Athens and Jerusalem

Athens and Jerusalem -faith and reason. in the middle ages that meant Plato and neo-platonic thought as we see in Duties of the Hearts. But at some point the emphasis got put on Aristotle. But I believe that the problems presented by the Mind- Body problem cannot be ignored, and thus you need some sort of answer. In my opinion, that is best found in Kant and the modified Kantian approach of Leonard Nelson. [And politics is downstream from philosophy, so this Kantian approach is really a much bigger deal than it seems to be on the surface. More over, this approach in itself needs clarification  for it starts with Beneke and Jacob Fries, but this was a sort of neo Kant approach that no one took seriously until nelson.  ]        

 The Obligations of the Hearts [Chovot Levavot] and all Rishonim take the view of faith with reason. in modern language that translates into the approach of a denial of absolute religious fundamentalisms and a denial of radical secularism. That means that  fundamentalism of Torah is in itself  a path of balance. You can see this in every chapter of the Chovot Levavot where for every good character trait he brings proof from the written Torah, the oral Torah and from reason [which to him means Aristotle, Plato, or Plotinus]

The marriage strike. MGTOW. Men going their own way.

 I think it is time to change secular laws about men. There is no reason why a wife can pick up a phone and send her husband to jail and prison, take away his children and money and reputation.  You can understand the MGTOW movement--men going their own way and refusing to get married or anything that can be considered marriage by the state. For once the state is involved, it is there forever.  

However, I can still see getting married as long as the wife learns the laws about lashon hara [slander] every day. [These laws are in the book Gates of.Repentance ] For people with values and that admit when they are wrong or have done wrong are still people that one can have a forever relationship with.

It is hard to know the laws of lashon hara without Gates of Repentance although they are in the gemara [Talmud]. Still to know them from the Talmud is hard, because they are spread out all over the place.  

[The main place in the Torah where the actual law  of lashon hara is stated is in Leviticus לא תלך רכיל בעמיך "Do not go as a tale bearer among your people." ] 

The best way to deal with a situation in which a wife is making her powerplay is to have values that you will not break under any circumstances.  Show her the door. 

Some of the basic problems with false allegations are the lashon hara problem;-- that is saying even what is true in order to cause damage.  There are, of course, many prohibitions that are involved in false allegations, but the lashon hara one is the most severe.

The general rules are that you need several conditions in order to say anything negative about someone: truth, rebuke, first hand evidence, not hearsay, intent to benefit someone, not cause harm that would not come according to din law of the Torah, not exaggerate. With issues between man and God the conditions seem to be less strict in that they do not seem to require all these conditions and there is some doubt about which ones apply--and it looks that a simple fact about someone' reputation is enough. that is that if it is common knowledge. 

Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron concerning the State of Israel.

I believe that the people of Israel ought to return to Israel mainly because of the opinion of the Ramban [Nachmanidess] who holds it is a positive command. But also i think one ought to support the State of Israel because it was made in order to facilitate the possibility of fulfilling this command. I was not always aware of the importance of the State of Israel until I noticed the opinion of both Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the state is the law [Bava Batra 35].That statement of the Talmud is well known but Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron both said that that applies also to the State of Israel. What makes this especially relevant nowadays is that girls in the USA tend to be JAP's [Jewish American Princess's] and thus not marriageable material. They have an attitude problem.   And even if they did not, the laws are made in such  way to put a loaded gun into the hands of any wife. She can, with one phone call, put a man into prison, take away his children and money and reputation any time she feels like it. What kind of trusting relationship can anyone have with a partner that has a loaded gun pointed at their head?

The Ramban you can find in his commentary on Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam. Reb Aaron's approach I found in a book of musar that he wrote. Reb Moshe --I forget where I found his opinion, but I think it is well known in the circles that knew Reb Moshe. But those were not my circles. I was at the Mir in N.Y. and really had no idea of the opinion of these two great sages. I had heard of the Rav of Satmer, Reb Yoel who disagreed, but that just makes the issue an argument among the authorities. And even though I really am no where near the greatness of these sages, still I think the law is like Reb Moshe, and besides that, you see that Rav Ovadia Yoseph held along the lines of Reb Moshe and Reb Aaron.     

Sharira Gaon on Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] [The statement of Sharira Gaon is brought in the Itur]

 The nice thing I thought about  Sharira Gaon is that to him Rava and R. Yose [Bava Batra 22] come out parallel. Even though to the Rishonim, there are ways of explaining things, still  the approach of Rav Sharira Gaon makes a great deal of sense, For to Rava one can not dig a hole right next to the border of his neighbor. And to Sharira Gaon R Yose agrees with the sages that it is incumbent one one who might cause damage to move away some distance between himself and his neighbor. Otherwise it is hard to understand how R. Yose who holds it is upon the one that might be damaged to distance himself and Rava could agree.   [Sharira Gaon says R. Yose agrees with the decision of the sages, but not their reasoning- but also that the law is like Rava only in the case of a pit where just by digging he causes the ground on the other side of the border to be weakened. Thus to Rav Sharira Gaon, the the law is to bring close to the border anything besides a pit is ok-- as long as there is nothing there at the time that can be damaged. 

The Rishonim explain this differently (1) Rava is saying his law only in the case of a pit [hole in the ground because that is directly damaging the field of his neighbor; i.e. "his arrows". (2) The Rif and Tosphot say who comes first to the border can stay, and the neighbor who wants to put something on his side of the border can do so if he does not mind. But the first one can stay. (3) Rambam says the first neighbor can put  something there, but then if the neighbor puts something that can be damaged next to the border, then the first one then has to move away.]  (4) Some say the only permission is if the neighbor is new and bought that property after there is already something at the border that can damage. 

The Reasoning of Sharira Gaon is that one statement of the Gemara is that R. Yose is saying his law in answer to the sages in one case but really he disagrees with them in all cases. The another statement  is that he agrees with them. So Sharira is deciding with the later statement.

