Western Civilization

To my mind it is clear the the basis is the Bible, Plato, Aristotle -as the basic bricks but the cement was Maimonides, Anselm, Aquinas. The reason I say this is that it is not at all trivial how the put the first three together, or even if it is possible at all. You can see the enormous amount of confusion in involved in this in history.

I should add that I do not think Christians have the right kind of understanding about what was going on with Jesus. However I do think they are right about the emphasis that they place on him.

I must have written about all this sometime in the past but I might as well repeat it just for information's sake.

Mainly after having studied the Ari {Isaac Luria} for a year or so in NY and then seeing and studying the writings of Reb Nachman the whole issue looks different to me than it does to Christians.
I never share my opinion because everyone is already set in their mind pro or con.
Son of Man is rather basic name for זעיר אנפין (Zeir Anpin the sephirah of Tiferet) and another possibility is it refers to יסוד יוסף (Sepherah of Foundation). There is no reason to assume anything more about it. Other people were considered to be unified with some sepherah of Aztilut (Emanation). For example, Avraham is considered to be unified with the sephirah of Kindness. And since the sephirot of Emanation are pure Godliness according to the Zohar thus all the seven shepards are one with G-d. [Avraham, Isaac, Yaakov, Moshe, Aaron, Joseph, David.][This however does not have anything to do with Divine Simplicity. God is not a composite and has no ingredients.] (Bava Sali said his son, Rav Meir Abuchatzeira,  was a soul of Emanation.)

[The sephirot of the lower worlds  the Zohar says are not Godliness.]






Picking wheat from standing sheaves that no longer need the soil is not forbidden on Shabat. Mixing ground also is not the same as kneading wheat--see the Rosh in Shabat. Washing hands before  a meal is according to the Gemara in Chulin a good thing. מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה. "First water is  a mitzvah, water in the middle of the meal is allowed, water after the meal is an obligation." Thus the idea that Jesus violated any mitzvah is not supported except by people that do not know the laws.


See the Recognitions and Homilies of Clement to see that Paul [code name Simon Magnus] was against Peter's and James's understanding of Jesus. And Paul's letters have become the consensus even though they are clearly not accurate, nor were they counted as Scripture by any of the early church fathers. (I do not remember the dates involved, but for anyone who wants this is easy to look up.)

t20 G Major t20 midi t20 nwc

Bava Metzia 97B

Without the actual Gemara in front of me it is hard to write about this from memory. Still I think it is important to bring up the subject at least to remind myself and maybe others.

Tosphot in Bava Metzia brings up that famous phrase that I spilled tons of mega-bites on in my little booklet: "Even without Abyee, we have to say what Abyee said." That is,- that the law of Rav Yehuda in Bava Metzia 97b ברי עדיף (certainty is better) is of Shmuel. [In its own context in Ketuboth that means the law of Rav Yehuda comes from Shmuel. Eventually I settled on the idea that Tosphot means only it is the same law, not that it comes from Shmuel.]

The basic context in this: 

Two people come to court. One says you owe me 200 zuz and the other says I do not know. Rav Yehuda says "Certainty wins"

In Bava Kama פרה שנגח an ox gored a cow that was pregnant and its calf is found next to it. We do not know what happened. Did the calf die from the goring or not? If memory serves me I think the owners of the ox were not there but the owner of the cow was and he says it was because of the goring. Shmuel said המוציא החבירו עליו הראיה One who takes money from another needs proof.

In Ketuboth a woman  was found not be be virgin after she got married. She says she was raped  after Kidushin but before the Chupa so she gets the full ketubah. The husband says it happened before the kidushin. Raban Gamliel says we believe her and Shmuel said the law is like Raban Gamliel.

Abyee said the law of Rav Yehuda comes from Shmuel.

Tosphot says even without Abyee we have to say what Abyee is saying.

Tosphot before that said Shmuel in Bava Kama does not believe the owner of the cow because his certainty is weak. He knows the owner was not there and so is not in a position to deny the events. 

What I wanted to bring up about all this is the Tospot Rid (Isaiah from Trani) in Ketuboth 12b, He says the the events of Ketoboth and Bava Kama are almost identical. The certainty is weak and in both cases there is חזקת הגוף. חזקה מעיקראת חזקת בתולה וחזקת מעוברת
My question here is if the Tosphot Rid helps in any way to understand our Toshot in Bava Metzia 97?He is after all saying you can not learn from the case in Ketuboth because there is something different there. He does not say what is different. But perhaps what he means is that if we ignore all other factors and simply look at the plea of the woman who is certain perhaps that is what Abyee and Tosphot mean. ברי עדיף (certainty is better).
So what might be possible to say is that תוספות  means that even without אביי we look at the fact that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) is the case in כתובות. That is, that ברי עדיף (certainty is better) has some strength as a טענה and that is all that תוספות means here also. That even without אביי we should say the law of רב יהודה is derived from שמואל

What I mean is if we take the תוספות רי''ד into account then we have to say that ברי עדיף over there in כתובות is not because of a חזקה but rather has strength on its own merits. We have to say this because in בבא קמא there is also a חזקה. So there is something about the ברי in כתובות that helps even if we do not know what other factors are involved.

