za95 A Minor midi file za95 A minor nwc file

בבא קמא ו' ע''א ארצה כאן להסביר שאלה שרב שך בניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' שואל על הרא''ש. הגמרא אומר אבנו סכינו או משאו שמי שהוא משאיר על הגג ונפלו ברוח מצויה חייב משום בור ואש. הרא'ש מביא יש מפרשים שאדם אחראי רק למה שאחראי אם הנזק היה משהו שיהיה אחראי אם הוא נגרם על ידי שניהם, אש וגם בור, לא זה או זה. הרא"ש חולק ואומר שעיקר לימוד היא מבור. רב שך שואל על כך מהעובדה שאבנו סכינו או משאו אחראים אם הם שוברים כלים. (בור פטור על כלים.) בהתחלה נראה לי שרב שך, ניסה להביא הוכחה להיש המפרשים. אבל אז עלה בדעתי שרב שך מציע דעה שלישית. דעה זו של רב שך היא אדם אחראי במקרה של אבנו סכינו או משאו (או בכל המקרים) הנלמדים משני גורמים שאדם אחראי לכל החובות שעלולות להיגרם לאחד או לשני או לשניהם. כלומר, אדם אחראי במקרה של איחוד, לא רק במקרה של הצטלבות. ואדם אחראי לא רק על מה שהוא היה אחראי עבור בור, אלא גם על מה שחייב גם בגלל אש לחוד כמו כלים. וגם הוא חייב על טמון שפטור משום אש אבל חייב משום בור

Bava Kama page 6A I would like here to explain a question that Rav Shach [in laws of damages chapter 1 halacha 8] asks on the Rosh. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The Gemara says a burden or stone one leaves on a roof and they fall in a common wind is liable because of pit and fire. The Rosh brings “some explain” that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both fire and pit, not one or the other. the Rosh disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. Rav Shach asks on this from the fact that the stone knife or burden are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that Rav Shach by asking on the Rosh was by that trying to bring a proof to the other opinion brought in the Rosh. But then it occurred to me that Rav Shach is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the “some say” nor like the Rosh. This opinion of Rav Shach is that one is liable in this case of stone knife or burden or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. that is one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for pit. ---------------------------------------------------- בבא קמא ו' ע''אI would like here to explain a question that רב שך in ניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' asks on the רא’’ש. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The גמרא says a אבנו סכינו או משאו leaves on a roof and they fall in a רוח מצויה is liable because of pit and fire. The רא’’ש brings יש מפרשים that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both אש and בור, not one or the other. The רא’’ש disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. רב שך asks on this from the fact that the אבנו סכינו או משאו are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that רב שך by asking on the רא’’ש was by that trying to bring a proof to the יש מפרשים brought in the רא’’ש. But then it occurred to me that רב שך is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the יש מפרשים nor like the רא’’ש. This opinion of רב שך is that one is liable in this case of אבנו סכינו או משאו or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. That is, one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for בור.

za92 G Minor a midi file za92 G minor nwc file

הרמב"ם כותב בהלכות גירושין פרק בהלכה ה' שאם אחד אמר לשניים, "כתבו גט לאשתי" אינן יכולים לומר לאחרים "כתבו וחתומו". בהלכה ו' כותב אם אמר "אמרו לסופר ויכתוב גט לאשתי", ואמרו לסופר הרי זה גט פסול, ומתישבין בדבר זה מפני שקרוב להיות בטל (דאורייתא). הדין הראשון הוא של ר' יוסי: אי אפשר למסור מילים לשליח. (מילי לא נימסרין לשליח.) אם הוא אומר לשניים לעשות משהו, אין להם סמכות לומר לאחרים לעשות זאת. הדין השני הוא: "אומר, 'אמרו'". כלומר, אם הוא אומר לומר לאחרים לעשות משהו, אין להאחרים סמכות לעשות זאת למרות שהוא אמר לעשות זאת בגלוי. הרמב"ם כאן משנה את לשון המשנה בדף ס''ו מסיבה לא ידועה, אולם כוונתו ברורה. המשנה אומרת "אמרו לשניים לתת גט לאשתי" הם עושים זאת בעצמם. המקרה השני אינו המקרה של שמואל בדף ס''ו ע''ב, אלא קרוב לכך. אמר "כתבו ותתנו גט לאשתי" ואמרו לסופר והוא כתב, והם חתמו. מקרה של שמואל הוא שאי אפשר למסור מילים לשליח, בעוד שהרמב"ם כתב מקרה של "אומר אמרו". נראה שהרמב"ם משווה בין שני חוקים נפרדים. נראה שהוא סבור שהם זהים למרות שבגמרא עצמה הם שונים. אלו מובאים בגמרא כשתי נקודות שבהן שמואל מסכים עם ר' יוסי לגבי נקודה אחת וחולק עם ר' יוסי לגבי השני. כלומר, שמואל מסכים איתו לגבי "מילי לא נמסרין לשליח", אבל הוא חולק עליו לגבי החוק, 'אמר לומר'. במקרה כזה, שמואל סבור שזה תקף. קשה לראות מדוע הרמב"ם משווה ביניהם. אני יכול להזכיר שהרמב"ן בהחלט חולק על הרמב"ם בנושא זה, וקובע שהמקרה של "אמר לומר לסופר לכתוב גט" תקף מבחינת החוקים לגבי שליחים, אך בטל במקרה הספציפי של גט מכיוון שהסופר צריך לשמוע את המילים מהבעל ישירות כדי שהגט יהיה לשמה. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהספק הזה של הרמב"ם הוא אם החוק הוא כמו שמואל על דפים ס"ו וס"ז או רב אשי בדף ע''ב ע''א. ושמואל מחזיק "אומר אמרו" תקף דאורייתא, בעוד שרב אשי אמר לא