I can imagine that Harvard takes smart people from the pool of applicants, but from the long gone years of some good teachers, it seems to be in rapid decline. The physics that has come out of Harvard has been the result of no name people. [The greats are at Cal Tech, Stanford and Princeton. No where near Harvard.]The philosophy that came from there has been sloppy .

The Transcendental Deduction of Kant never really worked.

  Mainly, I believe that the Leonard Nelson approach makes the most sense because the transcendental deduction of Kant never really worked to be able to combine reason and perception. As Kelley Ross put it,-- both must  have a deeper source.  That is non-intuitive immediate knowledge. But as Michael Huemer pointed out, that there is no reason to believe implanted knowledge has any relation to reality.  Therefore, immediate non-intuitive knowledge (-the axioms by which knowledge starts) must be open to correction. It is not infallible. And if one asks-- that empirical facts ought not to be able to correct a priori knowledge, -that is where Hegel comes in handy. [Hegel would not have wanted empirical facts to correct an a priori, but even so even in Hegel, logic and reason flow through everything. Every fact is partly a priori.] There is a point where knowledge itself gets to a plateau, and gets above it by contrasting two points where separate series of reasoning led to and end up in a contradiction by which one starts the whole process again. Something like Electromagnetism and Newton that contradicted until you got Special Relativity,-- and Relativity and Quantum Mechanics contradicted until you got Quantum Field Theory; and to sew up gravity, you get String Theory. [In STRING THEORY, I think there is a way forward with Hashimoto Flow in differential geometry, i.e. to see how the closed strings develop in time.]

The issue here are the two points of Jacob Fries: empirical facts can not tell us anything about  how to make logical deductions. And logical deductions can't tell us if there is a continent between Europe and Asia.  

[There is no problem here from General Relativity because to Kant, space is a formal intuition.--Not a priori.]

There is another problem in Kant's transcendental deduction. That deduction says that the knowledge of transcendental subject depends on the knowledge of the transcendental object;-  and knowledge of the transcendental object depends on knowledge of the unity of the transcendental subject. The circularity here does not bother me, even though it probably should. What bothers me is that how can knowledge of object A be dependent on knowledge of object B? Or more precisely: Why is it that Kant says I can not know that I exist unless I know that something else exists?  I assume people in Europe knew that Europe existed before they knew that America existed. Therefore I think that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right that there has to be a deeper source of knowledge: immediate non intuitive knowledge.

I realize that there is a certain amount of stretching things to combine Fries and Hegel in the way that I am doing it here. But what I am doing here I think is somewhat like Plotinus when he combined Plato and Aristotle.] 

I might mention here that I have thought a lot about the Fries-Leonard Nelson approach for years and how it compares with the Hegel- McTaggart approach. [Though there are other approaches to Kant and Hegel but these seem the best of both. But in the long run I think I have to go with the Leonard Nelson non intuitive immediate knowledge idea.] 

the age of prophecy is over.

In Zachariah 13 verse 3 it says that if one will prophesize his parents will tell him''you deserve to die because  you have spoken falsely in the name of the Lord' and then will stab him to death. Then a bit later    Zachariah continues that people  will ask one, ''Are you a prophet?" He will say, "I am just a working guy." And they will ask, "Then what then are those bruises on your hands?" And he will say, "I was at my girl friend's house, and they beat me up." So the idea is that the age of prophecy is over. That is after all the context of those verses--that God will get rid of the spirit of evil from the land. 

 During the era of Victorian England, people were  over much thinking and talking about death. People would spend vast fortunes on their future grave monuments,-- but sex was never discussed, and thought to be in extremely terrible taste to even mention it. Nowadays, people are thinking and talking all the time about sex, while death is a forbidden subject. But things are again changing into obsession's with power.--the attempt to take power from anyone who has had it, and give it to the least powerful--the race and competition to be the best victim. This age is reducing all relations to power relations.--Love is non-existant.  

 Both learning in depth with lots of review and learning by just saying the words and going on are mentioned in the gemara.''לעולם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג לא ידע מאי קאמר'' ''Always one should learn fast  by just saying the words even though he forgets and even though he does not even know what he is saying.'' And there is the event where one teacher was teaching each his lesson to his student 400 times until he understood. Then one day the student was not paying attention, so the teacher taught the same lesson another 400 times. Then in that merit, he was granted 400 years of life and that all the people of his generation would merit to the world to come.

So you need both. my suggestion is to do the in-depth learning in math, physics and gemara [talmud] in the morning and the fast type in the afternoon and evening as is the regular order in most Litvak yeshivot. [However, I do not think that Shar Yashuv had any set time for fast learning,-- as all the learning there was in depth.]   [My son, Isaac, told me many times that the main thing is in depth learning, and that fast learning (saying the words in order and going on) should only be after one has completed his in-depth learning sessions.] 

בבא בתרא כ''ב Bava Batra page 22 and In Laws of Neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam.

