So while there is no promises, still the idea was the only way to deal with life's difficulties is to learn Torah.

 The general approach of the Mir Yeshiva in NY when it came to life's questions was "learn Torah". [In pain English that means the oral and written Law: the Old Testament, the two Talmuds plus the midrashim.] That was at least the basic idea I got by hanging around the rosh yeshiva, Rav Shmuel Berenbaum. That is there was an implicit awareness that life has tons of difficulties and most of which simply have no "solution". That is just the way life is. As Jordan Peterson puts it: "Life is hard." [He means that it is implicitly hard, not because someone else is making it hard.] 

So while there is no promises, still the idea was the only way to deal with life's difficulties is to learn Torah. 

[There are differences in approach however. How much in depth learning and how much fast leaning and the proper balance seems to differ from Litvak yeshiva to any other Litvak yeshiva.]

The only two things I would like to add to this is the idea of Physics and Mathematics being part of the command to learn Torah as you can see in the last of the first four chapters of Mishna Torah where "Pardes" is defined as Physics and Metaphysics as the Greeks understood them, and then later where it is stated that one should divide the learning time into Tenach, Oral Law, and Gemara and in the category of Gemara is ''Pardes." 

Plus the idea that even Math can be learned in that fast sort of way that is usually reserved for learning Gemara fast- that is to say the words and go on. 

crises [plural] in an individual's life

 The point of Rav Nahman of Breslov and the point of those learning his books is to address crises [plural] in an individual's life. It is not to define Torah. Nor is it actually to "be mehazek" strengthen one in keeping Torah-- though sometimes that is the effect. The cause of this is that something changed in human mentality in the 1700's. The old forms of community were still in place, but something about the modern mind changed. The issues and problems became very different.

This is very different from the sort of Musar (Ethics) books of the Middle Ages which were to define what it is that Torah requires from you in terms of Fear of God and character traits. They in essence explain what the Torah is all about in a practical sense. They are slightly different from books of the Middle Ages which deal more directly with the actual worldview of Torah. 

What were some of the crises that Rav Nahman was dealing with? The average layman could accept the idea that we ought to just learn and keep Torah plainly and simply.  But the problem was with religious leaders that seemed intent on fouling up the whole thing--and still are. So he deals with that often in e.g. LeM vol. I ch.s 8, 12, 28, 60, vol. II ch.s 1, 8  and many other places I forget off hand.

בבא בתרא דף ב' ע''אAt the very end of this i suggest an approach that might help understand this sugia. But without my learning partner, David Bronson, I am not sure how it all would fit together.

תוספות asks in of בבא בתרא דף ב' ע''א why do you need "therefore"? [היינו since they are required to build the wall, therefore they divide if it falls.]. Answers תוספות: it might fall into the domain of just one and he would be believed saying, "I built it" because he has a מיגו of saying, "I bought it." רב עקיבא אייגר asks, "Why do you need 'I bought it?'" Perhaps just "I built it" alone should be believed since it is in his domain except for the "therefore" of the משנה. To answer this question רב שך says if he would say "I built it", and if he is believed, that takes the wall out of its חזקה of belonging to both. He got the idea from  רב איסר מלצר the author of the אבן האזל. That means that he would not be believed to say I built it except for the possibility that he could have said I bought it. So now we know he can not even say that because they are both required to build the wall. רב שך suggests further that this might depend on a similar argument between תוספות and the Rambam in בבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א. The case is two people come into court holding a garment. The law is they divide. What happens if after that, one comes in and only he is holding it and says, "The other admitted to me that it is mine." The other says, "I rented it to him." The גמרא says, "He is not believed, because we say 'Until now you thought he is  a thief, and now you rented it to him without witnesses?" תוספות asks why do we need the "We are witnesses?" Answer: because there is a מיגו he could have said, "You grabbed it from me." So we see that in fact if he had said that he would be believed. So why not believe the first one that has the object? Because he says you agreed with me and by that he tries to place the other in the category of  a thief and so he is not believed. What רב שך is saying here is hard to figure out. It seems to me that both are accusing the other. And why would this have a חזקת מטלטלים after they were already in court and it was decided they should split? I would like to suggest that this is in fact the reason the גר''א in חושן משפט קל''ח  and the ריטב''א have a different answer for why he would be believed to say, "The other grabbed it," because it is talking about things that are commonly borrowed or rented out. That is what I think that note of the גר''א means over there. Furthermore the רמב''ם is consistent with his other opinion  about if one grabs after there is already a doubt [תפס אחר שנולד הספק] that we do not take it from him and the רא''ש holds we do take it from him. That is about the case of  "a כהן grabs a animal of tithe that is doubtful." So the רא''ש is just going with the תוספןת as usual. That is to say both of the pleas cancel since each is accusing the other of lying so we simply go with חזקה. And the one that has it now has no חזקה since he has it after there has already been born the doubt.

However the reason why I think the גר''א is right here is that תוספות is saying that the טענה "he took it from me" in the בבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א is believed in and of itself, not just because of the חזקת מטלטלים. So while the issue of  one party seized it  after the doubt is born is relevant, still that is not the reason for תוספות to say the actual טענה of "he seized  it" is believed.