The Rambam writes in Laws of Gitin chapter 2 law 5 if one said to two, “write a get to my wife” they cannot tell others write and sign. In law 6 he writes if he said tell a scribe and he will write a get for my wife and they said to a scribe this get is pasul and one needs thought in this matter because this case is close to being invalid from the law of the Torah. The first law is that of R Jose words cannot be handed to a messenger in so much as to mean that if he tells two to do something they have no authority to tell others to do so. The second law is the law is "he says, 'tell'". That is if he tells to tell others to do something, they have no authority to do some even though he said to do so openly. The Rambam here is changing the language of the Mishna on page 66 for some unknown reason, however his intension is clear. (The Mishna says tell two to give a get to my wife they do so themselves. The second case is not the case of Shmuel on page 66 b but close to it where he said write and give a get to my wife and they told a scribe and he wrote and they signed.) The case of Shmuel is words cannot e handed to a messenger while the Rambam wrote a case of he said to say. The Rambam seems to equate the two separate laws. he seems to hold they are the same even though in the Gemara itself they are different. These are brought in the Gemara as being two points in which Shmuel agrees with R Jose about one point and disagrees with R Jose about the other. That is that Shmuel agrees with him about, “Words cannot be handed to a messenger,” but he disagrees with him about the law, ''he said to say”. In that case, Shmuel holds that is valid. It is hard to see why the Rambam seems to equate them. I might mention the Ramban definitely disagrees with the Rambam about this, and holds that the case of he said to tell a scribe to write a get is valid from the standpoint of the laws about messengers, but invalid in the specific case of a get because the scribe needs to hear to words from the husband directly in order for the get to be for her sake. I might mention here that this doubt of the Rambam is about if the law is like Shmuel on pages 66 and 67 or Rav Ashi on page 72. Shmuel holds he said to say is valid from the law of the Torah while R Ashi said it is not.-------------------------------------------------------------------------------The רמב’’ם writes in הלכות גירושין פרק ב' הלכה ה' if one said to two, “write a גט to my wife” they cannot tell others write and sign. In הלכה ו' he writes if he said tell a scribe and he will write a גט for my wife and they said to a scribe this גט is pasul and one needs thought in this matter because this case is close to being invalid דאורייתא. The first law is that of ר’ יוסי words cannot be handed to a messenger in so much as to mean that if he tells two to do something they have no authority to tell others to do so. The second law is the law is "he says, 'tell'". That is if he tells to tell others to do something, they have no authority to do some even though he said to do so openly. The רמב’’ם here is changing the language of the משנה on page 66 for some unknown reason, however his intension is clear. (The משנה says tell two to give a גט to my wife they do so themselves. The second case is not the case of שמואל on דף ס''ו ע''ב but close to it where he said write and give a גט to my wife and they told a scribe and he wrote and they signed.) The case of שמואל is words cannot be handed to a messenger while the רמב’’ם wrote a case of he said to say. The רמב’’ם seems to equate the two separate laws. he seems to hold they are the same even though in the גמרא itself they are different. These are brought in the גמרא as being two points in which שמואל agrees with ר’ יוסי about one point and disagrees with ר’ יוסי about the other. That is that שמואל agrees with him about, “Words cannot be handed to a messenger,” but he disagrees with him about the law, ''he said to say”. In that case, שמואל holds that is valid. It is hard to see why the רמב’’ם seems to equate them. I might mention the רמב''ן definitely disagrees with the רמב’’ם about this, and holds that the case of he said to tell a scribe to write a גט is valid from the standpoint of the laws about messengers שליחות , but invalid in the specific case of a גט because the scribe needs to hear to words from the husband directly in order for the גט to be לשמה. I might mention here that this doubt of the רמב’’ם is about if the law is like שמואל on דפים ס''ו and ס''ז or רב אשי on page ע''ב ע''א. AND שמואל holds "אומר אמרו is valid דאורייתא while אשי said it is not.

