בבא מציעא י''ד:ב תוספות says the argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד is the same as their argument as on page ק''א. But on page ק''א the גמרא concludes that there really is no argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page ק''א there is no argument and on page י''ד there is, how can תוספות say it is the same law in both places?


בבא מציעא י''ד: ב תוספות אומר הטיעון בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד זהה לטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. אבל בעמוד ק''א הגמרא מסכמת כי באמת אין שום טיעון כי הם דברו על מצבים שונים. אז אם בעמוד ק''א אין ויכוח ובעמוד י''ד קיים ויכוח, איך תוספות יכול להגיד שזה אותו דבר ואותו החוק בשני המקומות?

To answer this question, it is possible to answer that תוספות holds there is no argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד  and that that is the exact explanation of their argument on page ק''א. That is  in the שיטת תוספות  ידו על העליונה means he gets the קרן ושבח and ידו על התחתונה means  he gets only the קרן and the first case is when the שדה is עשוי לטעת and the other case is when it is not.


כדי לענות על שאלה זו, אפשר לענות  שתוספות מחזיק שאין ויכוח בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד, וכי זהו ההסבר המדויק של הטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. כלומר לפי שיטת התוספות ידו על העליונה אומר שהוא יקבל את הקרן ושבח, וידו על התחתונה אומר שהוא מקבל רק את הקרן.  המקרה הראשון הוא כאשר השדה הוא עשוי לטוע והמקרה השני הוא כאשר הוא לא.

Bava Metzia page 14b Tosphot says the argument between Rav and Shmuel on page 14 is the same as their argument as on page 101. But on page 101 the gemara concludes that there really is not argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page 101 there is no argument and on page 14 there is how can Tosphot say it is the same law in both places?

I think that there have been others that have thought the idea of a synthesis between Torah and Reason is in some need a revision after the 800 years since the Guide for the Perplexed. The basic problem starts with the fact that 20th century philosophy is obviously false and based on mistaken ideas. The ideas starts out innocuously enough with some good  suggestions from Frege about expanding the category  of a priori. But then it devolved into pure incoherent nonsense. The Ari [Isaac Luria] did not fare much better.
So the first task is to identify what needs to be rejected.

The Nefesh HaChaim of Reb Chaim from Volloshin certainly does a great job in terms of one half of this problem. And The Rambam in the Guide does a great job with the other half. The problem is really how to put both together.
The point almost all religious people are affected by the delusion of moral superiority along with a assortment of various fantasies.. Non religious people have their own set of different kinds of delusions. Finding the right balance is essential,- along with some way of safeguarding that balance.

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. The רשב''ם holds  בפרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף

The proof of רב שך that the רמב''ם hold by the רשב''ם is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the רמב''ם would be holding like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the רשב''ם. If he can pay back any שווה כסף Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

Besides that to seems to me that the רמב''ם states the הלכה openly like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back money. If he could also pay back שווה כסף I think the רמב''ם would have to state that.

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הרשב''ם מחזיק בפרק השואל שהגנב יכול להחזיר שווה כסף. ההוכחה של רב שך כי הרמב''ם מהחזיק כהרשב''ם קשה להבין. הנקודה העיקרית שלו היא העובדה כי הבעלים של האובייקט יכולים לבקש בחזרה את החלקים. הנקודה היא שאם הרמב''ם  מחזיק כמו רש''י והרא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלי שלם או כסף, אז לשלם בחזרה את השברים לא מסתדר עם זה. אבל כמו שאני רואה את זה,  זה גם אינו מתאים עם הרשב''ם. אם הוא יכול להחזיר שווה כסף אז מה נותן לבעל הזכות לבקש אלה דווקא? חוץ מזה  נראה לי כי הרמב''ם קובע הלכה בגלוי כמו רש''י ואת רא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כסף [דמים] . אם הוא יכול גם להחזיר שווה כסף אני חושב שהרמב''ם יצטרך להצהיר על זה.

Rambam laws of theft. Chapter 1, law 14.

Rambam laws of theft 1:14. The Rashbam holds Bava Metzia פרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף [not just money, but rather anything that is worth money.]

