In the world of Lithuanian Yeshivas, learning Physics and Math were not high priorities --at least when I was there. On one hand I can understand this because in fact it takes a long time and a lot of effort to gain any kind of understanding of Gemara. So you really do not want distractions.

On the other hand at some point I noticed that Physics and Metaphysics were considered part of the Gemara by the Rambam. Also Ibn Pakuda [the author of the Obligations of the Heart].


[In the Obligations of the hearts you see this in perek 3 of behina where he says to learn the wisdom in side of creation and also  the spiritually inside of creation. Clearly two different things. The Metaphysics part you see right on the first page where he talks about the wisdom the Arabs call Metaphysics. So he is not talking about something differen than the Rambam.

[Still I admit this is not universal among rishonim. Some take a dim view of Aristotle.]

But in terms of Post Aristotle Philosophy what would the Rambam and Ibn Pakuda hold by?

My own feeling about this issue is that Kant and Hegel would be thought to be legitimate continuations of Metaphysics just as i think modern day Physics would be a legitimate continuation of what the Rambam is calling "Physics".

learning Torah for its own sake. Ketuboth circa page 64.

Let's say  for example you are sitting and learning Torah for its own sake. And your wife is complaining that you are not making enough money.--or any money for that matter. How much money are you required to be making to support her? קביים חיטים או או ארבעה קבים שוערים.

That is the volume of 12 eggs of wheat or 24 eggs of barley per week. That is actually easy to figure out because that is in the USA the way they sell eggs. [12 per package]. So just imagine a package of 12 eggs filled with wheat instead of eggs. That is what a husband is required to support his wife.
[about two cups of flour].

From the document of the Ketubah itself it seems to me there is not much to learn. True that a husband is required to give Io his wife two cups of wheat flour per week` to support her, but the fact that work is written into the ketubah does not in itself make it required. As you can see in laws of partners in Hoshen Mishpat of Rav Joseph Karo. That even if one writes a document "I will work for so and so thus and thus per week." and makes a kinyan [acquisition] the document does not cause him to be required to do anything since אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם (acquisition does not happen to anything that is not already in this world).

Besides that instead of trying to force a guy to divorce his wife on the basis of her complaint that he is not making enough money why not help him find  a job? This is exactly what Rabbainu Tam said in such a situation.


But this is not so common anyway. Most women that want a guy that is sitting and learning Torah are not in fact complaining about that fact. Just the opposite --they are proud and happy their husband is learning Torah.

This is usually what is the case when  girl marries a guy in Mir or Ponovitch. But the arrangement of kollel however seems to be a problematic issue. It is like using the Torah to make money. And even if that is not the intention it looks like it is. So at some point I decided it was best not to accept money for learning Torah and rather find some other way of making a living.

My advice however for people that love to learn Torah is this: before you get married make it clear to your prospective bride that that is what you are going to do --learn Torah for its own sake. Period. and if there is no money then so what. As one amora said to his wife when she was complaining about parnasa, " there are lots of reeds in the marshes". [I mean to say--no one is starving in Israel. But to avoid misunderstanding the best thing to do is right at the beginning of one's marriage to make it clear that you are going to learn Torah period. End of sentence.

Ketuboth page 78

I wanted just to mention a few issues that come up in Ketuboth page 78. One is that the case of when a woman acquires property before she gets married and then gets married. and then she sells it. there is a disagreement if the husband takes back the property in total (Rosh) or that it stays in the possession of the buyers but the husband just keeps the profits (Rambam).Also there is a disagreement if when he takes back the property itself if he pays for it. Even though these are two separate issues its seems to me that it would not do for the husband to pay for the fruits of the property so that opinion of paying for it must be going like the Rosh.

Another issue is the Tosphot on page 78b. There there is an argument between Tosphot and the Ran.

The issue is when the husband writes that the property of the wife that comes into the marriage he has no profits from it. In Ketuboth later on in the 9th perek that works if the note is written when she was just betrothed. But over here on page 78 it says property she has before she gets married she can sell after she gets married [not to Rav and Shmuel--but that is the opinion of the mishna.] To the Ran the writing has to be before she gets married but only applies to property she gets after she is married. To Tosphot the later on Mishna in perek 9 is going like R Hanina ben Akavia.( I.e. Tosphot is thinking now that R Hanina holds in fact that what comes to her when she is betrothed she does not own and can not sell. So if the husband writes he does not own it that is valid-but otherwise he would own it.]


The basic background here is this. property that comes to a woman when she is betrothed and then she gets married. Raban Gamliel says she can sell it and the deal is valid. R Hanina asks him if he has gained a wife should he not also acquire her lands? R Gamliel says we are already embarrassed about the new one [property she gets after she is married] and you want to make problems about the old?
Rav and Shmuel both say property that comes to her before or after she is betrothed and she sells it after she is married the deal is null. 


I should mention that I only saw the Ran after the Maharam Shif said to look him up and I admit the answer of the Ran is pretty good. Still there is a need to understand Tosphot.

I have learned that telling the truth at all cost creates a kind of force field around you that protects you from all evil. However, there is  a down side.

Since you tell the truth, you tend to think that others also tell the truth. That is often a mistake. But there is a principle that can help in this kind of situation. Once you have heard someone tell a lie, then you already know they will tell more lies. This applies to slander also. Once you have heard someone say slander, then you can be sure they will slander you too when you are not around .

