It is possible to defend objective morality. I think I did so on my blog a long time ago. The main way I would do so would be to shorten the version of Dr Michael Huemer, Bryan Caplan or Dr John Searle. This would be in two steps one would be to show universals exist. Then to show moral principles are universals. Next to show they are known or can be known by reason. I never know when I am about to be interrupted so I am nervous about how long this letter can be. God willing I will write a short defense. Yellow is a universal. Yellow is a color. It is not an idea. It is something yellow things have in common. It does exist. for the sentence "Yellow is a color" to be true, yellow must exist. Therefore universals exist. There are many kinds of universals. Moral principles are an example of universals. To know the existence of a universal you do not need a reason. You can recognize its truth prima facie. I will expand on this in a minute bli neder.
Part of the problem comes from Hume. It is possible to sum up David Hume's vital
Appendix:
(1) I have to apologize for this essay. It would not even have occurred to me to write it if not for the fact that in most USA universities they teach the opposite to freshmen, people not really prepared well to defend traditional Torah values from onslaught and attack.
(2) Kant is along the lines that morality should have formal rules. That it is suggestive that he uses the idea of a universal rule. He is trying to capture the essence of a universal and apply it to morality. Morality is the same as the laws of physics but you just replace the = sign with "ought."
But formal rules miss something about content.
Schopenhauer wants to lose the formal aspect of it and get down to essence.
The Rambam has both these areas interacting.
[That is to say: universals have a problem that they are content free. And pure content has another problem that it is individual, not a universal. The Rambam links the two. The rules flow from the content.]
Morality is rules but rules that flow from an area not open to human cognition.
Part of the problem comes from Hume. It is possible to sum up David Hume's vital
assumptions about reasoning in a single proposition: Reason does NOTHING except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Whenever Hume wants to show that reasoning cannot support something, he uses the same argument: the alternative is not a
contradiction. An Alternative Conception of Reason. Consider the claim: Circular arguments are invalid. Think about it for a while. You can see that it is true -- but how? Even
though Hume himself uses this principle in his argument, we could never justify it on his principles. The denial is not a contradiction. We can at least conceive that "Some circular arguments are valid" is true. At this point it will be useful to summon Kelley Ross's argument for different levels or modes of necessity. But I am trying to be short here. I am not sure which steps I can skip in order to present a whole argument.
So what we have is we know things that are not known by observation nor by induction nor deduction. But we know them to be true. That is by reason. Hume made a terrible mistake that has eroded the foundations of morality. For the way we know morality is by reason.
Hume wants to show only we can have only empirical knowledge. But that is false. There are well known counter examples and he gives some himself. One example is nothing can be yellow and blue in the same place at the same time. There are many examples. But then he resorts to a trick to claim a priori knowledge is meaningless unless it is the kind he claims.
What I am saying here is that there are degrees of necessity known by reason. "Ought" can not be derived from an "is" but it is a universal and is one mode of necessity. Kelley Ross has eight in all.
For the people that this jargon might make sense: what I am saying is non intuitive immediate knowledge recognizes modes of necessity.
I am calling this "reason" which Kelley Ross would not do because as he puts it "we realize that we are dealing with processes that cannot possibly belong to consciousness." when referring to Kant's idea of synthesis. And he goes into the reasons in chapter 3 of his PhD thesis sec 4. But I think is is there mainly going into the reasons for treating this kind of reason as something not thought nor sensed but known. "Kant thus says that we possess "sensible intuition" rather than the active intellectual [non sensuous] intuition ." This point became the center of a debate between Kant and Fichte. by Marcus Willaschek
See this link by Michael Kolkman
In spite of this point being central to Kant it does not effect my argument. How reason perceives universals is not the issue. The point is: it does.
The last paragraph. What I am saying is certain universals are given to be taken up by the mind to make synthesis. This is the basic idea of Kant. The universals have to come fro outside. Objects of cognition is I think how he would put it.
Appendix:
(1) I have to apologize for this essay. It would not even have occurred to me to write it if not for the fact that in most USA universities they teach the opposite to freshmen, people not really prepared well to defend traditional Torah values from onslaught and attack.
(2) Kant is along the lines that morality should have formal rules. That it is suggestive that he uses the idea of a universal rule. He is trying to capture the essence of a universal and apply it to morality. Morality is the same as the laws of physics but you just replace the = sign with "ought."
But formal rules miss something about content.
Schopenhauer wants to lose the formal aspect of it and get down to essence.
The Rambam has both these areas interacting.
[That is to say: universals have a problem that they are content free. And pure content has another problem that it is individual, not a universal. The Rambam links the two. The rules flow from the content.]
Morality is rules but rules that flow from an area not open to human cognition.