תוספות שואל בבבא בתרא דף ב' ע''א מדוע אתה צריך "לפיכך"? [היינו מכיוון שהם נדרשים לבנות את הקיר, ולכן הם מתחלקים אם הקיר נופל.]. תשובת התוספות: זה עלול ליפול לנחלתו של אחד בלבד והוא יאמין באומרו, "בניתי את זה" כי יש לו מיגו לומר: "קניתי את זה." רב עקיבא איגר שואל, "למה אתה צריך 'קניתי את זה?'" אולי צריך להאמין רק "בניתי את זה" לבד מכיוון שהוא נמצא בתחום שלו, למעט "לכן" של משנה. כדי לענות על שאלה זו רב שך אומר אם הוא היה אומר "בניתי את זה", ואם מאמינים לו, זה מוציא את החומה מחזקה של שייכות לשניהם. הוא קיבל את הרעיון מרב איסר מלצר מחבר אבן האזל. זה אומר שלא יאמינו לו שהוא אומר "שבניתי את זה" למעט האפשרות שהוא יכול לומר "שקניתי את זה." אז עכשיו אנחנו יודעים שהוא אפילו לא יכול לומר את זה בגלל ששניהם נדרשים לבנות את החומה. רב שך מציע עוד שזה עשוי להיות תלוי בוויכוח דומה בין תוספות לרמב"ם בבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א. המקרה הוא ששני אנשים מגיעים לבית המשפט המחזיקים בגד. החוק הוא שהם מתחלקים. מה קורה אם אחרי זה, אחד נכנס ורק הוא אוחז בזה ואומר, "השני הודה בפניי שהוא שלי." השני אומר, "הישכרתי לו את זה." הגמרא אומרת, "לא מאמינים לו, כי אנחנו אומרים 'עד עכשיו חשבת שהוא גנב, ועכשיו הישכרת לו את זה בלי עדים?' תוספות שואל מדוע אנו זקוקים ל"אנחנו עדים"? תשובה: מכיוון שיש מיגו הוא יכול היה לומר, "תפסת את זה ממני." אז אנחנו רואים שלמעשה אם הוא היה אומר את זה שיאמינו לו. אז למה לא להאמין לראשון שיש לו את האובייקט? כי הוא אומר "שהסכמת איתי" ועל ידי זה הוא מנסה למקם את האחר בקטגוריה של גנב ולכן לא מאמינים לו. את מה שרב שך אומר כאן קשה להבין. נראה לי ששניהם מאשימים את האחר. ולמה שיהיה לזה חזקת מטלטלין אחרי שהם כבר היו בבית המשפט והוחלט שעליהם לחלק? ברצוני להציע שזו למעשה הסיבה שלגר"א בחושן משפט קל''ח והריטב"א יש תשובה אחרת מדוע יאמינו לו לומר "האחר תפס את זה" כי זה מדבר על דברים שמושאלים בדרך כלל או מושכרים. זה מה שאני חושב שפתק הגר"א אומר שם. יתר על כן הרמב''ם תואם את דעתו האחרת לגבי אם תופס אחרי שיש כבר ספק [תפס אחר שנולד הספק] שאנחנו לא לוקחים את זה ממנו והרא''ש מחזיק שאנחנו כן לוקחים את זה ממנו. זה בערך המקרה של "כהן תופס חיה של מעשר שהוא בספק." אז הרא''ש פשוט הולך עם התוספת כרגיל. כלומר שתי התביעות מתבטלות מכיוון שכל אחת מהן מאשימה את השנייה בשקר ולכן אנחנו פשוט הולכים עם חזקה. ולמי שיש לו עכשיו אין חזקה שכן יש לו את זה אחרי שכבר נולד הספק [ביניין תקפו כהן]. אולם הסיבה שבגללה אני חושב שהגר"א צודק כאן היא שתוספות אומר כי הטענה "הוא חטף את זה ממני" בבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א מאמינים כשלעצמה, לא רק בגלל של חזקת מטלטלין. אז אמנם הנושא של צד אחד תפס אותו לאחר לידת הספק הוא רלוונטי, אך עדיין זו לא הסיבה של תוספות לומר כי מאמינים בפועל לטענה של הוא תפס אותו  

Leonard Nelson

 There seems to be an argument about who is the greatest philosopher of the 20th century. That would imply that 20th century philosophy had much to say.

However my suggestion is Leonard Nelson of the Kant Fries School. [His ideas are explained in plain English by Dr Kelley Ross on his Friesian.com site].

The reason is that Dr. Ross tends to combine a few admirable things. One is the rigor of the analytic school-and yet not be caught in their triviality. Two is deeply human concerns--that very things that were of great interest to Nietzsche. Third is that odd fact that philosophical profundity and political common sense usually so not come together, yet in Kelley Ross they do.

cease using Torah to make money.

The arise of science, and organized religion have produced a crisis in faith.

Organized religion is known to be at the cost of sincere religion. This theme you can see in the Prophets. [Just one example is in Isaiah at the very beginning where he does not think more sacrifices or more attendance at the Temple is a positive thing.  He reports that God is displeased with that.]

