Yet  without philosophy, people tend to pick up the attitudes of the age. They unknowingly absorb the spirit of the times from their environment, and think it is obviously what the Torah means.



Like Steven Weinberg said: The  major advantage learning philosophy--  is to protect oneself from other  philosophies.

And I think that my point of view is born out by experience. In the world where this anti-learning-philosophy attitude is prevalent, we do find large kaleidoscope of attitudes and worldviews --none of which have any correspondence with the actual world views presented in the Torah and Talmud. It seems to me that without learning philosophy, one is simply not equipped with any intellectual tools that one needs to even be able to discern incoherent world views.

On the other hand,  academic philosophy is a real problem, nowadays especially in the English speaking world where the accepted world view is that of Linguistic/Analytic philosophy.

Yet the irony of this situation is that the philosophical foundations of materialism, in a proper metaphysics, are in worse shape now than they have ever been.



The truth is that the evils detailed by atheists in religion are by no means unique to religion but are simply characteristics of human nature.
It is noteworthy, however, that the heaviest blows against materialism in the 20th century have been delivered, not by philosophy or religion, but by science itself. The Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics, proposed by Niels Bohr (1885-1960), although metaphysically poorly motivated in some respects, represents a stark anti-realism that merely bewilders the physicists and philosophers who literally appear not to have the philosophical background to address it properly. It has proved easierjust not to worry about it and to lapse back into a naive materialism.




Much as Thomas Sowell has said, this incoherence is found in people who don't understand the virtues and advantages of their own land, but idealize some foreign hell hole as Utopia.

Most versions of relativism involve a reinterpretation or redefinition of moral judgements. What is common to all of the redefinitions of moral concepts is that they leave out everything moral. 


Second, it has been argued from time to time that moral relativism presents a simpler picture of the universe than objectivism. Objectivism postulates these entities, objective moral values, that we could explain the world just as easily if not more easily without. Therefore, the burden is on the objectivist to prove the existence of these things.

I think this argument is insincere; that is, nobody ever became a relativist because of this. It was invented after the fact to confuse objectivists.

The argument is exactly analogous to the following argument for mathematical relativism: Objectivism postulates these entities, objective numbers and numerical relationships, that we could explain the world just as easily if not more easily without. Therefore, the burden is on the objectivist to prove the existence of these things. Since he cannot do so, I conclude that all mathematical statements are arbitrary and subjective.

I have tried to show that, like most false philosophical theories, moral relativism dissolves under clarification. 

http://www.uwgb.edu/dutchs/PSEUDOSC/Postmod.htm

"Calling twentieth-century philosophy superficial gives it too much dignity; vacuous is the closest term."

The Gra saw the energy of spiritual rot of Shabatai Tzvi was subsumed into Hasidut

The excommunication of the Gra  had in it two points that were common to all the different excommunications against.

The Gra saw the energy of spiritual rot of Shabatai Tzvi was subsumed into Jewish cults.


There were many  excommunications, but the two points that come up in all of them was disparaging learning Torah and disparaging Torah scholars. Though cults have been hard at work to deny these two allegations by a parade and show of learning Torah, it is still hard not to see that the Gra was right. I do not mean that this is something you can see looking in from the outside, but rather if you are in the actual world of cults it is hard not to admit that both of these complaints are based on actual attitudes that continue today--very strongly.

Now I don't  know if it is right to excommunicate people for things, even if they would be 100% true, but the Gra did feel that these were serious issues.

The excommunication of the Gra did not treat this as a minor problem. The actual text stated that  one is not allowed to sit in 4 amot [yards] of a chasid, nor talk with a chasid, nor marry the daughter of a chasid etc. It is interesting that this excommunication did not single out secular Jews.
I mean there have always been secular Jews and Jews of various degrees of religiosity. Why not excommunicate Jews that go to Collage? Or other such things? Why specifically Hasidut?


Part of the answer is that the essence of something is what  makes it what it is. That is when we talk about the essence of a thing we mean that something else of the same essence would be put into the same category. When there is a  claim to be of the same essence as the Creator of the Universe and this does not spark outrage in the general world of , then we know something is off.

The problem of the provability of the connection between Shabati Tzvi  with later Jewsih cults was the reason it was not mentioned in the actual text of the excommunication. That was in those days. Today we have lots of evidence of this connection. Cookies that were placed in the writings of the Shatz and Natan from Gaza that you find in all books of Ashkenazic Mysticism. The connection is undeniable. Even if you don't see how that stuff got into Ashkenazic Mysticism never the less it is there.



\

Speed reading when it comes to Talmud studies does not require much of an explanation.

There are two major kinds of learning in the Talmud. One is the learning of the Sugia [subject]. The other is speed reading. Speed reading when it comes to Talmud studies does not require much of an explanation. It simply means saying the words in order and going on without worrying whether you got it or not.

This type of fast learning I found very helpful when it came to learning Physics at Polytechnic Institute at N.Y.U..


The other kind of learning is called learning the Sugia (subject). This does mean to some degree learning a particular subject with the commentaries. But it also means getting a general feel for the subject. This kind of learning is hard to define.
Two examples may help to describe what I mean. Lets us take the subject (סוגיא) of work done on Shabat not for its own sake. מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. This is a subject which you really could not understand by speed reading alone. The reason for this is that the subject itself is spread all over the Talmud  and the particular Tosphots that deal with it are not in Tractate Shabat at all but rather in Yoma page 34 and in  Ketubot and in Bava Kama.


So what I am suggesting is that every subject  has it own peculiarities that make going into one subject completely different than going into another one.