In laws of neighbors (9:13) in the Rambam, we have the law that one can put the leftovers of the olive press or other forms of garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The Gra explains  this in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 155:8) it is because the oven is a doubt, and in case of doubt in prohibitions the law is to be strict, and in money the law is to be lenient. So before the attic is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the attic was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the Avi Ezri the notebook on laws of damages paragraph 2 and the Avi Ezri on that law in the Rambam.] I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the ""chezkat mamon" possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built the garbage has little right to remain while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

      

___________________________________________________________________________

In הלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג in the רמב''ם we have the law that one can put the גפת leftovers of the olive press or  garbage next to the border of his neighbor until the neighbor puts up a wall there. Then he must take the garbage away so that it does not damage that wall. But if  an upstairs neighbor is planning on making the upper floor a storage place for fruit, then he can object if the downstairs neighbor wants to make an oven downstairs right underneath. But if the oven was put there anyway, it can stay. What makes the oven more strict than the leftovers of the olive press before the attic is made into a storage space, and less strict afterwards? The גר''א explains this in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח'  it is because the oven is a doubt. In case of doubt in prohibitions, the law is to be strict.  In doubt of  money, the law is to be lenient. So before the upper floor is made for storage, the question is that of the prohibition to cause damage, so we are strict. After the upper floor was made for storage, the question is that of money, and so we are lenient. My question here is that even after the oven was put downstairs and the attic is used for storage, still the question seems to be that of causing damage to the fruit.  [See the רב שך אבי עזרי the notebook on קונטרס הרחקת נזקים paragraph ב and the אבי עזרי on that law in the רמב''ם. ]      

I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. It is that the חזקת ממון possession of garbage is weaker than possession of an oven. So while after the  the wall is built, the garbage has little right to remain, while the oven has more of a right to remain.   

בהלכות שכנים פרק ט' הלכה י''ג ברמב''ם יש את הדין שאפשר לשים את שאריות הגפת של בית בד או אשפה ליד גבול שכנו עד שהשכן ישים חומה שם. אז הוא חייב לקחת את האשפה כדי שלא יפגע בקיר הזה. אבל אם השכן מלמעלה מתכנן להפוך את הקומה העליונה למקום אחסון לפירות, אז הוא יכול להתנגד אם השכן מלמטה רוצה להכין תנור למטה ממש מתחת. אבל אם התנור הונח שם בכל זאת, הוא יכול להישאר. מה מחמיר את התנור משאריות בית הבד לפני הפיכת עליית הגג לחלל אחסון, ופחות מחמיר לאחר מכן? הגר''א מסביר זאת בשלחן ערוך חושן משפט קנ''ה ס''ק ח' זה משום שהתנור ספק. במקרה של ספק באיסורים, יש להחמיר את הדין. בספק כסף, החוק צריך להיות מקל. אז לפני שהקומה העליונה נעשית לאחסון, השאלה היא של איסור גרימת נזק, ולכן אנחנו מחמירים. לאחר שהקומה העליונה נעשתה לאחסון, השאלה היא של כסף, ולכן אנו מקלים. השאלה שלי כאן היא שגם לאחר שהוכנס התנור למטה ועליית הגג משמשת לאחסון, עדיין נראה שהשאלה היא של גרימת נזק לפרי. [ראה רב שך אבי עזרי קונטרס הרחקת נזקים פסקה ב', ובאבי עזרי על הדין ההוא ברמב''ם. ]

אני רוצה להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו. זה שהחזקת ממון של אשפה חלשה יותר מהחזקה של תנור. אז בעוד שלאחר בניית הקיר, לאשפה אין זכות להישאר, בעוד שלתנור יש יותר זכות להישאר

wisdom of the Greeks

 Even though the wisdom of the Greeks is frowned upon in the Gemara, many Rishonim (note 1) did not think that applied to Plato or Aristotle but to the other schools of Greek philosophy. [There were four such schools altogether including Epicurus ]. It seems likely that the Rishonim understood the objection of the sages was directed against  Epicurus. otherwise it is hard to understand why the Rambam would have written that מעשה מרכבה ומעשה בראשית the Divine Chariot and the Work of Creation mentioned in the Mishna and Gemara refer to what the ancient Greeks called Physics and Metaphysics   

(note 1)   [FIRST AUTHORITIES from the  Rif [Isaac ALFASSI ] up until the Beit Joseph [JOSEPH KARO-author of the SHULCHAN ARUCH]--not including the Beit Joseph]

My opinion is that the prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].

 The major point of the Book of Maccabees is against worship of idols. The miracle of the oil and the menorah are not even mentioned. The only thing that comes up is that the king of Syria put up an idol and demanded that people worship it and when someone went over to bow down to that idol, Matisyahu killed him, and started the rebellion against Syrian rule.   [My opinion is that this prohibition of idolatry was the basic point of the herem [excommunication] that was signed by the Gra [Gaon of Vilna].]

[And I believe that herem is still valid and in force, but I do not think it applies to Rav Nahman of Breslov for reason that looking at the actual language of the herem, I noticed it did not seem applicable to him. ]

THE king of Syria, Antiochus is referred to as Greek because he was king of of of the four areas conquered by Alexander of Macedonia which after conquering Greece adopted much of Greek culture. AS a result, ''Greek wisdom'' got a negative review until Rav Saadia Gaon, ibn Pakuda, the Rambam. and the Gra. I myself would have been happy to it a learn Gemara, and ignore all ''outside learning'' until I discovered the opinion of these above mentioned  sages that wrote about the importance of certain aspects of secular learning--but not all. learning.  Physics and Metaphysics, in fact, the Rambam writes are included in the commandments to love and fear God. But most of what today is considered science is pseudo science [e.g., psychology], and would  not be included in these commandments 

'' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one]

 The synthesis faith and reason was the major idea of the Middle Ages. Each by itself can get seriously out of kilter. This is a case where faith in the Bible can correct flaws in reason. '' Male and female HE created them.'' [Genesis chapter one].

Reason by itself does not tell us much. To Hume it is confined to analytic propositions. Kant struggled mightily for ten years to answer this approach of Hume, and came up with his justification of synthetic a priori knowledge-which is that it is justified within the realm of possibility of experience. But this approach in itself has been subject to debate until rejected totally by both continental and Anglo American so called ''Analytic philosophy.'' The approach favored by me is the Kant-Friesian School [Leonard Nelson] which rightly shows that reason itself has to have starting principles-otherwise it can not get off the ground. This is by immediate non-intuitive knowledge.