The proof of Rav Shach that the Rambam hold by the Rashbam is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the Rambam would be holding like Rashi and the Rosh that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the Rashbam. If he can pay back any שווה כסף (anything that is worth money). Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

That is one way or the other we need to find some reason the owner can ask for the pieces back. But what ever that reason is can not have anything to do with the argument between the Rashbam and Rashi and the Rosh.

This was the last idea I had before I broke my leg. [I called for help and some people called an ambulance and took me to the local hospital.] ]

It would be a worth while project to defend the basic Litvak path of straight Torah based on the insights of my predecessors. That would mean making full use of  Ari and the Kant and Hegel while not drifting off into mysticism nor sterile philosophy..
This would not be all that different than the Rambam's Guide. But it would need someone of that kind of stature to do this.[I mean to say I would come out with a neo Platonic approach anyway just like the Rambam did.]

My own personal defense of Torah really began with Dr Kelley Ross's web site where he has an approach based on Kant, Schopenhauer, and Fries. It of course did not hurt that I was aware of the Ari's  interpretations of Torah based on the Talmud and his own insights.
But this has all been personal, and rarely do I ever share insights in this regard.
And any serious effort in this regard would have to take into account the important results of Hegel. So even to get the philosophical part of this project worked out could not be easy as it would have to plow a middle path between the Kant School of Dr. Ross and Hegel.--no easy task.

Or one could  just simply depend on the Rambam's Guide which is a perfectly valid approach. But it seems that after the Ari and Kant and Hegel there is considerable work to be done. 

fear and love of God

In terms of coming to fear and love of God, the Rambam's position is not usually considered. It seems paradoxical of the face of it. No one that I have heard of ever thought that learning physics and metaphysics of Aristotle brings to fear and love of God.  No one except the Rambam that is.

They way people usually translate him in the religious world is that he meant something like mysticism even though he refers specifically to the physics and metaphysics of the ancient Greeks which clearly is not the same thing.

I have usually defended the Rambam's based on the idea of the hidden Torah that is concealed in the work of Creation which you do find in the Ari. But that does not mean the Rambam is referring to the Ari.
[The hidden holiness in creation is a fairly big subject mentioned by Reb Nachman.]

And even though I do hold the Rambam was right, I still feel the learning "Musar" the ethical works written during the Middle Ages is important in order to come to fear of God.--

Reb Nachman's own objections to what is called secular learning has to be understood as a reaction to the over-sided emphasis on on secular learning that the enlightenment had. Both the gentile enlightenment and later the Jewish one. As a reaction to that, Reb Nachman's ideas can be understood. Certainly the Enlightenment was not aiming towards fear of God of learning Torah.
My own emphasis of Physics and Metaphysics can also be seen in the light of my experiences in the religious world where I saw over religiosity does not bring to fear of God. Just the opposite. Over religiosity often  comes with exaggerated degrees of wickedness as anyone in the religious world can bear witness to.


[Using Reb Nachman as a source and an authority seems to be an venerable Litvak practice. I never even heard of any Litvak gadol  in Torah claim otherwise. Though there is an an awareness that Breslov is a cult, still people freely borrow and make use of the ideas of Reb Nachman pretty much all the time and I approve of that

The truth is my history with Reb Nachman is long. But the sum total of my observations is easy to sum up. People that become Breslov go downhill very fast. People that stay Litvak and simply learn Reb Nachman privately gain a lot. Nothing could be simpler.

כי הרשב''ם מחזיק אין שמין לגנב אומר לנו שאנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין כאשר כלי נשבר.

In other words, in my way of understanding, הלכה י''ד is complete. The first part deals with the case the כלי went down in value whether it was broken of not and then we go by the time of העמדה בדין. And that is not like the רשב''ם. For the רשב''ם holds אין שמין לגנב tells us one thing that we go by שעת העמדה בדין when the כלי  was broken. It matters not if it went up or down in value before that.

במילים אחרות, בהבנתי, הלכה י''ד שלמה. החלק הראשון עוסק במקרה שהכלי ירד ערך, אם הוא נשבר או לא, ואז אנחנו הולכים לפי זמן של העמדה בדין. וזה לא כמו הרשב''ם. כי הרשב''ם מחזיק אין שמין לגנב אומר לנו שאנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין כאשר כלי נשבר. זה לא משנה אם זה עלה או ירד בערך לפני זה.

And therefore the Rambam can not hold by the opinion of the Rashbam. Then we still are stuck because Rav Shach brings  a proof of the exact opposite.