Learning fast helped me also in physics. When I first applied to Polytechnic Institute of NYU, and they accepted me, they gave me one piece of paper of math to see whether to put me in a remedial math program  or to let me into Calculus 101. I had no idea which side of the paper was up. But since I did not have to start there until Chanuka, I had the three month period from Rosh Hashanah   until then to prepare. And during that time I plowed through [read fast saying the words and going on] the pre-Calculus and Calculus books that I had. And amazingly enough it went in!
But I should mention the reading fast part was done from Rosh HaShanah until Hashana Raba and then I started work on problems and doing so I read everything again forwards and backwards. This all worked well except the Calculus book I had {by Bittner} was economics based and so he did not have right-hand sums and left hand sums for Riemanian Integrals. So when I got to that in the actual Calculus class I was totally unprepared. I started saying  the words and going on. And that helped me very much to at least get to basic String Theory, Group Theory, Abstract Algebra, and Algebraic Topology. So even though there is still plenty of stuff I do not understand, still I learned a lot more than if I had gotten stuck on every last detail. And I think other could benefit from this approach also.
[One slight advantage of this is that when philosophy professors or other amateurs start spouting nonsense about physics, at least you can tell they don't know what they are talking about. Just by this fats method at least you get a feel for the subject.]

The major evil that people do is when they think they are doing a mitzvah.

The Satan is disguised  in Mitzvas.
This concept is also mentioned by the Geon from Villna.

The basic idea is that we  find that the evil inclination does not try to seduce a person into sin by openly advertising what his intentions are. Rather he says, "Come, and let's do a mitzvah." But mitzvas are highly dependent on the particular Halacha [Jewish Law] that apply to any given situation.  nowadays we should no longer call the evil inclination by its common names ["Satan", or the "evil inclination" etc.] but rather call it the name of "Dimion"/"imagination". [דמיון] That means to say:  the major evil that people do is when they think they are doing a mitzvah. [If people would settle for being selfish jerks, we would all be better off than having people that are out to save the world.]


The idea that "the Satan dresses himself in Mitzvot"  Also, many times the Satan will come to you and ask you to do some actual mitzvah. This is another case of the Satan being dressed in Mitzvot.

That being said, we all should learn Torah [i.e. the Old Testament, Talmud and its commentaries, the Zohar, Isaac Luria]. That fact is not the issue here.
Rather the issue is sometimes something seems like a mitzvah when it is not. There are an infinite number of factors which can make this happen. For example the situation is not parallel to the situation the Shulchan Aruch or the Rambam is talking about. That is: there is a mistake in the material facts of the case. Or there is a mistake in understanding the actual Halacha.
Reb Joseph Karo made this point in his commentary on the Rambam. He wrote that people dot understand the Rambam because they don't know the sugia in the Talmud from where the Rambam derives his law.  And the same idea was stated by the Maharshal and the Maharsha about the Shulchan Aruch. The Maharsha said it is proper to rebuke people that decide halacha from the Shulchan Aruch without knowing the sources.

Bava Sali's Path is actually very easy to describe and yet still very mysterious.

Rav Israel [Avuchatzeira].
The last time I was in Israel I was at a pidion haben [the party you make after a first born son is 30 days old] and one fellow started telling me the story of how he got married. It seems he was in a kind of situation in which no one was offering to him a shiduch.[marriage possibilities]
 So he went to Israel Avuchateira in Netivot. It was Friday --a day on which Bava Sali did not accept visitors. But his wife had compassion of this  student and brought him into Bava Sali. He was doing the normal Chok LeIsrael  seder [reading the Bible portion for that week].
He interpreted to start raining blessings on this student in the kind of dialectic that Jews from Morocco used to speak  Within a very short time he found his wife and got married.
I don't know the name but there was apparently a rav in Europe who was the prime  rav there. I think in Antwerp. Once a visitor came to see him and saw in his home pictures of Bava Sali and asked him why does he have pictures from a Sefardi Rav. He answer that once Bava Sali was in France and he this rav came to see him. After the visit he left at 3 PM and a when he arrived at this city it was still 3 PM. [This is called Kephitazt HaDerech]

The son in law of Bava Sali David Buso told me how once in Paris, he and  Bava Sali were waiting for the moon to come out on the last night that Kidush Levana was possible [the blessing on the new moon]. When it seemed apparent that the clouds cover was just too think for the moon to come out on its own, Bava Sali waved his hand and moved the clouds aside.

Once I was praying in Safed a one person came over and told me the story of  how a female relative of his was a secular Jew. From what I remember her husband was slightly sick and she had heard of a rav who had come from Morocco and people were going to him to get blessings. [Even though she was secular she thought, "Why not give it a try?"] She took the long trip from Kiryat Shemona to Netivot [about a six hour drive from the tiptop of Israel to the very bottom].When she arrived she discovered a  disappointing fact,- Bava Sali never saw women or received them as visitors.. She was left with no option but to give her request to the Gabai [the attendant] and he forwarded the request to Bava Sali. He returned and said that Bava Sali asked her to write a check.She did so and in return she received a bottle of water that Bava Sali had blessed. She took it and drove back home.That means she was altogether 12 hours on the road, plus the time she had spend by Bava Sali. When she returned home she put the bottle on the kitchen table and went into the bathroom. By that time she was angry, tired, and frustrated. She opened the faucet in the bathroom and saw the running water and began to think to herself, "Here in my own home I have running water and bottles also! Why did I need to waste a whole day to get an ordinary bottle of water?"
When she returned to the kitchen to her surprise she saw the bottle of water was gone; and in the place where she has set it down was her check.


Sadly today that impressive family line seems to have lost the touch that it had a for at least 5 or more generations.Yet there are still some members of that family that I think still retain some of the holiness. In particular, I am impressed with Shimon Buso --a grandson of Bava Sali who is  in Netivot. From what I can tell he seems to be on the path that Bava Sali himself was on of service of God in the way of learning Torah day and night with self sacrifice.


Bava Sali's path is actually very easy to describe and yet still very mysterious. He learned Torah and kept Mitzvot. Now learning Torah in the Bava Sali way means that he learned Torah, Talmud, Rambam, Zohar, R. Isaac Luria and etc.--all the things that are part of a regular Torah curriculum. It was a path that included learning a little bit of Kabalah, and a lot of Talmud. It included a lot of fasting--from week to week. And it also meant no contact with women unless it was his own immediate family. Also I should mention Bava Sali had a thing about being married. It was kind of a personal law for him not to be without a wife even for a second.


