misuse of a philosophy

if every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant rightly noticed that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently and held that one need to learn the organum of Aristotle known by the name of the seven wisdoms.It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam afre ignored.

the first mishna in Bava Batra המשנה הראשונה בבבא בתרא

Tosphot holds in first mishna in Bava Batra the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of derara demomona. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “We both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the gemara says openly that that is not a case of derara demomona. Now the case of derara demomona, Tosphot often says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their pleas, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the gemara in Bava Batra (page 35 side B) holds` derara demomona is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the gemara in Bava Metzia (page 3) says derara demomona is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in Bava Batra where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of derara demomona to be when they object could belong to both. later note: Rav shach brings Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 97b and the beginning of perek 10 that derara demomona is that each is considered to be holding the object. The Rabbainu Yona (bava batra page four and page 35) (who is brought by Rav Isar Meltzer) holds derara demomona is that the object is tied or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the rashbam and Tur as brought by Rav Nachum of the Mir ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of derara demomona in Bava Batra 35a that it means both might own the object. But if you hold derara demomona is like the gemara in Bava Mezia page 3a that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the ketzot HaChoshen that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two gemaras differ about derara demomona is possible to see in the language in Bava Batra 35 "it cannot be derara demomona because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so derara demomona mean it can belong to both. In Bava metziaa page 3a it says it cannot be derara demomona because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be derara demomona ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________ תוספות holds in first משנה in בבבא בתרא the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of דררא דממונא. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “we both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the גמרא says openly that that is not a case of דררא דממונא.. Now, the case of דררא דממונא, often תוספות says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their טענות, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the גמרא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) holds דררא דממונא is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the גמרא in בבא מציעא (page ג') says דררא דממונא is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in בבא בתרא where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of דררא דממונא to be when the object could belong to both. note: רב שך brings תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב and the beginning of פרק י' הבית והעליה that דררא דממונא is that each is considered to be holding the object. The רבינו יומה (who is brought by רב איסר מלצר) holds דררא דממונא is that the object is שייך or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the רשב''ם and טור as brought by רב נחום of the מיר ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of דררא דממונא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) that it means both might own the object. But if you hold דררא דממונא like the גמרא in בבא מציעא page ג' ע''א that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the קצות החושן that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two גמרות differ about דררא דממונא is possible to see in the language in בבא בתרא ל''ה "it cannot be דררא דממונא because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so דררא דממונא mean it can belong to both. In בבא מציעא ג' ע''א it says it cannot be דררא דממונא because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be דררא דממונא _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תוספות אוחז במשנה ראשונה בבבא בתרא דין חומה בחצר בין שני שותפים מתחלק שווה בשווה כיון שהוא דין דררא דממונא. אבל אם היו מחלקים כי שניהם נחשבים כמחזיקים בחומה, אז אם אחד אומר "בניתי את כל החומה", והשני אומר "שנינו בנינו", אז יצטרכו לחלק אותו שלושה רבעים, ורביעית, כמו במקרה של שניים אוחזים בבגד ששם מחלקים שלוש רביעיות ורביעית (כשאחד אומר "הכל שייך לי" והשני אומר "שנינו הבעלים שלו"). (ושם עם שניים אוחזים בבגד, הגמרא אומר בגלוי שזה לא דין דררא דממונא.) עכשיו, במקרה של דררא דממונא, פעמים רבות תוספות אומרים שזה מקרה שלבית הדין יש ספק גם בלי ההסבר שלהם, ולכן שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה בלי בהתייחס לטענות שלהם. כעת הגמרא בבבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''ב מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא כאשר החפץ שהם מתווכחים עליו יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, ואילו הגמרא בבא מציעא (דף ג') אומר דררא דממונא הוא רק כאשר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אלא צריך להיות שייך רק לאחד או לשני, לא לשניהם. לכן, אני חושב שהחוק בבא בתרא שבו הם מחלקים את הקיר באופן שווה חייב לקבוע שההבנה של דררא דממונא היא כשהחפץ יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. הערה: רב שך מביא תוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב ותחילת פרק י' הבית והעליה שדררא דממונא הוא שכל אחד נחשב מחזיק את החפץ. רבינו יונה (בבא בתרא דף ד' ול''ה) (שהביאו רב איסר מלצר) מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא שהחפץ הוא שייך או קשור לכל אדם.(זו גם גישתם של הרשב''ם וטור כפי שהביאו רב נחום מהמיר) אבל, בכל אופן, אני חושב שדין חלוקת החומה הולך בבירור עם הרעיון של דררא דממונא בבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''א) שפירושו של שניהם יכולים להיות בעל החפץ. אבל אם תחזיק דררא דממונא כמו הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ג' ע''א שזה אומר שהחפץ לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אז דין חלוקת הכותל צריך להיות כמו קצות החושן כלומר משום שכל אחד מהם נחשב כמחזיק את הקיר אציין כאן שזה ששני הגמרות נבדלים לגבי דררא דממונא אפשר לראות בלשון בבא בתרא ל''ה "לא יכול להיות זה דררא דממונא כי אם זה שייך לאחד זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשני ואם זה שייך להאחר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לראשון". אז דררא דממונא מתכוון שזה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. בבבא מציעא ג' ע''א כתוב "שזה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא כי זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם" לכן אם זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם יחד אז זה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא

za57 E minor midi<za57 E minor nwc format

za56 E Flat Major midi za56 nwc

Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot. I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam

There was a great scholar in the Mir who I have just discovered, a Rav Nachum. I  can see great importance in learning his ideas and I might mention here that while Rav shach and Rav Isar Zalman Meltzer generally concentrated their efforts in understanding the Rambam, Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot as was my learning partner, David Bronson in Uman, and also Rav Naftali Yegger in the yeshiva shar Yashuv in New York.  I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David bronson took a definite I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David Bronson took a definite stand that, "Tosfot is always right." Period. But I think that I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam. I think that both Rambam and Tosphot are important. I would like to take use this internet platform to suggest to learn Rav shach and Rav Nachum in each subject, and I also believe that there is a connection between their approaches. however i recommend the approach of balance with a combination of learning in depth along with quike learning--doing the review many time.

za555 midi in A Minor za55 in nwc

za54 midi same file in nwc

to combine tea and coffee

It is obvious` that the rise of the ancient Chinese empire was due to tea. and it was` that same thing that gave rise to the British empire. however, it was coffee that was the direct cause of the rise of Germany in the 1700's and 1800' because obviously coffee is better than tea in giving that first punch. However, I believe that we all should learn from the English custom of having a set tea time every day and in fact having a "nice tea often." The first thing the English did on D-day when they were part of the advance on Nazi Germany was to boil a pot of tea until their commanding officer told them first to fight the Nazis, and then have tea. But, I think the best idea is to combine tea and coffee in the same cup since each one gives a specific and different kind of energy. However, I must also add that immediately after having tea with any kind of sugar, one must brush his or her teeth since bacteria in the mouth love sugar.

Without a doubt Nietzsche is the most powerful prose writer in the German language, and possibility in any language [much beyond any writer that I have seen]. However powerful and convincing he is, every jot and tittle of his writing` is philosophy for angry adolescents, not a word of truth. Instead, I recommend reading Chesterton, the Anti-Nietzschean. [Convincing and powerful does not equal True--as any lawyer or politician can tell you.] ll

Where is Marxism? Argentina was plunged into a devastating economic crisis in December 2001/January 2002, from communist policies that led to a collapse in output, high levels of unemployment, and political and social turmoil? In the cannibalism Venezuela? In the millions of murdered people under Stalin and Meo Zedong? Or is in books?? Of course, if you ask a Marxist, they will tell you true communism has never been tried. However, if you compare anything in this world to paradise, and claim that true paradise is what Marxism promises, well then, Marxism will win. But, if you compare anything in the world to paradise, then nothing will win

Bava Batra page 3a. Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 10

I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of Rav Isar Meltzer about the Rosh [rav ]. The Rosh holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners) they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the Rosh entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the Rosh. The question then what is the reason for the Rambam? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both Rav shach and Rav Isar meltzer explain the reason is that to the Rambam this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of Rav Isar Meltzer that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of רב איסר מלצר about the רא''ש. The רא''ש holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners), they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the רא''ש entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the רא''ש. The question then what is the reason for the רמב''ם? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both רב שך and רב איסר מלצר explain the reason is that to the רמב''ם this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” הטעם הוא Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of רב איסר מלצר that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” הברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול לגבי גישתו של רב איסר מלצר לגבי הרא''ש. הרא''ש מחזיק בחצר זו (שאין בה ארבע אמות לכל אחד מהשותפים), הם מסכימים לחלוקה לפי החלפה (קנין חליפין). זה כשלעצמו מסביר את הרא''ש לגמרי. עם החלפה, אף אחד לא צריך להגיד "לך ותרכוש" (לך חזק וקני) ואתה צריך רק אחד שילך ויאחז בחצי שלו. כך שאין אי בהירות לגבי הרא''ש. השאלה אם כן מה הסיבה לרמב''ם? למה שניהם צריכים להשתלט, אבל אף אחד לא צריך להגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש?" לשם כך מסבירים גם רב שך וגם רב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שלרמב''ם זו לא רכישה על ידי החלפה, אלא חלוקה של מה שכבר יש לשניהם. לכן, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש", אולם שניהם צריכים להשתלט על המחצית שלהם. עכשיו אתה יכול לשאול מדוע הם לא צריכים לומר, "לך לרכוש?" הטעם הוא כי אתה צריך את זה רק כאשר אחד מוכר נכס לשני, והשני משתלט לא מול המוכר. זה הולך לפי הרעיון של רב איסר מלצר שלומר "לך ורכש" פירושו פקודה ישירה שנצטרך במקרה של רכישה. אבל גם בלי הפקודה הזו, עדיין יש הסכמה מרומזת לרכישה. אבל אם במילים האלה יש רק משמעות של הסכם לרכוש, אז גם עם חלוקת רכוש נצטרך שאחד יגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש

