In the book of Rav Nahman of Uman he deals with the issue of Torah scholars that are themselves demons in the LeM vol I ch 12. Later in vol I chapter 28 he deals with a slightly different issue of people that hear Torah lessons from Torah scholars who themselves receive their Torah lessons from the Dark Side.

 

The basic idea there is that there are the "alef"s in the higher worlds. But often what some higher spiritual essence comes down into this world , it gets physicalized  in such a way that the dark forces have a hold on it. So when Torah scholars who receive their lessons from teh demons, when they see someone who is serving God with simplicity and with no "wisdoms", they try to stop them.

This I can imagine was the case in the days of Rav Nahman himself who had a lot of enemies and certainly his students. And this Torah lesson was probably said in relation to that fact. But I think it applies all the more so nowadays. When there is someone who just wants to sit and learn Torah for its own sake and not work and just trust in God to provide his needs, often the very enemies of that person are Tora scholars who are demons.

the beginning of בבא מציעא also page 7 and the end of that chapter.

  It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that רב שך laws of שאלה ופיקדון bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of בבא מציעא]. Now רב שך answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say "I paid". But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that רב שך had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both, so both have a חזקה. [The word "hazaka" means holding onto the object.] But רב שך [Rav Shach] himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both, but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful, we should not say "divide" but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently רב שך did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why. [I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of רב שך's approach in that entire section, the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a חזקה in the object. If this was not the case, then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of בבא מציעא that the law is to divide, because there is a חזקה for both people.]

עלה בדעתי כשהייתי בים וחשבתי על הנושא שרב שך מביא בהלכות שאלה ופיקדון. אדם מוצא מסמך בין המסמכים שלו והוא לא יודע אם המלווה או הלווה מסרו לו אותו לשמירה, [ בסוף הפרק הראשון של בבא מציעא]. כעת רב שך עונה שזה חוזר להלוואה מילולית בה הלווה יכול לומר "שילמתי". אבל חשבתי שאותן תשובות שרב שך נתן לפני כן במקרים אחרים כמו המאה השלישית עשויים לעבוד גם פה. אז במקרה של המאה השלישית הוא שומר על 300 המאות לשניהם כך שלשתיהן יש חזקה. אבל רב שך עצמו אומר על אובייקט אבוד שהוא נשאר על ידי המוצא כי הוא לא שומר עליו לשניהם, אלא רק לבעלים האמיתי. אז תהיתי מדוע לא להשתמש באותה תשובה מדויקת כאן במציאת מסמך בין המסמכים שלו. יכול להיות ששני האנשים נתנו לו את זה לשמירה. אך איננו יודעים זאת. יתכן שרק אדם אחד נתן לו את זה. מכיוון שזה ספק, אנחנו לא צריכים לומר "לחלק" אלא להשאיר את זה כמו שהחוק למעשה. כנראה שרב שך לא רוצה להשתמש בזה כתשובה, ואני לא בטוח למה. [אני חושב שנכון להוסיף כאן שזה הנושא שעומד במרכז הגישה של רב שך באותו סעיף, העובדה שאדם ששומר על משהו עבור מישהו אחר פירושו אותו אדם שהוא שומר עליו נחשב כבעל חזקה באובייקט. אם זה לא היה כך, תמיד היית אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זו הסיבה היחידה שבתחילת בבא מציעא שהחוק הוא חלוקה, כי יש חזקה לשני האנשים.  

 It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that Rav Shach [laws of שאלה ופיקדון] bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of Bava Metzia] Now Rav Shach answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say I paid. But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that Rav Shach had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both so both have a "Hazaka". But Rav Shach himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful we should not say divide but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently Rav Shach did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why.

[I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of Rav Shach's approach in that entire section--the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a hazaka in the object. If this was not the case then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of Bava Metzia that the law is to divide--because there is a hazaka for both people.

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Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

 Rav Avraham Abulafia held that Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

I asked Professor Moshe Idel about this since he brings it up in his first book which was actually his PhD thesis. But this does not imply what Christians are usually thinking about this issue.

But it is also not the same things as just a saint.

Rather if you look in the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov, vol I chapter 65 you can see what the idea of the "Baal Hasade" [lord of the meadow].

The idea there is that there is a meadow which has beautiful grasses and flowers and trees and fruit. And these trees and plants are all souls. And they need watering and taking care of. There can be weeds and diseases that try to attack these beautiful souls. So there has to be someone to do that work. That is a true tzadik. But even to get to that level to do the slightest smallest work  in meadow requires a very great saint.  

[There is a lot of animosity towards Jesus, but that is because people are not aware of Avraham Abulafia. Even among Christians people are ambivalent towards Abulafia, even if they hear about his insights. This seems sad to me. Now while he was not at all positive towards the catholic church that is clearly because of the problem of worshiping Jesus which  can not be correct. But that does not mean to go to the opposite extreme and start speaking slander about who was really a very great tzadik and even more. For most tzadikim do not have a soul from azilut/emanation. ] 

The sugia of messiah son of Joseph is brought at length in the Gra's Kol HaTor.

[It does seem that Rav Nahman himself was not careful about the signature  of the Gra. However he was not in that category himself.]

There are three cases that Rav Shach brings in the beginning of laws of שאלה ופיקדון in which you say, "Let it be". [Let it stay where it is until proof can be brought.] (1) The case of the third hundred, (2) signs and signs, [He found an object and two different people give signs that the object is theirs. So he does not know to who to return it.] (3) he found a document of  a loan among his documents. [The lender and borrower each claim that he alone was the one that gave it to him to guard.] 

These cases are like an unpaid guard who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But in a case of transgressing, he is somewhat similar to the borrower. The borrower pays for everything. But in the case of the third hundred he is not borrowing anything. Still the fact that he should have written down the names of each one, he is thought to have trespassed and so he pays both. That is like a borrower. 

In the cases above the fellow is somewhat like an unpaid guard since you just leave the found object where it is. He does not know to who to return it. But he does not take an oath because one never takes an oath of  "I do not know."

So  all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are simply still in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects.

 For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The un-paid guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the third hundred. There a person is given three hundred dollars to keep safe for two people. One gave 100 and the other 200. When they come to get it each says the 200 is his. There we say the third person has to pay 200 to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a unpaid guard who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל

The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the third hundred. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the 200 and whom is the 100. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives 100 to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each 200.