There was once a student in Netivot who used to drive Bava Sali around when  he needed a ride.
Once he drove him to Meron and wanted to fill the gas tank on the way back. Bava Sali told him "Just drive." So they drove the whole five hours from Meron to Netivot on an empty tank of gas.



 He also had zero patience for the so called Kabalists in Israel and thought they were a bunch of fakes. As Bava Sali's daughter once told me:" No kabalist was ever allowed in to see Bava Sali. He never accepted any of them under any circumstances."]

I perhaps should mention the community around Bava Sali was Mesorati [traditional Judaism- not Orthodox] While he was involved in Torah alone the community around him was a working community and he never expressed any disapproval of that. Sefardim in Netivot generally worked and served in the Army and got regular secular Israeli educations. And that is the vast majority of the people that still follow in that tradition.

falling of the generations in their spiritual level

The concept of the falling of the generations in their spiritual level [Yeridat Hadorot] is  mentioned in the Gemara itself concerning Chizkia the teacher of Rabbi Yochanan.
R. Yochanan had answered a hard problem brought up by his teacher and his teacher said "This is no ordinary human being." At that point the Gemara brings up this idea that "If previous generations were like angels, we are like men etc."

However the Rambam disagrees with this idea. He sees no problem in disagreeing with the Geonim [Example in Hilchot Ribit], or the Rif [e.g  in Ketubot] [see in the laws of Mishpatim and the beginning of Mishna Torah where he discuss the rules of deciding Halacha]
Also this idea is clearly in contradiction to the other idea mentioned by the Gemara itself that the law goes by the last Amora [the later Talmudic sage]



Now sometimes the idea of the falling of the generations makes sense. I encounter this all the time when I see the difference between Tosphot and Achronim [later commentaries] that come after the Beit Yoseph.

Nothing is a holy and as truth. And truth is the way things are.

World view issues. 

My basic was formed by growing up as a Jew  in a relatively decent and wholesome society. That was a thoroughly WASP society in Orange County in California.
So I have had every reason to believe that Democracy and Capitalism can create along with basic Torah values a highly wholesome and moral society. I have what could be considered as empirical evidence to testify to that fact. [The evidence is I lived in a wholesome home in a wholesome community in a whole country.--the way things used to be in the USA]

But to justify this kind of system based on philosophy can be a real sticky issue. While growing up this kind of question occupied me very much and I did plenty of reading. Plato, Buddhism, Torah, Nietzsche, Chinese Philosophy, Spinoza, Ann Rand, the Communist Manifesto, etc. And later,  I continued this and learned postmodern philosophy. [That was at the recommendation of my teacher  Shelomo Freifeld at Shar Yashuv. I myself would have been happy just to concentrate on Torah.]

With most of the systems that I studied, I noticed sooner or later different problems. And sometimes the problems were so thick that I decided that the whole system had to be thrown out, i.e. one mistake or another will not bother me much, but a lots of shoddy logic will eventually turn me off. [Postmodern philosophy is a good example of that]. [Also, empirical evidence counts for me. No matter how logical a system is, if I see its results in people acting in ways that are obviously evil, then I will reject the system. Nothing is as holy and as truth. And truth is the way things are.]
 The best of philosophy today I have seen in  Dr. Kelley Ross in California. 


John Searle is obviously great but as Kelley Ross noticed he fell into scientism.
Habermas is Germany is also very great. Steve Dutch wrote a bunch of great essays on his site one of which is a detailed critique of Hume. Also Michael Huemer and Bryan Caplan and very good when they stick with their subject, not when they wander into other territories.






To be brief I think that there are universals. Universals are perceived by reason and by non-intuitive immediate knowledge. Universals applied to the human realm are moral values. [That is I do not hold from Empiricism,  Rationalism,  Nominalism, nor moral relativism].

The advantage of learning philosophy,  is that it gives a protection from  philosophers (and religious manics). For in general without learning to analyze ones world views, he or she will usually pick world view that often can't stand the test of reason and logic.

In terms of Yevamot page 3b.

Introduction; I ask an obvious question here on Tosphot.  One that everyone asks. Then I try to answer by saying the Braita is a Ma Metzinu, not a Gezera Shava. But then I throw that out. Then I answer a different answer that the braita holds a gezra Shava can go just in one direction.





The Braita says how do we know the the sister of ones wife is forbidden in yibum? It answers that it says "upon her" in Leviticus and upon her in Deuteronomy concerning Yibum [Levirate marriage]. This looks like a Gezera Shava. [A "Gezara shava" means the same word is used in two different places, so we apply the laws of one place to the other place unless there is some specific reason that undoes the gezera shava.] Tosphot asks, "Why not turn the gezera shava around to the opposite direction?" He answers the teacher of this Braita holds that a positive commandment pushes off a negative commandment [even one that has cutting off as part of its penalty].

Since the Gemara concludes later on that  a positive commandment does not push off a negative commandment that has cutting off as part of its penalty,-- therefore the reasoning would have to go in the opposite direction. [That עליה on her has to tell us she (the sister of one's wife) is allowed in yibum.] I mean to say: Fine. The teacher of the Braita thought the positive mitzvah would push off the negative mitzvah if not for the word "upon her." But we {who hold that a positive commandment does not push off a negative command that has cutting off in it} are left with nothing to tell us from where we learn the sister of ones wife is forbidden in yibum.

Now this is all just a short introduction to this subject. But I wanted to mention that one alternative way to look at this Braita is to say that it has nothing to do with a Gezera Shava. It is rather thinking like this: We find that the wife of ones brother is forbidden even after one brother is gone. And yet we find that in the specific case of Yibum she is permitted. So we should allow all forbidden relations in the case of Yibum. So now we need the extra word "upon her" to tell us that she is forbidden. [That is to say that the Braita is thinking of a "Ma Metzinu" [what we find in one place we automatically expand to other places unless we can find specific reason to limit its application] , not a gezera Shava]. The problem with this is that this would work even with just the word "upon her" all by itself.. The Braita definitely refers to the fact that the same word is used in both places to derive its law. So it definitely means a gezera shava.