page 3a of Bava Batra

There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page 3a of Bava Batra. Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief, or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the Rosh, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the Rosh this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the Rambam both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “Go and make an acquisition.” To Rav Isar Meltzer, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “Go and acquire”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “Go and acquire” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to Rav Shach the reason of the Rosh is that the Rosh considers this a case of acquisition by exchange where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “Go and acquire.” But Rav Shach and Rav Isar Meltzer agree that the reason for the Rambam is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “go and acquire,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what Rav Isar Meltzer holds here about the opinion of the Rosh, it is from exchange or from agreement?" Rav Shach mentions that the law is that even in dividing, you only need one to take his share. He however does mention that that might be only in a case when the courtyard is big enough for four cubits to come to each one. But from this we can understand the Rosh, who says even if just one divides that is enough. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________]_________________________ There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page דף ג' ע''א of בבא בתרא Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief (סודר), or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the רא''ש, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the רא''ש this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the רמב''ם both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “לך חזק וקני.” To רב איסר מלצר, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “לך חזק וקני.”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “לך חזק וקני” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to רב שך the reason of the רא''ש is that the רא''ש considers this a case of acquisition חליפין where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “לך חזק וקני.” But רב שך and רב איסק מלצר agree that the reason for the רמב''ם is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “לך חזק וקני,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what רב איסר מלצר holds here about the opinion of the רא''ש, it is from exchange or from agreemenT? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ יש נושא שארצה להציג בדף דף ג' ע''א בבא בתרא. שני אנשים מחזיקים יחד חצר ורוצים לחלק אותה, למרות שהיא קטנה. למעשה, הוא כל כך קטן שארבע אמות לא ילכו לשניהם. ולמעשה, במקרה זה, הם לא יכולים להכריח זה את זה להתחלק. אבל הם רוצים להתחלק בכל זאת. הם יכולים לעשות רכישה על ידי מטפחת (סודר), או אפילו בלי רכישה במטפחת על ידי שכל אחד יכניס לחלק שהוא רוצה ולעשות שם רכישה על ידי עשיית גדר או נעילה או פירוק גדר. לרא''ש רק אחד צריך לעשות רכישה. הסיבה היא שמכיוון ששניהם מחזיקים בו במשותף, לאחר שאחד לוקח חלק אחד, השני מקבל את החלק השני באופן אוטומטי. לרא''ש זה דומה או אולי זהה לרכישה בהחלפה (חליפין). לרמב''ם שניהם צריכים לעשות רכישה. אבל לשניהם אין צורך לומר לשני "לך חזק וקני". לרב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שבמקרים כלליים של רכישת קרקע צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כאן אין מדובר ברכישה רגילה, אלא בחלוקת מה שכבר מחזיקים במשותף. ובביטוי "לך חזק וקני" יש במרומז את המשמעות של נתינת חזקה ישירות, לא רק הסכמה לתת לאחר לרכוש. (ובענייננו, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש" כיון ששניהם מחזיקים בו, אבל צריך להיות הסכם לתת לשני לרכוש.) אולם לרב שך טעם הרא''ש הוא שהרא''ש רואה בזה מקרה של רכישה על ידי חליפין כאשר וכאשר שותף אחד רוכש, השני רוכש אוטומטית מבלי לומר "לך חזק וקני". אבל רב שך ורב איסר מלצר מסכימים שהסיבה לרמב''ם היא שזה חלוקת מה שכבר יש להם, ולכן לא צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כל אחד צריך להחזיק בחציו כפי שאתה יכול לדעת, אני לא בטוח מה רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כאן לגבי דעת הרא"ש, זה מחילופין או מהסכמה רב שך מזכיר שהדין הוא שגם בחלוקה צריך רק אחד שייקח את חלקו. עם זאת, הוא מזכיר שזה יכול להיות רק במקרה שבו החצר גדולה מספיק כדי שארבע אמות יגיעו לכל שותף. אבל מכאן אפשר להבין את הרא''ש, שאומר גם אם רק אחד מחלק די בכך.

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Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76. Also see the teaching: "All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of flesh and blood are removed from him."

I have a few approaches to learning that I would like to recommend. sometimes one approach seems best and other times another. One way I mentioned in the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76 to say the words and go on. Even if one does not understand immediately he will eventually understand when he goes on to the end of the book and then reviews it many times. This I found helpful not just in Gemara but also in some of the important commentaries on the Talmud, like Rav Shach' Avi Ezri and Rav Isar Meltzer; Even Haazel. I also have used this method in math and physics. another method was low methodical saying the words of every page or even every sentence forwards and backwards and in fact that method helped me get though my course at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. Another method is what is in fact practiced in the secular world of listening to lectures by experts in the subject. That one is probably the best since it really was the reason for any success at Polytechnic and also at the Mir in NY where I heard classes and lectures by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. I highly doubt if I had been able to get anywhere in these subjects without listening to the experts. Study alone at home was helpful in getting ready to absorb the message, but the real quality learning was from listening to lectures. Can you imagine if I had been able to play the violin by learning books? Obviously not. It had to be by learning from the best. on. Even though this approach to learning is effective in Torah, Math and Physics, still i would like to place a special emphasis on the Mishna: All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of people are removed from him. My learning partner (David Bronson mentioned to me the importance of this teaching.)

Bava Metzia page 2a, 3a, 37b. Rambam Laws of two people arguing in court ch 9, law 7. Laws of Robery ch four, law 10.

I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of rav shach in the rambam. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). [The case of theft is one wants to give back an object that he stole, but does not know from which one of two people he stole it. The case of buying is one sold an object to two people and does not remember to which one of them. The case of holding is two people are holding an object, and each one says, "It belongs to me." In each case you divide the value of the object.] These are the three cases the Rambam says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding an object for two people, and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The Rambam does not make the sort of difference of the Ri Migash. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] The difference according to Rav Shach is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the Gemara and brought in Tosphot that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that certainly can not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when he says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the Rambam and the Gemara. The Rambam says they divide and the Gemara on page 37b says “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer is the case of holding an object for two people. There each is certain, and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that Rav Shmuel Rozovski says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt, and that there comes the laws money that is in doubt stays in its place as the R’’an suggests. But what would be the difference between theft and a deposit if both are certain and neither is holding it and yet the case of theft you divide and the deposit stays put? I can answer somewhat like the gemara says how ca you compare theft with a deposit? the case of theft is such that there is no reason to leave the object in the hands of he who stole it. Even if there is no proof for either side and even if one is lying and even if the division can’t be correct, still you give it to them both a and they divide it between themselves. (That is not the same as when the court itself divides the value in half and gives a half to both parties.) But in the case of a deposit both gave their object to him by their own volition. Now there is no way of knowing to whom belong the part that is argued over, therefore it stays in its place. That is because it is where the actual owner put it. Until proof is brought, that is where it stays. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of רב שך in the רמב''ם. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). These are the three caseS the רמב''ם says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding aפקדון for two people and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The רמב''ם does not make the sort of difference of the ר''י מיגש. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] Even though the רמב''ם does not mention the idea of the גמרא of where there is definitely a liar, nor the idea of the division might be correct it, still he might hold with these ideas as I will mention soon. But the main difference according to רב שך is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the גמרא and brought in תוספות that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that can certainly not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when it says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the רמב''ם and the גמרא. The רמב''ם says they divide and the גמרא on page ל''ז ע''בsays “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer the case of holding an object for two people. there each is certain and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that רב שמואל רוזובסקי says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt and that there comes the law המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיהas the ר''ן suggests. But רב שך can answer that you divide when they are certain and also because the law what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him and like the גמרא says the division might be true and there is not a liar for a certainty. But in the case of holding an object for two people, even though each one is certain, but neither is holding it and there is a liar for sure and the division can not be correct. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ בבא מציעא ב' ע''א ג' ע''א ל''ז ע''ב רמב''ם טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', גזילה פרק ד' חלכה י יש שלושת המקרים שהרמב''ם אומרכל אחד מחלק.[[המקרה של גזלה הוא שרוצה להחזיר חפץ שגנב, אבל לא יודע מאיזה אחד משני אנשים הוא גנב אותו. במקרה של קנייה הוא מכר חפץ לשני אנשים ואינו זוכר למי מהם. המקרה של תופסים הוא שני אנשים מחזיקים חפץ וכל אחד אומר "זה שייך לי". בכל מקרה אתה מחלק את הערך של האובייקט]] המקרה שבו אתה לא אומר זאת הוא במקרה של החזקת פיקדון לשני אנשים ולא ידוע למי שייך. שם אתה אומר שהחלק שמתווכחים עליו צריך להישאר במקומו. הרמב''ם אינו עושה את סוג ההבדל של הר''י מיגש. [אם שניהם מחזיקים בו, מחלקים אותו, אבל אם לא, הוא נשאר במקומו.] אף על פי שהרמב''ם לא מזכיר את רעיון הגמרא איפה בהחלט יש שקרן, וגם לא את רעיון שהחלוקה עשויה להיות נכונה, ובכל זאת הוא עשוי להחזיק ברעיונות האלה כפי שאציין בקרוב. אבל עיקר ההבדל לפי רב שך הוא שכשהם בטוחים מחלקים את החפץ. ותוכל לראות שזה הולך כרעיון הגמרא והביא בתוספות שמה שיש ביד אדם שייך לו. אבל זה בהחלט לא יכול להיות המקרה אם הוא עצמו בספק. אדרבא, מניחים שזה שייך לו כשאומר ''זה שייך לי בוודאות'' ולמעשה, במקרים שכל אחד מחזיק בו ובמקרה של מכירה, הם בטוחים. רק במקרה של גניבה יש לומר שהם מחלקים כשהם בטוחים, וזה נשאר במקומו כשהם בספק. [זה יענה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם לגמרא. הרמב''ם אומר שהם מחלקים והגמרא בדף ל''ז ע''ב אומר "נשאר במקומו".] השאלה שרעיון זה לא יענה במקרה של החזקת חפץ לשני אנשים. שם כל אחד בטוח ואתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו. אני מתאר לעצמי שזאת הסיבה שרב שמואל רוזובסקי אומר את ההיפך כלומר, המקרה שבו אתה מחלק הוא בגלל ספק וששם מגיע החוק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה כמו שהר''ן מציע אני מבין שזה לא בדיוק מה שרב שך אומר, (הוא משווה הרמב''ם עם הר''י מיגש שהעיקר תלוי באוחזים) אבל אני עדיין סומך מ על הרעיון הבסיסי שלו שאתה מחלק כששניהם בטוחים. אבל אני יכול לראות מה קבע הרב שמואל רוזובסקי [שמחלקים כששניהם בספק] כי הוא סומך על הרעיון של רב חיים מבריסק שצריכים לקיים ''החזרת החפץ'', מה שיכול להיות אם שני הצדדים מוטלים בספק, אך לא היכן שאחד משקר

A complaint about Hegel is that he idolizes the state and detracts from the importance and significance of the individual. But this critique seems to me to be unfair because his general approach across the board is that nothing has reality except in so far as it corresponds to its true concept. And so one might ask ''what is the true idea of a state? Hegel sensed this and said that “the USA is the state of the future,” meaning that its principles corresponded most closely with the ideal state. See the essay of Kaufman about Hegel. On the other hand the approach of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross is also important as to answering the problem of how knowledge is possible as different and my point here is that Hegel is better understood as a philosopher, not a political activist. And if he was advocating anything it certainly was not the Prussian state as historical evidence shows but rather the English and later the American model. [see the cambridge book on hegel where different authors explain different aspects of hegel.]

