Religious obsession most often turns into obsession with the Dark Side

Religious interest is often just a kelipa--force of evil. That is to say most often it is just a way to get a person off track.
Though to learn and keep Torah is important, however the area of religious value tends to decay and become its exact opposite.
That is: religious obsession most often turns into obsession with the Dark Side; - even though it started out with obsession with doing good and holy works.
This is the reason that secular Jews tend to put all religious obsessions into one basket. They tend to be justified in doing so as the Ari says that עולם הזה (this world) is mostly kelipa--sitra achra.
This also accounts for the basic nature of Litvak yeshivas to discourage religious fanaticism. Sure they learn Torah all day, but the emphasis is to do so in a balanced fashion.

The best way to understand this I think is with Dr. Kelley Ross and the Kant-Friesian School. That is at least what helped me put things into context and perspective. Even thought the Kant-Fries School does not openly deal with the problems with the Sitra Achra it does have the Polynomic theory of Value which for me helped to understand "the Big Picture." [The big picture is after all what is needed in order to understand one's place in the Big Picture. ]
[Dr. Ross is mainly ignored since the focus is far from mainstream academia.  This is I think in part because mainstream academia has been off the path of reason for  long time as John Searle himself noted about  Analytic Linguistic, [Continental versus British] philosophy of the last century. As John Searle himself puts its so eloquently, "It is obviously false."]   

ראשיה בשוחד ישפוטו וכהניה במחיר יורו
"It's [of Zion] heads judge for pay, and it's priests teach for a price."

In one of the less known later prophets, מיכה, פרק ג' פסוק י''א  is brought this verse  in which the doom of Jerusalem is predicted because Torah becoming a paid profession and judges also were getting a salary.

If you look there you can see that that is the major reason the prophet there is predicting the fall of Jerusalem.
This goes along with what we find in the Gemara  כל דיין שנוטל שכר לדון כל דיניו בטילים
"Every judge that receives a salary for judging, all his judgments are null."
The law is that this is the case even if he takes an equal amount of money from both parties.
The only allowed way is if the judge has an honest job and two people come to him for judgment and give שכר בטלה for his time שכר הניכר. Not if he [in theory] might have a job, but rather he has at present a real job that he is willing to take time off of.

The issues are divided into three: (1) judging for pay, (2)teaching Torah for pay, (3) learning Torah for pay.
The Gemara already says teaching Torah for pay is forbidden as God says מה אני בחינם אף אתם בחינם Just as I taught Torah for free so you must teach Torah for free.
Learning for pay also the Rambam deals with in Avot chapter 4 where he says one who learns Torah for money loses his portion in the next world. He repeats the same idea in Mishne Torah

Music files U49 U43

U-49 F Major   U-43 E Minor

A question on R. Tam in Bava Batra 45 and an answer

בבא בתרא מ''ה ע''א וע''ב.  The משנה says an artisan can not say about a certain object that he bought it. רבה says that is only when witnesses were present when the object was given to him to fix. But if there are no witnesses he is believed because he could have said it never came to him as an object to fix, but rather he bought it outright in the first place. אביי asks then even with witnesses [but we do not see the object with him now] he should be believed that he bought it, because he could have said "I gave it back to you." רבה answered this. If he received it in front of witness he has to  have had to give it back in front of witnesses. So there is no מיגו That he could have said החזרתי לך. And then ר' תם asked this. אביי should have asked after that answer of רבה even with witnesses [but not seeing it right now] he still should be believed because he could say the object was stolen or lost in some other was that was not his fault. [like lost or stolen for a non paid guard or stolen at gun point for a paid guard.] 

My question is this seems difficult to say. Why should we should believe him that he bought the object because  the מיגו he could have said it was stolen and then have to take an oath. The oath part of it makes the thing that מיגו "he could have said" to be not desirable to say. 

After I wrote this it occurred to me that the second answer in תוספות is exactly that. The second answer of the  יש מפרשים says that the intention of רבה is to say this. The משנה says an artisan can not say he bought the object. רבה says that is only if he wants to be believed without an oath, but with an oath he is believed. This is when there are witnesses, but the object is not seen with him right now. Thus in fact there is this idea he could have said the object was stolen and be believed with an oath. So now also we believe him with an oath. I think that you have to say for ר' תם that the oath in the case where the object was stolen is only from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. And therefore the fact that a plea of stolen will require an oath from the words of the scribes will not affect the law of the Holy Torah which considers both, (1) the case of the artisan that says he bought the object and (2) the case of his saying it was stolen both to be without an oath. So the oath requirement will not affect the fact that the Torah believes him because of "he could have said."