And if this is gezera shava then the result is a disaster. The normal gezera shava puts the laws of one place into the other place and visa versa. That would put the "upon her" from levirite marriage into forbidden relations and make them all forbidden only in a case of yibum!

I have not had a chance to look into this yet but my first reaction would be to find the book the Aruch Laner on Yevamot and see if he has any suggestions how to make sense of this.

I should mention that Rabbainu Isaac Hazeken--the grandson of Rashi just simply concludes that the teacher of the Braita thought all positive commandments push off negative commandments period and that is why we we the upon her to forbid her. [But we are still left with the unresolved issue of the gezra shava in general goes both directions.] Later note: No. Actually if a gezera shava goes in both directions is a debate. Perhaps we could use this idea to help us here and and go with the opinion the gezera shava goes only in one direction.

_________________________________________________________________________________

The ברייתא says how do we know the the sister of one's wife is forbidden in יבום? It answers that it says "עליה" in ויקרא and עליה in דברים concerning יבום. This looks like a גזירה שווה. A גזירה שווה means the same word is used in two different places. So we apply the laws of one place to the other place unless there is some specific reason that undoes the גזירה שווה.




One alternative way to look at this ברייתא is to say that it has nothing to do with a גזירה שווה. It is rather thinking like this. We find that the wife of one's brother is forbidden even after one brother is gone. And yet we find that in the specific case of יבום she is permitted. So we should allow all forbidden relations in the case of יבום. So now we need the extra word "עליה" to tell us that she is forbidden. That is to say that the ברייתא is thinking of a מה מצינו what we find in one place we automatically expand to other places unless we can find specific reason to limit its application , not a גזירה שווה. The problem with this is that this would work even with just the word "עליה" all by itself.. The ברייתא definitely refers to the fact that the same word is used in both places to derive its law. So it definitely means a גזירה שווה.

And if this is גזירה שווה then the result is a קשה. The normal גזירה שווה puts the laws of one place into the other place and visa versa. That would put the "עליה" from יבום into forbidden relations and make them all forbidden only in a case of יבום!

That is we have a question because a  גזירה שווה in general goes both directions.
Answer. Actually if a גזירה שווה goes in both directions is a debate. Here the נרייתא holds  with the opinion the גזירה שווה goes only in one direction.


) יבמות ג: הברייתא שואלת איך יודעים שאחות אשתו אסורה ביבום? והיא מתרצת שכתוב בויקרא אצל עריות "עליה" וכתוב בדברים אצל יבום "עליה". זה נראה כמו גזרה שווה. [גזרה שווה בדרך כלל היא שיש אותה מילה בשני מקומות, ולכן שמים את הדינים של מקום אחד למקום השני.] תוספות שואל, למה לא להפוך את הגזרה שווה לכיוון השני? והוא מתרץ, שהתנא של הברייתא אוחז בשיטה שעשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. זאת אומרת שבלי הגזרה שווה היינו אומרים שיבום דוחה איסור אחות אשתו. אם כן למה צריכים את הגזרה שווה? אלא על כורחך היא באה לומר את החידוש שאין יבום דוחה אחות אשתו.
עכשיו שמסקנת הגמרא היא (לקמן) שעשה אינו דוחה לא תעשה הסברה הייתה צריכה ללכת בכיוון השני. זאת אומרת שאין לנו מקום ללמוד ממנו שעריות אסורות ביבום. (אולי יש לומר שבאמת זאת היא סברת בית שמאי, אבל בית שמאי מתיר רק צרת ערווה לא העריות עצמן) אופן שני להסתכל בברייתא הוא זה: אין הברייתא מזכירה גזרה שווה. יכול להיות היא חושבת על "מה מצינו". והיא חושבת כך: אנחנו מוציאים שאשת אחיו אסורה אפילו אם אחיו אינו בעולם. רק במקום יבום היא מותרת. באופן דומה היינו צריכים להתיר את כל העריות במקום יבום. ולכן אנחנו צריכים את המילה "עליה" לומר לנו שאחות אשתו וכל העריות אסורות. הקושיא כאן היא שזה היה עובד אפילו אם היתה לנו את המילה "עליה" רק במקום אחד. והברייתא אומרת שהדין שלה באה מן העובדה שאותה מילה נמצאת בשני המקומות. עוד קושיא גדולה כאן היא שאם הברייתא מכוונת לגזרה שווה יש כאן אי הבנה. גזרה שווה רגילה נותנת את הדינים של מקום אחד למקום השני וממקום השני למקום הראשון. אם זאת היא גזרה שווה, אזי התוצאה של זו היא שמילת "עליה" בעריות מדברת רק במקום יבום, ואז כל העריות תהיינה אסורות רק במקום יבום. וזה אי אפשר. ולכן צריכים לומר שכוונת התנא היא שזה מה מצינו.
במילים אחרות. הברייתא אומרת איך אנחנו יודעים שאחותו של אשתו אסורה היבום? והיא עונה שהפסוק אומר "עליה" בויקרא ו"עליה" בספר דברים בנוגע ליבום. זה נראה כמו גזירה שווה. (גזירה שווה פירושו  המילה  זהה משמשת בשני מקומות שונים. אז אנחנו מיישמים את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, אלא אם כן קיים טעם ספציפי כי להפחית את כח הגזירה שווה.) דרך חלופית  להסתכל על ברייתא זו היא לומר שזה לא קשור עם גזירה שווה. אפשר לחשוב ככה. אנו מוצאים כי אשתו של אחיו (של אחד) אסורה אפילו אחרי שהוא  נפטר. ובכל זאת אנו מוצאים כי במקרה הספציפי של יבום היא מותרת. אז אנחנו צריכים לאפשר לכל היחסים האסורים במקרה של יבום להיות מותרים. אז עכשיו אנחנו צריכים את מילה אחת מיותרת "עליה" לספר לנו שהיא אסורה. כלומר כי ברייתא הוא חושבת על "מה מצינו", מה אנו מוצאים במקום אחד אנו מרחיבים באופן אוטומטי למקומות אחרים, אם לא נצליח למצוא סיבה ספציפית להגביל את תחולתו, לא גזירה שווה. הבעיה עם זה היא כי זה יעבוד גם אם רק הייתה המילה "עליה" לבדה. את ברייתא בהחלט מתייחס לעובדה כי אותה המילה משמשת בשני המקומות לגזור את  החוק שלה. אז זה בהחלט אומר שזה גזירה שווה. ואם זה גזירה שווה, אז התוצאה היא קשה. הגזירה שווה הרגילה מעמידה את החוקים של מקום אחד למקום השני, ולהיפך. זה היה גורם לשים את "עליה" של יבום לתוך היחסים ולעשות את כולם אסורים רק במקרה של יבום! כלומר יש לנו שאלה משום גזירה שווה הולכת לשני הכיוונים. תשובה. למעשה אם גזירה שווה הולכת בשני הכיוונים הוא ויכוח. כאן נראה שהברייתא  בדעת שהגזירה השווה סובבת רק לכיוון אחד.
רציתי להציג נושא שעולה בתחילת יבמות. זה יעזור לענות על שאלה ששאלתי בתחילת יבמות. זוהי שאלת אשת אחיו מאמו. החוק בתורת כהנים שתוספות מביא בתחילת יבמות. משפט זה מובא על הפסוק  שלא לישא אשת אחיו של שאומר "נדה היא". תורת הכהנים שואלת למה להשוות אותה לנדה? מכיוון שבדיוק כמו נדה יש ​​זמן של רשות, כך גם היא, כלומר אם אחיו מת ללא ילדים. אז הפסוק לא ניתן לדבר על אח מהאם. יבמות מ''א.  הותרה ונאסרה וחזרה והותרה אסורה כמו שמואל ורב אסי. הסיבה לזה הרשב''א אומר היא הדעה שמכילה את היבמה באיסור כרת אבל עשה של יבום דוחף אותו. אבל הלכה בגמרא עצמה היא הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת כמו רב ור' חנינא וכי הדעה מחזיקה לאיסור של אשת אח יש מגבלת זמן ואחרי שהיא נופלת ליבום אין עוד כל כרת מעורב. לכן לשאלה שלי בתחילת יבמות יש תשובה. כי ההוראה המקורית שם זה  מחזיקה בשיטה שעשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת וזו תהיה גם כמו הדעה שנדחתה בגמרא , הדעה של שמואל ואת רב אסי. היינו תשובתי על הברייתא בתחילת יבמות. שזו הולכת כמו שמואל ורב אסי שמחזיקים עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. אז התשובה שלי תהיה בכך בדיוק כמו שהרשב''א אמר ששמואל ורב אסי מחזיקים הותרה ונאסרה והותרה אסורה וזה יהיה בגלל שקבעו כי עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת ואפילו אשת אח מאביו איסור של אשת אח נמשך, אבל פשוט נדחף על ידי עשה של יבום. אבל הלכה היא כמו רב ור' חנינא כי הותרה ונאסרה והותרה מותרת. וזה הולך כדעת אין עשה דוחה לא תעשה שיש בו כרת. זה הכי הגיוני כי בדרך כלל אנחנו מבינים יבום להיות כמו נדה באופן שבו לאחר הזמן של האיסור אין איסור כלל, לא כי הוא נדחף משם.
Later note: This last paragraph is a answer to the question, but for some reason it looks like I did not bring it here in English. Maybe I wrote the English version somewhere else? I simply can not remember.