___________________________________________________________________________
I think what you have to do here is to look at תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. There on the דף we have a מקווה that is lacking the ארבעים סאה volume. The גמרא uses חזקה דהשתא to push back חזקה מעיקרא but only with  a צירוף of another חזקה. On the page תוספות there says either one could push back the  time למפרע at least to make a doubt. Therefore in  כתובות we believe her even though the חזקה דהשתא pushes back the time frame to before the קידושין. Therefore she is believed only because of ברי עדיף. There are other cases where we do go by חזקה מעיקרא like in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א where the גמרא says let give the calf to מרא קמא but that is because there is no חזקה דהשתא working against it.
Also in בבא קמא the fact of the cow having חזקת מעוברת has against  it a חזקה דהשתא  so it makes sense to say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה since there is חזקת ממון  of the נתבע. Therefore , I think that our תוספות in בבא מציעא makes sense if we look at it in the light of תוספות in נדה  That is the law of רב יהודה comes from שמאול even if we do not look at חזקות

אני חושב מה שאתה צריך לעשות כאן הוא להסתכל על תוספות נדה ב' ע''ב. יש  יש לנו מקווה  שחסר הנפח של ארבעים סאה. הגמרא משתמשת עם חזקה דהשתא להדוף חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק עם צירוף של עוד חזקה. בדף הזה תוספות אומרים אפילו אחת מן החזקות  יכולה להדוף את הזמן למפרע לפחות לעשות ספק. לכן בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה בגלל שחזקה דהשתא דוחפת בחזרה את מסגרת הזמן לפני הקידושין. לכן היא נאמנת רק בגלל ברי עדיף. ישנם מקרים אחרים שבהם אנחנו הולכים על ידי חזקה מעיקרא כמו בבא מציעא ק' ע''א שבו גמרא אומרת בואו לתת העגל למרא קמא אבל זה בגלל שאין חזקה דהשתא פועלת נגדה.גם בבא קמא בעובדה של הפרה יש חזקת מעוברת אבל יש נגדה חזקה דהשתא כך שזה הגיוני לומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה שכן יש חזקת ממון של נתבע. לכן, אני חושב שלנו תוספות שלנו בבבא מציעא צ''ז ע''ב הגיוני אם נסתכל על זה לאור תוספות בנדה. כך שהחוק של רב יהודה מגיע משמאול גם אם אנחנו לא מסתכלים חזקות.

California

California used to be different. My Dad was there at Cal Tech for his master's degree and then joined the Air Force, the USAF (i.e. WWII). After the war  he moved back to join  aerospace stuff going on there. The USA was way behind the Soviets in everything related to space including Star Wars (Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI). So my Dad was asked to create a kind of laser communication device between satellites so the Soviets could not eavesdrop on our communications like they could with radio waves. There was a lot of good stuff going on in those days. It was a magnet for talent. The problem is that once it was successful it became a magnet for the wrong types.  I knew some really talented people there and I think there still are some great things going on there in Stanford and Cal Tech. 

The Rashbam in Bava Batra 175B

בבא מציעא ק' ע''א פרה נמכרה ויולדה ואנחנו לא יודעים מתי. אם לפני שהעסקה נחתמה, אז העגל שייך לבעליה הראשונים. אם לאחר שהעסקה נחתמה, העגל שייך לבעלים השניים. יש ויכוח בין רשב''ם ורבינו יצחק על המילה אלא. זוהי הגמרא:  מדוע חזקת מרא קמא לא עוזרת? הגמרא משיבה ",אלא היא סומכוס." סומכוס מחזיק כסף בספק מחולק. כלומר, הגמרא זורקת את הרעיון כי העגל הוא בסמטה. במקום זה הוא ברשות של הבעלים השניים, ועדיין אין חזקת ממון משום המשנה היא כמו סומכוס. זו גרסה אחת. הגרסה האחרת משמיטה את "אלא".  בבבא מציעא ק' ע''א לנו חזקא דהשתא יחד עם חזקת רשות. האם ניתן לומר כי  תוספות  ואת הרשב''ם הם בקו אחד עם דעותיהם במקום אחר? תוספות  למעשה מעלה את  השאלה הזו בטיעוניו נגד הרשב''ם בהתוספות השניה בדף.] הנושא המרכזי שאני רואה כאן הוא זה: כמה חזקה היא  חזקה דהשתא? האם  לחזקת השתא לבדה יש מספיק כח להפוך  שאלה לספק ועם חזקה אחרת  להפוך לודאות? או רק עם עוד חזקא היא יכולה להפוך לספק כפי שהיא עושה נדה ב' ע''ב? הסיבה שאני מזכיר זאת היא כי בבבא מציעא ק 'ע''א יש ויכוח בין הרשב''ם ותוספות אם שמא עם חזקת הרשות מחליטה את הבעלות על העגל או לא.  הגמרא המלאה היא זה ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא? בסימטא. (בוא נראה לאן העגל הוא עכשיו? תשובה: זה בסמטה.) אז בואו פשוט לתת אותו לבעל הראשון? זה סומכוס, (או ליתר דיוק זה סומכוס). מה חשוב לשים לב הוא לחכמים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זה אומר שאם זה ברשות  של הבעלים השניים אז זה הולך להם אפילו נגד מרא קמא.

רשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב מחזיק גט עם עדים על זה אבל בלי זמן הוא כשר. לא כמו רמב''ם ולא רמב''ן. הדרך שרב שך מבין את זאת היא על ידי נדה ב' ע''ב שבו יש לנו חזקה דהשתא בצירוף עוד חזקה שיכולה לנצח בחלקו חזקה מעיקרא לעשות ספק. כלומר: לעשות ספק כנגד חזקה מעיקרא, אבל רק בעזרת חזקה אחרת. לכן במקרה שלנו של גט הכל טוב. אין בעיה של חיפוי על בת אחותו כי ללא זמן על הגט, אין סיבה לדחוף את הזמן של המסמך אחורה בזמן. זה ברור. אבל תוספות אומר נדה ב' ע''ב כי גם לחזקה דהשתא יש כח להביס חזקה מעיקרא לפחות להפוך אותו מצב לספק. אז הבעיה היא זו. הרשב''ם בבבא מציעא מחזיק חזקת רשות יכולה לקבוע את החוק אפילו לסומכוס. לפיכך חזקה היכן העגל הוא עכשיו יכולה להביס חזקת מרא קמא אפילו לסומכוס. עכשיו ברור חזקת רשות אינה חלשה כמו חזקת השתא, אבל הנקודה היא כי כאן יש משהו שמחליש את חזקת הממון, וזו חזקת מרא קמא. הכל יהיה בסדר אם נוכל להפוך את הדעות. אחרי הכל השאלה היחידה היא מה עשוי סומכוס להחזיק לגבי רשות של הבעלים השניים. האם חזקה זו מספיקה לקחת את כל הספקות ולזרוק אותן, ואת הבעלים השניים בכך מקבלים את העגל? רשב''ם מחזיק כן ולכן חזקא דהשתא היא חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. תוספות מחזיק שלא כן הוא. לכן חזקא דהשתא אינה חזקה מספיקה כדי לקבוע בעלות. זה נראה יותר כמו הדרך רב שך מבין את הרשב''ם בבבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב כי גמרא בנדה ב' ע''ב מחזיקה  שחזקה דהשתא צריכה  עזרה איתה כדי להיות יעילה.  אני לא אומר שום דבר על חכמים. החכמים ממילא אומרים כי חזקת הרשות עובדת. כל מה שאני אומר הוא שהעובדה שחזקת רשות חלשה כאן בבא מציעא ק' ע''א כי יש חזקת מרא קמא נגדה זה נותן לסומכוס את היכולת להגיד שהיא חלשה מספיקה לומר חולקים. אחרי הכל אין ויכוח בין חכנים וסומכוס על מה הן חזקות אלא אם הן חזקות מספיק כדי לקבוע את הבעלות.

 The Rashbam in Bava Batra 175B hold the divorce with witnesses on it but no time is Kosher. [Not like the Rambam nor the Ramban.] The way Rav Shach understands this is by Nida 2b where we have a state now that at least can defeat in part to make a doubt a state that comes before, but only with the help of some other state.  Therefore in our case of the divorce everything is good. There is no problem of the daughter of his sister because with no time in the document there is not reason to push the time backwards. That much is clear. But Tosphot says right there in Nida 2b that either the state now or a different state can defeat a previous state to at least make it doubtful.

So my problem is this. The Rashbam in Bava Metzia 100b holds חזקת רשות can determine the law . Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא .
[That is why the Gemara says Let's see where it is. That would answer all questions. Then it answers it is in an alley. Then it asks let's give it to the first owner. Answer the Mishna is Sumchos, But that answer implies we leave it in the alley. So if there was חזקת רשות that would answer the question.]


Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון- but the point is that here there is something that weakens the  חזקת רשות and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does Sumchos hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות belay all doubts  and the second owner thus gets the calf? The Rashbam holds yes and so the חזקא רשות is strong enough to him to determine ownership. Tosphot holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way Rav Shach understands the Rashbam in Bava Batra 175 that the gemara in Nida holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.

I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the sages. The sages in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in Bava Metzia 100b because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to Sumchos some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the sages and Sumchos about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.

The answer here is this: חזקת השתא works with חזקת מרא קמא. The reason is it says the state of affairs now we push back in time. Thus if the cow has given birth we say it gave birth as far back in time as possible. So the Rashbam is being consistent that two two חזקות together are effective to give the calf to the first owner. So we would have to say the mishna is like Sumchos



התשובה כאן היא זו. חזקת השתא עובדת עם חזקת מרא קמא. הסיבה היא שהיא אומרת את מצב העניינים עכשיו אנחנו דוחפים אחורה בזמן. לכן אם פרה הולידה, אנחנו אומרים  הולידה ככל אחורה בזמן ככל האפשר. אז רשב''ם אומר ששתי החזקות יחד יעילות לתת וולד לבעל הראשון. אז היינו צריכים לומר המשנה היא כמו סומכוס.







_________________________________________________________________________________

 The רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב holds the גט with עדים on it but no זמן is כשר. Not like the רמב''ם nor the רמב''ן. The way  רב שך understands this is by נדה ב' ע''ב where we have a חזקה דהשתא that  can defeat in part  a חזקה מעיקרא. That is: to make a doubt against a חזקה מעיקרא , but only with the help of some other חזקה.  Therefore in our case of the גט everything is good. There is no problem of the חיפוי על בת אחותו because with no זמן in the גט there is no reason to push the time of the document back in time. That much is clear. But תוספות says  in נדה ב' ע''ב that either the חזקת השתא or a different חזקה can defeat a חזקה מעיקרא to at least make it a ספק.

So my problem is this. The רשב''ם in בבא מציעא ק' ע'א holds חזקת רשות can determine the law even to סומכוס. Thus a חזקה of where the calf is now can defeat חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.