The idea here is that to ר' תם for there to be an oath in the case of a שומר there has to be two objects. One that he says was stolen and another that he admits to. Since that is not the case here, the oath he has to take in the case of אונס is מדברי סופרים


בבא בתרא מ''ה ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול לומר על חפץ מסוים שהוא קנה אתו. רבה אומר כי זה רק כאשר עדים היו נוכחים כאשר האובייקט ניתן לו לתקן. אבל אם אין עדים הוא נאמן בגלל מיגו כי הוא יכול היה להגיד את זה אף פעם לא הגיע אליו כאובייקט לתקן, אלא שהוא קנה אותו על הסף מלכתחילה. אביי שואל אז אפילו עם עדים [אבל אנחנו לא רואים את האובייקט איתו עכשיו] הוא צריך להאמין שהוא קנה אתו, כי הוא יכול היה לומר "נתתי אותו בחזרה אליך." רבה ענה זה. אם הוא קיבל את זה מול עדים הוא צריך להחזיר אותו מול עדים. אז אין מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר החזרתי לך. ואז ר' תם שאל את זו. אביי צריך לשאול אחרי התשובה של רבה אפילו עם עדים [אבל לא רואים את זה עכשיו] הוא עדיין צריך להאמין כי הוא יכול לומר את האובייקט נגנב או אבד לא באשמתו. [כמו אובדן או גניבה של שומר לא בתשלום (שומר חינם) או נגנבו באיומי נשק עבור שומר שכר.] השאלה שלי היא זו נראית קשה לומר. למה אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו כי הוא קנה את האובייקט משום מיגו, שהיה יכול לומר שזה נגנב ואז צריך להישבע. הצורך של השבועה עושה את המיגו "הוא יכול היה לומר" להיות לא רצוי לומר בשבילו. עלה בדעתי כי התשובה השנייה של תוספות אומרת בדיוק את זה. התשובה השנייה של יש מפרשים אומרת כי כוונת רבה היא זאת. המשנה אומרת אומן לא יכול להגיד שהוא קנה את האובייקט. רבה אומר כי זה רק אם הוא רוצה להיאמין בלי שבועה, אך עם שבועה הוא אמין. זהו כשיש עדים אך האובייקט לא ראה איתו עכשיו. כך שלמעשה יש רעיון זה של מיגו שהוא יכול היה לומר את האובייקט היה נגנב שיאמין בשבועה. אז עכשיו גם אנחנו מאמינים לו בשבועה. אני חושב שיש לך להגיד על ר' תם כי השבועה במקרה שבו האובייקט נגנב היא רק מדברי הסופרים, לא מן התורה. ולכן העובדה שטיעון של גנוב ידרש שבועה מדברי הסופרים לא תשפיע על החוק של התורה הקדושה שרואה במקרה של אומן שאומר שהוא קנה את האובייקט לבין המקרה שהוא אומר שזה היה נגנב שניהם להיות בלי שבועה. אז דרישת השבועה לא תשפיע על העובדה שהתורה מאמינה לו. הרעיון כאן הוא שלר' תם כדי שתהיה שבועה במקרה של שומר חייב להיות שני אובייקטים. אחד שהוא אומר נגנב ועוד אחד שהוא מודה. כיוון שזה אינו המקרה כאן, השבועה שהוא צריך לקחת (במקרה של אונס) היא מדברי סופרים



So I am thinking that the answer of R. Tam only works if you hold טענת אונס צריכה הודאה במק. This R. Tam comes up also Bava Metzia also. And in my notes over there on page 98 I discuss him in the context of Tosphot.
I should mention that I myself was totally unaware of this opinion of R. Tam until it came up in Bava Metzia pg 98.

Tractate Bava Batra pg 45b.