דף ס''ו ע''ב בגיטין, המשנה אומרת שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים לתת גט לאשתו או לשלושה אנשים לכתוב ולתת אותו, אינם יכולים לבקש מאחרים לעשות זאת. עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. אבל אם הוא אומר לשלושה לתת גט לאשתו, ר' מאיר אומר שהוא מתכוון להפוך אותם לבית דין, ולכן הם יכולים למנות מישהו אחר לעשות זאת. ר' יוסי אומר שגם במקרה כזה עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. אחר כך אמר שמואל שאם אחד אמר לשניים לכתוב ולתת גט, ואמרו לסופר לכתוב אותו, וחתמו עליו, הוא פסול, ואם נישאה בשנית בהנחה שהגט תקף, עליה לעזוב את הבעל השני. עם זאת, זה עדיין דורש לימוד. שואלת הגמרא על זה מדיבור אחר של שמואל שסיבת ר' יוסי היא "מילי לא נמסרין לשליח"מילים אין נמסרים לשליח, וזה הדין. בדף כ''ט יש משנה שאדם שמינה להביא גט וחלה, יכול לתתו לאחר שיעשה כן. שואלת הגמרא, "האם אין זה סותר את המשנה בדף ס"ו שבו אינו יכול לעשות שליח? אביי השיב לשאלתנו: סיבת דף ס"ו ביזיון הבעל. רבא אמר שהטעם לדף ס"ו הוא לא ניתן למסור מילים לשליח. והגמרא מסיק שרב ושמואל חולקים על זה העיקרון. אמר רב מתנה לא כמו גט, ושמואל אמר מתנה כמו גט. בדף כ''ט תוספות שואל למה הגמרא בדף ס''ו לא שואל גם מר' מאיר שגם במקרה של שני אנשים שאם נותנים לאחרים לעשות את הגט, הגט בטל. שמואל אמר בהצהרתו הראשונה שהגט פסול, אך עדיין צריך ללמוד את זה. ההצהרה השנייה של שמואל אומרת שהגט פסול. נקודה. לכן, יש לנו שאלה על ההצהרה הראשונה גם מר' מאיר שאמר שהם חייבים לכתוב את הגט ולא לתת את העבודה לאף אחד אחר, נקודה. התשובה היא שצורך הלימוד עשוי להיות בהתאם לר' מאיר. (אז, אנחנו לא שואלים ממנו על שמואל.) ייתכן שהסיבה לר' מאיר היא ביזיון של הבעל, וזה יהיה גזרה ולכן יהיה בהתאם ספק של לשמואל. אם גישה זו נכונה, הדין יהיה שאם היא תתחתן בשנית היא לא תצטרך לעזוב את בעלה השני מכיוון שהגט היה תקף מדין התורה. אז אפילו בתפיסת העולם של ר' מאיר למרות שהוא מסכים עם תחילת המשנה , הסיבה והתוצאה עשויות להיות שונות (ולכן זה דורש לימוד). כמו כן, שמואל יכול להסכים עם ר' מאיר באופן חלקי לגבי מבוכתו של הבעל, אך לחלוק בקצת ולומר שזה חל רק על החתימה על הגט (לא על כתיבתו), ולכן במקרה של שמואל, הגט יהיה תקף לחלוטין. לכן, שוב יש סיבה לומר שזה דורש לימוד. ---------כעת, בנקודה זו, התוספות לא אומרים לנו מה שמואל חושב על דעתו של ר' מאיר. הוא רק אומר את הסיבה לר' מאיר היא בזיון של הבעל, ושמואל עשוי לחשוב שהקפדה היחידה היא לגבי החתימה על הגט, לא לגבי כתיבתו. עם זאת, אנו נאלצים לומר ששמואל חייב לחשוב שלגבי ר' מאיר, שמואל עצמו יוכל להסכים אתו, אחרת תהיה שאלה מר' מאיר על שמואל, ואנחנו לא רוצים את זה. עם זאת, התוצאה של זה היא שכאשר התוספות אומרים לשמואל שהדאגה היחידה היא לגבי החתימה על הגט, אבל אם שני האנשים אומרים לסופר לכתוב את זה, זה בסדר אפילו לר' מאיר. עם זאת, הבעיה בכך היא שהגמרא בשלב זה אינה מבחינה בין הכתיבה לחתימה על הגט. זה עולה רק בהמשך. לכן, בשלב זה אין זה יכול לספק תשובה מדוע הגמרא לא שואל מר' מאיר על שמואל. יתר על כן, לא ברור לי מה דעתו של שמואל לגבי ר' מאיר. כי בשלב זה שמואל תואם את ר' יוסי, ולכן הספק הבא הוא האם ההקפדה היא לגבי החתימה על הגט בלבד או גם לגבי כתיבת הגט. אבל במבט ראשון זו צריכה להיות שאלה רק לדעתו שהבעיה עם שני אנשים שאומרים למישהו אחר לכתוב את הגט היא רק לגבי בזיון של הבעל וזה יכול להיות לר' מאיר. אבל לשמואל קשה לראות זאת. אם השניים לא יכולים להגיד לאחרים לכתוב את זה, אז זה צריך לחול על הכתיבה והן על החתימה. כדאי להזכיר כאן שר מאיר לא אומר מה הדין עם השניים לא כותבים את הגט, רק חותמים. ולכן יכול להיות שר' מאיר אוחז מילי לא נמסרים לשליח וכל סיבת המשנה היא בזיון הבעל, וטעם של ר מאיר שאם הבעל אומר לשלשה לתת גט היא שהם בית דין, לא שלוחים. או שהוא אוחז בשיטה שמילי נמסרים לשליח אבל הבעיה אם שניים אומרים לאחרים היא בזיון הבעל..התשובה לבעיה זו בתוספות היא שאמנם נכון שהגמרא אינה מבחינה בין כתיבה לחתימה בשלב זה, אך זה רק משום שאנו הולכים לפי ר' יוסי. עבור ר' מאיר, סביר יותר שמדובר בהבחנה, ולכן גם ר' מאיר וגם שמואל עשויים להסכים עם זה, לפחות בטענה שיש ספק בכך. כך שהגמרא לא יכולה לשאול על שמואל מר' מאיר. עבור שניהם, הגט יכול להיות רק פסול או אולי תקף לחלוטין אם העדים רק אמרו לסופר לכתוב אותו, אך הם עצמם חתמו עליו