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the beginning of Bava Metzia [and the answer of Shmuel Rozovski, the rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach.]

I have not been writing about the beginning of Bava Metzia because I see there are a few different approaches to solve the conundrum of why in the begining you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide, while in a case in Bava Metzia 37a you have cases of a deposit and theft where there is one case where you say the object being argued over should be left in neither’s possession, and in another case you say nothing and the parties decide it between themselves. The main approaches to solve this mystery are Rav Shach, Rav Isar Meltzer, Rav Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shmuel Rozovski. Reb Chaim and Rav Shmuel Rozovski are very similar in approach. Rav Shach has radical new approach in which he explains the position of the Rambam as being based on the idea that the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia is they divide because you say that "What is in one's possession is assumed to belong to him," without needing any further proof. Rav Isar Meltzar has a new approach to the idea of "derara demomona" by which he solves these problems. Some of the major problems come from the Rambam, but there are two arguments between Rashi and Tosphot conerning "derara demomona" and the reason in the first mishna you say divide. [I hope that i might gain some clarity into this subject, but for now I am just trying to get some idea of what the problems are and possible solutions] I might mention that I am limited by the fact that is do not have my learning partner, David Bronson, to learn with any more. His razor-sharp computer mind made getting to the depths of any subject highly accessible for me. I have just these great thinkers of the Litvack world, David Bronson was invaluable in his way of electron micro scoping a subject. But since I do not have him with me, I look to the great sages of the Litvak world that have a more global perspective In the meantime, I want to mention here that the answer of rav shmuel rozovski makes a lot of sense to me. he brings from the ran that there is a possibility that the law of the mishna of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from Bava Metzia pg 6 where a braita continues the mishna and says if one grabs the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the mishna would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. but if the law of the mishna came from a doubt then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain.[shmuel rozovski was the rosh yeshiva of ponovitch before rav shach.]But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. it seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the Gemara state openly. thus it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what Rav Shach is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the Rambam why in some cases you say divide and in other cases you say it remains in its place until Eliyahu comes. He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ why in the begining משנה you have two people holding onto a garment that you divide? רב שמואל רוזובסקי brings from the ר''ן that there is a possibility that the law of the משנה of dividing is because of a doubt. The proof comes from בבבא מציעא ף ו' ע''א where a ברייתא continues the משנה and says if one תופס the vessel in from of us, we say we do not take it from him. Thus, if the law of the משנה would be for a certainly that the vessel belongs to both, then why not take it from him after we already know and have decided the law of dividing. But if the law of the משנה came from a doubt, then it makes sense to leave it in the possession of he who grabed it since now it is in his domain. But it seems to me that there is still an important question to ask here. It seems to me the reason you say the object stays in the hands of him who grabbed it is because silence is like admitting as the גמרא states openly. Thus, it is not because of doubt. And in the opposite case you take it away, that is because silence is not admitting and so we give it back to being divided, not because dividing is because of a certainty. I might mention that is can see what רב שך is saying. He is trying to give an answer to explain the רמב''ם why in some cases you say "Divide!" and in other cases you say "It remains in its place until Eliyahu comes." He says if there is no doubt, then you divide like in the case both are holding. In a case where there is a doubt, you say it stays in its place until Eliyahu comes. למה במשנה ראשונה בבבא מציעא יש לך שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שאתה מחלק? רב שמואל רוזובסקי מביא מהר''ן שיש אפשרות שדין משנה שהחלוקה היא מחמת ספק. ההוכחה באה מבבא מציעא דף ו' ע''א. שם ברייתא ממשיכה את המשנה, ואומרת אם אחד תופס את הכלי בתוכנו, אנו אומרים שאיננו לוקחים אותו ממנו. לפיכך, אם דין המשנה יהיה בוודאי שהכלי שייך לשניהם, אז למה לא ניקח אותו ממנו לאחר שכבר ידענו והכרענו דין חילוק. אבל אם דין המשנה בא מתוך ספק, אז הגיוני להשאירו ברשות מי שחטף אותו כיון שכעת הוא ברשותו. אבל נראה לי שעדיין יש כאן שאלה חשובה. נראה לי שהסיבה שאתה אומר שהחפץ נשאר בידיו של מי שתפס אותו היא בגלל שהשתיקה היא כמו להודות כפי שהגמרא קובעת בגלוי. לפיכך, זה לא בגלל ספק. ובמקרה הפוך אתה לוקח את זה, זה בגלל שהשתיקה היא לא הודאה, ולכן אנחנו מחזירים את זה להיות מחולק, לא בגלל שהחלוקה היא בגלל ודאות אני יכול להזכיר שזה יכול לראות מה רב שך אומר. הוא מנסה לתת תשובה להסביר את הרמב''ם מדוע במקרים מסוימים אתה אומר "תחלק!" ובמקרים אחרים אתה אומר "זה נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו". הוא אומר שאם אין ספק, אז אתה מחלק כמו במקרה שניהם מחזיקים. במקרה שיש ספק, אתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו עד שיבוא אליהו

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My feeling about philosophy is that it kind of got side tracked during the 20th century. In the words of John Searle, "The last 50 years of 20th century philosophy is obviously false." That includes existentialism which was proven false by a 13-year-old eight grader listening to Sarte about how meaning is different for every person. You construct your own meaning. The eight grader asked him, "Then why are you talking?" Robert Hanna has shown that so-called "Analytic Philosophy" is of historical interest only. The case is, however, even more severe. It is all about truth and meaning of words, but is totally innocent of awareness that meaning is 100 percent subjective without the slightest bit of objectivity in it. For example, the word "Dog" has meaning only to me and to whom I am talking to. In itself, it has zero relation to the dog except in the minds of people talking. [I mean to say that it has zero relevance to objective reality. And after all, what is the point of philosophy but to have an idea of what objective reality is all about. Well, here you have about 100 years of supposed rigorous philosophy which has no relevance at all to objective reality.] If you want my suggestion about philosophy, I think that Leonard Nelson is what people ought to spend time learning. That is after first getting through Kant's three critiques. You might also look at the web site of Kelley Ross who does an excellent job of getting across the main points of this Kant/Nelson approach. I might mention here the complaint of Michael Huemer about this Kant/Nelson School of thought--that is immediate non intuitive knowledge. The complaint is why would we think that implanted knowledge is true? But that is the very point of Kelley Ross in defense of this school --the very reason he resorted to Karl Popper' idea that knowledge can’t be proven. It can only be falsified. You can never prove without a shadow of doubt about any proposition, but you can disprove false propositions.And that position is not all that different from Huemer's idea of using a kind of probability theory to come to knowledge. He agrees that you can only come to truth by a long series maybe infinite series of step each one known by a kind of probability theory] The flaw in Kant is idealism along the line of Berkely and Hume. But Hegel has flaw also like the master slave dialectic. It seem to me like Plato and Aristotle in which each had important point but a 1ynthesis happened only later in Plotinus.

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argument between Tosphot and the Rambam. Kritot 28a כריתות כ''ח ע''א