. The mishna says an artisan can not say about a certain object that he bought it. Rabah says that is only when witnesses were present when the object was given to him to fix. But if there are no witnesses, he is believed - because he could have said it never came to him as an object to fix, but rather he bought it outright in the first place. Abyee asks then even with witnesses [but we do not see the object with him now] he should be believed that he bought it, because he could have said "I gave it back to you." Rabah answered he would then have had to give it back in front of witnesses. [If he received it in front of witnesses, he has to give it back in front of witnesses]

R. Tam asked Abyee should have answered even with witnesses [but not seeing it right now] he still should be believed because he could say the object was stolen or lost in some other way that was not his fault [like lost or stolen for a non paid guard or stolen at gun point for a paid guard].


My question is this seems difficult to say. Why should we should believe him that he bought the object because he could have said "It was stolen" and then have to take an oath. The oath part of it makes the thing that "He could have said" to be not desirable to say.


After I wrote this it occurred to me that the second answer in Tosphot is exactly that. He says that the intention of Rabah is to say this. The Mishna says an artisan can not say he bought the object. Rabah says that is only if he wants to be believed without an oath, but with an oath he is believed. This is when there are witnesses but the object is not seen with him right now. Thus in fact there is this idea he could have said the object was stolen an be believed with an oath. So now also we believe him with an oath. [Still it is hard to understand why this is a question in the first place to the other Rishonim.]
"He could have said thus and thus and be believed so we should believe him when he says a weaker plea." actually came up with me in a case before the Israel Supreme Court when that was the exact reason they acquitted me of wrongdoing  in a certain case.


I think that you have to say for R. Tam that the oath in the case where the object was stolen is only from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. And therefore the fact that a plea of stolen will require an oath from the words of the scribes will not affect the law of the Holy Torah which considers both the case of the artisan that says he bought the object and the case of his saying it was stolen both to be without an oath. So the oath requirement will not affect the fact that the Torah believes him because of "he could have said"
The reason the oath of a stolen object is from the words of the scribes is that to R. Tam, in order for an oath (that something was stolen) to be from the Torah it is needed that there be two objects. One that he admits to and the other the object that he claims was stolen. This you can see in Bava Batra page 70b in Tosphot and also in Bava Metzia page 98a

The subject of demons that pretend to teach Torah

The subject of demons that pretend to teach Torah is in fact a rather big subject which comes up  in the  writings of Rav Isaac Luria. Without really saying so, this is the reason that the Reform and Conservative movements got started in the first place.  Not that  I agree with the Reform and Conservative on every detail, but the basic idea is that they were reacting to a certain kind of situation.
 In any case, both the Reform and Conservative are right about a good deal of major points --for example the primary importance of laws between man and his fellow man. Clearly the Musar movement of Reb Israel Salanter also tried to emphasize  that area of obligation --but with limited success.

I have to admit that I think Reb Israel and the Gra were right about the basic approach of the Holy Torah, but I think that in practice the Reform and Conservative people come closer to the ideals of Torah.
[There are however areas where the Reform and Conservative movements tend to be weak and t is in those areas that I go with the Gra.]

divorce laws

The trouble in divorce laws is there is something about them that goes against natural law. In natural law, a woman depends on a man. In the Law of Moses also  a woman can leave her husband, but she gets no support from him for doing so. The Torah says to the woman, "If you feel you not longer need him, then you can leave [that divorce is allowed, but it has to be that the husband desires it], but then do not suppose you can bankrupt him in desire for revenge that you did not get Superman." That is in plain language, there is no such thing as alimony.

[In Ketuboth there is for a widow alimony until she remarries. Not a divorcee. In any case, it seems to me proper to write this down as I have noticed a large degree of misunderstandings about this issue. It all comes from the simple fact that people do not learn tractate Ketuboth as thoroughly as they ought.

Not that I learned it so well either. But in Shar Yashuv [Rav Friefeld's Yeshiva] that was the tractate they were learning during my second year there, so I did try to do it as well as I could with the Tosphot, Tosphot HaRosh, Pnei Yehoshua and the Tur and other achronim. Still that was just my second year, so I did not learn it very thoroughly since I was more or less a beginner.

In any case, there is no reason to reward women for doing evil.

[Furthermore there is no reason to think that the government can just make up laws at random that goes against natural law. This is spelled out in the 9th and 10th amendment to the Constitution that people retain whatever rights they naturally have. That includes rights to their private property. The government can not just make up laws at random which benefit one part of the population at the expense of another. The "General Welfare"  clause means the general welfare of all the states--not one state at the expense of another.]