Ketuboth chapter 6 כתובות פרק מציאת האישה What is the law--the halacha?

If amoraim (sages of the Talmud) are discussing an opinion in a mishna does that mean that is the law? The Rif (Rav Isaac Alfasi) brings this idea in chapter 6 of Ketuboth. It is in fact based on a gemara in Sanhedrin which deals with the issue of when a judge makes a mistake in a law. It is in reference to damages that are owed to a  woman. If someone hits her and makes a wound or causes to her some kind of embarrassment. To R. Yehuda if the embarrassment is public she gets 2/3 of the damages that are owed and her husband gets 1/3. If the embarrassment is private then she gets 1/3 and her husband 2/3.

The Gra asks on this that there are lots of places where the amoraim discuss an opinion in  mishna that is not the halacha.
On the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo one of the commentaries wants to answer this question that when the amoraim discuss an opinion in  mishna then that is the law.

In any case this does deal with the question what is the law--the halacha?

I tried to get somewhere with this subject in Sanhedrin with David Bronson where there are tons of permutations concerning the issue when a judge makes a mistake. When does he have to pay but the law stays and when the law is that the case is reversed.

 But over there the idea of the amoraim arguing about one opinion shows that it is the halacaha is brought.
This will clearly disagree with lots of other places in the gemara where the issue comes up what teh law actually is. In Eruvin the Gemara goes through the list of Tenaim--with whom is the law when there is disagreement.

The confusion about this issue i mentioned a few days ago about an situation where the stam mishna [mishna with no name mentioned in it]  says one thing and the gemara says this is the opinion of so and so but the sages say differently.In Bava Kama this is brought an used as a proof against Sumchos. In Ketoboth this exact situation is brought and the law is like the Mishna!

I heard once from Abigail Bussu [The daughter of Rav Israel Abu-hazeira] the main things are the Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo and Musar [Medieval books of Ethics]. So in terms of halacah that would seem to settle things.--

The Shulchan Aruch is I heard one about 70-80 like the Rambam since Rav Joseph karo always goes by the majority between the Rif, Rosh, and Rambam. And in fact a lot of effort has been spent in understanding the Ramabm in recent years mainly starting with Rav Haim from Brisk [Soloveitchik] and Rav Shach. Still I think that the whole issue of halacah is still not clear.
But it is interesting that in the list of books that one is supposed to learn and finish every year Rav Nahman brings the Rif Rosh and Shulchan Aruch [The large edition with all commentaries]and he leaves out the Rambam.

religious world problems

The problem with the religious world is actually easy to understand in terms of Howard Bloom's The Lucifer Principle. That is the intention is to create a super-organism a movement that controls everyone else. and gets all the perks and benefits while they sit on top of us plebeians.

The ideas of Howard Bloom are actually quiet close to Hegel but he explains them in a understandable way.


The point is that if you ask why is the religious world so oblivious about the authentic values of Torah and instead focus on rituals -the answer is they need the rituals in order to seem like they are for the Torah and by that they can entice and capture innocent souls to be their slaves.--at first by love bombing them and then after they are trapped then their true disgusting faces appear.

The religious world presents themselves as if they have the true approach to Torah. The truth is the opposite. The religious world does not worship God. They worship their religious leaders.And they cover up their deception by emphasizing rituals that are in themselves made up to look like they are Torah principles.

The principle of the "meme" that Howard Bloom says is the nerve center of the super organism is also the center of every person's world. We all approach the world with a set of principles. Some of these principles tell of how to evaluate the world around us. Others tell us how to act. What should be the basis of all our actions. The set of principles of the religious world are directly opposed to Torah. Their principles are to put up a nice face in order to get control of everyone else so that they can be on top.

Of course if the religious world would be based on authentic Torah like you have in Ponovitch based on Rav Shach and the Gra then I would have nothing to complain about. But the issue is that once there is an authentic place of Torah like Ponovitch or Brisk, then a million copy cats sprout up. This is like Rav Nahman of Breslov said about the true tzadik. He said once there is a true tzadik then a million copy cats sprout out to try to get in on the act.

"A country of halacha"?

"A country of halacha" sounds to me like a nightmare. One reason we can already see in the Lekutei Moharan of Rav Nahman of Breslov. That is that a lot of the religious leaders in the religious world are actually not human. This is first mentioned in the L''M volume I chapter 8 where he brings the idea of רברבי עשו people that claim ordination but are actually from the realm of evil. [There he brings the cure for this is to groan--that is to pray with such sincerity that one actually groans].

But the most dramatic place this is mentioned in in the LeM chap 12 and 28 concerning Torah scholars that are demons. So it is clear that giving power to these religious leaders could not possibly be a  good idea.

The issue really relates to Howard Bloom's Lucifer Principle. There he goes into the problem of a social system that is set up on principles that are not moral. Even though he does not really go into what is moral and what is not until the very end of the book in a footnote where he advocates the system of the US Constitution as opposed to Islam. But the basic idea is that the religious world is a social system based on a meme that all power belongs to its leaders and that ritual is supreme especially wearing a kipa[ yarmulke similar to the pope.]
Torah itself is mainly for show. The real agenda is actually pretty sinister.


In "halacha" the way the religious world understands is there is no freedom. And the rules are made by religious creeps. So it is no surprise that in Uman my learning partner said one of the greatest thinbgs about it was that it was not under religious authority.