I am really not sure what to make of all this.[I went on later to write about this in Ideas in Bava Metzia, but I do not recall if I was ever able to resolve this issue.] 

A proof that the Rambam holds like Rashi and the Rosh that a thief must pay either money or whole vessels, not שווה כסף [Things that are worth money]

 I think there is a proof that the רמב''ם does not hold like the רשב''ם but that אין שמין לגנב means he must pay כלים שלמים or כסף.
רב חיים הלוי says there is  a doubt about this, and רב שך brings a proof that the רמב''ם does hold with the רשב''ם that the גנב can pay שווה כסף
The proof I have that the רמב''ם does not hold by the רשב''ם is from הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד.
My reason is simple. If the רמב''ם would hold by the רשב''ם then why does he not write simply if the גנב broke the כלי we evaluate it according to the time of העמדה בדין? Why does he divide הלכה י''ד into two parts? One is which the value of the כלי went down and we go by שעת הגניבה and part two is where it went up in value and then he broke it and we go by שעת העמדה בדין?
Part one  by itself is not a question on the idea that that רמב''ם hold from the רשב''ם because it only is referring to a case where the כלי was not broken. But if we look at הלכה י''ד  in its entirely it is obvious something is missing in part one. That is the case where the כלי went down in value and then it was broken. If the רמב''ם really would be holding from the רשב''ם then he would say if the vessel went down or up in value and then it was broken we go by שעת העמדה בדין.
So instead according to the way I see it, אין שמין  has nothing to do with the time of evaluation but the fact that the thief must give back כלים שלמים or כסף.

אני חושב שיש הוכחה שהרמב''ם לא מחזיק  כמו הרשב''ם, אלא אין שמין לגנב אומר שהוא צריך לשלם כלים שלמים או כסף. הרב חיים הלוי אומר שיש ספק לגבי זה, ועוד רב שך מביא הוכחה שהרמב''ם מחזיק כרשב''ם שהגנב יכול לשלם שווה כסף. ההוכחה שיש לי שהרמב''ם אינו מחזיק כרשב''ם היא מתוך הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הסיבה שלי היא פשוטה. אם הרמב"ם יחזיק כרשב''ם אז למה הוא לא כותב פשוט אם הגנב שבר את הכלי אנו מעריכים אותו לפי שעת העמדה בדין? מדוע הוא מחלק את ההלכה לשני חלקים? אחד הוא מצב שערך של הכלי ירד למטה ואנחנו הולכים לפי שעת הגניבה וחלק שני הוא כאשר הוא עלה בערך ואז הוא שבר אותו ואנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין. החלק הראשון, כשלעצמו, אינו שאלה לגבי הרעיון שהרמב"ם מחזיק כרשב''ם משום שהוא מתייחס רק למקרה שבו הכלי לא נשבר. אבל אם נתבונן  בה בכלל, ברור שמשהו חסר בחלקו הראשון. זה המקרה שבו הכלי נפל בערך, ולאחר מכן נשבר. אם הרמב''ם באמת מחזיק כרשב''ם, אז הוא צריך להגיד אם כלי ירד או עלה, ואז הוא נשבר, אנחנו הולכים לפי שעת העמדה בדין. אז על פי הדרך שאני רואה את זה, לדין אין שמין אין שום קשר עם הזמן של הערכה, אבל אלא כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלים שלמים או כסף.

Right before I broke my leg, I was thinking that Rav Shach's proof that the Rambam hold like the Rashbam is not a strong proof. I do not know if I wrote my thoughts down anywhere but as far as I recall Rav Shach was building on the idea that the owner of the broken vessel can ask for the pieces back. If the Rambam would hold like Rashi how could that make sense? But the way I see it even if the Rambam hold like the Rashbam this still makes is a problem. If after all the thief owns the broken object, what gives the owner the right to ask for the pieces back? So you have to say this is just a special thing to allow the owner to ask for the pieces back.

I might just mention the important fact that the Rambam does say the thief pays back דמים money. If he would be holding like the Rashbam that at least  seems curious.