Tractate Yevamot. Page three of Yevamot

Tractate Yevamot. Page three of Yevamot is  a very important page in the Talmud. This is one of the  places  where the Talmud takes the time and trouble to derive its laws from the verses in a logically rigorous manner. The basic beginning on the subject comes from the question how do we know that a Tzarat Erva (צרת ערווה) is forbidden [to Beit Hillel]. The Talmud answers from the extra "upon her."(עליה) I would rather not go into the details here but the problem in this piece of Talmud are discussed on the side in the Tosphot Yeshanim.

I don't remember all the details but the basic idea was that the Gemara uses "upon her" (עליה) for a Gezeira Shava. (גזירה שווה) The Gemara says: "Just like in forbidden relations, a sister is forbidden, so also by yevamot a sister is forbidden."
  The Tosphot Yeshanim asks: "Let's turn the Gezeira Shava in the opposite direction to make her permitted in Yibum? He answers the Gemara is depending on a later page in the Talmud (sugia) in which we know the a positive prohibition pushes off a negative prohibition. So that is what we would think even without the extra words "upon her."(עליה)  So why do we need upon her? Only to tell us something different from what we would have thought, -and that is to make her forbidden.
  At this point I asked:  But what happens after later on the Gemara says a positive commandment does not push off a negative commandment that has karet (being cutting off from ones people) as part of it penalty? After we know this, then without "upon her" we would already know he is forbidden. So what the the "upon her"(עליה)  tell us? That she is permitted! 

Did you ever notice how a bride becomes more beautiful after she gets married?

It is not really a big deal but when I was learning Isaac Luria a few years back I never did the subject of (Nukvah) the wife in depth.



 So for a few days I have been looking at Shaar HaNukva in Isaac Luria's Mavo Shaarim. I discovered something interesting that I had not seen before when I was skimming over it.

It is the fact that when the husband builds the wife, there are aspects of light that she gets from him and there are other actual aspects of her spiritual vessels that she gets from him. We know that she has a half of one third of his kindness in her Crown. But as I looked closer I saw some details I had missed. For one thing there is a difference between the man and the woman in this regard. The husband gets 2/3s of one kindness for his Sphere of Beauty. But he does not use it all for that Sphere. Rather 1/2 of 1/3 goes to his wife, 1/3 stays there, and a whole 1/3 goes up to his crown.