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There are three cases that רב שך brings in the הלכות פיקדון ואבדה in which you say, יהיה מונח. The case of the מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. It is clear that these cases are not considered to be like an שומר חינם who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But he is somewhat similar to the שואל. The borrower pays for everything. שואל משלם את הכל. But in the case of the מנה שלישית he is not borrowing anything. So it seems that in all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects. For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The שומר חינם נשבע על הכל guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the מנה שלישית. There a person is given three שלש מאות שקלים to keep safe for two people. One gave מאה and the other מאתיים. When they come to get it each says the מאתיים is his. There we say the third person has to pay מאתיים to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a שומר חינם who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל. The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the מנה שלישית. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the מאתיים and whom is the מאה. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives מאה to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על הכסף שלו

ישנם שלושה מקרים שרב שך מביא בהלכות פיקדון בהם אתה אומר, יהיה מונח. המקרה של מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. המקרים אלה כמו שומר חינם שאיבד את החפץ עליו היה אמור לשמור. אלא שאינו נשבע שלא לוקחים שבוע על איני יודע. אבל אם הוא פושע זה דומה לשואל. שואל משלם את הכל. כך בשלושת המקרים החפץ האבוד או הכספים אינם נחשבים לאבודים כלל מכיוון שהם למעשה לא אבודים. הם נמצאים ברשות האדם שנתן לשמור. אבל הוא לא יודע למי להחזיר את החפצים. כי אם הם היו משהו כמו חפצים אבודים, היינו אומרים שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. שומר חנם נשבע על הכל השומר נשבע על הכל. היום עלה בדעתי שזה לא דומה לחוק מנהלת השלישית. שם נותנים לאדם שלושה שלש מאות שקלים כדי לשמור על בטיחותם של שני אנשים. אחד נתן את מאה ולשני מאתיים. כשבאים לקחת את זה כל אחד אומר המאתיים הוא שלו. שם אנו אומרים שהאדם השלישי צריך לשלם מאתיים לכל אחד מכיוון שזו הייתה אשמתו. העניין כאן הוא גם נראה שזה קצת שונה ששומר חינם נשבע שהוא לא יודע איפה החפץ ואז לא משלם כלום. לכן נראה שמקרה זה פשוט לא נחשב לשומר של אובייקט אבוד. הסיבה היא שהאובייקט [המאה] לא אבד. הוא לא יודע למי לתת את זה. ולשם כך חושבים שהוא פושע. וכך הוא משלם כמו לווה, שואל משלם את הכל. [הצעדים הבסיסיים להגיע למסקנה זו הם אלה: יש לנו את מנה שלישית. שם שני אנשים נותנים לו שלוש מאות שקלים במעטפה אחת ואומרים לו למי הוא שתי מאות ומי המאה. אבל הם נתנו את זה בחבילה אחת, והוא לא כתב את זה. הוא שכח מי מהם. הוא נותן מאה לכל אחד, והמאה האחרונה נשאר במקום שהוא נמצא. אבל אם הכסף ניתן בשתי מעטפות, אז הוא נותן לכל אחד מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על מעטפה שלו]

 In the subject of the third mana [the third hundred] (מנה השלישית). [ note 1] The law is to leave it as long as the middleman was not negligent. [If he was, then he has to pay.] The question that come up in the gemara in Bava Metzia is why is this not divided? They answer division happens only when it could be true. [note 2] Rav Akiva Eigger askes from page 28 what about the case of signs and signs that is left. That is, there is  a lost object. two people give signs to show that it belongs to them. It is left by the finder until some absolute proof can be brought. But it could be of both so why not divide? Answers Rav Shach: division only happens when there is derara demomona [דררא דממונא] a doubt about the money and both have some prior "hazaka" ( "חזקא" holding", that is a reason to say the object is theirs.) But here the finder is not holding the object for both but only for the true owner-even if we do not know who that is.  

[I am being a bit short here because Rav Shach brings up a second question about the last mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia where also you leave the document even though the middleman is in fact holding the document for two people.

And I have not worked out how the argument between Sumchos and the sages fits in here--o if it is relevant at all.

[note 1] Two people give three hundred zuz  to a middleman to take care of. When they return each claims 200. If it was given together in one envelope, it stays with the middleman.

[note 2] Two people might pick up an object in the street at the same time. But the third mana belongs to one or the other, Not both. 

Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman actually has two places in the LeM where he seems to contradict himself. In one place he says to learn "Poskim" [the medieval authorities that wrote on law. This is different than medieval authorities that wrote commentaries.] separates the good from evil--since that is the whole purpose of the poskim --to come to clarification of the law. [However I should add that in the terminology of Rav Nahman, the word "poskim" means basically the actual Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo (who was not a Rishon). He was the beginning of the period of the Achronim. However, it is clear throughout his writings that "poskim" to Rav Nahman means especially the actual Shulchan Aruch with its commentaries , the Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc. 

But in Le.M vol. I, chapter 54, he says the "כוח הדמיון שורה על שונה הלכות" ["Delusions rest upon those that learn halacha."] And there is no mistaking his intension there as he goes into great detail explaining this.

But I think that a simple answer is that he uses the word "shone halachot" שונה הלכות not "lomed halachot." לומד הלכות [To be "Shone" is  meant to to say the words and go on. The word "lomed" means to learn in depth.

So the best idea in terms of Halacha according to this would be not to be "shone halachot",  but rather to learn in depth starting from the Gemara and going through the Rosh, Rif, Tur, Shulchan Aruch with the basic commentaries on the Shuclan Aruch. [Later note, actually I think the best of all halacha books, the Tur with the Beit Yoseph is the best.] 

Incidentally, this is how I was taught in my second year in Shar Yashuv (the yeshiva of Rav Friefeld). Only in the third year there did they start with deep "lumdus" [learning] as you can see examples in Rav Shach and Rav Chaim of Brisk.

[There is a way of learning in depth which is to review the paragraph 10 times, and  that helps me to learn Physics and Math.] 

 "Social Justice Warrior"s advocate theft. They call it "redistribution" but changing the words that describe something still does not change the actual act.

This last so called "election" was not an election at all. There was was an astounding amount of open fraud. It was just a test of how much Democrats could get away with cheating. And if the voices that object would make any difference. It takes about two minutes to open any computer that count the votes and program it to count all the votes for Bidden or simply put in as many votes for Bidden as you want. This was already demonstrated in the Conference in Los Vegas at a computer conference.

The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia

When there is a doubt about money the law is in some cases to divide, in other cases to let the money or object remain where it is until Elisha the prophet comes. The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia deal with this.

One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית [the third hundred.] That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred dollars.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the $200 and who gave the $100, then he has to give 200 to each and pay from his own pocket.

The question Rav Shach brings from the last Mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

Rav Shach answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in Bava Metzia when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the Mishnas goes like Sumchos [ממון המוטל בספק חולקים] , not the sages ( המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) [like on page 100 side a]. But sometimes the mishna is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the Gemara deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last mishna might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית . That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred שקלים.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the 200 and who gave the 100, then he has to give 200 to each and משלם from his own pocket.

