yal kegam. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with Rabbanu Tam, and to hold that R Yose agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what Rava means. And to me it seems best to go with Rabainu Izhak who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this:(the gemara would be read thus): "If Rava is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like R Yose implies? Answers Rav Papa, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the sages, but to R. Yose they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point since R Yose thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away].Then why would the sages hold that the tub of linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene." And Rava is like the sages. If you would go with Rabbainu Tam, it is hard to see why and at what point in the gemara that rava is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the Ramban brings against the way most rishonim understand rabainu Tam and rabbainu chananel. How to answer the contradiction in halacha? I would say the two sugiot are not the same. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________
If you look at רבינו יצחק in page י''ח of בבא בתרא then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the חכמים that hold it the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the פוסקים hold the law is like ר' יוסי who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of רבא was retracted, and only applies in the case of of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the פוסקים were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand the גמרא says later that the law is like ר' יוסי. On the other hand, the law is always like רבא except in יע''ל כג''ם. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with רבינו תם and to hold that ר' יוסי agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what רבא means. And to me it seems best to go with רבינו יצחק who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this. If רבא is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like ר' יוסי implies? Answers רב פפא, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the חכמים, but to ר' יוסי they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point, since ר' יוסי thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away]. Then why would the חכמים hold that the משרה linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene. And רבא is like the חכמים. If you would go with רבינו תם, it is hard to see why, and at what point in the גמרא that he is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the רמב''ן brings against the way most ראשונים understand ר' תם and ר' חננאל. How to answer the contradiction in הלכה? I would say סוגיות חלוקות
29.1.25
General Grant in his book on the Civil War
General Grant in his book on the Civil War wrote that the Constitution does not forbid succession, nor allows it. From that fact, I would say that the Federal Government can not go against it because the Federal Government has only enumerated powers. But Grant himself did not draw that conclusion, but rather wrote that since the idea of succession was not stated in the Constitution, therefore the country founded on the Constitution has the right of self-defense.
What I think this brings forth is the question of how different politics is different from civil law between individuals. In mean in individuals, what I written in a contract is exactly what I there, nothing more or less—unless things are unclear. And if that would be applied to the Constitution then this issue is not ambiguous, it clearly stated that the government has only enumerated powers. How however politics in terms of nation states is different from civil law between individuals. How much so and why is unclear to me. In the tradition of England [upon which the American concept of government is based] a written document of the government is absolutely binding. But if you look at countries like the ussr, contracts are approximate indication of intention, but what matters is the individuals in power.
28.1.25
Rav shach does not usually state a halacha, but in his pamphlet of keeping damages away, he does actually bring the idea that most first authorities hold with the law of Tophot on page 22 of Bava Batra that the kind of damages that are brought in chapter 2 of Bava Batra are only considered to cause damage if on the other side of the border, there is already placed there something that could cause damage. And also, that if that is the case (that one has placed there something that can cause damage), then it can stay there even after the other person has placed his object there. And example would be like a tub used to soak linen that can cause vegetables on the other side of the border to absorb the noxious fumes. so, if that tub was already there, then even if the neighbor plants vegetables on the other side of the border, the tub can stay there [within three handbreaths of the border].
26.1.25
I have been thinking about politics and it occurred to me that it is a significant subject that deserves study. One thing I learned when very young is the approach taken by the hard sciences that even if one has the most logical consistent system, and most developed with rigor and painstaking logic, if that theory predictes a result that turns but to be false, then that theory is wrong. And this fact is what always seemed to me to be wrong with communism. It is a powerful logical system based on great thinkers like Adam smith in economics [who came up with the Labor Theory of Value which is an essential building block of communism, and on Hegel. And like any respectable scientific theory, it makes specific predictions. The problem is all its predictions turned out to be false. And this was obvious even to Lenin himself when he established the first communist state, and therefore tried to patch up the system by claiming certain outside forces were propping up Capitalism. But even since then, there has never been a communist state with prosperity as claimed in the communist manifesto.
But if you try to find logical rigor in capitalism, you will have a hard time trying. The kind of system that results in prosperity and human flourishing wherever it is tried is based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights. And these were not created by any kind of abstract theory, but came about as a result of a cruel King, John I who was so overbearing that the lords of the land decided to force him to sign a document—the Magna Carta. And later, a religious crusader (Simon DE Monfort) forced a king to sign an even more extensive document, the Provisions of Oxford. And the English system as developed was taken over almost in its entirety by the American Colonies who kept the system. The idea of the America Revolution was in order to keep on living under the same kind of system that they had been already. The objection to England was that the Parliament was treating the colonies not as Englishmen with the same rights as all other Englishmen.
The reason that "Reason" fails that the important task of figuring out a decent system of government is that there is a limit to pure reason, and that when it attempts to go beyond its limits, it begins to come up with aburdities.
24.1.25
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)