Now clearly חזקת רשות is not as weak as חזקת ממון,  but the point is that here there is something that weakens the חזקת ממון and that is חזקת מרא קמא.
Everything would be fine if we could reverse the opinions. After all the only question is what does סומכוס hold in the רשות of the second owner. Does that רשות take away all doubts  and the second owner thus gets the calf? The רשב''ם holds yes and so the חזקא שהשתא is strong enough to him to determine ownership. תוספות holds no. Therefore חזקא דהשתא is not strong enough to determine ownership. That seems more like the way רב שך understands the רשב''ם in בבא בתרא קע''ה ע''ב that the גמרא in נדה ב' ע''ב holds all חזקות דהשתא need some other חזקה with them to be effective at all.

I hope it is clear I am not saying anything about the חכמים. The חכמים in any case say that חזקת רשות works. All I am saying is that the fact that חזקת רשות is weak here in בבא מציעא ק' ע''א because there is חזקת מרא קמא against it this gives to סומכוס some ability to say it is weak enough to say חולקים. After all there is no argument between the חכמים and סומכוס about what are the different חזקות but rather whether they are strong enough to determine the ownership.

[What I am saying here is really an amazingly simple thing. I'm sorry if it sounds complicated. All I am doing is noticing what Rav Shach said about Tosphot and the Rashbam in Gitin (Rambam Hilchot Gitin ch 1 halacha 25) and taking note that that is the reverse of their opinions in Bava Metzia as Tosphot himself points out there that he is going with the idea of חזקא דהשתא needs help to defeat חזקא מעיקרא --just like the Gemara in Nida sounds like. The trouble is in Nida Tosphot says something different. Now Tosphot is a lot of different people so one Tosphot does not have to agree with the other. But with the Rashbam this is curious. Take a look at Tosphot ב''מ ק'ע''א the second one and you will see he raises this exact issue.

[I actually do not remember what Tosphot says. All I know is he brings up the issue in a way that is not obvious at first sight. I hope someday to have a Bava Metzia to be able to check on this. ]
The only thing that I have to add to this that really is anything new is just the question of how this all relates to how I already dealt with this argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot in my little book on Bava Metzia. I sort of remember that I brought the idea of Naphtali Troup is חזקת מרא קמא Is like חזקת איסור  and also there is an argument how the second Tosphot relates to the first between the Maharshal and the Maharsha. These things might shed some light on our problem here.

I

Bava Metzia 100A, the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot in the light of Rav Shach.

Bava Metzia page 100a.
A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was concluded, the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was concluded the calf belongs to the second owner.

There is an argument between the Rashbam and Rabbainu Isaac about the the word אלא "rather". That is the Gemara asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא [possession of the first owner] [first owner] not help? The Gemara answers, "rather it is Sumchos." [Sumchos holds money in doubt is divided], That means the Gemara throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון [assumption that since it is in the property of the second owner we give it to him] because the Mishna is like Sumchos.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא ("rather"). Then this is what the Gemara says: "Why does מרא קמא [first owner] not help? Because it is Sumchos. That is: it is in an alley, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it-- even against חזקת מרא קמא  even to Sumchos. So we have חזקה מעיקרא that pushes the time forwards along with חזקת רשות thus it belongs to the second fellow. What works against this is חזקת השתא since it gave birth we push that back to time and that helps חזקת מרא קמא

What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא [what is the present state of affairs we push backwards as far as possible -like a mikve that lacks 40 S'eah We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured.]. In the beginning of Nida we have חזקא דהשתא  can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקא. There is another argument between Tosphot and the Rashbam if that is only in that case of a mikve or if it is a general rule.[Rav Shach mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the Rambam.]  Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.

 In Bava Metzia pg.100 we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות.  It is possible I think to say that Tosphot and the Rashbam are being consistent in Bava Metzia with their opinions in Nida. [Tosphot in Bava Metzia actually brings this up in his arguments against the Rashbam in the second Tosphot on the page.]


The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא Just make a doubt a it does in Nida?
The reason I mention this is that on the page [BM 100] there is an argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot if  שמא with חזקת רשות  gets the calf or not.

Appendix: The full Gemara is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is Sumchos. [Or ''Rather it is Sumchos."] "It is Sumchos" means we leave it in the alley and there מרא קמא would have answered the question but if it had been in the רשות  the the second fellow he would now own the calf  even to Sumchos. If the Gemara reads "rather it is Sumchos" that means we reject even the idea of the alley. So to answer the first question Let's see where it is? we answer it is Sumchos and that is why even in the domain of the second fellow, he would not own the calf.



What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא ( the first owner who we know owned it at a certain point in time.)

______________________________________________________
בבא מציעא ק' ע''א A cow is sold and gives birth and we do not know when. If before the deal was signed and sealed, then the calf belongs to the first owner. If after the deal was signed, the calf belongs to the second owner.

There is an argument between the רשב''ם and רבינו יצחק about the the word אלא "rather". That is the גמרא asks, why does חזקת מרא קמא  not help? The גמרא answers, "rather it is סומכוס." סומכוס holds money in doubt is divided. That means the גמרא throws out the idea that the calf is in an alley. Rather it is in the property of the second owner, and still there is no חזקת ממון because the משנה is like סומכוס.
That is one version.
The other version leaves out the אלא. Then this is what the גמרא says: "Why does מרא קמא  not help? Because it is סומכוס. That is: it is in an סימטא, but if it was in the property of the second owner, the second owner would acquire it, even against חזקת מרא קמא even to סומכוס.