The question רב שך brings from the last משנה in the first chapter of בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

רב שך answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say: "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in בבא מציעא when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the משנה goes like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים, not the sages  המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) like on page 100 side a. But sometimes the משנה is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the גמרא deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last משנה might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

נושא אחד שעולה הוא מנה שלישית. זה כאשר שני אנשים מגיעים למישהו שהם סומכים עליו ונותנים לו מעטפה עם שלוש מאות שקלים. ואז הם חוזרים זמן מה אחר כך וכל אחד אומר שה -200 היו שלי והמאה היו של השני. ואז הוא נותן לכל אחד את 100 ואת המאה האחרונה שהוא שומר עד שמביאים הוכחה כלשהי, כך או אחרת. אבל אם כל אחד נכנס ונפרד נותנים לו מעטפה משלהם. ואז הוא שוכח מי נתן לו את ה200 ומי נתן את ה100, ואז הוא צריך לתת 200 לכל אחד ומשלם מכיסו.

השאלה שרב שך מביא מהמשנה האחרון בפרק הראשון בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח (אדם מוצא מסמך של הלוואה בין מסמכיו ואינו זוכר מי נתן לו המלווה או הלווה. שניהם מבקשים את המסמך. שם הוא משאיר את זה. האם זה אינו זהה למקרה דלעיל בו עליו לשלם מכיסו מאז ששכח?

רב שך עונה על המקרה של ההלוואה חוזר להלוואה מילולית ובמקרה זה מאמינים שהמלווה שאומר: "שילמתי". אז אנחנו עוזבים את המסמך ונותנים אותו לאף אחד מהם.

השאלה כאן היא שרוב הזמן בבבא מציעא כשנושאים על כסף שאיננו יודעים למי הוא שייך, המשנה הולכת כמו סומכוס (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים), ולא החכמים (המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) כמו בעמוד 100 בצד א. אבל לפעמים זה מקרה שבו אפילו החכמים מסכימים. לפעמים הגמרא עוסקת בנושא זה ולעיתים עוזבת אותה. כך שבמקרה האחרון של שיכחת השטר יכול להיות כמו החכמים שאתה משאיר את המסמך במקום שהוא נמצא בגלל שהוא המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

 x45 F Major

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x45 Midi file

I suggest getting up in the morning and saying right away the Shema [first paragraph], then a bit of Musar/ Ethics. [That is from some few paragraphs of what one feels he needs strength and encouragement in.] Then the Oral Law [in such a way as to get through the oral law, i.e. two Talmuds and Midrashim]. Then what the Rishonim essential Physics and Metaphysics. That approach you can see in Chovot Levavot and More Nevuchim/ the Guide for the Perplexed.  

As for halacha -my approach is that any opinion in the Gemara counts as Halacha unless openly dismissed. רב שלמה לוריא מחבר של החכמת שלמה  Shelomo  Luria writes [in his commentary on the Gemara which is printed with every Gemara at the bottom of the page of the Mahrasha] that it is better to decide the halacha straight from the Gemara even if one is wrong, rather than to decide from the Shulchan Aruch even if that is right. He thought the whole idea of taking away the authority form the Gemara into later on books was a terrible idea.

the problem with USA universities.

 Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind pointed out the problem with USA universities. Maybe it all starts from philosophy as Ayn Rand suggested. If Ayn Rand is right the place to begin would be a different kind of Philosophy program. My suggestion would be the steps leading to the Kant Fries School of thought. That is Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel, Leonard Nelson.

But to ignore philosophy does not seem like a good idea. The Mediaeval approach to combine faith and reason seems like to the best idea to me.

I just noticed in the LeM of Rav Nahman vol. I 64 the subject of the limitation of reason which comes up in Kant. The way Rav Nahman deals with this is in relation to the "Halal Hapanui" the empty space.

[You have to say two opposite things about it. One: That God withdrew his presence from within for otherwise there would have been no room for the creation of all the worlds. But it did exist and nothing can exist without God creating it and so God presence was there.] Kant reached his conclusion about the limitation of reason from John Locke that said there   are primary characteristics and secondary. Kant noticed even what Locke thought were primary really also depend on the observer. So what really is the "ding an sich" [thing in itself]? There we have the limit of reason. Now reason is not limited to what can be observed. Nor just what is contained in definition. It can perceive universals. It can figure out synthetic a priori. But the limit is conditions of possible experience.

 Right in the beginning of Bava Metzia in Tosphots and on page 7, there is raised the issue of when the law is to divide, when "who is stronger", when we say it should remain as it is until Eliyahu comes.

So one of the issues is this a document of a loan is in the hands of a middle man and he has forgotten who gave it to him, the lender or the borrower. There we say it should remain where it is until Eliyahu come.

Rav Shach asks why is this any different from an object that was given to a middle man to help until the people that gave it to him come to get it. And he has forgotten who gave it to him and he gives it to one and pays the other since it was his fault for not writing it down or remembering who gave it to him. 

The answer of Rav Shach I admit is a bit  hard to understand. The document he says has a category of a verbal loan and that makes sense since the only difference between a verbal loan and one in a document is the borrower can say "I paid" in a verbal loan. The written loan he can not say that because the lender can ask, "Then why do I still have the document?"  [So in the case the document is in the hands of teh third party the lender can not say that.] Still it is hard to understand why here also we do not say it is the fault of the middle man for not writing down who gave the document to him.

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I am not sure why there are so many problems in my life or in other peoples' lives. Mainly I think the problems come from sin. But it helps to know which sin so that one can repent. So what I do is to try to think back in my life to see exactly what were my sins so as to know what to repent on. That approach can help others also.

That is to say,-- that when you see things not going well, you ought to think back in your life to try to discover what exact sins triggered the problems.

I can do this fairly well in my life. I can recognize not listening to my parents, leaving the Land of Israel, leaving the good advice of Rav Nahman, and also pushing off a kind of state of inspiration. But clearly others have all kinds of other sorts of sin. And I think that with a little thought most people can discern what sins they need to repent on. But I am not saying that these are my major sins. Also I am not saying that one  can easily discover what their major sins are. Rather I think that if you repent on the things you know you need to repent on, then (in that merit) I believe God reveals to one what further sins he or she needs to repent. on.

[What do I say that problems come from sin? Because in the Musar book Shaarie Teshuva [Gates of Repentance] of R. Yona, he brings from the Gemara that אין ייסורים בלי עוון ("There are no troubles without sin.")

You Can't Turn a Whore into a Lady · Rebel Son.

Listen to me friend I know her kind
She'll just tear up your nerves if you fall for her
So just walk away and leave her behind
'Cause when you fall in her lap, you're falling in her trap
And she'll rob you blind of your last dime

She'll lie to you and leave you
With nothing but depression
A heartache and sorrow and shame

 

To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse

 To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse that means when both are written, the reason and the isur [[prohibition] then we go by both. So when it says by a king not to have more than 18 wives because she might tilt his heart away from God -- that means we go by both the letter of the law and also the reason.