There is an argument between Tosphot and the Rambam about the law animals are not pushed off. [That means if one declares that "This animal will be a burnt offering" while that animal can't be a burnt offering. But the later it becomes fit.] To Tosphot, that is reflected in the statement R. Shimon and R. Elazar that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a guilt offering or a burnt offering, and it gives birth to a male, that male can be sacrificed as a guilt offering or a burnt offering. The sages however disagree, and hold that the mother and male sheep have go to pasture, and stay there until they get a blemish, and then are redeemed (sold), and with that money they are sold for, one buys a male sheep to bring for a guilt offering or a burnt offering. However, the Rambam holds both with the principle “Animals are not pushed off” and with the sages that disagree with R Shimon and R Elazar. Rav Shach (sacrifies 15 law four) solves this puzzle with the idea that when the one sanctifies the female sheep to be a guilt offering that is holiness that is pushed off. And it is in such cases that even when the animal becomes fit for a sacrifice, it remains pushed off. However, in a case like when one partner sanctifies his portion in an animal and the other does not, then if that partner later buys the remaining part then the whole animal is fit for a sacrifice. The reason I bring this up is that it is unclear to me in what kind of case one says the holiness is pushed off. For two examples the case of the partners Rashi says there it is holiness that is pushed off. (However, that might be because Rashi there is explaining R. Yochanan. It might be that Rav hold the holiness is not pushed off]. Another example is in Kritot 28a where R Oshiya says if one is liable a sin offering as a rich man and puts aside two birds to sell and use that money to buy a sheep, and then becomes poor, he cannot bring the birds which are the sacrifice of a poor man. It is unclear to me why this case would be considered holiness that is pushed off while the case of partners is not. However, that might be because he holds like R Yochanan that even the case of partners is considered holiness that is pushed off. ( R.Yochanan holds animals can be pushed off.) And in fact, the Rambam wrote in that case that the pair of birds can be brought as his sin offering. So it might be that this is exactly the argument between Rav and R Yochanan, what kind of case is considered holiness that is pushed off. Much later after writing the above paragraph I noticed Rav Shach in the end of Laws of Temura brings two examples that might help to clarify the subject. One is the case of one sanctifies a female sheep for the Passover sacrifice. That animal and its temura and even the male offspring cannot be brought for a Passover sacrifice. But if one sanctifies a female animal to be a sacrifice and then it gets a blemish, and then gives birth, that offspring can be brought as a sacrifice. I have been pondering this for a while and this seem like a clear proof to this idea of Rav Shach that the difference is the sanctification of a female for a Passover sacrifice is holiness that is pushed off from the start. In general, the difference that Rav Shach is making is between regular "being pushed off " and between holiness that is pushed off. This might not work in all cases like the above example of the animal with a blemish, but in general the difference is normal being pushed off is like the case of partner where that being pushed off can be corrected. The partner can buy the second half. But the case of holiness that is pushed off is like the case where one sanctifies a female to be a guilt offering. that being pushed off can never be corrected. So, for regular pushing off we say animal are not pushed off. But for holiness that is pushed off we say it and its offspring go to pasture. This difference between what one can fix and cannot fix is how Tosphot explains the idea of animals that are devoted to be sacrifices that are in the Temple at a time when the altar becomes damaged. They can be sacrificed after the altar has been repaired. This is how Tosphot explains the opinion of R. Shimon. But Rav Shach uses this idea explain the opinion of the Sages in the approach of the Rambam. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________ There is an argument between תוספות and the Rambam about the law animals are not pushed off.(כלומר שאם מפריש איזו בהמה להיות קרבן אבל אותה בהמה לא יכולה להיות קרבן. אבל מאוחר יותר הבמה נעשה ראוי) To תוספות that is reflected in the statement ר' שמעון and ר' אלעזר that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a אשם or a עולה, and it gives birth to a male, that male can be sacrificed as a אשם or a עולה. The חכמים however disagree, and hold that the mother and male sheep have go to pasture, and stay there until they get a מום, and then are redeemed (sold), and with that money they are sold for, one buys a male sheep to bring for a אשם or a עולה. However, the רמב''ם holds both with the principle, “Animals are not pushed off” and with the חכמים that disagree with ר' שמעון and ר' אלעזר. In order to solve this puzzle, Rav Shach suggests the idea that when the one sanctifies the female sheep to be a אשם that is holiness that is pushed off. And it is in such in such cases that even when the animal becomes fit for a sacrifice, it remains pushed off. However, in a case like when one partner sanctifies his portion in an animal and the other does not, then if that partner later buys the remaining part, then the whole animal is fit for a sacrifice. The reason I bring this up is that it is unclear to me in what kind of case one says the holiness is pushed off. For two examples the case of the partnersרש''י says there it is holiness that is pushed off. (However, that might be because רש''י there is explaining ר' יוחנן. It might be that רב hold the holiness is not pushed off] Another example is in כריתות כ''ח ע''אwhere ר' אושיה says if one is liable a sin offering as a rich man and puts aside two birds to sell and use that money to buy a sheep, and then becomes poor, he cannot bring the birds which are the sacrifice of a poor man. It is unclear to me why this case would be considered קדושה דחויהwhile the case of partners is not. However, that might be because he holds like ר' יוחנן that even the case of partners is considered holiness that is דחויה. And in fact, the רמב''ם wrote in that case that the pair of birds can be brought as his sin offering. So it might be that this is exactly the argument between רב and ר' יוחנן, what kind of case is considered holiness that is דחויה. רב שך in the end ofה' תמורה brings two examples that might help to clarify the subject. One is the case of one sanctifies a female sheep for the Passover sacrifice. That animal and its תמורה and even the male offspring cannot be brought for a Passover sacrifice. But if one sanctifies a female animal to be a sacrifice and then gets a blemish and then gives birth, that offspring can be brought as a sacrifice. I have been pondering this for a while and this seem like a clear proof to this idea of רב שך that the difference is the sanctification of a female for a Passover sacrifice is קדושה דחויה In general, the difference that רב שך is making is between regular דיחוי and between holiness that isדחויה . This might not work in all cases, like the above example of the animal with a blemish, but in general the difference is normalדיחוי is like the case of partner where that דיחוי can be corrected. The partner can buy the second half. But the case of holiness that is דחויה is like the case where one sanctifies a female to be a guilt offering. Thatדיחוי can never be corrected. So, for regular דיחוי we say בהמות are not נדחות. But for holiness that isדחויה we say it and its offspring go to pasture. This difference between what one can fix and cannot fix is how תוספות explains the idea of animals that are devoted to be sacrifices that are in the מקדש at a time when the altar becomes damaged. They can be sacrificed after the altar has been repaired. This is how תוספות explains the opinion of ר' שמעון. But רב שך uses this idea explain the opinion of the חכמים in the approach of the רמב''ם. _______________________ יש ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם על חוק בעלי חיים אין נדחקים. (כלומר שאם מפריש איזו בהמה להיות קרבן אבל אותה בהמה לא יכולה להיות קרבן. אבל מאוחר יותר הבמה נעשה ראוי) לתוספות זה באה לידי ביטוי בהצהרה ר' שמעון ור' אלעזר שאם מקדשים כבשה נקבה להיות אשם או עולה, והיא מולידה זכר, אפשר להקריב את הזכר הזה כאשם או עולה. אולם החכמים חולקים, וגורסים שהאם והכבשה ילכו למרעה, ונשארים שם עד שיקבלו מום, ואחר כך נפדים (נמכרים), ובכסף הזה הם שהם נמכרים, קונים כבשה זכר להביא לאשם או עולה. ברם, הרמב''ם תופס הן עם העיקרון " אין בעלי חיים נדחקים " והן עם החכמים החולקים על ר' שמעון ור' אלעזר. על מנת לפתור את החידה הזו, רב שך (מעשה הקרבנות ט''ו ה''ד) מציע את הרעיון שכאשר מקדש את הכבשה הנקבה להיות אשם, זו קדושה דחויה. וזה במקרים כאלה שגם כשהבהמה מתאימה לקרבן, היא נשארת נדחה. אולם במקרה כמו שותף אחד מקדש את חלקו בבהמה והשני לא, אז אם אותו שותף יקנה אחר כך את החלק הנותר, הרי כל הבהמה ראויה לקרבן. הסיבה שאני מעלה את זה היא שלא ברור לי באיזה מקרה אומרים שהקדושה דחויה. לשתי דוגמאות המקרה של השותפים רש''י אומר שם הקדושה היא דחויה. (עם זאת, זה יכול להיות בגלל רש''י שם מסביר ר' יוחנן. יכול להיות שרב מחזיק את הקדושה לא דחויה.] דוגמא נוספת היא בכריתות כ''ח ע''א מקום ר' אושיה אומר אם חייב קרבן חטאת כעשיר ומניח שתי ציפורים למכור ולהשתמש בכסף הזה לקניית כבשה, ואז נעשה עני, הוא לא יכול להביא את הציפורים שהם קורבן של עני. לא ברור לי מדוע תיק זה ייחשב כקדושה דחויה בעוד המקרה של שותפים לא. אולם יכול להיות שזה בגלל שהוא סובר כמו ר' יוחנן שאפילו דין שותפים נחשב לקדושה שהיא דחויה. ולמעשה כתב הרמב''ם באותו מקרה שאפשר להביא את צמד העופות כקורבן חטאתו. אז יכול להיות שזה בדיוק הוויכוח בין רב לר' יוחנן, איזה מקרה נחשב לקדושה דחויה רב שך בסוף ה' תמורה מביא שתי דוגמאות שעשויות לעזור להבהיר את הנושא. האחד הוא מקרה שמקדישים כבשה נקבה לקרבן פסח. אי אפשר להביא את אותה בהמה ותמורה שלה ואפילו את ולדה הזכר לקרבן פסח. אבל אם מקדישים בהמה נקבה להיות קרבן ואחר כך היא מקבלת מום ואז יולדת, אפשר להביא את ולד הזה כקרבן. וזה נראה כהוכחה ברורה לרעיון הזה של רב שך שההבדל הוא קידוש נקבה לקרבן פסח הוא קדושה דחויה באופן כללי, ההבדל שרב שך עושה הוא בין דיחוי רגיל ובין קדושה שהיא דחויה. זה אולי לא יעבוד בכל המקרים, כמו הדוגמה לעיל של בעל החיים עם מום, אבל באופן כללי ההבדל הוא נורמלי דיחוי הוא כמו במקרה של שותפים שבו ניתן לתקן את הדיחוי הזה. השותף יכול לקנות את המחצית השנייה. אבל קדושה דחויה דומה למקרה שמקדישים נקבה להיות קרבן אשם. את הדיחוי הזה לעולם לא ניתן לתקן. אז, עבור דיחוי רגיל אנחנו אומרים בהמות אינן נדחות. אבל לקדושה דחויה אנו אומרים אותה ואת ולדה הולכים למרעה ההבדל הזה בין מה שאפשר לתקן ולא יכול לתקן הוא איך תוספות מסבירים את הרעיון של בעלי חיים המוקדשים לקרבנות שנמצאים במקדש בזמן שהמזבח ניזוק. ניתן להקריב אותם לאחר תיקון המזבח. כך מסבירים תוספות את דעת ר' שמעון. אבל רב שך משתמש ברעיון זה להסביר את דעת החכמים בגישת הרמב''ם

za45 midi format same file in nwc format

za44 midi same piece in nwc format

za43 in midi same piece in nwc If you wonder about my style, it comes from listening to records of Mozart that my father bought for me, and fron playing in my high school orchestra with a conductor who had a profound taste in music, Mr. Smart. I know no one can ever reach Mozart, Beethoven or Bach, but these are my small attempts at music that I write mainly for my own sanity, and in hope that others may gain some benefit from them