What is important here to notice is the חזקת השתא like a מקוה that lacks ארבעים סאה. We say it was lacking the right amount as far back as the time it was last measured. In the beginning of נדה we have חזקא דהשתא  can at least put חזקא מעיקרא into doubt if it works together with another חזקה. There is another argument between תוסות and the  רשב''ם if that is only in that case of a מקוה or if it is a general rule. רב שך mentions this at the beginning of laws of divorce in the רמב''ם.  Thus in general חזקא דהשתא works to even the odds against חזקא מעיקרא even with no help.

 In בבא מציעא ק' ע''א we have חזקא דהשתא along with חזקת רשות.   Is it possible  to say that תוספות and the  רשב''ם are being consistent in בבא מציעא with their opinions elsewhere? תוספות in  actually brings this up in his arguments against the רשב''ם in the second תוספות on the page.]


The major issue that I see here is this: how strong is חזקא דהשתא by itself? Does it just make a doubt and with another חזקא make a certainty? Or even with another חזקא just make a doubt as it does in נדה ב' ע''ב?
The reason I mention this is that on the page בבא מציעא ק' ע''א there is an argument between the רשב''ם and תוספות if  שמא with חזקת רשות  gets the calf or not.

 The full גמרא is this ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא בסימטא Let's see where the calf is now? Answer: It is in an alley. So let's just give it to the first owner? It is סומכוס. Or rather it is סומכוס.
What is important to notice is to the sages המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה means that if it is in the actual property of the second owner then it goes to him even against מרא קמא 

_____________________________________________________



בבא מציעא ק' ע''א פרה נמכרה ויולדה ואנחנו לא יודעים מתי. אם לפני שהעסקה נחתמה וחתומה, אז העגל שייך לבעליה הראשונים. אם לאחר שהעסקה נחתמה, העגל שייך לבעלים השניים. יש ויכוח בין רשב''ם ורבינו יצחק על המילה אלא. זוהי הגמרא:  מדוע חזקת מרא קמא לא עוזרת? הגמרא משיבה ",אלא היא סומכוס." סומכוס מחזיק כסף בספק מחולק. כלומר, הגמרא זורקת את הרעיון כי העגל הוא בסמטה. במקום זה הוא ברשות של הבעלים השניים, ועדיין אין חזקת ממון משום המשנה היא כמו סומכוס. זו גרסה אחת. הגרסה האחרת משמיטה את "אלא".  בבבא מציעא ק' ע''א לנו חזקא דהשתא יחד עם חזקת רשות. האם ניתן לומר כי  תוספות  ואת הרשב''ם הם בקו אחד עם דעותיהם במקום אחר? תוספות  למעשה מעלה את  השאלה הזו בטיעוניו נגד הרשב''ם בהתוספות השניה בדף.] הנושא המרכזי שאני רואה כאן הוא זה: כמה חזקה היא  חזקה דהשתא? האם  לחזקת השתא לבדה יש מספיק כח להפוך  שאלה לספק ועם חזקה אחרת  להפוך לודאות? או רק עם עוד חזקא היא יכולה להפוך לספק כפי שהיא עושה נדה ב' ע''ב? הסיבה שאני מזכיר זאת היא כי בבבא מציעא ק 'ע''א יש ויכוח בין הרשב''ם ותוספות אם שמא עם חזקת הרשות מחליטה את הבעלות על העגל או לא.  הגמרא המלאה היא זה ולחזי ברשות דמאן דקיימא? בסימטא. (בוא נראה לאן העגל הוא עכשיו? תשובה: זה בסמטה.) אז בואו פשוט לתת אותו לבעל הראשון? זה סומכוס, (או ליתר דיוק זה סומכוס). מה חשוב לשים לב הוא לחכמים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זה אומר שאם זה ברשות  של הבעלים השניים אז זה הולך להם אפילו נגד מרא קמא.

the father of Trump

I know of at least one story in which the father of Trump helped someone. My father-in-law had a few unpleasant run ins with the Nazis in Western Poland until he escaped to the East and was caught by the Red Army. His papers said was a German Jew, so they sent him to a labor camp in Siberia. [I do not know why they simply did not enlist him like his brother Shmuel. I think the reason may have been that Bill (Binyamin) had German papers while his brother had Polish papers ] Since he could fix almost anything they made him in charge. After the war he came to the USA with no money and no job, and he knew no one, and it was the father of Trump that hired him and helped him get set up. He knew Rita [who had been on the Kindertransport, the only time the Nazis let Jewish children go to England.] Her parents survived by going Far East and came to California. So after the war Rita went from NY to CA, and Binyamin [Bill Finn] joined her there.[Bill changed his name when he got to the USA from some Jewish name that I forgot.]
That is the basic story. I met their oldest daughter in my second year in high school in Mr. Smart's orchestra practice.
We were friends all through high school but things only got serious after I went to yeshiva Shar Yashuv in NY with her letters. Then by the time I got to the Mir she came to NY and began calling me for different reasons. We were married after two years at the Mir and I learned there in kollel for another few years until the idea of making Aliya to Israel came along.

T-19 B flat Major r2 r1 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 r9 r10

Learning Torah.

Rav Shach in the introduction to the Avi Ezri mentions the importance of learning Torah in several contexts. This type of idea really became common in the Lithuanian yeshiva world after the time of the Gra. It is kind of the basic "culture" (if you can call it that) of the Litvak yeshiva world. It is is based on statements in the Mishna, Gemara, Midrashim, and Zohar. The most commonly known statement to this effect is the Mishna אלו דברים that ends with תלמוד תורה כנגד כולם. ["The Mitzvah of learning Torah goes above all other mitzvot."] [The basic idea I mentioned about culture is this. In the Litvak world the idea of learning Torah is not just a slogan the essential element. It is the essential goal in life. There is this, however, only in authentic yeshivas. Some people have found they can make good money by pretending to be on this wavelength and so try to make copycat yeshivas without the spirit. ]

The trouble is to discern real Torah from Torah of the Sitra Achra [Torah of the Kelipot, Dark Side.]