I am not sure how to say this simply but basically I think there is some proof that the Rambam does not hold like the Rashbam but that אין שמין לגנב means he must pay כלים שלמים or כסף.
Reb Chaim says there is  a doubt about this and Rav Shach brings a proof that the Ramabm does hold with the Rashbam that the גנב can pay שווה כסף
The proof I have that the Rambam does not hold by the Rashbam is from הלכות גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד.
My reason is simple. If the Rambam would hold by the Rashbam then why does he not write simply if the thief broke the vessel we evaluate it according to the time of העמדה בדין? Why does he divide halacha 14 into two parts? One is which the value of the vessel went down and we go by שעת הגניבה and part two is where it went up in value and then he broke it and we go by שעת העמדה בדין?
Part one  by itself is not a question on the idea that that Rambam hold from the Rashbam because it only is referring to a case where the vessel was not broken. But if we look at halacha 14 in its entirely it is obvious something is missing in part one--then case where the vessel went down in value and then it was broken. If the Rambam really would be holding from the Rashbam then he would say if the vessel went down or up in value and then it was broken we go by שעת העמדה בדין.
So instead according to the way I see it, אין שמין  has nothing to do with the time of evaluation but the fact that the thief must give back כלים שלמים or כסף.
However Rav Shach's proof is also valid. Thus we are left with a doubt about what the Rabam really holds.

The Torah is not at all exclusive about who can come to true holiness. It does give objective standards, but as far as the Torah is concerned, anyone who fulfills those standards graduates.

(1) Accepting the yoke of Torah is not the same thing as being "Davuk"(attachment)  to God --but it is close.

(2) Some people think their feelings of a spiritual high are automatically classified as being "Davuk" to God. But as a rule,- feelings of spiritual highs are not from the realm of holiness. These come from counterfeit Torah, and counterfeit spirituality. And counterfeit spirituality can be awesomely powerful; and in externals it can look and sound just like real Torah.

(3) Accepting the yoke of Torah does not automatically lead to true devekut ((attachment)) but it tends to protect from the false kind of spiritual highs that are common in the religious world.

(4) Devekut is a part of Torah. The reason it is legitimately ignored by the Litvak world is because it so easily decays into its opposite, and the fact that it has a short half life.  But attachment with God is in fact one of the 613 commandments. [It is mentioned twice in Deuteronomy as being one of the three purposes of the Torah which are to come to (1) Love of God, (2) Fear of God and (3) Attachment with God. ]
(5) But a spiritual high is not the same thing--but it can be from the realm of holiness. It is what is called numinosity. But a spiritual high can be from (1) holiness or from (2) its exact opposite or (3) some mixture of the two (as usually happens to people when they enter into spiritual practices). They get caught in the Intermediate Zone.

(6) One difficulty about all this is the fact that the Torah is not at all exclusive about who can come to true holiness. It does give objective standards, but as far as the Torah is concerned, anyone who fulfills those standards graduates. גדולה לגימא שמשרה רוח הקודש על נביאי הבעל. "Great is bringing in guest for it brings true prophecy even to false prophets."
This idea is brought in the Gra on Shir Hashirim chapter 2, and in a Midrash mentioned in the Talmud that is a set of statements given by Eliyahu the Prophet to an Amora. [It is a well known Midrash, but it is not the same as Midrash Raba or Midrash Tanchuma.]

(7) That is to say the giving of the Torah is a one time event in history, but the standards it sets are set in stone,-- objective morality. Anyone that fulfills its conditions gets the prizes.
Being a part of any group does not count towards holiness. It is how one acts that matters.

(8) The standards of Torah are well defined in the classical Musar books. Musar is not a purely Litvak thing. The daughter of Bava Sali was telling me how important Musar is, along with the basic books of Rav Joseph Karo.
(9) Good character is the basic thing Torah wants. This is explained best by Rav Sar Shalom Sharabi in his Nahar Shalom on the Eitz Chaim.