The wife gets a part of the outer light of kindness which is contained in his beauty and a part of the inner light.
She gets from the inner light only 1/2 of one third as I just mentioned. This stays in her crown. But from the outer light of his kindness she gets 1.5 thirds  [i.e. a whole half]. Here things are different for the wife than for the husband. She uses 1/2  of one third for her crown, another 1/2 of one third for her Intellect [Daat] and the last 1/2 of one third for her beauty. Actually you can see this easily. Did you ever notice how a bride becomes more beautiful after she gets married? I have seen this and the effect is sometimes startling.


However a word of warning. When i hear any kind of Hasidim talking about Kabalah i cringe. In general chasidm have not done the basic homework to know what they are talking about and explains concepts of Isaac Luria in  many  ways that are opposed of what Isaac Luria says. If they would not be pretending knowledge of Isaac Luria I would not mind so much but once you decide to talk about Kabalah you have a n obligation to have done the homework.

Bava Metzia 14b

In Bava Metzia 14b we find that the Talmudic sage Rav said that in a case where one has bought something from a thief and the property returns to  the owner, that the buyer [party number three] gets the money he paid for it from the thief and the improvement also. Rashi explain that this is a case in which the original property was already improved and the thief damaged the property. So the original owner is getting back the property with zero improvement. Tosphot explains that the case is simply that the property was empty and the buyer improved it, and so when Rav says the thief pays back the improvement, it is a simple case of his giving back the improvement, and the original owner gives back the investment to the buyer.

The idea of Tosphot is that this is not any different from a case where a person goes into someone else's field and plants it. In such a case the owner pays the investment, but not the improvement.
This all seems simple and plain. Now this is also the way the Pnei Yehoshua understands this and it seems like there is no need of any explanation.

The problem here arises when we look at Bava Kama page 95a. It looks like this entire subject in Bava Metzia is going according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir over there, and against Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon.--which seems absurd on the face of it. Simply put, it so happens that R. Meir is the one person who holds that improvement goes back to the original owner with the stolen object--not Rabbi Yehuda or Rabbi Shimon. But if you try to explain the subject in Bava Metzia as if it was going like the halacha (law) in Bava Kama, you encounter major problems. Some of these problems were noted by the Pnei Yehoshua, but there is  a  question  that seems to me to be even more powerful that the questions the Pnei Yehoshua raised. The fact is that Shmuel is the person that argues with Rav in Bava Metzia and he says the third party --the buyer-- does not get back the improvement. If you try to explain this according to Rabbi Yehuda it makes no sense. Of course he does not get back the improvement -- because no one took it from him in the first place!
In short, the whole subject in Bava Metzia seems to be going completely like Rabbi Meir and we know from Tractate Eruvin that this is simply impossible. When there is an argument between Rabbi Meir and or Rabbi Shimon with Rabbi Yehuda the law always is like Rabbi Yehuda.

Here is a different idea on that some page.


 ב''מ יד: יש פה שלשה אנשים: נגזל,גזלן, ולוקח מן הגזלן והקרקע שנגזלה. הקרקע חוזרת לבעלים עם השבח שהשביחה הלוקח. רב אמר שהלוקח גובה מחיר הקרקע ושבחה מן הגזלן. תוספות אומרים שהדין של היורד לתוך שדה חבירו בלי רשות שמקבל היציאה שייך לפה. זה דין של רב בדף קג. ושם רב אומר ידו על התחתונה. זאת אומרת שאם השבח פחות מן היציאה, אז הנגזל משלם את היציאה. ואם היציאה פחותה, אז הוא משלם את היציאה. ועכשיו אפשר להבין כוונת התוספות פה בדף יד:. פה יש שתי אפשריות. א) השבח יותר מן היציאה. ב) השבח פחות מן היציאה. מצב הראשון הוא המצב שרב דיבר עליו. שם הנגזל משלם את היציאה, והגזלן משלם את השבח. [פה כוונת רב היא שהגזלן משלם את השבח היתר מן היציאה, היינו ההפרש. וזה שלא ככוונתו בדף קג. אולי יש פה איזו קושיא?] במצב השני שהשבח פחות, אז הגזלן אינו משלם כלום, והנגזל משלם את השבח. וזאת היא השאלה שלי. למה הגזלן אינו משלם את היציאה? אם אנחנו הולכים לפי מה שכתוב בשטר, אז הוא חייב לשלם את היציאה. אם אנחנו לא הולכים לפי מה שכתוב בשטר (אחריות לאו טעות סופר היא) אז גם השבח אינו משלם

[Looking at this essay later I am not sure why I did not write the first idea in Hebrew.  I think the reason I did not put the first paragraph into Hebrew was  I was thinking along the lines   of Tosphot that the two Gemaras pg 14 and 101 mean the same thing-that the שבח goes to the thief and then to the buyer. But later I decided that that can't be what Tosphot meant. Rather who ever did the שבח gets paid for it. And therefore the whole above essay becomes important again.

Yoseph Yozel Horowitz (from Navaradok) held that trust in God is of prime importance in life.

It is well known that the Yoseph Yozel Horowitz (from Navaradok) held that trust in God is of prime importance in life.
I have claimed that this is a good approach, but it only works if one has held to it as soon as he has heard of it, and not gone away from it. If one starts to depend on his own deeds and intelligence in obtaining life's needs, then one can't go back to trust.

Now the basic approach here is that trust in the concepts of Navardok is not belief nor is it religious frenzy. Nor is it related to the idea of sitting and learning Torah. It is however often mixed up with that, but  conceptually it is unrelated. One can in theory sit and learn Torah all day and be depending on handouts from the Israeli government or from rich Jews in America. One could also be working all day in physics job at New York University, and still be trusting in God.

However, we do find that Schopenhauer made a correct observation that there is no reason to assume that the Will has human good in mind. To him, the Will almost delights in surprising people and acting in unpredictable ways. At first glance these two points of view seem contradictory. I claim they are not.

But first I should mention is that there are sub-levels between the First Cause and the actual physical universe that when these levels intersect this world cause what can be called supernatural effects. But these sub levels are not identical with the First Cause.








To me trust in God is going to university and getting an honest job and working for a living but putting one's trust in God.

