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17.7.19

Bava Metzia page 99. בב''מ צ''ט ע''א A New Idea based on Rav Shach.

I have a great deal of trouble in getting to learn Torah. Certainly no new ideas are coming to me since I stop learning with David Bronson my learning partner. But for what it is worth I wanted just to mention a few random thoughts I had about Bava Metzia page 99.




The first thing I think is important is in Tosphot very first question. At first glance it looks hard to understand why Tosphot just does not use the end of the Tosephta that he brings to answer his own question. I mean to say this. Rav Ami in our Gemara on page 99 says one who lends to another person an ax of hekdesh (that was dedicated to the Temple) transgresses the prohibition and the second person can use it.  In the Tosephta it says (as far as I can recall from a few days ago when I had a chance to take a look at that page) that ten people that use an ax one after the other,--they all transgress the prohibition of using hekdesh [an object dedicated to the Temple]. But then it says if one gives it to another, then the first person transgress, and the second is allowed to use it. Tosphot uses the end of the Tosephta to show that we are not talking about vessels used in the sacrifices (which never go out to be secular even if used for a secular purpose).  But why not use that end statement of the Tosephta simply to show that change of domain makes one liable in Meila [using temple goods]?
[התוספתא כותבת שאם עשרה אנשים משתמשים עם קרדום אחד כולם מעלו. זה מיצג קושיה על רב אמי שאומר  שאומר בב''מ צ''ט ע''א המשאיל קרדום לחבירו הוא מעל וחבירו מותר להשתמש בו. תוספות אומר שאי אפשר לומר שהתוספתא מדבר בכלי שרת בגלל שבסוף התוספתא כתוב שאחד נתן את הקרדום לחבירו הוא לבד מעל וחבירו מותר להשתמש בו. אפשר לשאול למה סוף התוספתא בעצמה אינה תירוץ על קושיית התוספות? אני חושב שהתירוץ הוא זה. יש מחלוקת אם מעילה שייכת רק בשוגג או רק במזיד. זאת מחלוקת תנאים במשנה. אני מתכוון לומר שמעילה במצב שהחפץ יוצר לחולין.. ברור שיש איסור בכל מצב. ולכן תוספות רוצים להגיד תירוץ ששייך לשתי הדעות. למשל שהם יודעים שהחפץ הוא הקדש אבל אינם רוצים להוציאו מרשות הקדש. איך זה שייך? רק במצב שהמשתמשים הם גיזברים.





Now I am not really asking a question as much as simply making an observation since it does seem that this is exactly what Tosphot says himself in his answer. That the beginning of the Tosephta is talking about Gizbarim (people appointed to watch and take care of things dedicated to the Temple).
So Tosphot in fact is simply saying the obvious--that the first case of the Tosephta is where each person uses it without intending to change domain.

But what I wanted to bring out which I think is more important is the fact that Tosphot is not making any claims about whether anyone in the Tosphot is doing it on purpose or by accident. That is to say- Tosphot is thinking that his idea applies in either case. If you hold that meila [using a holy object  takes the object out of the catagory of holiness and makes it secular) is only in  case of shogeg (accident) then his idea applies. And if you hold it only applies in a case of Mezid [on purpose] it also applies.
(That is an argument among the tenaim of the Mishna). So in plain English that means that in one case the people that use the ax know that it is hekdesh, but are not intending to take it out of the domain of hekdesh since they are all gizbarim (people appointed over Temple treasury). In the other case they in fact do not know that the ax is hekdesh. And so this answer my first question or observation. Why do the Tosephta have to be talking about Gizbarim? Because that is the only way they can know it is hekdesh and still not intend to take it out of the domain of Hekdesh.[That is to say that Tosphot wants his answer to fit both opinions. Including the one that Meila is only in a case of knowing it is hekdesh.]
I think this is an elegant answer for the observation why Tosphot needs to say the Tosephta is a case of Gizbarim instead of just any group of people.[Incidently I think one of the Tenaim that I mentioned is R Meier.]

The other observation I wanted to make is that perhaps Rav Huna over here can provide some support to the opinion of the Rambam that Meila is only when one actually derives some benefit out of the object. [Since I am not learning Torah, this is all a bit vague --but what I am thinking has to do with Rav Huna here and also on page 43a. That is to say that from what I can recall on page 99 we do not have any proof. But what the Rambam might have noticed is that if Rav Huna on page 43 would hold that meila only applies in a case where one derives benefit then he would have an answer to Rav nahman. So the Rambam decided that in fact that must be the opinion of Rav Huna and decided for some reason to state that that is the law. [I only noticed this opinion of the Rambam after seeing it pointed out in the Even haAzel by Rav Meltzer one of the teachers of Rav Shach.]
[I do not recall what the Even Hazel said about this Rambam. He might have had a different idea of how the Rambam derived his result. I just do not recall.]