Rav Shach had two major teachers; one was Rav. Isar Meltzer and the other a son of Reb Chaim of Brisk. So here I would like to share a question I have that occurred to me when I was learning the Even Haazel of Rav Isar Meltzer. But I want to mention that I have still to learn the subject in more depth to see if this really is a good question. The issue comes up in Temura 19b where the Sages (tana kama) say one who says, ''This female sheep should go to be a guilt offering." {A female sheep can not be a guilt offering.} The law then is it can be redeemed only once it gets a blemish. The reason is once something that can be brought to the altar get holiness of money, then automatically it gets holiness of body. Raba said, "Therefore one who says on an animal that is not fit for the altar that its monetary value should go to buy a burnt offering, that it can be redeemed only when it gets a blemish. But if he said, 'It will go for the wine offerings,' then it can be redeemed with no blemish." My question is based on the Gemara in Shavuot page 10B and 11A where the entire page is dealing with the argument between Raba and Rav Chisda about the incense where Raba holds it has holiness of body. So, I ask, how can Raba hold the incense has holiness of body, but the wine offering does not? Also, one can ask about the derivation of Rabah. From the Mishna that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a guilt offering, it needs a blemish to be redeemed, that therefore one who sanctifies a male sheep to be the monetary value of buying a burnt offering, it becomes itself a burnt offering. From where is this derivation? The cases are opposites. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תמורה י''ט where the חכמים say one who says ''this female sheep should go for a אשם." The law then is it can be redeemed only once it gets a מום. The reason is once something that can be brought to the altar get קדושת דמים, then automatically it gets קדושת הגוף. Then רבה said therefore one who says on an בהמה that is not fit for the altar that its monetary value should go to buy a עולה, that it can be redeemed only when it gets a מום but if he said it will go for the נסכים then it can be redeemed with no מום. My question is based on the גמרא in שבועות י''א ע''א where the entire page is dealing with the argument between רבה and רב חיסדא about the קטורת where רבה holds it has קדושת הגוף. So, I ask, how can רבה hold the incense has קדושת הגוף but the נסכים does not? Also, one can ask about the derivation of רבה From the משנה that if one sanctifies a female sheep to be a אשם, it needs a מום to be redeemed, that therefore one who sanctifies a male sheep to be the monetary value of buying a עולה, it becomes itself a עולה. From where is this derivation? The cases are opposites. בתמורה י''ט שם החכמים אומרים מי שאומר ''הכבשה הזו היא אשם, החוק הוא שאפשר לפדות אותה רק ברגע שהיא מקבלת מום. הסיבה היא מיד שמשהו שניתן להביא למזבח קבל קדושת דמים, ואז אוטומטית הוא מקבל קדושת הגוף. אז רבה אמר לכן מי שאומר על בהמה שאינה מתאימה למזבח שהערך הכספי שלה צריך ללכת לקנות עולה, שאפשר לפדות אותו רק כאשר הוא מקבל מום, אבל אם הוא אמר שזה ילך על הנסכים אז אפשר לפדות את זה בלי מום השאלה שלי מבוססת על הגמרא בשבועות י''א ע''א שם כל העמוד עוסק בויכוח בין רבה לרב חיסדא לגבי הקטורת שבה רבה מחזיק יש קדושת הגוף. אז, אני שואל, איך יכול רבה להחזיק שהקטורת יש קדושת הגוף אבל הנסכים לא וכן אפשר לשאול על הלימוד של רבה מהמשנה שאם המקדש כבשה נקבה להיות אשם, היא צריכה מום להיפדות, ולכן מי שמקדש כבש זכר להיות ערך כספי של קניית עולה , זה הופך בעצמו לעולה. מאיפה הגזירה הזו? המקרים הם הפכים ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Another question is this R Yochanan said animals that are left over can be sold without a blemish. Rabah repeated this. Abyee asked, “Aren’t you the one who said ‘one who sanctifies an animal for holiness of money that can go to the altar automatically gets holiness of body.’” Rabah answered that is for one who said for the cost of a burnt offering while the case of R. Yochanan is the case one said the cost of wine offerings. --what could this mean? Leftover animals are sold for new plating of the vessels of the Temple to the sages or to the dessert of the altar. not wine offerings. [Of course this means the wine offering that go with the dessert of the altar--but why put it in such an odd way?]

R. Shimon [Tractate Temura page 19B ] said if a person sanctified female sheep to be a guilt offering it should be sold without a blemish. [Not like the First Tana who said it can be sold only after it gets a blemish]/(A guilt offering can only be male.) Rav Shach [laws of things that invalidate a sacrificee] makes a comment on this that he should have said what is relevant to the altar does not leave the altar. This comment is based on the shita mekubetzes that says there is no such thing as having an animal that is totally secular, and yet one has to bring the money he sells it for to the Temple. [He means of course outside of the context of oaths and vows.] Rav Shach is asking why R Shimon did not make it clear that he means that the female sheep would-be old and money of that sale has holiness of money. Or maybe he even means that that money has to be used to buy a male sheep to bring as a guilt offering. This last possibility seems to me to be the clearest since R Shimon is going on the word of the first tana who said it goes to pasture until it gets blemish and then is old and the money of that ale goes to buy a guilt offering. And on that R Shimon inert his comment it is sold without a blemish. The idea of the Shita Mekubezet comes from this subject. bar pada said one cannot sanctify a fetus. the gemara asks on this from the mishna. One who wants to avoid of having to give the first-born sheep to a priest says, “What is in the womb of this sheep will be a burnt offering.” If it gives birth to a male, it burnt offering. Bar Pada answered that means the money of its sale will be for a burnt offering. Tosphot asks but what about the end of the Mishna that says, “If it gave birth two males, one is a burnt offering and the other is sold for a burnt offering.” If bar pade is right then both are equal. So why does the Mishna say they are different? Tosphot answers it must be the tana holds if an animal is fit for the altar and yet only has been sanctified with holiness of money, then the holiness of body comes on it automatically. the shita asks on tosphot why not answer the question tosphot thus: the first has holiness of money and the second does not and yet it still has to be sold to buy a sheep for a burnt offering. The shita answers if that money does not have holiness of money ten one could buy groceries with it. That means that this suggested answer cannot be true. and that is from where Rav shach learned his point that if the animal has neither holiness of body or monetary vale then there i no reason to buy a sacrifice with the money of its sale. _____________________________________________________ ר' שמעון בתמורה י''ט ע''ב said if a person sanctified female sheep to be a אשם it should be sold without a מום. [Not like the תנא קמא who said it can be נמכר only after it gets a מום]. רב שך בהלכות פסולי המוקדשין makes a comment on this that ר' שמעון should have said what is relevant to the altar does not leave the altar. This comment is based on the שיטה מקובצת that say there is no such thing as having an animal that is totally חולין and yet one has to bring the money he sells it for to the מקדש. [He means of course outside of the context of oaths and vows.] so I think רה שך is asking why ר' שמעון did not make it clear that he means that the female sheep would-be נמכר and money of that sale has holiness of money. Or maybe he even means that that money has to be used to buy a male sheep to bring as a guilt offering. This last possibility seems to me to be the clearest since ר' שמעון is going on the word of the תנא קמא who said it goes to pasture until it gets מום and then is נמכר and the money of that מכירה goes to buy a guilt offering. And on that ר' שמעון inserts his comment it is sold without a blemish. THE idea of the שיטה מקובצת comes from this subject. בר פדא said one cannot sanctify a עבר. the גמרא asks on this from the משנה . One who wants to avoid of having to give the first-born sheep to a priest says, “What is in the womb of this sheep will be a burnt offering.” If it gives birth to a male, it burnt offering. בר פדא answered that means the money of its sale will be for a burnt offering. תוספות, asks but what about the end of theרמשנה that says, “If it gave birth two males, one is a burnt offering and the other is sold for a burnt offering.” If בר פדא is right, then both are equal. So why does the משנה say they are different? צוספות answers it must be the תנא holds if an animal is fit for the altar and yet only has been sanctified with קדושת דמים then the קדושת הגוף comes on it automatically. the שיטה asks on תוספות why not answer the question תוספות thus: the first has holiness of money and the second does not, and yet it still has to be sold to buy a sheep for a עולה. The שיטה answers if that money does not have קדושת דמים then one could buy groceries with it. That means that this suggested answer cannot be true. And that is from where רב שך learned his point that if the animal has neither קדושת הגוף or קדושת דמים, then there is no reason to buy a קרבן with the money of its sale. ___________________________________________________ ______ ר' שמעון בתמורה י''ט ע''ב אמר אם אדם קידש כבשה נקבה להיות אשם צריך למכור אותה בלא מום. [לא כמו התנא קמא שאמר יכול להיות נמכרת רק לאחר שהיא שתקבל מום]. רב שך בהלכות פסולי המוקדשין מעיר על כך שר' שמעון היה צריך לומר מה שרלוונטי למזבח אינו יוצא מהמזבח. הערה זו מבוססת על שיטה מקובצת שאומר שאין דבר כזה שיש בהמה שהיא חולין לגמרי, ובכל זאת צריך להביא את הכסף שהוא מקבל ממכירתה למקדש. [הוא מתכוון כמובן מחוץ להקשר של השבועות ונדרים.] אז אני חושב שרב שך שואל למה ר' שמעון לא הבהיר שהוא מתכוון שהכבשה הנקבה תהיה נמכרת וכסף של המכירה הזו יש קדושה של כֶּסֶף (קדושת דמים שהולך לבדק הבית). או אולי הוא אפילו מתכוון שצריך להשתמש בכסף הזה כדי לקנות כבשה זכר כדי להביא כאשם. אפשרות אחרונה זו נראית לי הכי ברורה שכן ר' שמעון הולך על דברי התנא קמא שאמר הולכת למרעה עד שתקבל מום ואז נמכרת וכספי מכירה ההיא הולך לקנות קרבן אשם. ועל זה מכניס ר' שמעון את הערתו הוא נמכר ללא מום הרעיון של השיטה מקובצת נובע מהנושא הזה. בר פדא אמר אי אפשר לקדש עובר. הגמרא שואלת על זה מהמשנה. מי שרוצה להימנע מהצורך לתת את הכבשה הבכורה לכהן אומר: "מה שברחם הכבשה הזו יהיה לעולה". אִם תוֹליד זָכָר, הוא עוֹלָה. ענה בר פדא שכסף מכירתו יהיה לעולה. תוספות, שואלת אבל מה עם סוף המשנה שאומרת "אם ילדה שני זכרים, האחד הוא עולה והשני נמכר בעולה". אם בר פדא צודק, אז שניהם שווים. אז למה המשנה אומרת שהם שונים? תוספות עונה שזה חייב להיות התנא מחזיק אם בהמה מתאימה למזבח ובכל זאת רק התקדשה בקדושת דמים אז הגוף נעשה אוטומטית. השיטה שואלת על תוספות למה לא לענות על השאלה של תוספות כך: לראשון יש קדושת כסף ולשני אין, ובכל זאת צריך למכור אותו כדי לקנות כבש לעולה. השיטה עונה אם לכסף הזה אין קדושת דמים, אז אפשר לקנות איתו מצרכים. זה אומר שהתשובה המוצעת הזו לא יכולה להיות נכונה. ומכאן למד רב שך את דבריו שאם אין לבהמה לא קדושת גוף ולא קדושת דמים, אזי אין סיבה לקנות קרבן בכספי מכירתו

סוכה י''ז ע''א Tractate Suka page 17 side A. Shulchan Aruch Orach Haim 630 halacha 9. Rambam Laws of Suka chapter four, law four

