Rambam laws of acquiring 11 laws 8 and 9. Rav Shach brings there the Rema [Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 207 law 4] that there are some Rishonim that hold that we say, "Things in the heart are not things'' in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the Gemara Ketuboth page 79b. There, there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of Rav Nahman asking for her property back from her daughter. Rav Nahman tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "things in the heart are things" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]  there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the Rema is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were, [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דמוכח ], still by a gift we say ''things in the heart are things.''

This opinion that we say thing in the heart are things for gifts can not  come from Bava Batra 146b because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how Rav Nahman shows that the opinion of the Mishna [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from R Shimon ben Nuri. But the Rema needs a proof that for a gift we say things in the heart are things even when the circumstances do not show it. 

 Gitin 73, Rambam Laws of divorce 9:18 and 19.  The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]] that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear,

   

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכה ח' וט'.There רב שך brings  the רמ''א שלחן ערוך חושו משפט ר''ז ס''ק that there are some ראשונים that hold that we say, "דברים שבלב לא הווי דברים  in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the גמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. There there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of רב נחמן asking for her property back from her daughter. רב נחמן tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "דברים שבלב הווי דברים" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to תוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב 97b]there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the רמ''א is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דלא מוכח ],  by a gift we say things in the heart are things   ---------

This opinion that we say "things in the heart are things" for gifts can not  come from בבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב  because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how רב נחמן shows that the opinion of the משנה [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from ר' שמעון בן נורי. But the רמ''א needs a proof that for a gift we say "things in the heart are things" even when the circumstances  do not show it/

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גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט:י''ח י''ט. The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band of robbers robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear

  

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכות ח' וט'. שם רב שך מביא את הרמ''א שלחן ערוך חושן משפט ר''ז ס''ק   ד' שיש ראשונים שגורסים שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב לא הוי דברים" בקנייה ומכירה, אבל לא במקרה של מתנה. אני חושב שדעה זו באה מהגמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. יש מקרה של אישה שהתאלמנה, וכן היא רצתה להתחתן בשנית. אבל היא לא רצתה שבעלה הבא יקבל את הרכוש שלה, אז היא כתבה מסמך שמסרה הכל לבתה. ואז היא נישאה והתגרשה, ובאה לבית הדין של רב נחמן ובקשה רכוש בחזרה מבתה. רב נחמן קרע את המסמך, וכך היא קיבלה את רכושה בחזרה. כך אנו רואים "דברים שבלב הוי דברים" במקרה של מתנה.

 

אני קצת מקצר כאן. כי לתוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב יש מקרים שצריך לציין את התנאים. וישנם מקרים נוספים בהם ברור מהנסיבות שכוונת המוכר ברורה ואין הוא צריך לציין את תנאי המכירה בגלוי. ויש מקרים אחרים שבהם מכירה היא סופית, לא משנה מה היו הכוונות. אבל המקרה של הרמ''א הוא שגם כשאי אפשר לדעת מהנסיבות מה היו הכוונות, במתנה אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים.

דעה זו שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" למתנות אינה יכולה לבוא מבבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב כי יש נסיבות המעידות על כוונתו. כך מראה רב נחמן שדעת המשנה [שכאשר יש נסיבות המראות את כוונתו אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים] באה מר' שמעון בן נורי. אבל הרמ''א צריך הוכחה שבשביל מתנה אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" גם כשהנסיבות אינן מראות זאת. 