עוד דבר. ראיתי באבן האזל שהרמב''ם מחזיק בשיטה שמעילה שייך רק במצב שאחד נהנה מהחפץ. נראה לי שהרמב''ם דייק את זה מרב הונא. היינו שרב הונא בב''מ צט. מחזיק שהמשאיל קרדום לחבירו אם בקע בו קנאו לא בקע בו לא קנאו. אם רב הונא יחזיק בשיטה הזאת גם לגבי מעילה זה יתרץ את קושיית רב נחמן עליו בדף מג ע''א. הרקע כאן הוא שהמשנה שם בדף מ''ג כותבת שהמפקיד כסף אצל שולחני בלא מכסה השולחני יכול להשתמש בו ולכן אם נאבד הוא חייב. רב הונא מחזיק בשיטה שגם אם נאנסו גם הוא חייב. היינו שיש לו דין שואל. רב נחמן מחזיק שרק אם נאבדו המעות  הוא חייב לא אם נאנס. היינו שיש לו דין שומר שכר.
רב נחמן מביא קושייה על רב הונא מהברייתא. גיזבר נתן כסף של הקדש לשולחני-והשולחני השתמש בו ונאבד הכסף,  הגזבר מעל. היינו רק אם השתמש בו הוא מעל אבל היתר השתמשות אינה מחייב אלא כמו שומר שכר. אני לא זוכר את זה בדיוק בגלל שאני לא לומד תורה בעוונותיי הרבים. אבל איך שהוא, אם רב הונא היה מחזיק בשיטה שם שמעילה שייך רק במצב של הנאה אז אין קושיא עליו מן הברייתא. ולכן הרמב''ם הסיק מסקנה שבאמת שה מה שרה הונא חייב להחזיק. וזה יוצא טוב עם שיטתו בדף צ''ט ע''א. ואז בגלל איזו סיבה הוא פסק כרב הונא.





Apollo 11

I had in mind yesterday to mention that the Apollo 11 mission left Earth on July 16. It was powered by the Saturn V that had been developed by Wernher Von Braun. I just wanted to add a few comments. That Von Braun was caught by the Gestapo and put into prison for two weeks. He was accused by the Gestapo of trying to make rockets for space exploration instead of for killing Englishmen. (I think their suspicions were correct) In fact, he was only freed because of an assistant vouching for him.

Another thing is his name is pronounced Von Brown.

Another thing is that there were a few people before him that contributed to the idea of space travel a  Tsiolkovsky (Russian) (The first letter of his name is like the Hebrew letter Tsadi צ) , and Oberth (German) , and of course the famous American, Goddard.

My dad was working at TRW at the time working on laser communication between satellites which was a totally different program than the Apollo Mission. [He had done the work on the infrared satellites an then started on the laser ones.]

[The first words spoken on the Moon were "Contact Light" by Buzz Aldrin--meaning that the sensor on one of the legs of the Lunar module showed contact with the surface.

I ought to mention that the Saturn V rocket was an achievement in itself. it is hard to build a rocket that can withstand the kinds of pressure that were needed to reach orbit.

16.7.19

The subject of Kabalah is a little difficult for me to deal with. Mainly I would say there are people whose judgment I trust as having insight into spiritual affairs like the Arizal [Isaac Luria] and Rav Nahman from Breslov and Rav Avraham Abulafia to name a few. That does not mean that they never made a mistake but rather that they had great insights.

This is to some degree based on Dr. Kelley Ross of the Kant Fries school that there is such a thing as non intuitive immediate knowledge.
[Non known by senses but known not through any intermediate step.]

The difficulty that I see is that of the Sitra Achra--the realm of evil that takes a disguise as holiness. And to discern the difference I see is hard. So how can you tell the difference? To me it seems fairly easy since internal rot always appears on the outside. That is you can tell by the fact of a person being overly concerned about outward appearance tells you already that without that concern--something rotten would appear immediately.

But that might seem like a hard thing to discern. There is then another way to judge the situation-- character traits. That is even though character and holiness are two difference areas of value, still they are connected.


[In any case in terms of the Ari I recommend the interpretations of the Ramchal, Rav Yaakov Abu-hazeira, and the Reshash. I also ought to add the Remak as being important as David Bronson mentioned to me numerous times.

15.7.19

layman's books in science

When it came to layman's books in science-it depends. In terms of Physics and Math I decided that it was better to learn the actual material. But in other areas like dinosaurs I enjoy the books written by experts for laymen like me.  But the difference I am not sure of. because even in Physics I was looking at books by experts  and yet at some point I got the idea that that was no substitute for the real thing.

Americans have had for  along time a suspicion of experts. and have held highly form self educated people.  When I was young I had a child's biography of Abraham Lincoln where I learnt that he was self educated. And that model served me well in yeshiva where in fact to get anywhere in gemara most of the effort had to be  done on my own. And yet even with that I admit that without the impute of Shar yashuv [Naftali Yegear] and the Mir {Rav Shmuel Berenbaum} in NY --even with all the effort in the world-I would have been a pure am haaretz [ignoramus]. [That is what is called "knowing how to learn." You do not get that by learning. You have to get it from someone who really knows.]
[However for people that do not have the advantage of being in the Mir or Ponovitch I might just add that if you learn Rav Haim from Brisk that is  a good introduction to understanding what it means to know how to learn. Now on one hand he does concentrate on the Rambam but the inner idea is more or less the same whether you apply it to the Rambam or Tosphot.  Mainly knowing how to learn has to do with become able to see the deeper issues inside of Tosphot of the Rambam. Even if you are like me that these issues are not at all obvious. Still being aware of the depth inside of the Tosphot of rambam in itself more or less means that you know how to learn.