But then how does one relate this to Schopenhauer? My answer has always been to this question that even Schopenhauer agrees that there is an aspect of the Will that is beyond the dimension that he talks about in The World As Will and Representation. It is the dimension of the Good. This is mentioned in a last letter of his.

I would like to defend the idea that trust in God is an objective moral value. That is it is something people should do. But it is not something they must do. I.e. I claim there are moral values that are oughts, but not musts. It is a realm of value that is totally separate from Thou must.

On a side note I should mention that just because one is engaged in learning Torah that is no reason not to serve in the IDF [Israeli Defense Force].

Trust in God used to be for me a big factor in my personal decisions.  It is not so any longer because I think that once one has left trust and seen that running after worldly ventures does not work well for him or her, one simply can't get back and change modes at will to "Next World" type of issues. [That means in English "siting and learning Torah."]

That being said, I still think that trust is a pretty good idea.
I  discovered a book  The Level of Man (מדרגת האדם) by Joseph Yozel Horwitz (Novaradok).\

He writes that think that in the Torah are all the answers to all of life's problems. And he does not like the idea of compromise on the idea of learning Torah and devoting one's life to Torah.

I thought that this was a pretty good idea, and took this idea to its outer limits. And as long as I went with pure trust in God, there is no question in my mind that God reciprocated. But when I fell from this idea and decided to depend on my own mind and efforts, that is the second that God removed his Divine Providence from me and left me in the hands of the ways of the world.


OK, what is done is done. Why is this relevant for  people at this point? The answer is that it seems to me that the answer to the problems the Jewish people is facing probably is like Yoseph Horwitz suggested --trust in God. I have seen a lot of other approaches, but this one seems the best.

Now, I am aware  that  learning Torah in recent years has become  means of making money.  But I am also aware that there is no system that can't be abused. [Abuse does not cancel use. It is an old Latin saying: Abusus non tollit usum.  ] Just because there are  those that use the Torah to make  a living, there is no reason to blame the Torah for this.

That all being said we still need to find some kind of safeguard(s) so that Torah should not be used for making money.

On a side note I should mention that just because one is engaged in learning Torah that is no reason not to serve in the IDF [Israeli Defense Force]. We do not find people learning Torah that claim that they are not obligated to marry and bear children.. In fact just the opposite. many people use the fact of their learning Torah  as a means to get marry and make money. Certainly learning Torah does not exempt anyone from doing any mitzvah. That is not including in the halachic definition of learning Torah which implies as a prerequisite that one is keeping the Torah also.



People that use the holy Torah to make their livings are not able to understand the Torah. The Torah is jealous of its honor and does not reveal itself to people that make it a "shovel to dig" with. See the Gra on Pirkei Avot  where he derives the prohibition of using Torah as a means of livelihood from the king Balshatzar [in the book of Daniel] would used the vessels of the holy temple in Jerusalem and was punished.

[The major issue in Israel is that of Islamic Fascism, not land. But this essay was not meant to deal with the problem of Islamic Fascism and my learning partner thought it is a waste of time to do so. Still it seems to me to be a good idea to justify the State of Israel.  Dr Dershowitz, and the Alt Right blogs like Brett Stevens {defending nationalism}.The most telling comment was on one Alt Right blog where one person commented he would love to side with the Muslims in Israel except for the fact that after they would be done with Israel the next person on their list of people to attack would include that person making the comment. In other words Islam is on the march to crush the West. ]

 The Torah is clear about the importance of Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.

 There are not many people that are aware of this fact, but I think a precursory reading of the Five Books of Moses should be enough to convince anyone that the bringing of Jews to the Land of Israel is of primary importance in the Torah. You don't even have to read it in Hebrew to see this.
It is the major theme of the Torah.
[In fact it is the one and only major theme of the Torah. The giving of the Ten Commandments was a semi finial, but the theme of bringing the Jews to Israel is the one and only foremost theme of the entire Torah from the beginning to the end.]



But even without this, the fact than Iran wants to wipe out the Jews is an important issue. I was discussing the Cuban Missile crisis yesterday with a person who served in the KGB. I mentioned that the USSR was a totally different type of adversary than the Islamic world. The goal of both the USA and the USSR was to create a decent and fair system for their people. The goal of the Islamic world is to destroy Western Civilization. This was the reason the Russians traditionally always kept Muslims down to a small number. They knew that Muslims when in small numbers act better than anyone. They are more decent and more polite. But after anywhere from 10 to 20 percent things change radically.

I am open to suggestions here if anyone has an idea of how to answer this question on the Rambam. If you think you will be able to open up the book of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and understand his answer on this then be my guest. Please enlighten me! [I see when I wrote this in Hebrew I thought the word for land is masculine which I think was a mistake.]

Leviticus chapter 25 verse 33

"The house shall go out in the jubilee."



Introduction. According to the Rambam, when a serf(מקבל) (a serf here is not a slave. He enters a voluntary agreement to wok and property and take some exact percentage of what grows) leaves his field at the end of his period and a buyer of a field when he returns it in the jubilee year, both keep the improvement (שבח,) [the amount which grew on the field not by itself, but from his efforts]. But if this is the case, then how can the Talmud (in Bava Metzia page 109a) ask why do we not learn serfdom from jubilee?
We do! It is the same law!

Frankly, I have no idea of how Reb Chaim Soloveitchik answers this problem in the Rambam [Maimonides] and I have no idea how to answer it myself. But I have one observation that I think might be useful in finding a solution. [Later sometime after I wrote this blog, I looked at the commentary of the Geon from Vilna(הגר''א) Eliyahu from Vilnius and he answers this question simply and powerfully.]
The thing I noticed about this law is that Maimonides does not mention anything about the sums of money the serf or the buyer put into the field. This is very strange because this is the first thing that you usually deal with in the case of a loaner and a borrower as in Bava Metzia 15b.

I know Reb Chaim has a whole different approach in his Chidushei HaRambam but I do not see how he answers this question; or how his approach could help us in any way.
I am getting so obsessed with this problem that I did not even do my regular math study today. I have been going through all the different possibilities that I can think of and nothing seems to work.