What I mean by this is a statement from Reb Nachman that once there is found a true tzadik (saint), there come many copycats to try to get the same level of money and success they see the true tzadik got. This same idea goes for yeshivas. After there were authentic Litvak yeshivas like Voloshin, Mir, Ponovitch and Brisk, there came copycats that seem to learn Torah but in fact only learn Torah of the Dark Side, demonic Torah. 

What makes the false Torah places particularly pernicious is they makes learning Torah for sincere people almost impossible.

However most Litvak places are pretty straightforward as to what they are about. If you have any kind of Lithuanian yeshiva in your area I do not urge caution, but assume it is OK. There surely are exceptions  but you do not have to worry about them unless it comes to your attention.

Torah is incidentally against sin. The hope in learning Torah is know what sin is, and to stop doing it. It is not to lift up people, and to be positive and make people feel good. That is, to feel comfortable and not to feel bad about sin. There is an alternative Torah that is taught nowadays that is made to make people feel good and to get the money keep coming in. That is not the Torah of God. When you hear teaching that is against authentic Torah, run for your life. The first verse in Tehilim says "I did not sit in the seat of the scoffers." I stay away from counterfeit Torah for I am afraid of God's punishment for sin.


[Sin is incidentally, how the Torah defines sin. It is not how people try to redefine sin in order to fit their lust for money. Therefore the best way to keep Torah is to learn Musar [basic Torah ethics]. ]

the child of a Jewess and a gentile

Tosphot holds in at least three places in Shas that the child of a Jewess and a gentile is not Jewish. [for example Kidushin 75 Tosphot first words ור''י סבר לה כר''ע וכו נינהו. 
Also יבמות ט''ו ע''ב תוס' ד''ה  אמוראי 
This is obviously not like the Rambam.

This is obviously relevant nowadays to groups that pride themselves on being Jewish when in fact it can be shown historically they are descended from mixtures like this. If people's sense of pride and identity was rather their effort to learn and keep the holy Torah --that would a lot better. This whole idea of Jewish pride seems vacant to me. 


Sephardim have a private approach to Ashkenazim. They say Ashkenazim are not Jewish, but they feel they have to pretend. But they definitely feel they are not the same tribe nor kosher.[Any Ashkenazim in  Sephardi community will experience an enormous amount of pressure to leave. There will always be at least one Sephardi determined to get rid of the Ashkenazim at all cost.] Still in all history books about the original conquest of Islam, the general rule was Muslims took Jewish wives as spoils of war. Therefore Spanish Jewry when exiled to North Africa always made a point to write ס''ט  ספרדי טהור in cases when they could trace their lineage father from father back to people that were certainly Jewish. That is why ס''ט is how the Rambam signed his name and Bava Sali also.
Outside of a few amazing people like Bava Sali the general problem in the Sefardi world stems from their origins from Muslims. This seems to create a kind of problem that still exists. If they would simply be committed to keeping Torah then I would have nothing to say, but instead their commitment in Israel seems to be to find fault in Ashkenazic Jew and then to try to kick them out. 
As one fellow mentioned to me they have the trait of Sedom and Amora [That fellow I believe is from the family of Bava Sali--at least I know his wife is a granddaughter of Bava Sali's older brother David. The one that was martyred.]

T-18 A Major   T18 in midi format  the reason for offering this in midi beside the mp3 is in case anyone wants to see or copy the notes, they can download the notes in midi. these were written in nwc which i would also share if people had access to it but it is a private compony.  

But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards?

There are unique individuals that  may not have any talent, but stand in some kind of test.נסיון. The archetype example  is Avraham [Abraham the patriarch]. And by that they merit to some kind of Divine light, or revaluation, or Divine Spirit. One recent example  would be Bava Sali. 

  But what if you are a person that has not stood in some test and you only realize it afterwards? You can not undo the damage because if you already know your mistake then the same issue can not be a test. You can not give a student after after he has glance at the answers.

In my opinion the best thing to do is to work on correcting the areas you made  a mistake

Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant, -but other times i think the emphasis ought to be on Kant and the Friesian School. But seem complementary.

Today Hegel looks to me better than Kant, but I think they really have to be learned together. Kind of Like Plato and Aristotle. There are aspects of things that Kant brings out which to me seem very important that you can miss in Hegel
The most obvious example is the limits of reason--even pure reason. Now to Kant  "pure reason" merely means not based on observation. But to me it seems the implication is clear that he was saying even pure reason in itself, not just human reason.


Red used to be thought of as in the object. Descartes noticed there are things that are not really in the object itself but depend on the subject observing. Kant noticed all  characteristics depend on the subject. So what is left? The thing in itself. 
Also universality and necessity as abstract ideas can not be derived by induction, no matter how many times you see them.
 Kant  argues against  universality and necessity are not  in objects, while  universality and necessity are true, as in mathematics and natural science. 
As Hegel puts it:  "But if universality and necessity do not exist in external things, the question arises “Where are they to be found?” Kant maintains that they must be  that they must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, “I”. This, simply expressed, is the main point in the Kantian philosophy. What makes them valid is that the object depends on the subject for its character."
Thus reason can not enter into "unconditioned reality" (things in themselves) that in no way is connected with physical objects.
To Hegel the kind of dialectical method used by Socrates is the very nature of reason in itself and allows reason to progress clearly and definitely into un-conditioned reality. 