But this problem has been rejected by Michael Huemer who says reason itself recognizes universals, i.e., a priori knowledge. While what he says is quite true, however it leaves the problem of how does reason recognize what principles are more ''reasonable''. What criteria does one have to judge. He depends on probability [of Bayes], but even there one needs criteria to decide what is more reasonable.  

The main contenders of the Kant Friesian School of Leonard Nelson were the neo- Kantian and Husserl. The Neo-Kantians have gone into oblivion, and Husserl is incoherent. What does he think?--to boil down a person to discover his essence? That is like boiling down a whale into its constituent atoms to find out what is the essence of a  whale.   And  his method of phenomenology  he never got around to defining what exactly it is. No wonder David Hilbert sided with Nelson. And there is a bit of poetic justice in that Husserl was paid back in kind in his efforts to block Nelson from a professorship. [That was when his own student, Heidegger, got Husserl removed from his professorship. Payback is a bitch.   

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a]

The Mishna [Bava Batra page 2a] says if a wall falls down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The Rashba [[Bava Batra page 4]] asks what if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, ''I built half and my neighbor built half.'' The Rashba answers [according to Rav Shach] since it is derara demomona [relevance of money] still both divide evenly. But what about Tosphot [Bava Metzia page 2a ]? To Tosphot when there is derara demomona that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the Mishna is Sumchos [money in doubt is divided]. And this is not far fetched, since the stam mishnas [anonymous mishnas  ] in the three bavot hold like Sumchos. However, we see the Rambam still decided the halacha like this mishna even though it is like Sumchos. The reason might be that if  the sages would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the Mishna does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

I am aware of the fact that in Bava Metzia pg 100 there is some modification of Sumchos, but I forget what was said there, and it could be it might disprove my suggestion here. If so, I am willing to retract.  All this is just a suggestion that this first mishna in Bava Batra might be Sumchos, and if so, that would help Tosphot.

_________________________________________________________________________

The משנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א  says if a wall fall down between two neighbors, they divide the stones or bricks evenly. The רשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד   asks What if one says, ''I built all of the wall',' and the other says, 'I built half and my neighbor built half. The רשב''א answers [according to רב שך] since it is דררא  דממונא still both divide evenly. But what about תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? To תוספות when there is דררא דממונא that is when the court says one takes three fourths and the other one fourth. I would like to answer this question thus. Perhaps the משנה is סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים . And this is not far fetched, since the סתם משנה in the three בבות hold like סומכוס. However, we see the רמב''ם still decided the הלכה like this משנה even though it is מסתבר like סומכוס. The reason might be that if  the חכמים would disagree with it, why did they not say so? So it must be that they agree. This leads me to a different answer. Perhaps if the one neighbor would say, ''I built all'' and the other would say, ''I built half'', then we would divide three fourths to one and one fourth to the other. It just so happens that the משנה does not deal with that case. Perhaps they are saying nothing and the case is that the bricks fell into one yard only.

המשנה בבא בתרא ב' ע''א אומרת שאם נפל קיר בין שני שכנים, מחלקים את האבנים או הלבנים באופן שווה. הרשב''א בבא בתרא דף ד' שואל מה אם אחד אומר ''בניתי את כל החומה'', והשני אומר ''בניתי חצי ושכני בנה חצי''. עונה הרשב''א [לפי רב שך] כיון שזה דררא דממונא עדיין שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. אבל מה לגבי תוספות בבא מציעא ב' ע''א? לתוספות כשיש דררא דממונא שבית הדין אומר אחד נוטל שלש רביעיות והשני רביעית. אני רוצה לענות על השאלה הזו כך. אולי המשנה היא סומכוס, ממון המוטל בספק חולים. וזה לא מופרך, מכיוון שהסתם משנה בשלושת הבבות מחזיקה כמו סומכוס. עם זאת, אנו רואים שהרמב''ם עדיין החליט על ההלכה כמו המשנה הזו למרות שזה מסתבר כמו סומכוס. הסיבה עשויה להיות שאם החכמים יחלקו על כך, מדוע לא אמרו זאת? אז כנראה שהם מסכימים. זה מוביל אותי לתשובה אחרת. אולי אם השכן האחד היה אומר ''בניתי הכל'' והשני היה אומר ''בניתי חצי'', אז נחלק שלוש רביעיות לאחד ורביעית לשנייה. המשנה לא מטפלת במקרה הזה. אולי הם לא אומרים כלום והמקרה הוא שהלבנים נפלו לחצר אחת בלבד

I was thinking about the idea of Rav Shach in the Rambam [laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18.] off and on for a few weeks. I felt there was some sort of question that I should ask, but I could not see it exactly until today on my way to the sea. So here it is: 

 I have a question on the way Rav Shach explains the Rashba in Bava Batra page 4 side a , brought in Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 18. . My question is that derara demomona [a relevance of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment, we say they divide equally. Or if one says, ''It is all mine'' and the other says, ''It is half mine,'' then 1/4 goes to the last one, and 1/2 to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is derara demomona. Tosfot Bava Metzia page 2a based on the mishna there and the case of the boat in Bava Batra page 35.  

But in Bava Batra, the first mishna says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The gemara on page 4 asks, "Is that not obvious?" The Rashba there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? Rav Shach explains there that the intension of the Rashba is because each has derara demomona which means there is a doubt to the court even without their claims, and therefore the court ignores their claims and divides the wall equally.

The question on this is that derara demomona in the beginning of Bava Metzia means that the court pays attention to their claims,--as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here Rav Shach is saying derara demomona is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.     