That is how Rav Shach explains the contradiction in the Rambam where in general he does not go by R Shimon. [Well, no one does because that is R Shimon against the sages. That is the reason the Tur does not decide like R Shimon either.] But in the debate if one can not marry any girl from the nations that worship idols [עכו''ם] or only a girl from the seven Canaanite nations-- it is R. Shimon who says all nations (that worship idols) are forbidden. So why does the Rambam decide the law like that against the sages? Answer (of Rav Shach): because the letter of the law means all nations, and there R Shimon forbids all nations because of the letter of the law.

On the way by from the sea, I thought about this and asked myself,  "What about a widow?" There we know R. Shimon says one can take a pledge from a rich widow. And then I realized what Rav Shach means. He means to say that when both the isur (prohibition) and the reason are written, then R Shimon goes by both. But if only one is written, then he goes by the reason. 

This is the opposite of R Yehuda. For to R Yehuda, if only the prohibition is written then he goes by the letter of the law,-- but if both are written, then he goes only by the reason for the verse. That is why he say a king can marry as many women as he likes as long as they do not turn his heart. 

[This is  a three way debate. It is R Shimon who goes by the reason for the verse always. Do we know the reasons for the verses? Yes. No one in the Gemara disagrees with that. If that would be in doubt, then the sages would bring that objection against R Shimon and ask him, "but we do not know the reasons for the verses." And in fact what are the reasons? they are spelled out in Sefer HaHinuch from a disciple of Nahmanides. Generally they are these: peace of the state, to lessen pleasures, to get rid of idolatry, to gain good character.]

 There is something very odd about judges in the USA. I would not be surprised if somehow the Frankfurt school had a hand in getting Marxist ideas into the legal system in the USA. I used to think it was from the KGB, but now I think that the infiltration was too vast and comprehensive for it to be from the KGB. It has to be from the inside. And from where else but the Frankfurt school in Columbia University? That is where the main policy makers of the the American education system were trained.

 I had a chance today to look at the last Torah lesson Rav Nahman of Breslov said in his lifetime the Le.M. vol. II, chapter 8, and I thought to bring here a few of the ideas he mentions there. 

One idea he says is not to give rebuke because unless one has great merit, because he can make things worse by giving rebuke in the wrong kind of way.\אף על פי שתוכחה היא דבר גדול ומוטל על כל אחד להוכיח את חברו כשרואה בו דבר שאינו הגון אף על פי כן לאו כל אחד ראוי להוכיח כמו שאמר ר. עקיבא תמה אני אם יש בדור הזה מי שראוי להוכיח כי כשהמוכיח אינו ראוי הוא יכול להביש את השומעים את תוכחתו  ["Even though rebuke is a great thing and it is incumbant on every person to rebuke his friend when he sees in him something not proper ,still not everyone is fit to rebuke as R. Akiva said, 'I would be surprized if there was anyone in this generation that is fit to give rebuke,' because when the one who gives rebuke is not fit, he can cause damage and make ugly the souls of those who hear his rebuke."

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"revival of the dead"

 I think about the issue of the "revival of the dead" that you see it very clearly in Ezekiel. You have there the valley of bones and then God telling Ezekiel that that whole event of reviving those people was a sort of preliminary example of what would be eventually with all Israel. That is, that He would bring about the revival of the dead for all Israel.

So that means when the Gemara asks How do we know revival of the dead from the Torah, it must mean how do we know it from the Five Books of Moses. They can not be asking how do we know it from teh Prophets. 

Leonard Nelson

The thing about Leonard Nelson that I think is a bit off putting to people is that his approach of non intuitive immediate knowledge is thought to be a  species of psychologism. That is that truths of logic or science depend on the human mind. Well Dr. Kelley Ross shows that that is not what Nelson was saying at all. But Husserl attacks that problem head on. He brings three proofs against it.[in the first part of Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Logical Investigations, Vol. 1)] 

The thing that I noticed  is Husserl's proof depends on there being absolute truth. That is, that there are truths that do not depend on the observer. And the best proof of that from what I have seen is John Searle's.  Searle shows that if all truth is relative it sinks into there being no truth at all by means of "dis-quotation." That is the "sentence snow is white", only if snow is white. (And  snow is white is true only if it is true with respect to a background in which things can be white or not white.) It is a short proof.  [It is good that Searle was attacked, since nowadays when universities attack someone, it just shows the greatness of that person.] 

I noticed there is a new Kant-Friesian on the horizon- Michael Cuffaro.   

The answer of Rav Shach for the Rambam Laws of Divorce chapter 3 law 9

[The idea here is that a divorce has to be written on a piece of paper that says "You are herby permitted to any man," and given into her hand or her courtyard. That is the basic essence of divorce. But I must add that it must be done in front of two witnesses. Also there is a decree of the scribes that the date should be on the document.]

 If  a husband gives a divorce  document to his wife and says that it will be valid after 30 days, and she puts it in an alley, and on the thirtieth it is still in the alley but after that it is stolen she is divorced.

This seems to be in contradiction to the Gemara in Ketuboth 86 which says the law of saying to one's wife, "This document of your divorce will be valid after 30 days," equals the law when one sells an animal and also says, "This sell will be valid after 30 days." In both cases if the object is in an alley on the thirtieth day, the transaction is valid. And the Gemara on page 82 says in the case of a sell that he must say "from now" and only then it is valid.

And in fact Tosphot says this exact fact. So the question is why does the Rambam ignore this and say "from now" only in the case of a sell, [but in the case of a divorce, he ignores this distinction.]

Rav Shach says because these are two different kinds of things. The divorce has to be in her domain or he hand and it is so on the thirtieth day. But the sell is valid by means of pulling the animal and that is no longer happening on the thirtieth day. The point of Rav Shach is clear. [The Magid Mishna says the difference is that the document in still around on the 30th day which is not the case with pulling. But it is not clear what that has to do with the need to say "from now."

[There is a possibility that this is what the Magid Mishna meant even though he did not say so openly.]

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There are some laws that are from the sages [called "from the words of the scribes"]

 There are some laws that are from the sages [called "from the words of the scribes"] but not from the Torah itself. For most of these laws, the reason for them is known. [But for some of them there is some doubt. E.g. the laws of Mukza on Shabat. There is an argument as to the reason.]

In any case, most rishonim [mediaeval sages] hold when the reason for a law from the words of the sages no longer applies then the law itself is automatically null and void. [This is brought in Tosphot and in the Raavad in laws of Mamrim. There the discussion is about the first fruits that have to be brought to Jerusalem. The Raavad holds since the reason for that law no longer applies so the law no longer applies. 