The Rambam writes that if you have a wall ten handbreadths tall attached to the ground, but does not reach the sechach (roof) of the suka, you consider that wall as continuing until it reaches the roof. However, it needs to be in an exact straight line with the edge of the roof. [Laws of Suka chapter four halacha four.] The Meiri and Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chaim Laws of Suka 630 halacha 9.] disagree with this, and say it does not need to be in a straight line with the roof, but to be within three handbreadths horizontally. The issue is if you can combine two different laws גוד אסיק מחיצתא ולבוד ''bring up'' and everything within three handbreadths is considered attached. The Ran in Suka page 17a brings a proof from the Gemara that you cannot combine two different laws, for we see in the Gemara you cannot combine (lvud) attach and crooked wall. However, the achronim in Shulchan Aruch side with the Shulchan Aruch that in our case of “bring up” and Attach (lvud) you can combine two laws. I would say that the Rambam must have seen that same issue in Suka page 17 which shows you cannot combine two laws of (lvud) “attach” and “crooked wall” and understood from there that you cannot combine two different laws of “bring up” and attach (lvud) as we see here that he says a complete wall of ten handbreadths has to be in a direct line with the roof and you don't say (lvud) attach. [I noticed this subject in the book Even HaAzel of Rav Isar Meltzer, and today I was in a Litvak beit midrash where I had a chance to look up the Shulchan Aruch. I was quite surprized to see him [the Shulchan Aruch/ Rav Josef Karo] disagree with the Rambam without even mentioning the opinion of the Rambam. --unless Rav Karo thought the Rambam did not really mean "in direct line"? And there might be a reason for that in laws of Tumat Met. That is the same place Rav Melzer bring about our subject here and mentions that in fact the Rambam might mean the "upper board" only, not the lower board for this same reason, i.e., that "in direct line" might mean with a slight overlap."] The place over there in tumat met is a case of a small unclean kezait [size that is the volume amount of an olive] on parallel sequential boards that are do not overlap and the mishna says only what is over them is unclean. The Rambam however writes the law with the same words but replaces over them with over the upper board. So there it seems when the Rambam wrote in line he meant approximately ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The הלכות סוכה פרק ד ' הלכה ד' רמב''ם writes that if you have a wall ten handbreadths tall attached to the ground, but does not reach the סכך of the סוכה, you consider that wall as continuing until it reaches the סכך. However, it needs to be in an exact straight line with the edge of the סכך. The מאירי and שלחן ערוך disagree with this, and say it does not need to be in a straight line with the roof, but to be within three handbreadths horizontally. The issue is if you can combine two different laws גוד אסיק מחיצתא ולבוד ''bring up'' and לבוד everything within three handbreadths is considered attached. The ר''ן in סוכה דף י''ז ע''א brings a proof from the גמרא that you cannot combine two different laws, for we see in the גמרא you cannot combine לבוד and דופן עקומה. However, the אחרונים in שלחן ערוך side with the שלחן ערוך that in our case of “bring up” and לבוד you can combine two laws. I would say that the רמב''ם must have seen that same issue in סוכה י''ז ע''א which shows you cannot combine two laws of לבוד and ופן עקומה and understood from there that you cannot combine two different laws of גוד אסיק and לבוד as we see here that he says a complete wall of ten handbreadths has to be in a direct line with the roof and you don't say לבוד. The place over there in טומאת מת is a case of a small unclean כזית on parallel sequential boards that are do not overlap and the משנה says only what is over them is טמא. The רמב''ם however writes the law with the same words, but replaces "over them" with "over the upper board." So there it seems when the רמב''ם wrote מכוון he meant approximately בהלכות סוכה פרק ד' הלכה ד' הרמב''ם כותב שאם יש לך קיר בגובה עשרה טפחים שמחובר לקרקע, אבל לא מגיע לסכך של הסוכה, אתה מחשיב את הקיר הזה כממשיך עד שהוא מגיע לסכך. עם זאת, זה צריך להיות בקו ישר מדויק עם קצה הסכך. המאירי והשלחן ערוך (שלחן ערוך אורח חיים פרק תר''ל חלכה ט') חולקים על כך, ואומרים שהוא לא צריך להיות בקו ישר עם הגג, אלא להיות בטווח של שלוש טפחים אופקית. הבעיה היא אם אתה יכול לשלב שני חוקים שונים, גוד אסיק מחיצתא ולבוד (''להעלות'' והכל בתוך שלושה טפחים נחשב מצורף. הר''ן בסוכה דף י''ז ע''א מביא הוכחה מהגמרא שלא ניתן לשלב שני דינים שונים, שהרי אנו רואים בגמרא לא ניתן לשלב לבוד ודופן עקומה. אולם אחרונים בשלחן ערוך מצדדים כשלחן ערוך שבמקרה שלנו של "להעלות" ולבוד ניתן לשלב שני דינים. הייתי אומר שהרמב''ם ודאי ראה את אותה סוגיה בסוכה י''ז ע''א שמראה שאינך יכול לשלב שני דינים לבוד דופן עקומה והבין משם שאינך יכול לשלב שני דינים ונים של גוד אסיק ולבוד כפי שאנו רואים כאן שהוא אומר שקיר שלם של עשרה טפחים צריך להיות בקו ישיר עם הסכך ואתה לא אומר לבוד המקום שם בטומאת מת הוא מקרה של כזית מת טמאה קטנה על לוחות רצפים מקבילים שאינם חופפים והמשנה אומרת רק מה שיש עליהם טמא. אולם הרמב''ם כותב את החוק באותן מילים, אבל מחליף את "מעליהם" ב"על הלוח העליון". אז שם נראה כשהרמב''ם כתב מכוון התכוון בערך

Philosophy has not reached any conclusions to any problems for thousands of years. Yet, it is not a waste of time because it is an attempt to gain some understanding about our place in the universe. Thus, to me there is great importance in Kant' s idea of the limits of pure reason. But since Kant, things have gone from intractable problems to insanity in academic gowns of respectability. To ignore Kant and dive into the vacuous philosophies of the twentieth Century also seems a waste. Rather, I suggest a modification of Kant--the Kant-Friesian school which had a rather good start with Leonard Nelson. But has little to no academic respectability. Nelson’s main rival Husserl gained, for some reason, much more respect along with existentialism and post modernism;- and to me it is hard to know why. [To show the fallacies of any philosophy is easy. All you need to do is look up any other philosopher, since all they do is spend their time showing how every philosophy beside their own is incorrect. ] in spite of this I highly recommend Kelley Ross's web site on the Kant Friesian School because to my mind it gets to a deep truth about the connection between Pure Reason and Empirical knowledge. That is it shows a lot of insight about faith and reason conflicts

za41 midi same piece in nwc format i might mention here that I owe a lot of gratitude to my teachers in music, like my violin teachers and Mr Smart who was the conductor of the high school orcestra that I played in. and father who bought for me records of Mozart, Beethoven and also Rossini

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I am not sure about how much philosophy is responsible for present day problems in politics. They ought to be separate fields. After all, they deal with different subject matters. But the effect of philosophy on politics has been mostly detrimental. England became a forerunner of modern democracies without the slightest influence of philosophy, but rather from the need of Edward the First to collect taxes with the tacet agreement of the lords [thus creating Parliament], and the result of Simon de Montfort [a crusader]] seizing power from a corrupt king, and thus creating the provision of Oxford. (Magna Carta was the result of a desire of the lords to limit the power of the king. )[John Locke was after the fact of the Glorious Revolution, not the cause.] Whenever philosophy professors venture into politics, their effect is almost always detrimental. [Take a look at the short dialogues of Plato and you will see tremendous depth, freshness and insight. but when Plato gets into politics in the republic and the laws, all that goes out the window.