בבא מציעא יד: The case is there is a מלווה a לווה and a לוקח of a שדה from the לווה. In case of default on the loan the לוקח collects his improvements from בני חורין of the לווה and the essential price of the field even from משועבדין of the borrower. תוספות asks why is there a second sold field? Why did the מלווה not collect from it? Perhaps we could prove from this "מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה" is not valid?
The רמב''ם in fact answers the question of תוספות  that in fact property that the borrower buys after he received the loan is not obligated unless he wrote it own explicitly.  That is obligation is considered to exist even if he did not write it down, but not for future property.
That is how רב שך explains the  רמב''ם. That is-Rav Shach asks that the Rambam says מה שאקנה משועבד and yet here he says future property of the לווה is not משועבד. He says the Rambam means this last statement for when שיעבוד was not written down.
The two essential הלכות in the  רמב''ם are in הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק י''ח ה''א ופרק י''ט ה''ח
In פרק י''ח ה''א the  רמב''ם says property that the borrower acquired after the loan is not משועבד to the loan.
In פרק י''ט ה''ח he says in a case the the מלווה wrote to the לוקח שני "I will not collect my debt from property you buy from the לווה" that the מלווה can not go collect his debt from the לוקח ראשון because the first buyer can say to him "I left free property of the borrower  for you to collect your debt from." That means the borrower had two fields at the time of the loan and he sold the first one and then the second one.
If the מלווה says to the first buyer דין ודברים אין לי עמך I will not collect from you, he can still collect from the second buyer and then the first buyer can collect from him. [The reason is that at that point the second buyer will try to collect his debt from the first buyer for his loss of the field.] But the opposite way not.
Though I had written that to the  רמב''ם the lender could collect his debt from either field that would have to be only in the case where the borrower had written explicitly what I will buy will be obligated to this loan.

בבא מציעא יד: המקרה הוא קיים מלווה לווה וכן לוקח של שדה מן הלווה. במקרה של ברירת המחדל על ההלוואה הלוקח גובה את השיפוצים שלו מבני חורין של הלווה ואת המחיר הקרן של השדה אפילו ממשועבדין של הלווה. תוספות שואל למה יש שדה שני? מדוע המלווה לא אסף ממנו? אולי נוכל להוכיח מזה "מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה" אינו תקף? למעשה, הרמב"ם עונה על שאלת התוספות, שלמעשה הרכוש שרכש הלווה לאחר שקיבל את ההלוואה אינו משועבד אלא אם כן כתב זאת במפורש. שיעבוד טעות סופר. שיעבוד קיים גם אם הוא לא כתב את זה, אבל לא עבור רכוש עתידי. ככה רב שך מסביר את רמב''ם. שתי הלכות הנוגעות ברמב''ם הן בהלכות מלוה ולוה פרק י''ח ה''א ופרק י''ט ה''ח. בפרק פרק י''ח הרמב''ם אומר כי נכס שהלווה רכש לאחר ההלוואה אינו משועבד להלוואה. בפרק י''ט ה''ח הוא אומר במקרה שהמלווה כתב אל לוקח השני, "אני לא אאסוף את החוב שלי מהרכוש שאתה תקנה מהלווה" כי המלווה לא יכול ללכת לאסוף את החוב שלו מן לוקח ראשון, כי הקונה הראשון יכול לומר לו "הינחתי רכוש חפשי של הלווה לך לאסוף את החוב שלך". כלומר, ללווה היו שני שדות בזמן ההלוואה והוא מכר את הראשון ולאחר מכן את השני. אם המלווה אומר לקונה הראשון דין ודברים אין לי עמך (אני לא אאסוף ממך), הוא עדיין יכול לאסוף מהקונה השני ואז הרוכש הראשון יכול לאסוף המלווה. [הסיבה היא כי בשלב זה הקונה השני ינסה לאסוף את הפסד שלו מן הקונה הראשון על אובדן שלו בשדה.] אבל ההפך לא. למרות שכתבתי  שלדעת הרמב''ם המלווה יכול לאסוף את החוב שלו מאיזה משני השדות זה  רק במקרה שבו הלווה כתב במפורש מה אני אקנה יהיה מחויב הלוואה זו.

The Tosphot in Bava Metzia and also in Bava Batra clearly are not going like this Rambam, but in what ways is not clear to me this minute.This is an area that requires more work.

The New Moon and "seeing is better than hearing."