.
The way the Stanford Encyclopedia puts it:  Kant’s mistake was that he fell short of saying that these contradictions are in the world itself. He failed to apply the insights of his discussion of the antinomies to “things in themselves”  Indeed, Kant’s own argument proves that the dialectical nature of reason can be applied to things themselves. The fact that reason develops those contradictions on its own, without our heads to help it, shows that those contradictions are not just in our heads, but are objective, or in the world itself.

[In any case I should mention I learned at lot from Dr. Kelly Ross and his particular approach to Kantian philosophy. And I see Kant as being a kind of umbrella and bringing out important points.]

So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law?

That is we know the American Constitution is valid from the basic standpoint of: (1) a contract which is binding. (2)  The law of the country is the law. [Bava Batra ch 3. This is brought in the Rambam as being applicable much more than you would expect.](3) It embodies natural law as understood by the Rambam {Maimonides} and Saadia Gaon.

So what would happen if you had someone expert in both Talmud Law and also Constitutional Law? What kind of perspective would this bring? [ Probably an emphasis on traditional values and private property and limited power of the state]
In yeshiva I always considered Talmud law to the same thing as objective morality. And the civil laws of the state I thought of as more or less irrelevant.  I am pretty sure this was the general attitude. And I still consider that Talmud law to be basically Revelation--but not exactly. After all it is Revelation combined with human reasoning trying to figure out how keep the written law.
Still the whole concept of a State and its laws is morally relevant even on the personal level. Richard Epstein makes a very strong case against libertarians in regard to the State.

[A lot of Israeli judges have the Talmud in their private chambers.]

One thing about this is false  and demonic teachers of Talmud sprout up all the time like mushrooms after a rain. Unless you can really tell the difference between the real authentic holy teachers of Torah from Litvak places like Ponovitch or Brisk, and the Sitra Achra/Dark Side teachers, it is just not worth it to get involved. The religious world is basically mentally ill and therefore choose their leaders according to the higher degree of mental illness.

panic of the Left

What adds to the panic of the Left is that their intellectual support collapsed. I still remember how Socialism was considered the only intellectual wave of the future. It was like Ayn Rand said--the people follow where the thinkers lead. 

The weight of reason no longer leads towards socialism. Post Modernism is dead. Classical education, free market, STEM, traditional Torah and Biblical values are thankfully on the rise. 

When people stop believing in a system it collapses.
It is the same basic thing that happened in the USSR, --people stopped believing in the system.

I am very grateful to God that in my high school classics were learned. And what was not officially learned was still considered important. Job, Chaucer, etc. Even in music the teacher, Mr. Smart was very much into classical music. But not just him. It was the same in elementary school and even in Idyllwild Music Camp. So I am a big fan the the Trivium and Quadrivium.

Bava Metzia 14b

There is some connection between what I wrote in Bava Metzia 14 and Rav Shach concerning a Ketubah. [Rav Shach's essay is found in the Avi Ezri on אישות laws of marriage]

In short the Rambam says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies they all have equal right to מזונות [cakes] even if he married them one after the other because they are getting מזונות [cake and staples] from מטלטלים (movable property). The Raavad said even if the situation would be such that they get mezonot (cake) from land (non movable property). [The idea here is that in the Ketubah (marriage contract) the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries. There is no such stipulation in case of divorce however. This rule is sadly ignored today in most courts of law.]

At any rate, the ראב''ד (Raavad) brings from לווה ולווה וקנה (someone borrowed and then borrowed again from someone else and then bought property which is considred collateral for the loan) to show that the שיעבוד (right to collect cake and staples from the movable property) of all the wives is equal. And the Magid Mishna (commentary on the Rambam) disagrees with the Raavad. He adds if the Raavad would be right then the same would apply to the Ketubah itself



Rav Elazar Shach says that the Raavad is right because the obligation of the ketubah is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the ketubah is because they were married. The obligation of mezonot is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a lender borrower and the borrower buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the lender would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the lender go after?

If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first.It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of Tosphot in Bava Metzia.
But what does the  Rambam hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting mezonot [their meals] from movable property that there is no order of who gets what first. But in case of land there is an order. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.





_________________________________________________________________________________






There is some connection between what I wrote in בבא מציעא י''ד:ב and רב שך concerning the כתובה.

In short the רמב''ם says if you have a man that has a few wives and then dies, they all have equal right to מזונות  even if he married them one after the other, because they are getting מזונות from מטלטלים. Movable property. The ראב''ד said even if the situation would be such that they get מזונות from land. The idea here is that in the כתובה the husband obligates his property to support her in case he dies until she remarries.

At any rate, the ראב''ד brings from לווה ולווה וקנה to show that the שיעבודof all the wives is equal. And the מגיד משנה disagrees with the ראב''ד. He adds if the ראב''ד would be right then the same would apply to the כתובה itself



רב שך says that the ראב''דmakes sense  because the obligation of the כתובה is not the same as מזונות. The obligation of the כתובה is because they were married. The obligation of מזונות is because he died. The obligations start at different time periods.
Thus in the case of a מלווה לווה and the לווה buys a field and sells it and then buys another field. At that point the מלווה would go after the second field. But then the borrower sells the second field. After which one does the מלווה go after?