On page 67 in Gitin the Mishna says that if one says to two people to give a get (document of divorce) to his wife or to three people to write and give it, they cannot ask someone else to do so, they must do so themselves. But if he says to three to give a get to his wife, R. Meir says he intends to make them into a court, and so they can appoint someone else to do so. R Jose says even in that case they must do it themselves. Then Shmuel said if one said to two to write and give a get, and they told a scribe to write it, and they signed it is invalid and if she remarried under the assumption that it was valid, she must leave the second husband. However, this still requires study. The Gemara asks on this from another statement of Shmuel where he said the reason for R. Jose is, “Words are not given over to a messenger,” and that is the law. On page 29 there is a Mishna that a person appointed to bring a getand got sick, he can give it to another to do so. The Gemara asks does this not contradict the Mishna on page 67 where he cannot make a messenger. Abaye answered our question: the reason for page 67 is embarrassment of the husband. Rava say the reason for page 67 is words cannot be handed over to a messenger. And the Gemara concludes, that Rav and Shmuel disagree about the same principles for in terms of a document of a gift, Rav said it is unlike a get and Shmuel said it is like a get. On page 29 Tosphot asks why the Gemara on page 67 does not ask also from R Meir who also holds in a case of two people that if given to others to do the get, it is invalid. The question is this. Shmuel said in his first statement the get is invalid yet this still needs study. The second statement of Shmuel says the get is invalid period. Therefore, we have a question on the first statement also from R Meir who said the they must write the get and not give the job to anyone else, period. The answer is that the need of study part might be in accord with R Meir. (So we do not ask from him on Shmuel.) It could be the reason of R Meir is embarrassment of the husband, and that would be a gezera and so be in accord with Shmuel's doubt. If this approach is right, the law would be if she remarried she would not have to leave her second husband since the get was valid from the law of the Torah. So even in the world view of R Meir, even though he agrees with the beginning of the Mishna , the reason and outcome might be different (so this requires study). ________________________________Now at this point Tosphot does not tell us what Shmuel holds about the opinion of R Meir. He just says the reason for R Meir embarrassment of the husband and that Shmuel might hold that only concern is about the signing of the get, not the writing of it. However, we are forced to say that Shmuel must hold that about R Meir that what ever opinion he holds, that Shmuel himself could agree with for otherwise there would be a question from R Meir on Shmuel, and we do not want that. However, the result of this is that when Tosphot says Shmuel might hold the only worry is the signing of the get, but if the two people tell a scribe to write it, that is ok even to R Meir. However, the problem with this is that the Gemara at this point makes no distinction between the writing and the signing of the get. That only comes up next. So, at this point that cannot provide an answer why the Gemara does not ask from R Meir on Shmuel. Furthermore, it is unclear to me what the opinion of Shmuel is concerning R Meir. For at this point Shmuel holds with R Jose, and so the next doubt is if the worry is about the signing of the get alone or also the writing of the get. But that at first glance ought to be a question only to the opinion of that the problem with two people telling anyone else to write the get is only about the embarrassment of the husband an that could be to R Meir. But to Shmuel this is hard to see. If he can not tell another to write it, then that ought to apply across the board both on the writing and the signing. The answer to this problem in Tosphot is that while it is true that the Gemara does not make any distinction between the writing and signing at this point, but that is only because we are going according to R Jose. To R Meir, it is more likely for this to be a distinction, and therefore both R Meir and Shmuel might agree with it on the side of there at least being a doubt about it. So that the Gemara cannot ask on Shmuel from R Meir. To both, the get might be just pasul or maybe completely valid if the witnesses only told the scrive to write it but they themselves signed it. ----------------------------------On page דף ס''ו in גיטין the משנה says that if one says to two people to give a גט (document of divorce) to his wife or to three people to write and give it, they cannot ask someone else to do so. They must do so themselves. But if he says to three to give a גט to his wife, ר' מאיר says he intends to make them into a court, and so they can appoint someone else to do so. ר' יוסי says even in that case they must do it themselves. Then שמואל said if one said to two to write and give a get, and they told a scribe to write it, and they signed it is invalid and if she remarried under the assumption that it was valid, she must leave the second husband. However, this still requires study. The גמרא asks on this from another statement of שמואל where he said the reason for ר' יוסי is, מילי לא נמסרין לשליח “Words are not given over to a messenger,” and that is the law. On דף כ''ט there is a משנה that a person appointed to bring a גט and got sick, he can give it to another to do so. The גמרא asks, "Does this not contradict the משנה on דף ס''ו where he cannot make a messenger? אביי answered our question: the reason for page ס''ו דףis embarrassment of the husband. רבא say the reason for דף ס''ו is words cannot be handed over to a messenger. And the גמרא concludes, that רב and שמואל disagree about the same principles for in terms of a document of a gift, רב said it is unlike a גט and שמואל said it is like a גט. On דף כ''ט תוספות asks why the גמרא on דף ס''ו does not ask also from ר' מאיר who also holds in a case of two people that if given to others to do the גט, it is invalid. The question is this. שמואל said in his first statement the גט is invalid, yet this still needs study. The second statement of שמואל says the גט is invalid. Period. Therefore, we have a question on the first statement also from ר' מאיר who said they must write the גט and not give the job to anyone else, period. The answer is that the need of study part might be in accord with ר' מאיר. (So, we do not ask from him on שמואל.) It could be the reason of ר' מאיר is embarrassment of the husband, and that would be a גזרה and so be in accord with שמואל doubt. If this approach is right, the law would be if she remarried she would not have to leave her second husband since the גט was valid from the law of the תורה. So even in the world view of ר' מאיר even though he agrees with the beginning of the משנה , the reason and outcome might be different (so this requires study). Also, שמואל might agree with ר מאיר in part about the embarrassment of the husband, but disagree and say that this applies only to the signing of the גט (not the writing of it), and therefore in the case of שמואל, the גט would be totally valid. Therefore, again there is a reason to say this requires study. Now at this point תוספות does not tell us what שמואל holds about the opinion of ר’ מאיר. He just says the reason for ר’ מאיר embarrassment of the husband and that שמואל might hold that only concern is about the signing of the גט, not the writing of it. However, we are forced to say that שמואל must hold that about ר’ מאיר that what ever opinion he holds, that שמואל himself could agree with for otherwise there would be a question from ר’ מאיר on שמואל, and we do not want that. However, the result of this is that when תוספות says שמואל might hold the only worry is the signing of the גט, but if the two people tell a scribe to write it, that is ok even to ר’ מאיר. However, the problem with this is that the גמרא at this point makes no distinction between the writing and the signing of the גט. That only comes up next. So, at this point that cannot provide an answer why the גמרא does not ask from ר’ מאיר on שמואל. Furthermore, it is unclear to me what the opinion of שמואל is concerning ר’ מאיר. For at this point שמואל holds with ר' יוסי, and so the next doubt is if the worry is about the signing of the גט alone or also the writing of the גט. But that at firsT glance ought to be a question only to the opinion of that the problem with two people telling anyone else to write the גט is only about the embarrassment of the husband an that could be to ר’ מאיר. But to שמואל this is hard to see. If he can not tell another to write it, then that ought to apply across the board both on the writing and the signing.------The answer to this problem in תוספות is that while it is true that the גמרא does not make any distinction between the writing and signing at this point, but that is only because we are going according to ר' יוסי. To ר' מאיר, it is more likely for this to be a distinction, and therefore both ר' מאיר and שמואל might agree with it on the side of there at least being a doubt about it. So that the גמרא cannot ask on שמואל from ר' מאיר. To both, the get might be just pasul or maybe completely valid if the witnesses only told the scribe to write it, but they themselves signed it.

נדרים דף ב' ע''א. רב שך ברמב''ם הלכות נדרים פרק א' הלכה א'. עיין בר''ן [רבינו ניסים בן ראובן]