There is an obvious answer, the Rashba is not Tosphot. But my question is based on the idea that the Rashba had a reason for his approach and the Tosphot also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

 ___________________________________________________________________________

 I have a question on the way רב שך explains the רשב''א in בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (This is brought in the רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח.) My question is that דררא דממונא [a שייכות of money] goes like this. If there is an argument between two people about who owns a ship or boat and there is no proof one way or the other, we say who ever grabs it first gets it. But for two people holding a garment we say they divide equally. Or if one says it is all mine and the other says it is half mine, then a fourth goes to the last one and חצי to the first. The difference is that with the garment, there is דררא דממונא. And תוספות בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''א based on the משנה there and the case of the boat in בבא בתרא דף ל''ה. But in בבא בתרא, the first משנה says  two neighbors must build a wall between their properties. Therefor if it falls the stones or bricks are divided equally between them. The גמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א asks, "Is that not obvious?" The רשב''א there asks, "Why is it obvious? What if one says, 'I built all of the wall.' and the other claims each one built half of the wall? רב שך explains there that the intension of the רשב''א is because each has דררא דממונא which means there is a doubt to the בית דין even without their claims, and therefore the בית דין ignores their claims and divides the wall equally. The question on this is that דררא דממונא  in the beginning of בבא מציעא means that the בית דין pays attention to their claims, as opposed to ignoring their claims, and letting them settle the matter by themselves. But here רב שך is saying דררא דממונא is a reason to ignore their claims, and simply divide the wall equally.   

There is an obvious answer, the רשב''א is not תוספות. But my question is based on the idea that the רשב''א had a reason for his approach and the תוספות also. Thus the question is based on the issues, not on who said what 

יש לי שאלה בדרך רב שך מבאר את הרשב''א בבבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א. (זה מובא בהלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י''ח) השאלה שלי היא שדררא דממונא הולך ככה. אם יש ויכוח בין שני אנשים לגבי מי הבעלים של ספינה או סירה ואין הוכחה לכאן או לכאן, אנו אומרים שמי שחוטף אותה קודם מקבל אותה. אבל לשני אנשים שמחזיקים בגד אנחנו אומרים שהם מחלקים שווה בשווה. או אם אחד אומר שהכל שלי והשני אומר  חצי שלי, אז רביעי הולך לאחרון וחצי לראשון. ההבדל הוא שעם הבגד יש דררא דממונא. (תוספות בבא מציעא דף בע''א לפי המשנה שם ומקרה הסירה בבבא בתרא דף ל''ה.) אבל בבבא בתרא, המשנה הראשונה אומרת ששני שכנים חייבים לבנות חומה בין הנכסים שלהם. לכן אם היא נופלת, האבנים או הלבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. שואל הגמרא בבא בתרא דף ד' ע''א "האם זה לא מובן מאליו?" הרשב''א שם שואל: "למה זה ברור? מה אם הראשון יגיד: בניתי את כל החומה", והשני טוען שכל אחד בנה חצי חומה? רב ש"ך מבאר שם שכוונת הרשב"א היא משום שיש לכל אחד דררא דממונא, כלומר יש ספק לבית דין גם בלי טענותיהם, ולכן בית הדין דין מתעלם מטענותיהם ומחלק את החומה שווה בשווה. השאלה על כך היא שדררא דממונא בראשית בבא מציעא משמע שבית דין שם לב לטענותיהם, לעומת התעלמות מטענותיהם, ולתת להם להסדיר את העניין בעצמם. אבל כאן רב שך אומר דררא דממונא סיבה להתעלם מטענותיהם, ופשוט לחלק את הכותל שווה בשווה   

יש תשובה ברורה, הרשב''א אינו תוספות. אבל שאלתי מבוססת על הרעיון שלרשב''א הייתה סיבה לגישתו וגם התוספות. לכן השאלה מבוססת על הנושאים, לא על מי אמר מה

Philosophy is still the servant of religion, but now that religion is the new secular religion of wokism.

Philosophy used to be thought of as being in the service of religion and Kant did not like that and tried to emancipate philosophy from religion.  After Kant  there was still a lot of optimism that philosophy would make some progress. Eventually all that optimism dissipated when philosophy could not show a single positive result. Zilch. So it became the handmaid of science. But even in that, it could not show anything deep nor profound or even relevant. So in her desperation, she became anti-science [with the no truth doctrine] and became the servant of wokism and political correctness. Philosophy is still the servant of religion, but now that religion is the new secular religion of wokism.

Analytic philosophy is good for people that would like to be mathematicians, but do not have talent. It gives them something to do, and keeps them out of the way from people with real talent. Continental philosophy is good for people that would like to be authors, but do not have talent.

Psychology  is good for people that would like to be con-men, but do not have talent.

I think one ought to have a goal of getting through the whole oral and written law, plus basic physics and mathematics. --at least once. You can see in the writings  of the Gra the importance of getting through the whole oral and written law plus the seven wisdoms. 

But how can one accomplish this?--that is by the way of learning called ''girsa'' i.e., just saying the words and going on. That is, to have one session in Gemara i.e.,  to make a place marker and  go through one side of a page of Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot with the Maharsha and Maharam printed in the back of the Gemara. Put the place marker in, and the next day to go on to the next page. Do the same with the Yerushalmi and Midrash. Plus go through daily a few pages of Physics and Mathematics. But all of this is what is known as ''bekiut''. Besides this, one should have a few in depth sessions with the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach or the Chidushei HaRambam by Reb Chaim of Brisk.     [ Mathematics in depth is not all that different from the fast learning called ''girsa''. The difference is for every chapter you go forward, you go back to all the previous chapters.]

Another aspect of learning in depth I heard from my son Izhak--that of doing lots of review. [The gemara mentions review forty times.But that should be done separately from the fast kind of learning i have mentioned up above. ] 

 To Rav Avraham Abulafia, Jesus was a very great tzadik. But that does not say anything at all about Christianity. Rav Abulafia quite definitely considered the Catholic Church to be straight idolatry. and in that he was going with the opinion of the Rambam. However Tosphot in tractate Avoda Zara considers Christianity to be ''shituf'' (joining anything with God's name ).[Actually in that one short Tosphot there are a few opinions, but the general gist of his argument is that it is shituf.] [Shituf is joining another with God. In the Gemara itself over there, it is talking about the prohibition of joining anything with God's name in an oath--for example when Gideon shouted ''A sword to the Lord and to Gideon'' to arose his men before battle.