Science also does cause questions.

Since you can see this in the Old Testament itself, it seems best to keep Torah private. Though there are times that there is some use for organization. [As I saw in the great and amazing Mir of NY and Shar Yashuv also.] Still the general result comes at a cost of authentic Torah.

The organization tends to promise the absurd --you can have everything. No need for moral choice.

It seems not to be authentic. And that follows. Fraud follows organized religion as heat follows fire.

And besides that we know from Pirkei Avot, that Torah is not meant to be a means of making a living.

Rav Nahman clearly indicates this problem when he discuss the problem of Torah scholars that are demons. 

[What is the source of the problem of organized religion? Self deception, not hypocrisy. That is people willfully ignore their own evil. [You can see this problem brought up a lot in Dostoyevsky in Anna Karenina ,]

Since I have seen this problem a lot, to me it seems the best idea is to listen to the Mishna in Pirkei Avot to simply cease using Torah to make money.

Tosphot asks in the beginning of Bava Batra

 Tosphot asks in the beginning of Bava Batra why do you need "therefore" [that is since they are required to build the wall, therefore they divide if it falls.]. Answers Tosfot: it might fall into the domain of just one and he would be believed saying, "I built it" because he has a migo  [i.e a case of "he could have said such and such and be believed, so if  he puts in a different plea, he should be believed. For after all if he wanted to lie, he had a better way of doing so."] of saying, "I bought it."

Rav Akiva Eigger asks, "Why do you need 'I bought it?'" Perhaps just "I built it" alone should be believed since it is in his domain except for the "therefore" of the mishna.

Rav Shach says if he would say "I built it",  and if he is believed, that takes the wall out of its hazaka [prior status] of belonging to both. [He got the idea from Isar Meltzer the author of the Even HaEzel]

So to say, "I built it" would be believed only because "I bought it" would be believed. But as the mishna says here neither would be believed because both are required to build the wall.

Rav Shach suggests further that this might depend on a similar argument between Tosphot and the Rambam in Bava Metzia 6b. The case is two people come into court holding a garment. The law is they divide. What happens if after that, one comes in and only he is holding it and says, "The other admitted to me that it is mine."? The other says, "I rented it to him." The Gemara says, "He is not believed, because we say 'Until now you thought he is  a thief, and now you rented it to him without witnesses?"

Tosfot asks why do we need the "We are witnesses?" Answer: because there is a migo he could have said, "You grabbed it from me." So we see that in fact if he had said that he would be believed. So why not believe the first one that has the object? Because he says you agreed with me placing the other in the category of  a thief and so he is not believed.

It is times like this that I wish I was learning with David Bronson, my learning partner in Uman. For what Rav Shach is saying here is hard to figure out on my own. It seems to me that both are accusing the other. And why would this have a Hezkat [prior status] movable objects after they were already in court and it was decided they should split. 

I would like to suggest that this is in fact the reason the Gra [in Choshen Mishpat 138] and the Ritva have a different answer for why he would be believed to say, "The other grabbed it," because it is talking about things that are commonly borrowed or rented out.

[That is what I think that note of the Gra means over there.]

Furthermore the Rambam is consistent with his other opinion  about if one grabs after there is already a doubt that we do not take it from him and the Rosh holds we do take it from him. [That is about the case of "a cohen grabs a animal of tithe that is doubtful."]  

So the Rosh is just going with the Tosphot as usual. That is to say both of the pleas cancel since each is accusing the other of lying so we simply go with hazaka. And the one that has it now has no hazaka since he has it after there has already been born the doubt.

However the reason why I think the Gra is right here is that Tosphot is saying that the plea "he took it from me" [in the Bava Metzia case on page 6] is believed in and of itself, not just because of the hezkat metatalim [status of movable objects.] So while the issue of  one party seized it  after the doubt is born is relevant still that is not the reason for Tosphot to say the actual plea of he seized  it is believed.

"Secular learning" חכמות חיצוניות is something that Rav Nahman Breslov was against. However his disciple R Nathan takes it to a degree that I think was not in the intension of Rav Nahman.

"Secular learning" חכמות חיצוניות is something that Rav Nahman Breslov was against. However his disciple R Nathan takes it to a degree that I think was not in the intension of Rav Nahman. I do not think you can put pseudo science into the same category as legitimate science. And there are hints to this distinction in the LeM itself. It is along the same lines as when Rav Nahman spoke at length against going to doctors and yet when a medicine came to that area and was only available in a far away town Rav Nahman said even to take one's children in the middle of winter to get it.

So I think to go with the approach of the rishonim like Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam that held one ought to learn Physics and Metaphysics. But how much and how deeply if one is not exactly talented in these areas? I think one ought to get up to String Theory. But what does that require? Well, not a lot of what you might think. That is sure you need Algebra, but how much? I think unless one is going to become a professional Physicist, he or she does not really need to spend a lot of time on solving equations. One needs to know what it means to solve an equation but to actually find the zeros--where the equation hits the x axis you really just need to feed the equation into a graph function hand held calculator and see where the equation hits the axis. Same idea with Calculus. What one needs for Physics is one single integral , the Gaussian integral.