היינו הנסיבות הצביעו בכיוון זה אך לא היו ברורות לחלוטין [אומדנא  שאינו מוכח

גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט: י''ח י''ט. המקרה הוא כשמישהו אומר: "זה הגט שלך אם אני לא אקום ממיטת החולה הזו", ואיזה אירוע לא צפוי קורה כמו אריה אוכל אותו. יש ספק אם הגירושין תקפים. כמו כן, יש מקרה שבו מוכרים משהו וקובעים שהמכירה תקפה גם אם מתרחש אירוע בלתי צפוי כמו להקת שודדים שודדת אותו. אבל אז מתרחש אירוע שהוא כל כך נדיר שאף אחד לא יכול היה לחשוב עליו כגון הנהר שהיה משקה אותו נפסק. אז המכירה לא תקפה והקונה מקבל את כספו בחזרה. השאלה שלי היא "דברים בלב הם לא דברים". אז למה זה צריך לשנות אם אירוע היה צפוי או לא? התשובה חייבת להיות כמו תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב שיש מקרים שברור מן הנסיבות [אומדנא דמוקח ]שכוונת המוכר ברורה.

 I do not agree with most of modern education, I my mind the thing to concentrate on are Mathematics Physics and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach  But I would also agree to learning Mechanical Engineering -which after all was what my father father majored in in school. But you might ask, "What if I am not talented in Math?" To answer that question I have mentioned that to some Rishonim, learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning the Oral Law.  [These would be Rishonim that were going by Rav Saadia Gaon Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam] That means that it is a mitzvah to learn them whether one i talented or not.

 רב לכם בני לוי In the chapters that we read this week in parshat Korah, both Moses  and the congregation of Korach accuse each other of being the rav of the "kelipa"[that is rav *(religious teacher) of the Dark Side] [This is how Rav Isaac Luria explains these verses]. For in the congregation of Korah were the greatest teachers of Torah in that generation as the second Rashi in the Parsha explains--that they were the 250 heads of the sanhedrins

[background note--Korah and his group were against Moses [Moshe], At  the beginning of their revolt they said to moses [''we have had enough of you children of Levi. Literally that is "That is too much of you Children of Levi" But the language also can mean, "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)" and Moses threw at them the exact same accusation "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)"  

One flaw in John Locke and the Declaration of Independence is the assumption that all men are created equal. This is a fiction. Just like in animal species, there is a divergence into different species, so the human species is diverging into separate species. And we know that the Constitution of the USA was never meant to work for  vastly different kinds of groups as the Founding Fathers said openly. It was meant mainly for a homogenous group of people: White Anglo Saxon Protestants. Other groups with a different kind of value system might need a different kind of government. One example is the former Soviet Union, even though it was founded on a flawed system of economics, still the brutality of the later czars gave people the idea that a system that favored working people [the proletariat ]  would be better that being slaves to the parasitic nobles and aristocracy.  And when the system failed, many people felt that they had fallen into chaos, not a liberal free democracy. For there to be any safety to walk on the street, there had to be unofficial war lords in charge of each area of a city in order to preserve peace and order.

 The world is shifting from the USA to the Russian -Chinese alliance. The Chinese space station is a case that already shows this shift. Rewarding merit instead of racial or sexual preference shows up in actual accomplishment.

[This is enough for me to wonder if Hegel actually had some good points as an extension of Kant. There is something odd going on in the USA, and it makes me wonder if perhaps there might be some essential flaw in the system itself? I admit to being somewhat in favor of Hegel because the only Hegel I read was  the Logic part of the Encyclopedia--almost the last thing he wrote which is closely reasoned--rather than the earlier works where most people start. Plus McTaggart who is a formidable proponent of Hegel. But I am not saying either that McTaggart got everything right either--even in Hegel.   