אני רואה שכבר כתבתי על זה, אבל אני חושב שאני צריך לחזור על הנקודות הבסיסיות בהסבר ברור יותר. לכל הראשונים מלבד הרמב"ם, הנדר העיקרי הוא על ידי צירוף הנדר לקורבן. כלומר, הוא אומר "זה אסור לי כקורבן". אם הוא משמיט את המילים "כקורבן", זה עדיין אסור בגלל יד לנדר. (נדר שלא נאמר בבירור ועדיין תקף בגלל הארכת הנדר). עם זאת, דעת הר"ן נראית במבט ראשון סותרת לגבי הנקודה האם יש צורך לצרף נדר לקורבן. רב שך מסביר שלר"ן, הנדר העיקרי הוא ללא התפסה [כמו הרמב"ם], אבל כדי שיהיה תקף צריך את המילים "כקורבן". בלי המילים האלה, נשמע שהוא אומר משהו לא נכון, לא שהוא באופן פעיל הופך משהו מותר להיות אסור לעצמו. עם זאת, יש כאן משהו שנראה קשה בתשובתו של רב שך. הוא אומר לר''ן שהמילים "כמו קורבן" הן להבהרה, לא בגלל יד לנדר. אבל נדמה לי שאני זוכר שבאחד המקומות שבהם הר''ן מביא את דעתו, הוא אכן מביא את הרעיון של יד לנדר. [המקומות נמצאים בדף ב' ע''א של נדרים, בראש ובתחתית העמוד, דף י''ד י''ד ובשבועות]. ועכשיו לנקודה אחרת. הנקודה של רב שך היא שהאמירה "זה אסור לי" אינה מרמזת על נדר אלא על אמירה שנראית לא נכונה. כך הוא מסביר את הר''ן. עם זאת, אותה נקודה צריכה להיות מיושמת גם לרמב''ם. הרמב"ם אומר "הנדר העיקרי הוא האמירה 'זה אסור לי'". זה תקף לא בגלל יד לנדר (לשם הבהרה), (אלא אם הוא אומר "כמו קרבן" יש מידה נוספת של חומרה כי אז מעילה חלה). עם זאת, גם בלי זה, עדיין הנדר העיקרי הוא האמירה הפשוטה. אבל האם אין צורך "לבטא בשפתיים"? כיצד יכול הרמב"ם להימלט מחידה זו. [לאחר זמן ראיתי שהר''ן בסוף דף ב' ע''א מביא את הצורך של יד ]

Nedarim page 2. See Rav Shach Laws of Vows chapter 1. halacha 1.

To all Rishonim [authorities from the Middle Ages] except the Rambam, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of Yad leNeder (a handle on a vow). (A vow that wass not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the Ran however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. Rav Shach explains that to the Ran (Rabainu Nisim ben Reuven), the main vow is without hatfasa (extension) [like the Rambam], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of Rav Shach. he says to the Ran the words like a sacrifice are for clarification, not because of a yad leneder. but I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the Ran brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a Yad leNeder. [The places are in Nedraim page 2, top and bottom of the page, page 14 and in Shavuot. Later I saw that the place the Ran brings the idea of yad neder (lit. hand of a vow)]. Now onto a different point. The point of Rav Shach is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a neder but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the Ran. However the same point ought to be applied to the Rambam. The Rambam says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a yad, but for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then meila applies). However even without that still the main neder is the simple statement. but don’t we need to pronounce with one lips"? How could the Rambam escape from this conundrum>? ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ I see I wrote about this already but I think I ought to repeat the basic points in a clearer exposition. To all ראשונים except the רמב’’ם, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of יד לנדר (a handle on a vow). (A vow that was not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the ר''ן however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. רב שך explains that to the ר''ן, the main vow is without התפסה (extension) [like the רמב’’ם], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of רב שך. He says to the ר''ן the words "like a sacrifice" are for clarification, not because of a יד לנדר. But I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the ר''ן brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a יד לנדר. [The places are in נדרים page 2, top and bottom of the page, דף י''ד 14 and in שבועות]. Now onto a different point. The point of רב שך is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a נדר but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the ר''ן. However the same point ought to be applied to the רמב’’ם. The רמב’’ם says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a יד לנדר for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then מעילה applies). However, even without that, still the main נדר is the simple statement. but don’t we need to לבטא בשפתיים? How could the רמב’’ם escape from this conundrum?

za91 C Minor midi file za91 C minor nwc file

ישנה מה שנראה כמו סתירה בחוק בסוכה דף ד' ובעירובין דף פ''ט. בסוכה, רב נחמן אמר שאנו רואים את הקירות כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה במקרה של ארבעה מוטות המונחים על צידי הגג. (גוד אסיק מחיצתא.) והרמב"ם פסק זאת כדין כפי שהוא כותב שתקע ארבעה מוטות בפינות הגג, ושם עליהם כיסוי של עלים, הסוכה תקפה, ואנו רואים את הקירות התחתונים כאילו הם משתרעים כלפי מעלה עד לפינות כיסוי העלים (סיכוך). אולם בעירובין, אמרו חכמים שכאשר יש גגות מחוברים, כולם נחשבים כרשות אחת. הגמרא אומרת שזהו הדין. אך שם איננו אומרים שקירות הבניינים שמתחת לגגות המחוברים נחשבים כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה. אני חושב שההבדל ברור ורמוז גם בתוספות. במקרה של גגות, הקירות התחתונים של הבניינים מוסתרים לחלוטין על ידי גגות והם בהחלט לא נראים. אבל בסוכה, לפחות קיר הבית נראה מבחוץ

Suka page 4 and Eruvin page 89b. there is what looks like a contradiction in law. In Suka Rav Nachman said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the Rambam decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put sa covering of leaves over them, the suka is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves. However in Eruvin, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The Gemara says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in Tosphot. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the suka the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside._______________________________________________There is what looks like a contradiction in law סוכה page 4 and עירובין page 89b. In סוכה,רב נחמן said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the רמב''ם decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put a covering of leaves over them, the סוכה is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves (סיכוך) . However in עירובין, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The גמרא says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in תוספות. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the סוכה the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside.

za90 E minor midi file za90 E Minor nwc file

גיטין ס''ז ע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'תנו גט לאשתי' או לשלושה אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם כותבים אותו ונותנים אותו. אבל הם לא יכולים להגיד לאף אחד אחר לעשות זאת. אבל אם אמר לשלושה אנשים פשוט "תנו גט לאשתי", אז לפי ר' מאיר הם יכולים להגיד לסופר לכתוב אותו ולעדים לחתום עליו והם נותנים אותו לאשתו. ר' יוסי חולק על כך ואומר שגם במצב האחרון הם חייבים לכתוב ולתת אותו בעצמם. שמואל אמר, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם צריכים לעשות זאת בעצמם. אם יאמרו לסופר לכתוב והם חתמו, הגט אינו תקף, אולם נושא זה עדיין דורש לימוד." הגמרא שואלת על משפט זה של שמואל. היא שואלת מדוע זה דורש לימוד? אולי משום שהוא יכול לחשוב שיש אפשרות שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. השאלה שיש לי על גמרא זו היא זו. הדעה שניתן למסור מילים לשליח היא ר' מאיר והוא מסכים במשנה שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים לתת גט לאשתו, עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. (ואף על פי שמקרה של שמואל שונה מהמשנה, כי במקרה של שמואל הוא אמר "כתובו ותנו" בעוד שבמשנה הוא אמר רק "תנו", עדיין זה מחמיר את השאלה שלי, כי הוספת המילה "כתובו" אנו רואים במשנה שזה אפילו מחמיר יותר מאשר אם הוא רק אמר לתת. אם הוא גם אמר כתובו לשלשה, אז ר' מאיר מסכים שהם חייבים לכתוב את הגט בעצמם.) אז אפילו אם שמואל יכול להסכים עם ר' מאיר, עדיין לא אמור להיות ספק לגבי ההלכה. תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו היא שאולי בנקודה זו הגמרא חושבת שר' מאיר עצמו יכול לחלוק אפילו על תחילת המשנה, לא רק בבא שנייה