You could apply this to marriage also. There is an argument if one is forbidden to marry someone from the Seven Canaanite nations or from all nations of idolatry. Since we do not hold from R Shimon Ben Yochai against the sages, so   לא דרשינן טעמא דקרא so only the seven nations are forbidden to the opinion of the Tur.  

 Okinawa should tell us a thing or two about the causalities that we could have expected in getting to mainland Japan. If 66 miles by 7 miles wide cost  95,000 Imperial Japanese Army troops and 20,195 Americans that were killed, then just dare to calculate what mainland Japan would have been like.

So the arguments against the American use of the Atom Bomb I think ignore the situation. Plus the arguments also ignore the issue of self defense. America was attacked --therefore it fought back as is the most basic human right of all--life.

And the demonstration is not a good argument since Japan was given a demonstration. That did not change anything. Then a second demonstration and that also changed nothing. Then the Russians invaded. And that is when the war cabinet assembled to discuss surrender. And even then there were not enough votes for a surrender until the emperor himself intervened and said that, "We are surrendering." [The military thought they still had a few aces up their sleeves--which is true. They had advanced airplanes in development. ] 

[The larger perspective here is this: The people entering this argument have a different purpose in mind. It is this. That whatever the USA does (or has done, or will do) is (was, and will be always) wrong. Their purpose is to disparage the USA at all costs. It does not matter what the subject is. It could be the American Indians or the Civil War or the Middle East. The one major principle of Leftist is always to disparage the USA.

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Herem [חרם excommunication] of the Gra

 So why is it that the Herem [חרם excommunication] of the Gra is ignored? [That is his signature on the letter of excommunication.] I think it is because people do not realize that a herem is a regular halacha (law) based on nedarim נדרים (vows). The only question would be if a herem is made by someone qualified.  Clearly he was qualified. So it applies according to the strict law.

[Why do I say it comes from nedarim (vows). That is because I saw this in the commentaries on Laws of Shavuot and Nedarim.

So what is a neder (vow)? It is when someone says, "This loaf of bread is forbidden to you like a karban."(קרבן sacrifice brought in the Temple) If that loaf belongs to the speaker, then the neder [vow] is valid, and the other person can not eat from that loaf. אדם יכול לאסור את שלו. So in the case of the Gra,  the herem was valid, and anyone transgressing it even until today  transgresses a prohibition of the Torah.

Rav Nahman I believe was a great tzadik and not under the herem. However he does not seem to have been aware of its validity.   So while `I think the best idea is to be part of a straight Litvak yeshiva, I can see the importance of following the advice of Rav Nahman in the many areas that he touches on. [Rav Nahman himself said a prophet knows only what is revealed to him. He is not "all knowing". It is a mistake to think of any tzadik as impervious to mistake--even the greatest like Moses as we see in the Torah in the case of the waters of Meriva

SO in short there are two reasons to be careful about the herem of the Gra. One: it matters not if one agrees with it. It still has halachic validity. Two: is refers to objective reality.

. 

 Avraham Abulafia [the mystic from the Middle Ages I have mentioned before] had an approach צירוף אותיות combining the letters of the Divine names of God. His approach is brought at length in the Remak (Moshe of Cordoba) and Rav Chaim Vital.

There was a  debate because of his books of prophecy. That I imagine was too much to swallow for many people. But even the Chida (Rav Chaim David Azulai) brings him in Shem HaGedolim.  

[One thing I noticed was his sympathetic approach to Jesus but from what I can tell that was not the reason the Rashba was against him.]

Nachmanides asks in the first mishna in Ketuboth this. We know that if the husband comes to court and says he found his wife not to be a virgin we believe him until she brings proof that she was. [So she loses the Ketubah and also to one opinion the marriage itself is not valid. [It is like when you buy something and what you get were two different things. The whole deal is null in the first place.] ]

The Gemara says the reason is that the Ketubah is from the words of the scribes, not from the Torah. So if it would be from the Torah she would be believed? And he would need to bring proof? But why? In general when a document comes to court that has a condition stated in in it do not we usually say first show that the condition has been fulfilled and then we can deal with the document?

The Ramban [Nachmanides] says the reason she would be believed is there is a Hazaka and a Rov [prior status and a majority that most women are married as virgins.]

So we see a hazaka (status) alone would not be enough. Rav Shach shows why this is the case from Ketuboth 76. There is an exchange of an ass with a cow. The owner of the ass now get the cow. But when the owner of the cow goes to take possession of the ass he finds it dead. Rav Yehuda said in the name of  Shmuel the owner of the ass has to show it was alive at the time of the deal. Tosphot askes over there but why? The owner of the ass already has a hazaka (status) in the cow. [He has already taken possession,] So should not the other party have to bring the proof the ass was not alive at the time of the deal? Answer. It is only a Hazaka. That is not enough when we need clear proof, not just prior assumptions. So we see from this that Where you need proof a Hazaka (status) is not enough, but a hazaka (status) with a rov (majority) would be. [Why would the Rov help? I did not look into this enough yet. But I assume it comes from that Gemara in Ketuboth where you collect the Ketubah because she got married in a garment that is reserved for virgins. That is a Rov (majority).]

There is such a thing as being too smart. Rav Nahman brings this up in the LeM in a few places but the most famous place is around LeM Vol II, chapter 12. "החכמות מטעות את האדם מאד".

You can see this in universities.  On one hand the stupidest people in universities are the students in the psychology departments. That is those are the students and teaches with the lowest IQ. They mostly have two digit IQs. But among the smartest are in the Philosophy departments. [They are not the smartest which are the Physicists.] But in the philosophy department you see this phenomenon that Rav Nahman talks about. They are too smart. At some point the smartness takes them off on some crazy tangent.

Even in Physics it is not the smartest that make the greatest advances. Anything more than an 150 IQ is  detrimental. The super IQ people that get on game shows are never the ones that make real advances. 

To combine faith with reason

To combine faith with reason was a major goal of the Middle Ages. But by means of Torah scholars that are demons as Rav Nahman [of Breslov] brings in the LeM vol I chapter 12 and 28 the Dark Side now tries to destroy faith under the cloak of faith.[It is like Daniel Defoe wrote that in every generation the Dark Side changes and develops new tactics.]

Another  method by which the Dark Side tries to destroy faith is by the disguise of "reason" which as a political system became Socialism. 

Socialism is not a good thing since I do not relish the prospect of the world de-evolving into socialist banana republics like in Africa or South America. I mean who in their right mind would want to live in Niguarda, the Sudan or Venezuela? You really think socialism is so great the  take a look at how it destroys everything in its path.