Rav Isar Melzer [one of the two teachers of rav shach, the other was r. izhak zev soloveitchik] noted a hard to understand fact that in the opinion of Shmuel that a animal with a external defect is more strict in regards to temura {exchange} than an animal with an internal defect (traif). But when it comes to holiness of body, we see in the mishna in temura page 17b the opposite is the case. One can not sanctify an animal with a mum, but temura can be applied to it. He anwers this by an idea in Reb Chaim from Brisk. But I might mention that this is most likely to be the reasoning of R' Oshiya that held holiness [of body] can not be applied to a trifa. [Rambam Things Forbidden to the Altar 3 law 10] I.e., the mishna says tmura applies to a baal mum but not to a traifa [according to r elazar]. Therefore R Oshiya holds that holiness which can not be applied to a baal mum certainly can't be applied to a traifa. ___ [Holiness of body applied to an animal would be a case of an animal that one dedicated as a sin offering, and then afterwards it got an external defect. Then it would have to be sold, and with the money one brings another animal to be a sin offering. Holiness of money means like in our case one tried to sanctify an animal with an external defect. Well, the holiness of body can not be applied, but of monetary value can.] I might mention that Rav Meltzer says that the point of Shmuel is that he agrees that a mum [external defect] is more strict than traif [since temura can come on it] but the reason holiness of body can't come on it [while it canon a traifa] is that a mum is the reason in itself why holiness of body can not come on anything. It is the reason why something that already has holiness of body can be redeemed. ____ Rav Shach makes a point that if one says about something that can't be sacrificed on the altar that it makes a difference if one said this is a sacrifice. In that case it is nothing. But if he said this is for a sacrifice or for the altar that it gets holiness of money. That is it has to be sold and the proceeds go to buy sacrifices for the altar. and before it is sold it has a regular category of holiness of money. And in that case, it is forbidden to be used for plowing or shearing until after it has been sold. To Rav Shach there is no middle category of something that ha holiness of money and yet can be used for plowing. And if the Rambam wanted to come up with such a new category then he should have said so, instead of making an ambiguous statement that one who sanctifies a traifa, it totally hulin just a if he ha sanctified wood or stones. That statement on its face makes no sense. If one sanctified wood or stone they are not absolute hulin but rather have holiness of money. if the Rambam had wanted to create a new category that no one has heard of then he should have aid so openly instead of writing a statement that makes no sense. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ רב איסר מלצר אבן האזל ה' איסורי המזבח ג' ה''י noted a hard to understand fact that in the opinion of שמואל that a animal with a מום is more strict in regards to תמורה than an טריפה . But when it comes to קדושת הגוף, we see in the משנה in תמורה דף י''ז ע''א the opposite is the case. One can not sanctify an animal with a מום, but תמורה can be applied to it. He anwers this by an idea in ר' חיים מבריסק. But I might mention that this is most likely to be the reasoning of ר' אושיעיא that held קדושת הגוף can not be applied to a טריפה. [קדושת הגוף applied to an animal would be a case of an animal that one dedicated as a sin offering, and then afterwards it got an מום קבוע. Then it would have to be sold, and with the money one brings another animal to be a sin offering. קדושת מים means like in our case one tried to sanctify an animal with an מום. Well, the קדושת הגוף can not be applied, but of monetary value can.] I might mention that רב מלצר says that the point of שמואל is that he agrees that a מום is more strict than טריף since תמורה can come on it, but the reason holiness of body can't come on it [while it can on a טריפה] is that a מום is the reason in itself why קדושת הגוף can not come on anything. It is the reason why something that already has קדושת הגוף can be נפדה. רב שך makes a point that if one says about something that can't be sacrificed on the altar that it makes a difference if one said, "This is a sacrifice." In that case, it is nothing. But if he said, "This is for a sacrifice" or "for the altar", thaמ it gets קדושת דמים. That is it has to be sold and the proceeds go to buy sacrifices for the altar. and before it is sold it has a regular category of קדושת דמים. And in that case, it is forbidden to be used for plowing or shearing until after it has been sold. To רב שך there is no middle category of something that haS קדושת דמים and yet can be used for plowing. And if the רמב''ם wanted to come up with such a new category, then he should have said so, instead of making an ambiguous statement that one who sanctifies a טריפה, it totally חולין just aS if he haD sanctified wood or stones. That statement on its face makes no sense. If one sanctified wood or stone, they are not absolute חולין but rather have קדושת דמים. if the רמב''ם had wanted to create a new category that no one has heard of, then he should have Said so openly, instead of writing a statement that makes no sense. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ רב איסר מלצר [אבן האזל ה' איסורי המזבח ג' ה''י] ציין עובדה קשה להבנה שלדעת שמואל שבהמה עם מום חמורה יותר ביחס לתמורה מאשר לטריפה. אבל כשמדובר בקדושת הגוף רואים במשנה בתמורה דף י''ז ע''א ההיפך. אי אפשר לקדש בהמה עם מום, אבל אפשר להחיל עליה תמורה. הוא עונה על כך ברעיון מר' חיים מבריסק. אבל אני יכול להזכיר שזה ככל הנראה הנימוק של ר' אושיעיא שלא ניתן להחיל את קדושת הגוף על טריפה כלומר, המשנה אומרת שתמורה חלה על בעל מום, אבל לא על טריפה לפי ר' אלעזר. לכן ר' אושעיא סבור שקדושה שלא ניתן להחיל על בעל מום בהחלט לא יכולה להיות מיושמת על טריפה קדושת הגוף המיושמת על בהמה תהיה מקרה של בהמה שהקדישה אותה כקורבן חטאת, ואחר כך היא קיבלה מום קבועה. אז היה צריך למכור אותו, ובכסף מביאים בהמה אחרת להיות קורבן חטאת. קדושת דמים פירושו כמו במקרה שלנו שניסו להקדיש בעל חיים עם מום. ובכן, את קדושת הגוף לא ניתן ליישם, אבל קדושת מים יכול.] אני יכול להזכיר שרב מלצר אומר שהטעם של שמואל הוא שהוא מסכים שמום יותר חמור מטריף כיון שתמורה יכולה לבוא עליו, אבל הסיבה שקדושת הגוף לא יכולה לבוא עליו [בעוד שאפשר על טריפה] היא שאם היא הסיבה בפני עצמה לכך שקדושת הגוף לא יכולה לבוא על שום דבר. זו הסיבה שמשהו שכבר יש לו קדושת גוף יכול להיות נפדה רב שך מדגיש שאם אומרים על דבר שאי אפשר להקריב על המזבח יש הבדל אם אמר "זהו קרבן". במקרה כזה, זה כלום. אבל אם אמר "זה לקרבן" או "למזבח", זה מקבל קדושת דמים. כלומר צריך למכור את זה, וההכנסות הולכים לקניית קרבנות למזבח. ולפני שהוא נמכר יש לו קטגוריה רגילה של קדושת דמים. ובמקרה כזה אסור להשתמש בו לחריש או לגזירה עד לאחר מכירתו. לרב שך אין קטגוריה אמצעית של דבר שיש לו קדושת דמים ובכל זאת יכול לשמש לחריש. ואם רצה הרמב''ם לעלות על קטגוריה חדשה כזו, אז היה צריך לומר זאת, במקום לומר משפט דו-משמעי שמי שמקדש טריפה, זה לגמרי חולין כאילו היה הקדיש עצים או אבנים. האמירה הזו על פניו אינה הגיונית. אם אחד קידש עץ או אבן, אין הם חולין מוחלטים אלא יש להם קדושת דמים. אם הרמב''ם היה רוצה ליצור קטגוריה חדשה שאף אחד לא שמע עליה, אז הוא היה צריך לומר זאת בגלוי, במקום לכתוב אמירה חסרת היגיון

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Rambam in Laws of Things that are Forbidden to bring upon the Altar chapter 3 law 10 . In chapter three, the Rambam brings the statement of R. Oshiya that if one sanctifies a traifa [animal with an internal defect that would cause it to die within a year], the sanctification is not valid at all. It is as if he sanctified wood or stones. He must sell the animal and bring that money to the temple to bring sacrifices on the altar, for it is not like an animal with an external defect. In chapter 2 law 10, he says one who brings a sacrifice and it is found to be traif, it is not redeemed, but is sent to pasture until it dies on its own. Clearly, the first case is when he sanctified an animal that he knew is traif. It is not like an animal with either a passing external defect or a permanent defect. The law in that case is if it has a permanent external defect then it is redeemed and the proceeds go the Temple. Before it is redeemed it cannot be sheared or used for plowing. But in a case when became traif came before it was sanctified, the sanctification is not valid except in so far as the proceeds of the sale go to the altar. The Raavad asks in chapter 3 law what is the difference between the case of one who sanctified a traif and one who sanctified a baal mum? Both are sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. Because of this some achronim say when the Rambam wrote, "It is not like an animal with an external defect," he means a non-permanent one in which case it goes to pasture until it gets permanent one and then is redeemed. However, it appears to me that there is a difference between being sold and being redeemed. In being redeemed, the cohen needs to evaluate the value of the animal before it is sold, and it can only be sold for that much. I think in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, that it is totally hulin, but the money of the sale goes to buy sacrifices. It is as if he had made an oath to bring sacrifices. The money is not sanctified at all, nor the animal that is sold to bring get that money. I might mention that Rav Shach sides with the Raavad. He says if he says this animal is a karban then it is nothing, but if he said it is for the altar then it is like a permanent defect. Rav Isar Meltzer writes that in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, it is unlike the case of a permanent defect because one who sanctifies an animal with a permanent defect, it can be sheared and used for work after it is redeemed, while in our case it can be sheared even before it is sold I think there is a middle category between total hulin and an animal that has sanctification of monetary value. Such a middle category is something that you have to sell and bring the money as a karban even though it does not have sanctification of monetary value. [e.g., a person says on a male goat "This is for a sin offering," it has no holiness, not of body nor of monetary value but is sold in order to buy a female goat tobring as a sin offering.] However, there is a possible refutation of this idea because in the Gemara Temura 17b the gemara brings a refutation of Shmuel from a braita that says in the case of one who sanctified a traifa, it does not need a permanent defect to be redeemed. There the language is to be redeemed, not to be sold. However, the Rambam uses the language to be sold and furthermore he writes that it is not like an animal with a defect. He does not say it is not like an animal with a temporary defect. It is possible that the Rambam understands the law of R, Oshiya that the animal has no category of holiness at all. However the stronges argument that the Rambam means that the traifa has holines of monetary value is he awrite one who sanctifie a traifa it is as if he asanctified wood or stones, and in fact if one say s about wood or stones these are for a in offering they get holiness of monetay value wood ____ רמב''ם in איסורי המזבח פרק ג' ה''י . The רמב''ם brings the statement of ר' אושעיא that if one sanctifies a טריפה [animal with an internal defect that would cause it to die within a year], the הקדשה is not valid at all. It is as if he sanctified wood or stones. He must sell the animal and bring that money to the temple to bring sacrifices on the altar, for it is not like an animal with an מום. In פרק ב' ה''י, he says one who brings a קרבן and it is found to be טריף, it is not נפדה, but is sent to pasture until it dies on its own. Clearly, the first case is when he sanctified an animal that he knew is טריף. It is not like an animal with either a מום עובר or a מום קבוע. The law in that case is if it has a מום קבוע then it is נפדה and the כסף go the Temple. Before it is נפדה it cannot be sheared or used for plowing. But in a case when became טריפה came before it was sanctified, the sanctification is not valid except in so far as the proceeds of the sale go to the altar. The Raavad asks in פרק ג' ה''י what is the difference between the case of one who sanctified a טריף and one who sanctified a בעל מום? Both are sold and the proceeds go to the Temple. Because of this some אחרונים say when the רמב''ם wrote, "It is not like an animal with an מום," he means a מום עובר one in which case it goes to pasture until it gets permanent one and then is redeemed. However, it appears to me that there is a difference between being sold and being נפדה. In being redeemed, the כהן needs to evaluate the value of the animal before it is sold, and it can only be sold for that much. I think in the case of one who sanctified a טריפה, that it is totally חולין, but the money of the sale goes to buy sacrifices. It is as if he had made an oath to bring sacrifices. The money is not sanctified at all, nor the animal that is sold to bring get that money. I might mention that רב שך sides with the ראב''ד. He says if he says this animal is a קרבן then it is nothing, but if he said it is for the altar then it is like a מום קבוע. רב איסק מלצר writes that in the case of one who sanctified a טריפה, it is unlike the case of a permanent defect because one who sanctifies an animal with a permanent defect, it can be sheared and used for work after it is redeemed while in our case it can be sheared even before it is sold I think there is a middle category between total חולין and an animal that has קדושת דמים. Such a middle category is something that you have to sell and bring the money as a קרבן even though it does not have קדושת דמים. [e.g., a person says on a male goat "This is for a חאטת," it has no holiness, not of body nor of קדושת דמים but is sold in order to buy a female goat to bring as a חאטת.] However, there is a possible refutation of this idea because in the גמרא תמורה י''ז ע''ב the גמרא brings a refutation of שמואל from a ברייתא that says in the case of one who sanctified aטריפה, it does not need a מום קבוע to be redeemed. There the language is to be נפדה, not to be sold. However, the רמב''ם uses the language to be sold and furthermore he writes that it is not like an animal מום. He does not say it is not like an animal with a מום עובר. It is possible that the רמב''ם understands the law of ר' אושיעא that the animal has no category of holiness at all. However the strongest argument that the רמב''ם means that the טריפה has קדושת דמים is he writes “one who sanctifies a טריפה it is as if he sanctified wood or stones,” and in fact if one says about wood or stones these are for a חאטת they get holiness of monetary value רמב''ם באיסורי המזבח פרק ג' ה''י . הרמב''ם מביא את דברי ר' אושעיא שאם מקדשים טריפה [בהמה עם מום פנימי שיגרום למותה תוך שנה], אין הקדשה תקפה כלל, וכאילו הוא קידש עצים או אבנים. הוא חייב למכור את הבהמה ולהביא את הכסף הזה למקדש כדי להביא קרבנות על המזבח, כי אין זה דומה לבהמה עם מום. בפרק ב' ה''י אומר המביא קרבן ונמצא טריף, אינו נפדה, אלא נשלח למרעה עד שמת מעצמו. ברור שהמקרה הראשון הוא כאשר הוא קידש בהמה שידע שהיא טריף. זה לא כמו בהמה עם מום עובר או מום קבוע. הדין במקרה כזה הוא שאם יש לו מום קבוע אז זה נפדה והכסף ללכת למקדש. לפני שהוא נפדה אי אפשר לגזור או להשתמש בו לחריש. אבל במקרה שנעשה טריפה בא לפני שנתקדשה, אין ההקדיש תקף, אלא במידה שתמורת המכירה עולה למזבח. הראב"ד שואל בפרק ג' ה''י מה ההבדל בין מי שהקדיש טריף למי שהקדיש בעל מום? שניהם נמכרים והרווחים הולכים לבית המקדש. משום כך אומרים אחרונים כשכתב הרמב''ם "אינו דומה לבהמה עם מום", כוונתו למום עובר, שאז היא הולכת למרעה עד שהיא מקבלת מום קבוע ואז נפדה. עם זאת, נראה לי שיש הבדל בין להימכר לבין להיות נפדה. בפדיון צריך הכהן להעריך את שווי הבהמה לפני מכירתה, וניתן למכור אותה רק בסכום כזה. אני חושב שבמקרה של מי שקידש טריפה, שזה לגמרי חולין, אבל הכסף של המכירה הולך לקנות קרבנות. זה כאילו נדר שבועה להביא קרבנות. הכסף אינו מקודש כלל. אני יכול להזכיר שרב שך מצדד כראב''ד. הוא אומר שאם הוא אומר שהבהמה הזו קרבן אז זה לא כלום, אבל אם הוא אמר שהיא למזבח אז זה כמו מצב של מום קבוע. רב איסר מלצר כותב שבמקרה של מי שקידש טריפה, אין זה דומה לפגם קבוע כי מי שמקדש בהמה עם מום קבוע, ניתן לגזור ולהשתמש לעבודה לאחר שנפדה, אבל במקרה שלנו ניתן לגזור אותה עוד לפני שהיא נמכרת. אני חושב שיש קטגוריית ביניים בין חולין טוטאלית לבין חיה שיש לה קדושת דמים. קטגוריה אמצעית כזו היא משהו שצריך למכור ולהביא את הכסף כקרבן למרות שאין בה קדושת דמים. [למשל, אדם אומר על עז "זה לחטאת", אין לו קדושה, לא של גוף ולא של קדושת דמים אלא נמכר כדי לקנות עז נקבה להביא כחטאת.] אולם ישנה הפרכה לרעיון זה משום שבגמרא תמורה י''ז ע''ב מביא הגמרא הפרכת שמואל מברייתא שאומר במקרה של מי שהקדיש טריפה, אינו צריך מום קבוע להיות נפדה. שם השפה להיות נפדה, לא להימכר. אולם הרמב''ם משתמש בלשון למכירה, ועוד הוא כותב שזה לא כמו בהמה עם מום. הוא לא אומר שזה לא כמו בהמה עם מום עובר. יתכן שהרמב''ם מבין את דין של ר' אושעיא שלבהמה אין כלל קטגוריית קדושה. אולם הטיעון החזק ביותר שהרמב''ם מתכוון לכך שלטריפה יש קדושת דמים הוא כותב "מי שמקדיש טריפה כאילו הקדיש עצים או אבנים", ולמעשה אם אומרים על עצים או אבנים "אלו הם בשביל חטאת" הם מקבלים קדושת דמים