If we go by the time the obligation starts then clearly the obligation on the first field came first. It was owned by the borrower before he bought the second field. That is the first answer of תוספות in בבא מציעא.
But what does the רמב''ם hold? He says only in the case where the wives are getting מזונות  from מיטלטלים that there is no סדר גבייה. But in case of קרקע there is an סדר. Thus it seems he also goes by this idea that we look at who was married first and thus we look at when the obligation started.





_________________________________________________________________________________

 הקשר בין בבא מציעא י''ד: ורב שך בדבר הכתובה. בקיצור רמב''ם אומר שאם יש לך אדם שיש לו כמה נשים ולאחר מכן מת, יש להן את כל הזכות השווה במזונות אפילו אם הוא היתחתן אתן אחת אחרי השניה, משום שהן מקבלות מזונות מן מטלטלים. הראב''ד אמר גם אם המצב יהיה כזה כי הן מקבלות מזונות מקרקע. הרעיון כאן הוא כי בכתובה הבעל מחייב את רכושו לתמוך בה במקרה שהוא מת עד שהיא נישאת מחדש. בכל מקרה, את ראב''ד מביא מן הדין "לווה ולווה וקנה" להראות כי שיעבוד של כל הנשים שווה. והמגיד משנה חולק על ראב''ד. הוא מוסיף אם ראב''ד יהיה תקין, אז אותו חוק יחול על הכתובה עצמה. רב שך אומר כי הראב''ד הגיוני, כי חובתה של הכתובה היא לא אותו הדבר כמו מזונות. חובתה של הכתובה משום שהם (הוא והן) היו נשואים. חובת מזונות היא כי הוא מת. החובות מתחילות בתקופות זמן שונות. 
כך במקרה (בבבא מציעא יד:) של מלווה ולווה והלווה קונה שדה ומוכר אותו ולאחר מכן קונה אחר. בשלב זה מלווה ילך אחרי השדה השני. אבל אז הלווה מוכר את שדה השני. לאחר איזה מהם עושי המלווה ללכת? אם נלך לפי זמן שהחובה מתחילה, אז ברור החובה על השדה הראשון באה קודם. זה היה בבעלות הלווה לפני שהוא קנה את השדה השני. זוהי התשובה הראשונה של תוספות בבבא מציעא יד:. אבל מה הרמב''ם מחזיק? הוא אומר רק במקרה שבו הנשים מקבלות מזונות מן המיטלטלים שאין סדר גבייה. אבל במקרה של קרקע קיים סדר. לפיכך נראה שהוא גם הולך לפי הרעיון הזה שאנחנו מסתכלים במי הייתה נשואה ראשונה וכך נסתכל כאשר ההתחייבות נכתבה

T 17 E flat major in mp3 format.    T17 [in midi format.]

Navardok yeshivas

The way Navardok yeshivas were first made was by two students from the yeshiva just showing up in some town and sitting and learning Torah without asking for any favors. [It was part of that path to trust in God so asking people for favors was out.] I wonder if perhaps a similar approach is possible today. If there is no authentic Litvak yeshiva nearby then at least I suggest an hour a day of learning Torah [Old Testament, Mishna, Talmud, Midrash,  and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.].That is to restart the whole idea of Torah for its own sake, and trust in God.

In fact doing this at home is better as a rule. That means to have a session every day in Tenach, Mishna, Gemara, and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. 



In essence Navardkok consisted of two complementary concepts (1) to learn Torah without monetary compensation. (That is known as "Torah Lishma," for it's own sake, not for the sake of anything else.) (2) Trust in God without effort. That is to trust in God without doing anything to get that help. That is not to do what is called Hishtadlus "השתדלות". (The the מדרגת האדם by Rav Joseph Horwitz-the Alter of Navardok for details.)

The reason this is important is: to receive the yoke of Torah really there is a need of a Beit Midrash where one can learn Torah without being bothered. But the religious world itself needs a thorough house cleaning. It is full of Chametz/leaven. That is the leaders as a rule are demons from the Hell and that tends to leave a bad effect on the regular people. So in  a practical sense, I would not walk into any religious place but pray in a Conservative or Reform. The only kind of religious place I would walk into would be an authentic Litvak yeshiva. [There are very few of these. In the USA the only ones that are true and authentic are in New York. In Israel there are only Ponovitch and its branches or startups from people that learned in Ponovitch. ]

[The basic idea of learning Torah Lishma is not to use Torah for money. So to  large degree all the yeshivas in Israel that do so are lying as the Rambam wrote (commentary of Chapters of the Fathers, Pirkei Avot, chapter 4). Still the ironic thing is when they do learn for its own sake, then I think there is  mitzvah to give. I think this is clear in a few places in the Gemara.]

The false yeshivas use Torah to justify their sins and lies and covetousness and lust for money. They way they do this is to justify sin to make people feel good and positive. They say "We do not want any doom and gloom here. We want only positive messages. No Musar here."
The sin of the religious world is to use Torah to justify their lust for money. So I go no where near them.

[The classical example is the history (in the book of Kings) of Achav and Chizkia and the four hundred prophets that said, "You will be successful." Chizkiah however thought they were lying. So the called a prophet of God, Michayahu. He came and said also "Go up and you will be successful." Achav said to him How many times have I told you tell me only the truth in the name of God. Michaya said, "OK, you really want the truth? The truth is --you will not return alive." Achav said to Chizkia you see he always speaks bad about me. He is always negative.