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It is possible to defend objective morality. This would be in two steps. One would be to show universals exist. Then to show moral principles are universals. Next to show they are known or can be known by reason. Yellow is a universal. Yellow is a color. It is not an idea. It is something yellow things have in common. It does exist. For the sentence "Yellow is a color" to be true, yellow must exist. Therefore universals exist. There are many kinds of universals. Moral principles are an example of universals. To know the existence of a universal you do not need a reason. You can recognize its truth prima facie.
Part of the problem comes from Hume. It is possible to sum up David Hume's vital
Appendix:
I have to apologize for this essay. It would not even have occurred to me to write it if not for the fact that in most USA universities they teach the opposite to freshmen, people not really prepared well to defend traditional Torah or Christian values from onslaught and attack.
(2) Kant wants that morality should have formal rules. That it is suggestive that he uses the idea of a universal rule. He is trying to capture the essence of a universal and apply it to morality. Morality is the same as the laws of physics but you just replace the "equals" sign with "ought."
But formal rules miss something about content.
Schopenhauer wants to lose the formal aspect of it and get down to essence.
The רמב''ם has both these areas interacting.
That is to say: universals have a problem that they are content free. And pure content has another problem that it is individual, not a universal. The רמב''ם links the two. The rules flow from the content.
Morality is rules but rules that flow from an area not open to human cognition.
It is possible to defend objective morality. This would be in two steps. One would be to show universals exist. Then to show moral principles are universals. Next to show they are known or can be known by reason. Yellow is a universal. Yellow is a color. It is not an idea. It is something yellow things have in common. It does exist. For the sentence "Yellow is a color" to be true, yellow must exist. Therefore universals exist. There are many kinds of universals. Moral principles are an example of universals. To know the existence of a universal you do not need a reason. You can recognize its truth prima facie.
Part of the problem comes from Hume. It is possible to sum up David Hume's vital
assumptions about reasoning in a single proposition: Reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Whenever Hume wants to show that reasoning cannot support something, he uses the same argument: the alternative is not a
contradiction. An Alternative Conception of Reason. Consider the claim: Circular arguments are invalid. Think about it for a while. You can see that it is true, but how? Even
though Hume himself uses this principle in his argument, we could never justify it on his principles. The denial is not a contradiction. We can at least conceive that "Some circular arguments are valid" is true. At this point it will be useful to summon different levels or modes of necessity.
So what we have is we know things that are not known by observation nor by induction nor deduction. But we know them to be true. That is by reason. Hume made a terrible mistake that has eroded the foundations of morality. For the way we know morality is by reason.
Hume wants to show only we can have only empirical knowledge. But that is false. There are well known counter examples and he gives some himself. One example is nothing can be yellow and blue in the same place at the same time. There are many examples. But then he resorts to a trick to claim a priori knowledge is meaningless unless it is the kind he claims.
What I am saying here is that there are degrees of necessity known by reason. "Ought" can not be derived from an "is" but it is a universal and is one mode of necessity. Kelley Ross has eight in all.
For the people that this jargon might make sense: what I am saying is non intuitive immediate knowledge recognizes modes of necessity.
I am calling this "reason" which Kelley Ross would not do because as he puts it "we realize that we are dealing with processes that cannot possibly belong to consciousness." when referring to Kant's idea of synthesis. And he goes into the reasons in chapter 3 of his PhD thesis sec 4. But I think is is there mainly going into the reasons for treating this kind of reason as something not thought nor sensed but known. "Kant thus says that we possess "sensible intuition" rather than the active intellectual [non sensuous] intuition ." This point became the center of a debate between Kant and Fichte. by Marcus Willaschek
See this link by Michael Kolkman
In spite of this point being central to Kant it does not effect my argument. How reason perceives universals is not the issue. The point is: it does.
The last paragraph. What I am saying is certain universals are given to be taken up by the mind to make synthesis. This is the basic idea of Kant. The universals have to come fro outside. Objects of cognition is I think how he would put it.
Appendix:
I have to apologize for this essay. It would not even have occurred to me to write it if not for the fact that in most USA universities they teach the opposite to freshmen, people not really prepared well to defend traditional Torah or Christian values from onslaught and attack.
(2) Kant wants that morality should have formal rules. That it is suggestive that he uses the idea of a universal rule. He is trying to capture the essence of a universal and apply it to morality. Morality is the same as the laws of physics but you just replace the "equals" sign with "ought."
But formal rules miss something about content.
Schopenhauer wants to lose the formal aspect of it and get down to essence.
The רמב''ם has both these areas interacting.
That is to say: universals have a problem that they are content free. And pure content has another problem that it is individual, not a universal. The רמב''ם links the two. The rules flow from the content.
Morality is rules but rules that flow from an area not open to human cognition.