contradiction between John Locke's idea of basic human rights and Darwin

it is an odd sort of fact that peopleare not aware that there is a basic contradiction between John Locke's idea of basic human rights and Darwin. According to Darwin,there is no such thing. There is no such thing as an immutable species with immutable traits. Rather, species evolve and small differences in the DNA are just begining stages of complete separation between the groups that eventually become completely different species. [THE PROBLEM that i am adressing here is that some unfortunate souls think that they can believe both at the same time and in that way can get points for their profile. They are not aware that these two theseses are in direct oppositiThe point is that it is not clear that John Locke had the absolute truth--as we see the system of the USA is not immune to corruption from within. It all was foreseen in Alan Bloom's the Closing of the American Mind. So, between the emphasis on the individual of John Locke and the emphasis of Hegel on the state there is still no clear solution. It is along the lines of being undecidable

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What is threatening Western civilization? Written by Michael Huemer

Q: What is threatening Western civilization? Is it nuclear war? Misaligned AI? Global warming? A: Meh. I mean, sure, nuclear war could be bad. But the real problem is contemporary woke, progressive ideology. Q: Wow. What is this ideology? A: Basically, Wokism views America and the West as deeply unjust, oppressive, racist, sexist, etc. It blames “cis-het” (cisgender, heterosexual) white men for this evil. It is also the source of cancel culture, a phenomenon in which hysterical, ignorant mobs try to ruin the lives of people who harbor forbidden thoughts. Progressivism is a broader set of views, which includes wokeness but also includes some other left-wing ideas, such as climate alarmism and opposition to capitalism. Q: Sounds silly. But how is it a threat to Western civilization? A: A few things. (i) It sows discord by teaching people that their true “identity” is some particular group within society (based on race, gender, etc.), and that some other group within society is their group’s enemy. (ii) It undermines loyalty and trust in Western civilization by teaching that the foundation of Western civilization is oppression and evil. (iii) It attacks the norms of free expression that are essential to the pursuit of truth as well as the peaceful resolution of disputes. (iv) It attacks the norms of meritocracy and individualism that are essential to the prosperity of our society. Q: Wow, that sounds bad. But isn’t Wokism just a fringe view of a few inconsequential crazies in the universities? Surely it doesn’t have any real influence on our society. A: That’s what moderate, old-school Democrats would like to think. They don’t want to have to criticize anyone on “their side”, so they try to make excuses and minimize the problem. In Progressive Myths (a book by Dr. Huemer ), you’ll see many quotations indicating how prominent, influential sources spread false, woke propaganda. You’ll see mainstream news sources making factually false reports to support the woke narrative about a given story. You’ll see public officials, up to and including the President, helping to spread these false narratives. You’ll see academic researchers mischaracterizing academic research or suppressing information to support progressive narratives. Woke progressivism has taken over huge swaths of the nation’s educational system, its media, and its entertainment industries. This ideology has been dictating what normal people learn about our society, and woke people have zero concern for objectivity; they have no problem whatsoever with blatant propaganda, suppression of dissent, and deception. In 2021, the year after the George Floyd protests, the S&P 100 companies hired >300,000 new employees. (These are 100 huge companies that appear in the S&P 100 stock market index. They include the likes of Apple, Amazon, Bank of America, Chevron, etc.) Of these new employees, just 6% were white; the other 94% were “POC”s (“people of color”, as the woke refer to non-white people). Bear in mind that about 60% of the country are white. This is obvious and extreme racial discrimination, and it’s obviously driven by the Woke scapegoating of white people. Of course, this is blatantly illegal under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But the woke progressives don’t care. They reject the Civil Rights Act; they think racial discrimination is great, as long as it targets the right group. And they have no fear of anyone actually enforcing the law against them, because the people whose job is to enforce that law are themselves woke ideologues, who will only enforce the law against “the other side”, not against their own side. Btw, Republicans hold roughly half of elected offices in the U.S., but the bureaucracy is mainly leftists, and leftists, as a rule, will not do anything against other leftists. Even moderates who privately know that the wokists are insane will generally not speak up, and they certainly won’t (if they are in a position to do so) do something so rash as trying to take legal action against woke causes. The Woke now control most of the government and most of our large companies, in addition to almost all of our information-producing institutions. Q: I dunno, what’s so great about Western civilization? Why not burn it down? A: Our current society is vastly better than the situation of almost all people throughout human history, on almost all dimensions of human well-being. I won’t go into detail here, but this is discussed more in the book. For now, let’s just say that most people in history lived lives of constant hardship, danger, physical suffering, oppression, and fear of violence. Contemporary America is a Shangri-La of which people in most of the world and almost all of history could not even dream. The progressives living in this paradise are so thoroughly sheltered that they cannot even comprehend what actual hardship is. If they had to experience a day of life in the Middle Ages, or North Korea today, they’d probably die. And this is relevant, because if we disrupt our current society in a large way, the most likely result is “regression to the mean”; that is, a move back toward the normal state of humanity, which is state of abject misery. The minimum “social science” education of every Westerner should include this knowledge, so that everyone appreciates what we currently have and is not eager to throw it away. But discussion of the greatness of our civilization is anathema to the wokeה progressives.Q: Right, of course. But how does your book combat woke progressivism? A: I expose some of the myths that progressives have been using to spread their ideology. Q: Like what? A: Like the myth that unarmed black people are frequently murdered by white people out of pure racism. That women get paid 30% less than men for the same work due to sexism. That global warming is shortly going to destroy human civilization. That most rich people get rich by inheritance, and that it’s almost impossible to get ahead in America once you’re born poor. Q: I guess that seems kind of useful. But that doesn’t prove in general that America and the West aren’t oppressive. Won’t woke people just say that there are some other ways in which we’re horrible, or some other evidence of our racism and sexism? A: Yes, they definitely will. Wokists are almost impervious to evidence. If you rebut one of their examples, they’ll just shift to some other alleged example, without at all diminishing their confidence in their general claims about how horrible our society is. Q: So you have to refute all of their examples of how our society is evil? A: No, that would be impossible. The underlying ideological claim is too broad, and there is an unlimited range of things that someone might say in support of such a broad claim. Q: So then how can you deprogram the Wokists? A: I think there’s probably no way to do it. Q: Well, then what good can your stupid book possibly do? A: I hope that there are some open-minded people who will read it, and it will stop them from becoming woke ideologues. Q: But since you can’t refute every alleged piece of evidence for Wokism, how can it do that? A: Once you see 20 examples of progressive deceptions, you should notice the pattern and know not to trust information that people give you to support progressive ideas. Basically, after reading the book, the next time someone tells you some new piece of evidence that supports progressive ideology, your reaction, if you’re rational, should be “I bet that’s BS.” After reading about what actually happened to Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown, the next time you hear about an innocent, unarmed black man being murdered by a white racist, your initial thought should be, “Yeah, I bet that’s not what happened.” Of course, initial media reports might turn out to be accurate, so don’t completely rule that out. But more likely they aren’t. Q: I guess that makes sense. Then why won’t that work on people who are already Woke? A: Basically because most of them have already adopted certain belief-system defenses that prevent them from revising their belief system. For example, they actually believe that it is morally wrong to question the woke worldview. And you can’t argue them out of that belief either, because they think it would be immoral for them to seriously entertain your arguments.