Rav Avraham Abulafia lived near the time of the Rambam. The Rambam died in 1204 and Rav Abulafia was born around 1240.

Learning fast--just saying the words in order and going on --is a great piece of advice about learning which really comes straight from the Talmud itself. לעולם לגרוס איניש אע''ג ששוכח ואף על גב שאינו יודע מה שהוא אומר .  and one of the major books of Musar the  אורחות צדיקים brings this path of learning in Shar Hatorah. But they are usually understood to mean learning gemara in this way. However at some point  a few years ago I became aware that learning math and physics is considered as part of the mitzvah to learn Torah and so I applied this path of learning to my studies in Physics at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU.  

So now I try to have both in depth learning sessions with lots of review of every chapter and also fast learning sessions.  [this is very well known in litvak yeshivot where the accepted approach to learning is to do in depth learning in the morning and fast learning in the afternoon.] [however the fast learning is much slower than the approachof just saying the words and going on]

  I might make clear a few categories. ''Zona'' [זונה] is a woman who has had sex with someone forbidden to her by a prohibition, not an isur ase איסור עשה. A zona is forbidden to a kohen. The Rambam expands the definition to include the common usage of the word to mean a prostitute. That is a woman who is willing to have sex with more than one partner. [It does not mean sex for money--because if it did, then all married women would be in the category of prostitutes.] The actual word for prostitute is kedeisha קדישה. Niuf adultery ניאוף is sex with a married woman. It is not sex outside of marriage, [as many Christians mistakenly believe.]

NOW that I am at it, I might expand this to clarify some more issues. ''Mezonot'' support in what is called alimony is none existent in Torah. But from derabanan [words of the scribes] a widow gets mezonot until she remarries. A divorced woman gets only the ketubah,-- $500 nowadays. There is a ketubah of $1000 for a virgin, but of course there is almost no such thing as a virgin anymore. Any woman getting married nowadays is almost never a virgin.  And there is almost no such thing as a ''good woman''. Almost any woman at 18 years old will be influenced by society and become a fat bitch after about 10 years. 

Even though to some people marriage is thought to be the only legal connection between man and woman -I do not see it that way . To most medieval authorities, a girl friend [concubine ]- is permitted. That includes the Rosh, Raavad, Ramban/Nahmanidess and others that I have forgotten off hand. Even to the Rambam/Maimonides there is no prohibition involved except for lack of doing kidushin [marriage]. That is,- he sees the kidushin as an obligation, but lack of it is not a prohibition in itself. And not all versions of the Rambam have that either. [''Rambam'' is said with emphasis on the first syllable. ''Ramban'' with emphasis on the last syllable ]

Besides that, a girl friend relationship is well established  even after the giving on Mount Sinai of the Torah as we see in Chronicles I chapter 2 verse 46 concerning the concubines of Caleb ben Yefuna. [That is the same Caleb who was a friend of Joshua. See whole incident in the Book of Numbers. Joshua and Caleb were among the 12 spies that Moses sent into the Land of Canaan [Israel] and they brought back a good report as opposed to the other ten spies]

[And even if you find a good woman, she can leave any time she gets tired of you and your beer cans on the couch, and take the kids and half of anything you own, and she will get paid by the government to do so.  Who needs it? ]

the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored.

I am very sad because I feel that the tremendous depth in Tosphot is being forgotten and ignored. but i also feel that I am not one who can help recover from this loss. [Tosphot is the commentary on the Talmud on the opposite ide from Rashi.] the only two people i ever knew that could see this depth were naftali yeager [the rosh yeshiva in Shar Yashuv and David Bronson my learning partner in Uman [by the ziun of Rav Nahman]. ] My feeling is that to see this requires a combination of high IQ and talent.

Now I do not mean to belittle the great efforts of that whole school of thought that revolved on Reb Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shach that digs into the Rambam. But I miss the people that could see what is really going on in Tosphot. Believe me,-- I looked . All my years in the Mir Yeshiva in New York I learned every achron [later commentary] I could get my hands on, but never saw this. They certainly have important points -especially the Maharsha. Still my impression is that they are all revolving on the outside of Tosphot--never the inside. 

[i tried to capture a little of this in my little booklet on bava metzia to which i provide a link here.]

but you will see what i mean here only in the parts that i bring the questions and issues brought up by david bronson and my tentative answers. that is from bava mezia pgs 97b to 104b. the rest i wa doing without his insights    

Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks

  When the Rambam [in the introduction to the Guide] identifies the Work of Creation [Genesis chapter 1] mentioned in the Gemara with Physics and the Divine Chariot [Ezekiel chapter 1]with Metaphysics as understood by the ancient Greeks  --that took a certain amount of courage. Even though this was an ancient approach that began with Saadia Gaon and the Obligations of the Hearts still it does not sound like how the sages of the Talmud think of the ancient Greeks. [Most of the time in the Talmud you get the idea that they did not like the ancient Greeks very much..And the few places where the Work of Creation and the Divine Chariot are mentioned, the Talmud does not describe them as being what in Attic Greece were the subjects of Physics and Metaphysics. Still I eventually had to depend on this opinion of the Rambam. [but no before i saw this same approach brought in the obligations of the hearts. ] [For some reason I have not been able to understand, I never ''made it'' in the Litvak yeshiva world which I really loved--but they did not love me. So from lack of choices, I went to university to major in Physics]