Gitin 67b The Mishna says if one says to two people give a get to my wife or to three people write and give a get to my wife they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a get to his wife then according to r Meir they can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. R Jose disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. Shmuel said if one says to two people write and give get to my wife they have to do it themselves. if they tell a scribe to write and they signed, it is not valid however this subject still requires study. The Gemara ask on this statement of Shmuel. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this gemara is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is R Meir and he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give get to his wife that they must do it themselves.(And even though the case of Shmuel is different from the Mishna because in the case of Shmuel he said “write and give” while in the Mishna he said only “give” still this makes my question even stronger because adding the words "write" we see in the Mishna that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also saidto three "write" , then R Meir agrees they must write it themselves.) So even if Shmuel might hold with R Meir there still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to thsi question is that perhaps at this point the gemara is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.---------------------------------------------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''ב The משנה says, "If one says to two people 'give a גט to my wife' or to three people, 'write and give a גט to my wife' they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a גט to his wife then according to ר’ מאירthey can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. ר' יוסי disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. שמואל said, "If one says to two people write and give גט to my wife they have to do it themselves. If they tell a scribe tp write and they signed, it is not valid, however this subject still requires study." The גמרא ask on this statement of שמואל. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this גמרא is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is ר’ מאירand he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give גט to his wife that they must do it themselves. [(And even though the case ofשמואל is different from the משנה because in the case of שמואל he said “write and give” while in the משנה he said to three only “give” tstill this makes my question even stronger because adding the word "write" we see in the משנה that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also said to three "write" then ר' מאיר agrees they must write it themselves.)] So even if שמואל might hold with ר’ מאירthere still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to this question is that perhaps at this point the גמרא is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.

za89 F Minor midi file za89 F minor nwc file

There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. Essay by Michael Huemer

3. Inclinations to Believe 3.1. Types of Inclination There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. You might be inclined to believe X because X just seems to be true. Or you might be inclined to believe X because X is emotionally comforting. Or because you think good people believe X. Or because your social group believes X. Notice how the last three are quite different from believing something because it seems correct. So here’s a theory: Unjustified beliefs result when non-appearance-based inclinations influence our credences or outright beliefs. Only appearances are (epistemically) justification-conferring. 3.2. Can We Control our Beliefs? Some philosophers would question whether we can control our beliefs and whether we can believe something on the basis of ordinary (non-epistemic) desires, such as the desire for emotional comfort, or to fit in, or to be a good person. Examples: If I offered you a million dollars to sincerely believe that you are a giraffe, I bet you still couldn’t do it. But maybe this only shows that you can’t believe for practical reasons when you have conclusive evidence that the proposition is false. So consider … If I offered you a million dollars to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is even, I bet you couldn’t do it. In #2, the evidence is evenly balanced; thus, if non-epistemic desires can ever influence belief, they should be able to do so in that example, right? It looks like they can’t, so desires can’t influence beliefs. 3.3. Doxastic Semi-voluntarism Consider two extreme positions: Doxastic Involuntarism: Desires can never have any influence on any beliefs. (Strong) Doxastic Voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs just as easily as they influence ordinary actions. Neither of these is the case. What is correct is Doxastic Semi-voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs sometimes, but their influence is limited. One cannot believe a thing that is too obviously false, or too obviously unjustified. There is a limit to how epistemically irrational a person can be, even if they want to (this limit varies across people). Thus, you can’t believe you are a giraffe, no matter the reward, because that’s obviously false. Nor can you believe the number of atoms is even, because that is obviously unjustified. But suppose that your child is accused of a heinous crime (say, deadnaming Caitlin Jenner). If the evidence is complex and hard to evaluate, so that it is not too obvious what the right judgment is, then it becomes much easier for your love for your child and desire to believe that she is good to influence your judgment, causing you to believe the child innocent even when the evidence does not justify this. There will be some degree of evidence that would induce you to admit that your child had committed the heinous act, but the evidentiary threshold will just be much higher than it would be for an impartial observer. Everyone knows that things like this can happen; that is why defendants’ family members are not allowed to sit on juries. If you try talking to a political ideologue some time and giving them evidence against their beliefs, you’ll probably become convinced that the same thing is happening to them. So the first thing that enables people to adopt unjustified beliefs is evidential ambiguity. There should be mixed evidence, evidence pointing in different directions, and it should be unclear how to weigh the evidence, perhaps because the evidence for and against X is of different kinds. 3.4. Confusing Feelings with Appearances In some cases, people may confuse their emotions with appearances. When you hear a claim that you don’t like, you may have an aversive reaction, which includes a sense of the clash between that claim and others of your current attitudes. E.g., you hear a negative claim about someone you like, or a positive one about someone you dislike. You might confuse that feeling with an appearance that the claim is factually wrong. Likewise, it is possible to confuse a positive feeling, a feeling of fit with your other current attitudes, with an appearance that a claim is correct. This, in turn, partially disguises the fact that your desired belief is unjustified; it makes this sufficiently unobvious that it becomes possible to adopt the belief. 4. Corruption of Belief-Forming Practices You’re obligated, before forming a belief on a controversial issue, to conduct a responsible inquiry. This typically requires things like: listening to both sides (or multiple sides), looking for counter-evidence, and trying to find objections to arguments that you are initially attracted to. Most people are terrible at this. They only listen to news sources who they already know agree with their political orientation; they accept evidence supporting their favored view at face value, while carefully scrutinizing only the evidence that undermines their favored view (if they happen to accidentally run into some); they don’t think about objections to their views but focus their attention on reasons for their views. This violation of epistemic norms stops many beliefs from being justified (the 3rd kind of irrationality mentioned in sec. 2). Why do people do these things? Again, doxastic semi-voluntarism is important. If involuntarism were true (so that only epistemic reasons could influence beliefs and not desires), then these measures would be impotent. E.g., you could still deliberately select news sources that already agree with you, but then your credences would automatically update on the fact that you did that, and that there were many other news sources that would very likely have given you evidence against your favored view, and that would prevent you from adopting a high credence in your favored view. On the other hand, if strong voluntarism were true (so that we could form beliefs based on our desires just as easily as we take actions based on our desires), then there would be no need for these measures. You would just directly believe X based on your desire to believe it, with no need to select evidence sources, direct your attention away from objections, etc. We do these things because our desires have some power to affect our beliefs, but only when it’s not too clear what epistemic rationality demands. 5. Conclusion Actually, it’s not hard to be irrational. Everybody has non-epistemic belief preferences—desires to believe something for reasons unrelated to truth or evidential justification. These have a limited, direct influence on our beliefs, which is most important when the evidence is ambiguous and when our feelings about a proposition can be confused with appearances. Desires can also directly influence how we conduct inquiry, enabling us to take advantage of our predictable cognitive shortcomings, such as the tendency to under-adjust for biases in our evidence sources. The beliefs that we form after such an inquiry are unjustified due to failure to satisfy obligations of responsible inquiry. This is bad because unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false, and false beliefs can wreak havoc. E.g., false political beliefs prevent us from solving social problems, and often make the problems worse. The mechanisms for generating unjustified beliefs will operate more or less automatically unless you make specific, positive efforts to stop them—which you should do to be a good person. That is why the points developed above are important to know. [After the above essay I might mention here that Michael Huemer is with the school of thought of the intuitionists which is different from the Kant Fries school and also different from Hegel. As for me I see value in all three schools and see each as relating to a different stratum of level of reality phenomenal world, the rational world and the world beyond reason the dinge an sich. All this along the lines of Plotinus the philosopher who was mainly with Plato but used modifications from Aristotle]