It seems to me that  ראש חדש ought to be calculated according to the actual time of the מולד. One reason I have already mentioned comes from סנהדרין ד''י ע''ב that several אמוראיים say that  ראש חדש is not dependent on the court. This goes along with  the opinion of ר' אלעזר בן עזריה  that if the court does not sanctify it on time, they sanctify it from heaven. But a further reason comes from the fact that a person that murders in front of a court is killed because דלא תהיה שמיעה גדולה מראיה. That is, certain kinds of things do not depend on the court knowing them through hearing. If they know the facts from a more accurate source of information (e.g. if they saw the events themselves), that is even better than hearing. There  in סנהדרין ע''ח ע''א where תוספות brings this it only says that seeing is better than hearing. But to me it seems the same idea applies.  You can see this from the מלחמות of the רמב''ן where the רמב''ן brings this idea about קידוש החודש specifically. [See האבי עזרי של רב שך  הלכות סנהדרין פרק י''ד ה''א where רב שך  brings these מקורות.]
[That is to say even if there was a Sanhedrin that sanctified all future new moons there is no reason to think that meant the present day calendar which was only adopted later in the time of the geonim.]





נראה לי כי ראש חדש צריך להיות מחושב לפי הזמן בפועל של מולד. סיבה אחת כבר הזכרתי בסנהדרין ד''י ע''ב, כי כמה אמוראיים אומרים כי ראש חדש אינו תלוי בבית המשפט. זה הולך יחד עם דעתו של ר 'אלעזר בן עזריה כי אם בית המשפט לא קידשו אותו בזמן, הם מקדשים אותו מן השמים. אבל סיבה נוספת נובעת מכך שאדם שרוצח בחזית בית המשפט נהרג כי "דלא תהיה שמיעה גדולה מראיה". כלומר, סוגים מסוימים של דברים אינם תלויים בשמיעת בית המשפט מעדים, אלא בראיה. אם הם יודעים את העובדות ממקור מידע מדויק יותר, למשל אם הם ראו את האירועים עצמם, זה אפילו טוב יותר מאשר לשמוע. שם בסנהדרין ע''ח ע''א תוספות מביא את זה. אבל יש להעיר  שזה אומר כי ראייה טובה יותר מאשר לשמוע. אבל בעיני זה נראה אותו רעיון. אתה יכול לראות את זה מהמלחמות של הרמב"ן שבו הרמב"ן מביא את הרעיון על קידוש החודש במיוחד. [ראה האבי עזרי של רב שך הלכות סנהדרין פרק י''ד ה''א שבו רב שך מביא את המקורות של: שלא תהיה שמיעה גדולה מראיה

It seems to me that the new moon ought to be calculated according to the actual time of the conjunction.

It seems to me that the new moon ought to be calculated according to the actual time of the conjunction. One reason I have already mentioned comes from Sanhedrin page 10 that several amoraim say that  the new moon is not dependent on the court. this goes along with r the opinion of R. Elazar Ben Azariah that 'If the court does not sanctify it on time , they sanctify it from heaven." But a further reason come from the fact that a person that murders in front on a court is killed because דלא תהיה שמיעה גדולה מראיה that is to say certain kinds of things do not depend on the court knowing them through hearing. if they know the facts from a more accurate source of information e.g if they saw the events themselves, that is even better than hearing. There in Sanhedrin 78a where Tosphot brings this, it only says that seeing is better than hearing. But to me it seems the same idea applies.  You can see this from the מלחמות of the Ramban where the Ramban brings this idea about Kidush Hachodesh specifically. [See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri הלכות סנהדרין פרק י''ד ה''א where Rav Shach brings these sourses.]

accepting the yoke of Torah

So in essence --the way it looks to me today is my major problems have been from simply not accepting the yoke of Torah and trust in God.
Even though there are for me lots of "קושיות" on this path, but I figure that the unscrupulous people that misuse the path of Torah do not present  a real question on it, and that I ought to simply get back to the straight and narrow path. [Gemara and Musar]
That is more or less based on the Mishna in Pirkei Avot כל המקבל על עצמו עול תורה מעבירים ממנו עול מלכות ועול דרך ארץ "The yoke of the government and the yoke of the way of the world is removed from him who accepts the yoke of Torah".

Not that this takes care of everything. Sometimes there comes a time when you stop praying and get up and do what needs to be done. "מה תצעק אלי דבר אל בני ישראל ויסעו" 

 When the Jewish people were at the Red Sea and calling to God for help God said to Moshe Why do you call upon me/ speak to the children of Israel and tell them to MOVE.
However though my own mistakes in leaving off learning Torah seems is clear, how to share this information is not since since most teachers of Torah are really just plain terrible people. They to me do not seem to follow Torah at all.