When the Rambam mentions Physics, he includes Chemistry as you can see in the first four chapters of the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah.] When he mentions metaphysics, he is mainly referring to the set of books of Aristotle by that name;- but not that alo ne. He clearly includes Plotinus--as has been noted before that he is not solely going with Aristotle, but rather the synthesis the Plotinus created between Aristotle and Plato. [Nowadays I would include Kant and Leonard Nelson's approach to Kant. see the web site of Kelley Ross]. That is  not the only approach to Kant but it makes a lot more sense to me than the other one's of sensibility first or reason first. See Robert Hanna and Sperber. [I mean that there were critiques on Kant by Schulze, and Maimon and some others. Because of that set of questions, there arose three approaches to Kant --1. reason first, 2. sensibility first, and 3. neither of the above but rather a kind of knowledge that precedes both reason and sensibility--nonintuitive immediate knowledge  ]

בבא בתרא י''ג ורמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכה ב'

 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the Rambam and the approach of Rav Shach. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the Gemara in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So Rava would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the Rambam who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard.

However you might ask if that is so that Rava agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the first born son and the second born? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So Rava would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''  

 +________________________________________________________________________________

 I was at the sea shore and it occurred to me to answer the question that I asked yesterday on the רמב''ם and the approach of רב שך. That is thus. We don't make a law to force someone to buy something they do not want, nor to sell something they need. So the whole point of the גמרא in saying if the yard is too small to divide, then one can tell the other partner, ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' (גוד או אגוד) is only a suggestion, not a requirement. So the case of the yard and the half slave are the same with respect to the idea of ''You buy half or I will buy half.'' It can't be a law. So רבא would agree that division in time would be a valid approach since we can not force either party to buy or sell their portion. So now we understand the רמב''ם who does hold that division in time is a valid approach with  a small yard. 

However you might ask if that is so that רבא agrees with division in time when ''I will buy your half, or you can buy my half''' is not possible, then why did he not say so in the first case of the בכור and the פשוט? I think the reason is that inheritance is not the same kind of thing as buying and selling or a normal partnership. In inheritance, the idea is to divide. So רבא would in fact agree to divide in time only if they refuse the ''I will buy your two thirds, or you can buy my one third.'''

הייתי בחוף הים ועלה בדעתי לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול על הרמב''ם וגישתו של רב שך. כלומר כך. אנחנו לא עושים חוק כדי להכריח מישהו לקנות משהו שהוא לא רוצה, וגם לא למכור משהו שהוא צריך. אז כל העניין של הגמרא באומרו אם החצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה, אז אפשר לומר לשותף השני ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' (גוד או אגוד) הוא רק הצעה, לא דרישה. אז המקרה של החצר וחצי העבד זהה לגבי הרעיון של ''אתה קונה חצי או אני אקנה חצי'' זה לא יכול להיות חוק. אז רבא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן תהיה גישה תקפה מכיוון שאיננו יכולים להכריח אף אחד מהצדדים לקנות או למכור את חלקו. אז עכשיו אנחנו מבינים שהרמב''ם שאכן מחזיק שהחלוקה בזמן היא גישה תקפה עם חצר קטנה

עם זאת אתה יכול לשאול אם זה כך שרבא מסכים לחלוקה בזמן כאשר ''אני אקנה את החצי שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את החצי שלי''' אינו אפשרי, אז למה הוא לא אמר זאת במקרה הראשון של בכור והפשוט? אני חושב שהסיבה היא שירושה זה לא אותו סוג של קנייה ומכירה או שותפות רגילה. בירושה, הרעיון הוא לחלק. אז רבא למעשה יסכים לחלק בזמן רק אם הם יסרבו ל''אני אקנה את שני השלישים שלך, או שאתה יכול לקנות את השליש שלי

בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א Bava Batra page 13 a

Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 1 halacha  2. The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide the other must divide if it is 8 yards by 4 yards. If the courtyard is less, then one can not force the other, but rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' The Rambam says if both refuse that arrangement then they divide in time. That is one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this.

The Raavad disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the Raavad is clear in the Gemara itself and it is hard to see how the Rambam would have understood that Gemara. 

The Gemara is Bava Batra 13 side a. Rava asked Rav Nahman,'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a braita, where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. Rava answered in that case there is not choice. In our case it is clear that Rava does not hold with dividing in time. Rav Shach says the case of a court yard that has less than  4 yards for each one is different and Rava would agree that dividing in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full slave. So Rava would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half, or I will buy your half.'' So the Raavad is right that Rava does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

_________________________________________________________

 The law for a courtyard that is owned by two people is that if one wants to divide, the other must divide if it is ח אמות על ד אמות. But if the courtyard has less area than that, then one can not force the other.  Rather one can tell the other, ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' [ גד או אגוד ] The רמב''ם in  הלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב says if both refuse that arrangement, then they divide in time. That is, one lives in it for a year and then the other, and they keep on trading off like this. The ראב''ד disagrees about trading in time. The opinion of the ראב''ד is clear in the גמרא itself and it is hard to see how the רמב''ם would have understood that. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א)'' You do not agree with the law that one says to the other 'you buy my half or I will buy your half. So what would a first born and second son do with a slave?'' He answered, ''He works for the first born two days for every one day that he works for  the second son.'' A proof is brought from a ברייתא. where a slave becomes free in half. (He had two owners, and one freed him.) He works one day for his master, and one day for himself. רבא answered in that case there is not choice. In our case, it is clear that רבא does not hold with dividing in time. רב שך says the case of a court yard that has less than ארבע אמות for each one is different, and רבא would agree that diving in time also makes sense since there is no choice. But refusal to listen to the offer to buy the other half or to sell your half, is not the same kind of case of a half slave who can not become a full Slave. So רבא would not agree that dividing in time is a valid substitution for an offer of ''Buy my half or I will buy your half.'' So the ראב''ד  is right that רבא does not agree in dividing in time unless there is no other alternative. 