Incidentally, there is nothing in the Talmud itself that makes this difficult. It is just the way the Rambam understands the case of a serf and a buyer that makes this difficult. If we would have just the Talmud then it would read thus: Rava  says, a serf does not get the extra growth of  trees [when he decides to terminate his contract]. The Talmud asks on Rava : But in Jubilee the law is that the buyer keeps all extra growth besides the field itself.

(k) Answer (Abaye on behalf of Rava): Jubilee is different, for the Torah said "V'Yatza Mimkar Bayis" - the sale goes back, the improvements do not go back. [The Torah says that in Jubilee the house goes back--not the improvements]
(l) Question: We should learn from Jubilee to a renter!

I am open to suggestions here if anyone has an idea of how to answer this question on the Rambam. If you think you will be able to open up the book of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and understand his answer on this then be my guest. Please enlighten me!

 ב''מ קט. הקדמה. נראה לי שהרמב''ם היה אומר שאף על פי שהדין של קבלנות והדין של יובל שווים לגבי הוצאה ושבח, הם שונים לגבי שבח שקמה. לגבי שבח שקמה, קודם שבע שנים המקבל אינו מקבל כלום אפילו אם עבד עליו. ואחרי שבע שנים הוא מקבל את הכל -גם השקמה בעצמה- אפילו אם לא עבד עליו (רק שעבד על השדה בכלל). ועל הדין הפרטי הזה הגמרא שואלת, "אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל?" עכשיו נכנס ליותר פרטים. המשנה אומרת שהמקבל אינו מקבל את השקמה אם לא עבד על השדה שבע שנים. רבא אמר גם אינו מקבל שבח שקמה. והגמרא שואלת על זה מיובל איפה שאנחנו אומרים "שמין"- זאת אומרת שהלוקח מקבל מה שהשדה הצמיח. ופה הגמרא מתרצת שיובל שונה בגלל גזירת הכתוב "ממכר בית" חוזר, ולא שבח. ואז היא שואלת "אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל?" והיא מתרצת שיובל שונה בגלל עוד סיבה, - הקרקע קנוי ללוקח. מצד עצמה הגמרא ברורה. הלוקח מקבל את מה שהצמיח השדה, ולא המקבל. מה החילוק? והיא מתרצת שהחילוק הוא שיש פסוק. אבל לדעת הרמב''ם, שני הדינים שווים. המקבל והלוקח מקבלים את מה שגדל בגלל העבודה שלהם, ולא את מה שגדל ממילא. רב חיים הלוי שואל את הקושיא הזאת,  אבל לא הבנתי את תירוצו. לי נראה שהרמב''ם היה יכול לתרץ את זאת כך: כשהגמרא שואלת אולי נלמד קבלנות מיובל, הגמרא אינה מכוונת לכל מיני שבח, אלא דווקא לשבח אילנות. בשבח אילנות אפילו את מה גדל מחמת עבודתו המקבל אינו מקבל, והלוקח כן מקבל. ועל הפרט הזה הגמרא שואלת את קושייתה

אבל מלשון הרמב''ם אינו משמע כן. הרמב''ם כתב לגבי שבח שיקמה שאם המקבל לא עבד עליו, הוא לא מקבל אותו. בתחלה חשבתי שאולי רק אחרי התירוץ של הגמרא שהלוקח קנה את הקרקע [לא כמו שהגמרא חשב בתחלה שהוא כמו שוכר] אז הגמרא השווה את דין הלוקח עם דין המקבל בגלל שגזירת הכתוב משווה אותם. אבל יש קושיא על התירוץ הזה בגלל שכל קושיית הגמרא נבנית על בסיס ששמין ללוקח, ולא למקבל. זאת אומרת, גם בתחלה וגם בסוף הגמרא אוחזת את השיטה שדינם שונה.
בתחלה היה נראה לי שאי אפשר לתרץ את הקושיא הזאת בגלל שכל כיוון הגמרא הוא כנגד הרעיון שדינם שווה. הגמרא מתחילה עם המושג שיובל וקבלנות הם שונים, והיא שואלת "למה יהיו שונים?" והיא מתרצת את זה: הם שונים בגלל שיש פסוק. אבל עדיין היא לא יכולה להסתפק עם זה. ואז היא מוצאת עוד סיבה שיהיו שונים. ואחר כל זה, איך אפשר לומר שהם שווים? התירוץ לזאת היא מוכלת בשתי מילים של הגר''א. הוא כתב שהמילה "אילנות" ברמב''ם (שכירות פרק ח' הלכה י') היא טעות סופר. וצריך לומר רק "שבח", ולא "שבח אילנות". זאת אומרת שלגבי שבח בכלל הדין של יובל וקבלנות הם שווים כמו שכתב הרמב''ם.  אבל מה שקשה לגמרא היא הדין של שבח אילנות ששם אין דינם שווה. לגבי יובל שבח אילנות שווה לשבח רגיל. [אם הוא עבד עליו הוא מקבל אותו-ואם לא,לא.] אבל לגבי קבלנות, אפילו אם המקבל עבד על שבח אילנות, הוא אינו מקבל אותו. ואז גמרא משתדלת למצוא סיבה שיובל וקבלנות יהיו שונים.

In the strictest sense of keeping Torah, we do find that attachment with God is a primary principle in Torah--along with the Ten Commandments.  We  find the major things the Torah is concerned with are: (1) Bringing the Jewish people into the Land of Israel, (2) Attachment with God, (3) Fear of God, (4) Love of God, and (5) The Ten Commandments. Now there are lots of commandants in the Torah besides the ten, but the ten are considered to be the roots of all the others. "What does God want from you but to fear and love God and to walk in his ways and do his commandments?" (Deuteronomy) "לדבקה בו" to be attached with God is mentioned twice in Deuteronomy as a command. Though in a practical sense this means to be attached with 'Torah scholars" תלמידי חכמים still אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and that is how the author of Sefer Yeraim a disciple of Rabbainu Tam describes it.