The entire religious world is basically a large bunch of cults. Even though they all claim Torah, there sadlly is little there that is kosher in any sense of the word.

My own approach is based on a statement of the sages אין יסורים בלא עוון. There are no troubles without sin. But when I try to figure out what exactly are my sins I do not get very far. Some things definitely seems to fit the bill  but they contradict other actions that also seem to fit the bill.

I have actually made a sort list on this blog a few times. But since I anyway have trouble identifying what exactly are my sins, I fall back to another statement of the sages. פישפש ולא מצא יתלה בביטול תורה One who has troubles should examine his deeds. One has examined his deeds and not found anything, should attribute the problems to lack of learning Torah.
[Essentially my sins seems to be leaving the straight path of Litvak Torah. I.e. the Gra's path.]



In any case what I think are the major causes of sin are that people join cults, and then their whole world view changes. Straight Torah no longer holds the charm it once did for people that join cults.
And the entire religious world is basically a large bunch of cults. Even though they all claim Torah, there sadlly is little in the religious world that is kosher in any sense of the word.



[The major issues for me are certainly Bitul Torah. For even when I got to Israel which was a great step up, I slacked off in learning Torah. I also did leave Israel eventually which I think was a terrible sin.]

[This is not intended to disparage kosher places built on straight Torah like the yeshivas that go by the Gra. The trouble is straight simple Torah is hard to hold onto.]

T87 A Major    [T87 in midi format]

straight Torah

The path of straight Torah is easy to stray from. Or perhaps better said-it was easy for me to stray from it. The major difficulty with sticking with straight, undiluted, unadulterated Torah  is not from enemies of Torah, but from its best friends. "Sure you should learn Torah, but if you come and join our group you will do it so much better! You get the true spirit, not just the words etc." The variations on this theme are endless. But the inner purpose if the same--to get the person out of  authentic Torah into something which seems to have so much more external spirit but is lacking the true essence.

What makes this hard is sometimes there really is something that is an important value--like going to Israel and serving in the IDF. It is just hard to make sense out of it all with so many cults out there.

It is perfectly possible to learn from Reb Nachman and say the Tikun Klali [ten pslams to say if one has done some sexual sin, psalms 16, 32, 41, 42, 59 77, 90, 105, 137, 150] and even go to Uman for Rosh haShanah, but not get involved in Breslov, but rather to remain in a straight Litvak yeshiva and to follow the path of Straight Torah--the Gra and Musar.

It is also possible to  appreciate the importance of "devekut" (attachment with God) and to stick with straight Torah.

But that is not what usually happens. it is just to easy to get caught up in bitul Torah. And Bitul Torah does not simply mean wasting time what could have been spent learning Torah. It also means anything that causes one's fervor for Torah to slacken and weaken.

One aspect of things was brought up to me -the fact that the Litvak path tends to be dry. People  can be interested in Reb Nachman for perfectly good reasons--as in looking for the inner meaning of life and the Torah.  That is not to say that in everything where people feel taste and and vibrancy is from the realm of Holiness. But I would have to say that in the case of Reb Nachman, it is true that he was a true tzadik and his lessons and ideas are valuable.

One of the difficult aspects however if that of בל תוסיף that is not to add to the commandments. This is prohibition in the Torah and it means that what the Torah forbids is forbidden and what the Torah commands to do must be do. You can not make up new rules and claim the Torah holds that way. And this is the practice of the religious world to transgress this on a constant basis.

[I should mention that I do hold with the Rambam opinion that Physics and Metaphysics are included in the Oral Law. Not just because of seeing this in the Rambam,and the Musar book the obligations of the Heart, but also from my parents emphasis on the natural sciences. In fact I have a new way of learning Physics that I do which is the same way I learned gemara for many years-that is just to say the words in order and go on. In Hebrew that is called "Girsa." That is how I think Physics ought to be learned. But I know it would be hard to convince people of this idea because they do not see every word of  Physics as a mitzvah as the Rambam's opinion. If they do not hold that every word is  a mitzvah then how could I explain to anyone this idea of just saying the words and going on?
[Though the Rambam specifically referred to these subjects as understood by the ancient Greeks i feel Physics today and also Kant and Hegel would be included. But I also would include the Ari, and the two major commentaries on the Ari, Rav Yaakov Abuchatzaira and Sar Shalom Sharabi.