 The problem with teachers of religion especially in the Jewish world is actually seen from ancient times. That is the false prophets that were documented in the books of Ezekiel and Jeremiah. And you see this in the Mishna and Gemara. The Mishna brings that the prushim [Pharisees] were מכלי עולם (destroyers of the world). [The group of "prushim" ([Pharisees]) are often confused with the sages of the Mishna,- but these are not the same group. The prushim were the religious fanatics. That would be the religious today. This is the opposite of the sages of Mishna who were not trying to make a show of how religious they were, nor trying to use the appearance of Torah to get others to give them money.

[So even though Rav Nahman of Breslov brings up the problem of Torah scholars that are demons in the LeM Vol I ch 12, he is not the first one to notice this problem]

  Here I would like to answer the question I asked on רב שך.  The question was ר' יהודה and ר' שמעון both hold we go by the דרשינן טעמא דקרא, לר' שמעון תמיד ולר' רק כשהטעם נכתב בתוך הפסוק and yet come to opposite conclusions. The answer is this. ר' שמעון מחזיק  we go by both the reason and the literal meaning. You see this in the case in Sanhedrin כ''א ע''א. He says a king may not marry more than שמנה עשרה and also not even one that might turn his heart. It is ר' יהודה that says we go only by the reason when the reason is written.

So back to our subject about marrying a gentile woman. The reason ר' שמעון says not to marry any gentile woman is not because of going by the reason for the verse, but rather because that is the literal meaning of the verse. In that particular verse the seven Canaanite nations are not mentioned even though that is the larger context there. And if he would only go by the reason for the verse he would forbid only seven nations. And the reason ר' יהודה who is the תנא קמא forbids only seven nations is when the reason for the law is written in the verse he goes only by the reason which applies only to the seven nations since they are specially more attached to idolatry more than any other nations.  

כאן ברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי על רב שך. השאלה הייתה שר' יהודה ור' שמעון שניהם מחזיקים שאנחנו הולכים דרשינן טעמא דקרא, לר' שמעון תמיד, ור' יהודה רק כשהטעם נכתב בתוך הפסוק, ובכל זאת מגיעים למסקנות הפוכות. התשובה היא זו. ר' שמעון מחזיק אנחנו הולכים גם לפי הסיבה וגם משמעות המילולית. אתה רואה זאת במקרה בסנהדרין כ''א ע''א. לדבריו, מלך לא יכול להתחתן יותר משמונה עשרה וגם לא אישה כזו שיכולה להפוך את ליבו. ור' יהודה אומר שאנחנו הולכים רק לפי הסיבה כשהסיבה נכתבת בפסוק. אז חזור לנושא שלנו על נישואין לאישה לא יהודיה. הסיבה שר' שמעון אומר שלא להינשא לאישה לא יהודיה אינה בגלל היותה של הסיבה לפסוק, אלא כי זו המשמעות המילולית של הפסוק. באותו פסוק שבעת העמים הכנעניים לא מוזכרים למרות שזה ההקשר הגדול יותר שם. ואם רק נלך לפי הסיבה לפסוק זה היה אוסר רק על שבעת האומות. והסיבה שר' יהודה שהוא התנא קמא אוסר רק שבעת האומות היא כאשר הסיבה לחוק כתובה בפסוק הוא הולך רק לפי הסיבה שמתייחסת רק לשבע העמים מכיוון שהם קשורים במיוחד לעבודת אלילים יותר מכל עם אחר

 Here I would like to answer the question I asked on Rav Shach in my previous two blog entries.  The question was R. Yehuda and R Shimon both hold we go by the reason for the verse and yet come to opposite conclusions. The answer is this. R Shimon hold we go by both the reason and the literal meaning. You see this in the case in Sanhedrin 21a. He says a king may not marry more than 18 and also not even one that might turn his heart. It is R Yehuda that says we go only by the reason when the reason is written.

So back to our sugia/ subject about marrying a gentile woman. The reason R Shimon says not to marry any gentile woman is not because of going by the reason for the verse, but rather because that is the literal meaning of the verse. In that particular verse the seven Canaanite nations are not mentioned even though that is the larger context there. And if he would only go by the reason for the verse he would forbid only teh seven nations. And the reason R Yehuda who is the Tana Kama [sages] forbids only teh seven nations is when the reason for the law is written in the verse he goes only by the reason which applies only to the seven nations since they are specially more attached to idolatry more than any other nations.  

There is an מחלוקת between ר' שמעון בן יוחאי and the חכמים if one can marry a woman who is a gentile but not from the seven Canaanite nations יבמות דף כ''ג ע''ב.

 There is an מחלוקת between ר' שמעון בן יוחאי and the חכמים  if one can marry a woman who is a gentile but not from the seven nations של כנען יבמות דף  כ''ג ע''ב. To the חכמים this is allowed since the actual verse forbids specifically the seven nations. And in fact that is how the טור decided the halacha which is against the רמב''ם. That verse says more or less לא תתחתן בם בתך לא תיתן לבנו ובתו לא תיקח לבניך Now ר' שמעון says this is not allowed since דורשין טעמא דקרא. The well known question here is clear. ההלכה היא שלא דרשינן טעמא דקרא

 Now רב שך answers based on a גמרא in סנהדרין. In an argument there on page כ''א ע''א the חכמים say a king can not marry more than eighteen wives לא ירבה לו נשים. Now ר' יהודה says he can have more as long as they do not turn his heart, i.e. he goes only  by the reason. ר' שמעון says you go by both the literal meaning and also the reason. So even one that turns his heart, he can not marry. And more than eighteen even like Abigail wife of king David. So what רב שך is saying is the Rambam in fact goes by the first sage תנא קמא not like ר' יהודה nor ר' שמעון. And when the גמרא says the תנא קמא of ר' שמעון can marry a gentile is meaning ר' יהודה. He would allow this because he goes the reason alone. רב שך is saying the verse itself he says is in fact talking about the seven nations but we do not care about that and rather go only by the reason which expands it to all gentiles. THAT IS he is saying the רמב''ם understands that גמרא in יבמות differently that we usually understand it. לי יש קשה. For to ר' שמעון  we go by the reason for the verse and so we forbid marrying all nations עובדי עבודה זרה עכו''ם. And ר' יהודה goes by the reason for the verse when the reason is written into the verse and so he forbids only the seven nations. So I have to admit I am confused here. I assume there must be a way of answering for רב שך but it does not occur to me this minute.  