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות בראש הדף

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות ראשון. עלה בדעתי בזמן שהייתי על שפת הים שתוספות מסתמכת על אחת משתי הדעות בגמרא לגבי מה שאדם יכול להתכוון כשאומר לכתוב גט (מסמך גירושין) ולתת אותו לאשתו. האם הוא מתכוון רק שעליהם לחתום, או שעליהם לכתוב אותו ולחתום עליו? בלי ההנחה ש"לכתוב אותו" פירושו רק שעליהם לחתום עליו, תוספות לא תהיה הגיונית. כדי להסביר למה אני מתכוון, הרשו לי להביא את התוספות. הוא שואל זאת. ר' מאיר סבור שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. מילי ממסרן לשליח. לכן הוא יכול לומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני אנשים אחרים לכתוב ולתת גט לאשתו. אבל אנחנו יודעים מר' ירמיה שאם זה החוק, אז הסופר לא יכול לחתום על הגט. אבל אם כן, יש שאלה. המשנה אומרת בגלוי שר' מאיר מסכים שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי", הם כותבים ונותנים אותו. מכיוון שיש רק שני אנשים במצב הזה, לכן, אחד מהם שכותב את זה גם חותם. התשובה של תוספת היא שהמשנה בעצם אומרת שהם חותמים על זה, וסופר כותב את זה. הבעיה עם תשובה זו היא שאנחנו מתחילים עם הגישה ש"אומר אמרו" אינה תקפה כלל. הסיבה היא שאם זה יהיה תקף, אז לא יכול להיות שחתימת הסופר על הגט (מסמך הגירושין) תהיה בסדר. כלומר, "הוא אומר לומר לאחרים" ("אומר אמרו") אינה תקפה מהתורה דאורייתא. לאחר מכן אנו עונים על סמך שינוי המשמעות הפשוטה של ​​המשנה בגלל גזירה שלא מוזכרת בשום מקום במשנה, ואנו משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלנו ש"הוא אומר, 'אמור'" מלהיות לא תקפה מהתורה לתקפה על סמך ראיות קלושות. ההסבר של תוספת צריך להיות כמו הגישה הזו בדף גמרא ס''ו ע''ב, שלכתוב את הגט פירושו רק לחתום עליו. אבל עם הדעה השנייה שזה מכווין לכתוב ולחתום, אז לתוספת לא תהיה תשובה לשאלתו

Gitin 67 side a Tosphot. it occurred to me while at the sea shore that Tosphot is relying on one of the two opinions in the Gemara about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it Tosphot would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the Tosphot. he asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger. thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. but we know from R. Jeremiah that if that is the law then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The Mishna says openly that "R Meir holds if one says to two people 'write and give a get to my wife' they write and give it." Since there are only two people in this case. Therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of Tosphot is the Mishna really means they sign it, and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say he says say is not valid from the Torah. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the Mishna because of a gezera (decree) that is nowhere mentioned in and Mishna, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of Tosphot has to be like that one approach in the Gemara page 66b that to write the get only means to sign it. but with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then Tosphot would not have an answer for his question.--------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות. It occurred to me while at the sea shore that תוספות is relying on one of the two opinions in the גמרא about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it תוספות would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the תוספות. He asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger.מילי מימסרן לשליח Thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. But we know from ר ' ירמיה that if that is the law, then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The משנה says openly that ר' מאיר מסכיםנ if one says to two people write and give a get to my wife, they write and give it. Since there are only two people in this case, therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of תוספות is the משנה really means they sign it and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say "he says, 'say'" is not valid from the תורה דאורייתא. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the משנה because of a גזירה that is nowhere mentioned in the משנה, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of תוספות has to be like that one approach in the גמרא page ס''ו ע''ב that to write the get only means to sign it. But with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then תוספות would not have an answer for his question.

Gitin page 66 side b. Rambam laws of divorce chapter 2 laws 5 and 6.