Idea Bava Metzia ch.8-9

Continued from yesterday. Rav Shach   never actually wrote that the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that Tosphot must hold the law of a pledge comes from a decree of the Torah where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. Tosphot in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her 100 zuz and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the mana [100 zuz"] she would in fact be by that married. In other words, if he just says, "You are married to me by  a mana that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the mana. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if lashon hara/slander is said in front of three people one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it i considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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 רב שך   never actually wrote that the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ם depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that תוספות must hold the law of a pledge comes from a גזירת הכתוב where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. תוספות in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her מאה זוז and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the מנה'" she would in fact be by that married. In other words if he just says "You are married to me by  a מנה that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the מנה. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if לשון הרע is said in front of three people, one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it  considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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רב שך מעולם לא כתב שהוויכוח בין תוספות לרמב''ם תלוי איך אתה מבין את הקטגוריה של משכון. נראה שמה שהוא התכוון היה שתוספות חייב להחזיק שחוק המשכון מגיע מגזירת הכתוב שבו הוא נמצא במקרה של הלוואה. לפיכך היא חייבת לבוא רק במקרה שישנה התחייבות. תוספות מחזיק אם היה נותן לה מסמך שאומר שהוא חייב לתת לה מאה זוז ולומר ש"את נשואה לי בזאת במסמך הזה, והנה משכון עד שאתן את המנה" היא בעצם תהיה על ידי זה שנשוי. כלומר אם רק יאמר "את נשואה לי במנה שאתן לך, והנה משכון עד שאתן", היא לא נשואה בזה כי אין לו חובה לתת את המנה. אבל כאן אפשר לשאול: יהא הדין שעל ידי האמירה ההיא היא נשואה כך, ואז הוא יהיה חייב לתת לה את המנה. ועכשיו היא נשואה. הדבר דומה לשאלה על הדין שאם נאמר לשון הרע בפני שלושה אנשים, מותר לאחר מכן לומר. הסיבה היא שמאחר שיש כבר שלושה אנשים שמודיעים, זה נחשב כבר ידוע. אלא שיהא הדין שאי אפשר לומר זאת אף על פי שנאמר בפני שלושה אנשים, ואז לא יהיו שלושה אנשים שמפרסמים

Kidushin 8. Rambam Marriage chapter 5 halacha 23

If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a pruta [penny], and here is a pledge until I give the pruta." She is not married because there is no pruta [penny], and there is no pledge. Thus sayeth Rava in Kiduhin. What does this mean, "There is no pledge?" Tosphot holds there is no pledge because there is no obligation to give the pruta. But if had written a document saying that he would give a pruta or had made kinyan sudar [acquisition by a scarf] she would be married, But what is the regular case of a pledge? Is it specifically from a decree of the Torah that there is such a thing as a pledge --. If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But is a pledge is a general sort of thing that a pledge can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how Rav Shach seems to explain the Tosphot.

 But on the other side, there is the Rambam and Rashba that hold she is not married and there is no pledge because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of Rav Shach is that this approach of the Rambam and the Rashba goes according to the way of understanding a pledge as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the Rambam and Rashba either. I admit I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either,

So Rav Shach must mean the opposite. A pledge is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. and this is the reasoning of Tosphot that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the Rambam and Rashba is that there is in general  an acquiring of a pledge that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition. But if so, then in the case of kidushin, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

So what the Rambam and Rashba mean  is that even though this pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no kidushin. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a category of a kidushin  

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If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a פרוטה and here is a  משכון until I give the פרוטה." She is not married because there is no פרוטה and there is no משכון. Thus sayeth רבא in קידושין ח. What does this mean, "There is no משכון?" And תוספות holds there is no  משכון because there is no obligation to give the פרוטה. But if had written a שטר saying that he would give  פרוטה or had made קניין סודר  (handkerchief)  she would be married. But what is the regular case of a משכון? Is it specifically from a גזירת הכתוב that there is such a thing as a משכון . If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But if a משכון is a general sort of thing that a משכון can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how  רב שך  seems to explain the תוספות. But on the other side, there is the רמב''ם and רשב''א that hold she is not married and there is no משכון because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of  רב שך is that this approach of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א goes according to the way of understanding a משכון as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the  רמב''ם and רשב''א either.  I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either, So רב שך must mean the opposite. A משכון is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. And this is the reasoning of תוספות that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א is that there is in general  an acquiring of a משכון that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition.