יש מחלוקת בין ר 'שמעון בן יוחאי לחכמים אם אפשר להתחתן עם אישה שהיא גויה אך לא משבע האומות של כנען יבמות דף כ''ג ע''ב. לחכמים זה מותר שכן הפסוק אוסר רק שבעת האומות. ולמעשה כך החליט טור את ההלכה שהיא נגד הרמב''ם. הפסוק הזה אומר לא תתחתן בם בתך לא תיתן לבנו ובתו לא תיקח לבניך עכשיו  ר’ שמעון אומר שזה לא מותר בגלל שדורשין טעמא דקרא. השאלה הידועה כאן ברורה. ההלכה היא שלא דרשינן טעמא דקרא עכשיו רב שך עונה על סמך הגמרא בסנהדרין. בוויכוח שם בעמוד כ''א ע''א הוא כך. אומרים החכמים מלך לא יכול להינשא ליותר משמונה עשרה נשים לא ירבה לו נשים. עכשיו ר' יהודה אומר שהוא יכול לקבל יותר כל עוד שהן לא הופכות את ליבו, כלומר הוא הולך רק לפי הסיבה של הקרא . ר' שמעון אומר שאתה הולך לפי המשמעות המילולית וגם הסיבה. אז גם אחת שמסירה את ליבו, הוא לא יכול להתחתן איתה. ולא יותר משמונה עשרה אפילו כמו אביגיל אשת המלך דוד. אז מה שרב שך אומר הוא שהרמב"ם למעשה הולך לפי התנא קמא לא כמו ר 'יהודה ולא ר' שמעון. כשהגמרא אומרת שהתנא קמא של ר 'שמעון יכול להתחתן עם גוי פירושו ר' יהודה. הוא יאפשר זאת כי הוא הולך לפי הסיבה לבד. רב שך אומר שהפסוק עצמו הוא אומר מדבר על שבעת האומות, אך לא אכפת לנו מזה, אלא הולכים רק לפי הסיבה שמרחיבה את הפסוק לכל הגויים. כלומר הוא אומר שהרמב''ם מבין הגמרא ביבמות אחרת שאנחנו בדרך כלל מבינים את זה. לי יש קשה. כי לר' שמעון אנו הולכים לפי הסיבה לפסוק ולכן אנו אוסרים להתחתן עם כל העמים עובדי עבודה זרה עכו''ם. ור 'יהודה הולך גם לפי הסיבה לפסוק כאשר הסיבה כתובה לפסוק, ולכן הוא אוסר רק על שבעת האומות. זאת נראית סתירה  

An argument between the Tur and the Rambam if one can marry a woman who is a gentile.

There is an argument between R Shimon ben Yochai and the Sages if one can marry a woman who is a idolater but not from the seven Canaanite nations [Emori, Hiti, etc.] [Yebamot 36b]

To the sages this is allowed since the actual verse forbids specifically the seven nations. [And in fact that is how the Tur decided the halacha which is against the Rambam ] R. Shimon says this is not allowed since you go by the reason for the verse.

[That verse says more or less "Do not marry a woman from them (the context refers to the seven Canaanite nations) because they might tilt your heart"] 

The well known question here is clear. The law like the sages. 

Rav Shach answers based on a Gemara in Sanhedrin. In an argument there on page 21a the sages say a king can not marry more than eighteen wives [לא ירבה לו נשים] R Yehuda says he can have more as long as they do not turn his heart, i.e. he goes only  by the reason. R. Shimon says you go by both the literal meaning and also the reason. so even one that turns his heart he can not marry. and more than 18 even like Abigail wife of king David. So what Rav Shach is saying is the Rambam in fact goes by the first sage [Tana Kama] not like R. Yehuda nor R. Shimon. and when the Gemara says the sages of R. Shimon can marry a gentile is meaning R. Yehuda. he would allow this because he goes the reason alone. Rav Shach is saying the verse itself he says is in fact talking about the seven nations but we do not care about that and rather go only by the reason which expands it to all gentiles. THAT IS he is saying the Rambam understands that Gemara in Yevamot differently that we usually understand it.

I have to admit I am having trouble understanding Rav Shach. I definitely need to spend a lot more time on that section. For to R Shimon we go by the reason for the verse and so we forbid marrying all nations that worship idols [Akum]. And R Yehuda goes by the reason for the verse [when the reason is written into the verse] and so he forbids only the seven nations. So I have to admit I am confused here. I assume there must be a way of answering for Rav Shach but it does not occur to me this minute.  

[Just information for the general public. Idol worshipers means people that worship idols, not all gentiles. But because of the censors it is hard to know what the original Gemara was saying.

[Later note: In a later blog entry I answered this. The basic idea is that the argument in Yevamot is not between R. Shimon and the sages that always go by the literal meaning, but R. Shimon and R Yehuda who goes only by the  spirit of the verse when both are written. R Shimon goes by both when both are written. So back to our case: 

To R Shimon only the 7 nations are forbidden because of the spirit of the verse. To R Yehuda all nations are forbidden since the seven nations are not in fact mentioned openly in that specific verse. 

x40  E Flat Major

Schools of thought that have gone after Kant and other kinds of schools that have gone after Hegel.

 As is well known there has been a lot of  friction between the schools of thought that have gone after Kant and the other kinds of schools that have gone after Hegel.

Most of the critiques on Hegel seem to focus on his political ideas, and how the Communists took over parts of his ideas to justify their actions.

My feeling about all this is that the later schools that took off from Kant are mostly ready for the trash as Robert Hanna goes into excruciating  detail to show. [That is he shows the flaws of all the off shoots of Analytic philosophy of the 20th century.] His motto is "Forward to Kant". Yet I think that the school of thought of Kelley Ross and Leonard Nelson is a great development of Kant.

[Some of the questions on Hegel were answered by Cunningham and McTaggart. I feel that there is no system that cannot be misused. So the fact that Hegel is not a socialist at all should count. He does not hold of government control of industry or property.] 

I would be happy if it was possible to take the good on the Kant Fries School of Nelson and Ross and at the same time not ignore the important contributions of Hegel.

So my point here is what is worth spending time on? I mean you only have  a certain amount of hours in each day. So to spend more time on philosophy than is really needed, I would rather not do. I want to get the best, and then move on to other things [the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and Physics] that I need more urgently. So to get a good picture of philosophy it is helpful to have people that are good at building a system or making improvements on existing systems. It is even more helpful to have people that can critique and show the flaws of some supposedly well thought out systems. For example Habermas showed his real genius in a short paper that blew Rawls's Theory of Justice out of the water. Robert Hanna nuked twentieth century philosophy. So by default who is left standing? Kant and Hegel. But there were plenty of detours that lead to dead ends like Marxism and other kinds of off shoots. So that is why I am saying Kelley Ross and Leonard Nelson are the  best developments of Kant and Mc Taggart and Cunningham the best to show what Hegel is all about.

the subject of ספק ספיקא

 I wanted to go into the subject of ספק ספיקא in short. The wife of a kohen was found not to have been a virgin, so she is forbidden since the sex might have been after she was betrothed. Tosphot asks what about the status that she is assumed Ok חזקת כשרות until proven otherwise? Answer: the  prior status of the body חזקת הגוף goes against that since it shows she remained a virgin until the last possible minute. That pushes the act to be during the time she was betrothed. R. Akiva Eigger asks but status of "now" [חזקת השתא] pushes that back in time. I.e. we assume the way things are now goes back in time until the farthest possible moment. He answers that status does not join with status of her being allowed to her husband since these two different kinds of status say different things.(החזקות לא מצטרפות)

Rav Shach asked that R Eigger himself say elsewhere that that point itself is subject to an argument between Rav and Shmuel. His answer requires showing his point from a lot of places, but the short of it is that status of now only can put a prior status in doubt if the prior status was already weak. But if it is strong, then the status of now does not count at all.