This coming piece is to give an approach to the Rambam. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people to two witnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone --or to two people tell two witnesses write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''get''(doc of divorce) the Rambam brings that it is not valid derabanan or maybe from the Torah. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the Rambam and the Ramban about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of divorce to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of Divorce chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a get and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the Ramban the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a get to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. therefore, the get in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The Rambam however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a get to his wife is not valid from the words of the Scribes and perhaps from the Torah. So he definitely does not agree with the Ramban about the problem being the need for lishma--for her sake. I think the reason for the Rambam is this. There is an argument in the gemara Gitin page 66. We know the law is like R. Jose, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a get “is not valid or not. The Rambam holds we see in the Gemara Gitin page 67 that even if he says, “Tell to others” is valid from Torah law, still there is a decree from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However there is also an opinion in the Gemara that R. Jose holds he says, “tell others” is in fact not valid from the Torah. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the Rambam. Now to go on in this subject a little. The Ramban holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a present to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “He says ‘tell others’” is valid. But the Rambam holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the Rambam decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in Gitin page 66.][this is a involved subject, but here i just wanted to give my take on the reason for the rambam. The reason for the Ramban is alredy pretty clear in the Ramban himself as quoted by the Ran and more openly said in the Drisha and Rav Naftali Trouphf and Rav Shach. I think my take on the Rambam here is original]------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This coming piece is to give an approach to the רמב''ם. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the אבי עזרי of רב שך. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people tell two witnnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone ; or write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''גט''(document of divorce) the רמב''ם brings that it is not valid דרבנן or maybe from the תורה דאורייתא. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the רמב’’ם and the רמב’’ן about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of גירושין to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of גירושין chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a גט and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the רמב’’ן the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a גט to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. Therefore, the גט in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The רמב’’ם however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a גט to his wife is not valid from the words of the סופרים and perhaps from the תורה. So, he definitely does not agree with the רמב’’ן about the problem being the need for לשמה for her sake. I think the reason for the רמב’’ם is this. There is an argument in the גמרא גיטיןpage ס''ו ע''ב. We know the law is like ר' יוסי, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” מילי לא מימסרו לשליח But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a גט “is not valid or not. The רמב’’ם holds we see in גיטין ס''ז that even if he says, “אומר אמרו” is valid דאורייתא, still there is a גזרה from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However, there is also an opinion in the Gemara that ר' יוסי holds אומר אמרו is in fact not valid דאורייתא. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the רמב’’ם. Now to go on in this subject a little. The רמב’’ן holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a מתנה to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “אומר אמרו’” is valid. But the רמב’’ם holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the רמב’’ם decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in גיטין ס''ו ע''ב. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ הקטע הבא נועד לתת גישה לרמב"ם. אבל גישה נוספת שאני זוכר היא שצריך לקבל מתנה [דעת המקבל]. זו עשויה להיות תשובה לרמב"ם. תשובה נוספת נמצאת באבי עזרי של רב שך. השאלה העיקרית היא מדוע, "הוא אומר 'תגידו'" (הוא אומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך מתנה ולתת אותו למישהו; או לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך גירושין ולתת אותו לאשתי) אינו תקף למסמך מתנה, אבל עבור "גט" (מסמך גירושין) הרמב"ם מביא שהוא אינו תקף דרבנן או אולי מהתורה דאורייתא אין ויכוח בין הרמב"ם לרמב"ן לגבי המקרה שבו אדם אומר לשני אנשים, "כתבו וחתמו על מסמך גירושין ותן אותו לאשתי", שהם יכולים לעשות כן, אך אינם יכולים לומר לאף אחד אחר לעשות כן. [הלכות גירושין פרק ב', חוק ה']. והם גם מסכימים אם הוא אומר להם לומר לסופר לכתוב גט ולחתום עליו ולמסור אותו לאשתו, שהם אינם יכולים לעשות כן. [פרק ב', חוק ו']. אולם בנימוק לכך, הם חולקים. לרמב"ן, הסיבה לחוק האחרון היא שאנחנו צריכים שהוא (הגט) ייכתב למענה. במילים אחרות, זהו מקרה רגיל של יצירת שליח. ואדם יכול למנות שליחים לומר לאחרים למנות אחרים לכתוב, לחתום ולתת גט לאשתו. אולם, הבעיה היא שהסופר צריך לשמוע את הפקודה מהבעל ישירות. לכן, הגט במקרה זה אינו תקף מדין התורה. לכן, במקרים אחרים של, "אמרו לאחרים לעשות דבר מה" זה תקף. הרמב"ם, לעומת זאת, סבור שהמקרה האחרון של אמירת אמרו לאחרים לכתוב ולחתום ולתת גט לאשתו אינו תקף מדברי הסופרים, ואולי גם מהתורה. לכן, הוא בהחלט לא מסכים עם הרמב"ן לגבי הבעיה שהיא הצורך של לשמה (למענה). אני חושב שהסיבה לרמב"ם היא זו. יש ויכוח בגמרא גיטין דף ס"ו ע"ב. אנו יודעים שההלכה היא כמו ר' יוסי, "דברים לא יימסרו לשליח". מילי לא מימסרן לשליח. אבל השאלה היא האם זה אומר גם שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים, "תאמר לאחרים לכתוב גט" זה לא תקף או לא.[אומק אמרו] הרמב"ם קובע שאנו רואים בגיטין ס''ז שגם אם הוא אומר "אמרו" תקף דאורייתא, עדיין יש גזרה מדברי הסופרים שאסור לו לעשות זאת מכיוון שהם עלולים לבקש מהסופר לחתום במקרה שבו הבעל אמר בגלוי שהסופר חייב לכתוב, ושני האחרים חייבים לחתום. (כלומר, הוא אמר שהם צריכים לחתום, לא הסופר). עם זאת, יש גם דעה בגמרא שר' יוסי סבור ש"אומר אמרו" למעשה אינו תקף דאורייתא. זו הסיבה לכך ששתי דעות אלו מובאות ברמב"ם. ועכשיו נמשיך קצת בנושא הזה. הרמב"ן סבור שאם הוא אומר לאחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה כמתנה למישהו, זה תקף. הסיבה לכך היא שהוא סבור ש"אומר אמרו" תקף. אבל הרמב"ם סבור שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים "אמרו לשני אחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה ותתנו אותו למישהו" זה בכלל לא תקף. הסיבה היא שבנקודה זו הרמב"ם החליט ש"אמר לומר לאחרים", זה לא תקף מדין התורה, כמו אותה דעה חלופית בגיטין ס"ו ע"ב

za88 midi file E Flat major za88 nwc file