But if so, then in the case of קידושין, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

so what the  רמב''ם and רשב''א  mean  is that, even though the pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no קידושין. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a  קידושין   

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אם אומר לאישה "את נשואה לי בפרוטה והנה משכון עד שאתן פרוטה". היא לא נשואה כי אין פרוטה ואין משכון. כה אומר רבא בקידושין ף ח. מה זה אומר "אין משכון?" תוספות מחזיק אין משכון כי אין חובה לתת את הפרוטה. אבל אם היה כותב שטר שייתן פרוטה או עשה קניין סודר (מטפחת) היא נשואה. אבל מהו המקרה הרגיל של משכנתא? האם זה ספציפית מגזירת הכתוב שיש דבר כזה משכון. אם כן, זה רק במקרה של הלוואה. אבל אם משכון הוא מעין דבר כללי שאפשר לתת משכון עד שתתקיים חובה כלשהי? כך נראה רב שך שמסביר את התוספות. אבל מהצד השני יש את הרמב''ם והרשב''א שמחזיקים שהיא לא נשואה ואין משכון כי שום דבר בעל ערך כספי לא הגיע אליה. המשמעות של רב שך היא שגישה זו של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הולכת לפי דרך הבנת משכון כנגזרה מגזרת התורה, שהיא להלוואה. אבל נראה שגם זה לא מתאים לרמב''ם ורשב''א. התלבטתי בנושא זה כי במקרה של התורה, (במקרה של הלוואה), גם שום דבר בעל ערך לא הגיע למלווה, אז רב שך חייב להתכוון להיפך. משכון הוא רק במקרה של התחייבות לפי גזירת התורה  כגון במקרה של הלוואה. וזהו נימוק התוספות שאם היה מסמך המחייב אותו, אז הייתה נשואה. והנימוק של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הוא שיש בכלל רכישת משכון שפשוט רכישת חפץ בתנאי שההלוואה לא תשולם או כל תנאי אחר

אבל אם כן, אז במקרה של קידושין, מדוע המשכון פחות מכל משכון אחר שניתן בתנאי?

אז מה שהרמב''ם והרשב''א מתכוונים זה שאף על פי שלמשכון הזה יש קטגוריה אמיתית של משכון, עדיין על ידי זה שהוא לא נשאר אצלה, אין קידושין. זו אותה סיבה שגם מתנה בתנאי להחזיר אינה גורמת לקידושין

 Rav Nahman did not hold with learning philosophy nor any secular studies. He echoed Rav Hai Gaon. But this was not the approach of Ibn Pakuda and Rambam. I went with the approach of Rav Nahman for a few years and yet my experiences with the more or less ghetto [frum] ultra religious world gave me reason to  reconsider. And so with due respect to Rav Nahman, I tend to the approach of Ibn Pakuda, Rambam and Gra who all held from the importance of some secular disciplines - but with a lot of limitations. In the long run, I have to conclude that certain philosophers of the ancient Greeks are important, and Kant also. The natural sciences also. However psychology is pseudo  science. See Karl Popper for the reason.

[In the approach of the Rambam, physics and metaphysics are apart of the mitzvah to learn Gemara. in laws of learning Torah where he says divide the learning into three parts--written law, oral law, gemara. and the subjects brought in the first four chapters are in the category of gemara.]

a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason

There is a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason, This is in Kant when he showed

even to begin reason one needs categories of space and time and causality that can not be known by reason. Nor can they be known by empirical reasoning as Hume showed 

 Whitehead suggested a third kind of fact that is not a mind fact  nor a physical fact in order to escape the Mind -Body Problem. {Process and Reality published 1929}. This has been excluded  from academia from around 1980. But this idea dovetails nicely with the Friesian kind of third source of knowledge that i non intuitive immediate knowledge.[And that too has been excluded from Academia]. [The third kind of fact is what is known by the third kind of knowledge.]

For someone like me this sort of thing that Whitehead suggested make a lot of sense because I am used to seeing in Quantum Mechanics formulations based on Lagrange [Kinetic without potential energy] or Hamilton. In these formulations f Physics the electron knows where to go. It goes where there is minimum of energy, the lowest energy level. But it doe not try out other venues before it does so. So how does the electron know? 

The advantage of Whitehead and Fries is in the categories of Kant. The Kant proof of their validity has been a problem almost immediately after  the ink was dry on The Critique of Pure Reason