 A lot of people get affected by some mental trap. There is a remarkable cure for this from Rav Nahman of Breslov: i.e., the prayer of Chavakook the prophet. That is the last part of that book. You can find this in the Bible in the minor prophets.

The fact is that nowadays with the whole world going insane, this seems like a good idea for people to say and even to say it as they are walking on the street. For the Evil Inclination, the Satan is attacking everyone in their thoughts. Bringing people to think exactly the things that are wrong and hurtful for them to think. This is a new technique of the evil inclination. For in former years people had to seek out evil ideas and insanities. Now these same evil thoughts come to everyone uninvited.  

[the prayer is השם שמעתי שמעך יראתי  השם פעלך בקרב שנים בקרב שנים תודיע ברוגז רחם תזכור Load i have heard about you and i was afraid. Lord you works are in the midst of years, in the midst of years let there be known, in anger remember to have mercy, etc.]

"Iyun" in depth learning and combine that with fast learning.

The idea of saying the words forwards and backwards as a way of doing "Iyun" in depth learning I found amazingly helpful when I was at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. I certainly see that it can get one bogged down if he does no fast learning either. Still in a situation where I found I had a time limit on how much I could study before exams, this method of saying the words forwards and backwards was helpful.

You can see this method in Rav Avraham Abulafia, a mystic of the Middle Ages [who is brought a lot as an authority by Rav Haim Vital and the Remak/Rav Moshe of Cordoba.]

When I first got to Shar Yashuv [beginner's yeshiva in NY] my first year was very difficult because there were no structured classes. I had to beg people to teach me anything. But I did manage to sort of get started. The second year was Hulin and that is when I began to understand the Litvak emphasis on "Iyun" in depth learning. The third year there was a class but instead I joined the group of Naphtali Yegger and then I began to see the depths of Gemara and Tosphot. But I could not do that own my own. So on my own I did just Tosphot along with the Maharsha and whatever Rishonim that seemed relevant to the sugia.

But all that time I had my separate sessions of learning fast in order to finish each tractate with Rashi and Tosphot. So I began to gain an appreciation for the idea of combining these two kinds of learning.

 I tend to be careful about rebuke because of Rav Nahman of Breslov's last Torah lesson. LeM vol II section 8. "Even though rebuke is a commandment in the Torah and everyone is required to rebuke their fellow man when they see him acting not properly, still not everyone is fit to rebuke as R. Akiva said, 'I would be surprised if anyone in this generation is fit to give rebuke.'"

What makes this especially significant is the in the thought of Rav Nahman, the later a Torah lesson was the more important it was. 

So by implication the idea of not giving rebuke (even when you think it is required) is the peak of all his Torah lessons.

Separation of religion and state. Even the thought that the religious authorities would have power gives me nightmares.

 Separation of religion and state is a big issue in Israel. But I can not see any source in Torah for this. Nor is it in the Constitution. "No national church" written in the Constitution of the USA is not the same as separation of church and state.

Still, in Israel I can see the point of this since the religious tend to be insane. [There is also the problem of group insanity besides individual insanity.] Even the thought that the religious authorities would have power gives me nightmares.

So why is this important principle not found in Torah? ANSWER: one of the reasons for the mitzvot is "shalom ha'Medina" (peace of the country), and experience has shown than power of religious authorities is highly detrimental to peace of the state and of the family, therefore one should have separation of religion and state.

 

Who is "Akum" עכו''ם עובד כוכבים ומזלות [idolater]

 Who is "Akum" עכו''ם עובד כוכבים ומזלות [idolater]? This is an argument among rishonim. The Rambam (as is well known) holds Christians are in that category. To Tosphot in Tractate Avida Zara, they are not because "shituf" ["joining" with God ] is not idolatry. This comes up because this argument is often ignored and people think the Rambam is the only opinion. That is just not so.

However the particular Tosphot that deals with this issue seems to have about three separate reason for the fact that Christians are not idolaters. [But besides his depending on that Gemara itself that Shituf is not idolatry, I forgot the other reasons.]

I might add here that Aquinas spent a good deal of effort in defining and defending the idea of Divine simplicity. He shows that according to the Torah, God is "simple" which means not a composite. And he shows that that does work within his context.  Divine simplicity is central to Torah faith as no one in the Middle Ages disagreed with.

[Divine simplicity was a major issue in the middle ages and in fact probably was the reason that the Platonic model of Emanation was dropped and the Aristotelean model was adopted.]

 

 In the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides there is a passage about revolutions. It is very accurate and gives one the chills. The idea is that  it brings out the worst in people.

[Though the War of Independence is called "revolution," it was to preserve the structure that had been in place from before Parliament started treating the colonies as serfs.]

A head covering, there is no requirement of such a thing except for during the public reading of Torah as brought in Mesechet Sofrim.

 The religious clothing has always seemed a little "off " to me. For one thing, you are not supposed to advertise how religious you are. מה השם אלוהיך שואל ממך ... והצנע לכת עם אלוהיך

"What does the Lord your God ask from you ... and to walk modesty with your God".

The skull cap itself has seemed to me to be even worse. There is no record of Jews wearing such a thing until long after it was the custom of popes and bishops. [Take a look at all paintings and drawings of Jews from the Middle Ages. There is not one skull cap.]

If the issue is a head covering, there is no requirement of such a thing except for during the public reading of Torah as brought in Mesechet Sofrim [not from the Mishna but one of the books on halacha from chazal/the sages.  The Taz wants to add that not wearing a head covering is the custom of gentiles. That is odd, since the skull cap itself is the custom of popes and bishops. So the Kipa itself is minhag hagoyim (custom of the gentiles). 

יצחק קדורי Rav Isaac Kaduri one of the most well respected mystics in Israel left a not that was not to be opened until after he died. It was opened and said the name of the true messiah is Yeshua [the well known name of Jesus in Hebrew]. It was ignored as you can imagine. Still, it does lend a degree of credibility to Rav Avraham Abulafia [a "mekubal" mystic from the Middle Ages] who wrote that Jesus is the messiah son of Joseph that is mentioned in the end of the Talmud tractate of Suka [Also this subject is brought up in Kol HaTor of the Gra and the New Tikunim  of the Ramchal.]