Can Morality Be Grounded in Science? [A question I saw mention in https://www.crisismagazine.com/2019/can-morality-be-grounded-in-science

Dr. Michael Huemer deals with that exact question. In one place he mentions Hume's law that you can not derive an ought from an is. But he also adds in another place that even if you can not derive an ought from an is still you can learn. For example it is not a fallacy to ask if communism caused the death of millions then how can it be a just doctrine? That is not a fallacy. Further I might add that he does hold that reason can recognize moral principles but not because they are based on science. But rather because reason recognizes universals.

I think Michael Huemer [Intuitionists based on Prichard and GE Moore] and Dr Kelley Ross [Kant Fries school] disagree about these issues. But still I tend to see them in a similar way. For after all what is "non intuitive immediate knowledge" except for knowledge that reason recognizes right away without any intermediate step. Is that not the same thing as what Michael Huemer saying what reason does? And in terms of things being possibly wrong Dr Huemer goes into that. That one a priori can defeat another a priori. based on a higher degree of credibility and also i think if it is more or less supported by the evidence.
In the world of Lithuanian Yeshivas, learning Physics and Math were not high priorities --at least when I was there. On one hand I can understand this because in fact it takes a long time and a lot of effort to gain any kind of understanding of Gemara. So, you really do not want distractions. On the other hand, at some point I noticed that Physics and Metaphysics were considered part of the Gemara by the Rambam. (He writes in the Laws of Learning Torah that the subjects discussed in the first four chapters of the Mishna Torah are in the category of Gemara) Also, Joseph Ibn Pakuda [the author of the Obligations of the Heart]. [In the Obligations of the hearts you see this in perek 3 of behina where he says to learn the wisdom inside of Creation and also (besides that) the spiritually inside of Creation. Clearly two different things. The Metaphysics part you see right on the first page where he talks about the wisdom the Arabs call Metaphysics. So he is not talking about something different than the Rambam. [Still I admit this is not universal among rishonim. Some take a dim view of Aristotle.] But in terms of Post Aristotle Philosophy what would the Rambam and Ibn Pakuda hold by? My own feeling about this issue is that Kant and Hegel would be thought to be legitimate continuations of Metaphysics just as i think modern day Physics would be a legitimate continuation of what the Rambam is calling "Physics". [There are people who are talented in math that are so smart that they make the rest of us feel small. That is why physics envy is ra real thing. People want their pseudo-science field to be respected as if was on the same level as physics. ]

learning Torah for its own sake. Ketuboth circa page 64.

Let's say  for example you are sitting and learning Torah for its own sake. And your wife is complaining that you are not making enough money.--or any money for that matter. How much money are you required to be making to support her? קביים חיטים או או ארבעה קבים שוערים.
That is the volume of 12 eggs of wheat or 24 eggs of barley per week. That is actually easy to figure out because that is in the USA the way they sell eggs. [12 per package]. So just imagine a package of 12 eggs filled with wheat instead of eggs. That is what a husband is required to support his wife.
[about two cups of flour].

From the document of the Ketubah itself it seems to me there is not much to learn. True that a husband is required to give Io his wife two cups of wheat flour per week` to support her, but the fact that work is written into the ketubah does not in itself make it required. As you can see in laws of partners in Hoshen Mishpat of Rav Joseph Karo. That even if one writes a document "I will work for so and so thus and thus per week." and makes a kinyan [acquisition] the document does not cause him to be required to do anything since אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם (acquisition does not happen to anything that is not already in this world).

Besides that instead of trying to force a guy to divorce his wife on the basis of her complaint that he is not making enough money why not help him find  a job? This is exactly what Rabbainu Tam said in such a situation.


But this is not so common anyway. Most women that want a guy that is sitting and learning Torah are not in fact complaining about that fact. Just the opposite --they are proud and happy their husband is learning Torah.

This is usually what is the case when  girl marries a guy in Mir or Ponovitch. But the arrangement of kollel however seems to be a problematic issue. It is like using the Torah to make money. And even if that is not the intention it looks like it is. So at some point I decided it was best not to accept money for learning Torah and rather find some other way of making a living.

My advice however for people that love to learn Torah is this: before you get married make it clear to your prospective bride that that is what you are going to do --learn Torah for its own sake. Period. and if there is no money then so what. As one amora said to his wife when she was complaining about parnasa, " there are lots of reeds in the marshes". [I mean to say--no one is starving in Israel. But to avoid misunderstanding the best thing to do is right at the beginning of one's marriage to make it clear that you are going to learn Torah period. End of sentence.