הדין לחצר שבבעלות שני אנשים הוא שאם אחד רוצה לחלק, השני חייב לחלק אם זה ח' אמות על ד' אמות. אבל אם בחצר יש פחות שטח מזה, אז אי אפשר להכריח את השני. במקום זאת אחד יכול לומר לשני ''קנה את החצי שלי או שאני אקנה את החצי שלך'' [גד או אגוד] הרמב''ם בהלכות שכנים פרק א' הלכות א' וב', אומר אם שניהם מסרבים להסדר הזה, אז הם מחלקים בזמן. כלומר, אחד גר בו שנה ואחר כך השני, והם ממשיכים ככה. הראב''ד חולק על חלוקה בזמן. דעת הראב"ד ברורה בגמרא עצמו וקשה לראות כיצד היה מבין זאת הרמב"ם. רבא שאל רב נחמן, (בבא בתרא י''ג ע''א) ''אתה לא מסכים עם ההלכה שאחד אומר לשני 'אתה קונה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך'. אז מה יעשה בכור ובן שני עם עבד?'' הוא ענה, ''הוא עובד יומיים בשביל הבכור על כל יום שהוא עובד לבן השני'' מביאים הוכחה מברייתא שבו עבד הופך חופשי בחצי. (היו לו שני בעלים, ואחד שחרר אותו.) הוא עובד יום אחד עבור אדונו, ויום אחד עבור עצמו. רבא ענה במקרה כזה אין ברירה. בענייננו ברור שרבא אינו מחזיק בחלוקה בזמן. רב שך אומר שהמקרה של חצר שיש בה פחות מארבע אמות לכל אחת שונה ורבא יסכים שגם חלוקה בזמן הגיונית כי אין ברירה. אבל סירוב להקשיב להצעה לקנות את החצי השני או למכור את החצי שלך, אינו אותו מקרה של חצי עבד שאינו יכול להפוך לעבד מלא. אז רבא לא יסכים שחלוקה בזמן היא תחליף תקף להצעה של ''קנה את החצי שלי או אני אקנה את החצי שלך''. אז צודק הראב''ד שרבא לא מסכים לחלק בזמן אלא אם כן יש אין אלטרנטיבה אחרת

 

 i  find it instructive that the only people that have opened their hearts and homes to the many several hundred thousands of Jews that had to escape from the areas in the south of Israel have been the kibbutzim. i was at first unaware of this until i saw an article about a nearby kibbutz givat chaviva that opened all its facilities to thousands of Jews that had to escape--and till cant go back to their homes. now i have become aware that the only places that have been helping the Jews that have had to escape have been the kibbutzim  

 The Russian revolution is for me a case where it is hard to take sides. given what Nicholas II saw what had happened to all the previous tsars when they tried to be soft [they were murdered], it is hard to imagine what else he could have done. On the other hand, the misery of the Russian people was already growing in intensity because of the cities and industry growing and with WWI it is hard to see any recourse to any kind of action than to throw out a czar that seemed insensitive to their trouble. It is also hard to see any party taking power except the Bolshevik who controlled the army with Trotsky at it head. It is all very confusing. Then to try to reason through it all seems to make it worse. Marx was the author of a brilliant hypothesis that like all scientific hypotheses needed to make predictions, and then can be tested based on those predictions. All of Marx's prediction turned out to be false. Maybe it all comes down to what Rasputin told the czar, ''If my death will be caused by you or any of your close relatives, then you and your family will not last one year after that.''

 

 I think I ought to make Kant clear. There is knowledge that is known by way of reason, for example things known by definition. And there are things known by the five senses. But can we know things like universals [things that particulars have in common]?-Yes. Things are in the realm of possibility of experience. We can know them by structures in the mind like computer chips. [E.G. the ideas of time space and causality. But outside of the conditions of possible experience we can not know.

There are some attempts to get past this blockage, and one approach is that of Jacob Fries--and that is to say there is knowledge that is known, but not by reason and not by the senses.

[This is different from reason first Kant [the first interpretation] and from sensibility first Kant [Robert Hanna, Sperber].] This Kant-Friesian approach says neither reason nor sense perception is first. See Kelley Ross's web site To get an idea about this Kant-Friesian approach I think the best idea is to learn the books of Leonard Nelson who is a lot more clear than Fries himself, even though I think most are still in  German.  

When Robert Hanna and Kelley Ross argue for the Kantian position they do not usually bring evidence from physics. [Dr Ross is mainly interested in expanding the position of Kant and Fries--to develop a much wider world view than you could see in either. Dr Hanna is mainly interested   in showing the flaws in those Analytic thinkers that attacked Kant. ] But one little piece of evidence has convinced me for years about the truth of Kant from Physics. The humble little unremarkable electron. As it reacts or is part of the equations that deal with its kinetic and potential energy, it is fine. But if you try to calculate its mass as independent of all interaction [including its own field], its mass comes out to be infinite. 

the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites

I To the Rambam [Maimonidess], the command of the Torah is to conquer the land of Israel from the Canaanites. To the Ramban/Nahmanidess the command is to live in Israel. However the Rambam agrees that one should live in Israel. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the Rambam. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer Israel and the move somewhere else? But where does one go to get clarity about the Rambam except to Reb Chaim of Brisk and that whole school of thought that started with him up until Rav Shach. And so far I have not seen anything that could bring me clarity about the Rambam.   

[And where is Israel? The boundaries are stated in Torah. And yet right then and there, the children of Gad and Reuben decided to live outside of those borders--and Moses agreed with them!! I imagine that this must be the reason for the Rambam. If it would be a command of the Torah to live in Israel, why did Moses not tell them to do so. Why did Moses agree that after they would help to conquer Israel, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay.--but you could  answer this that the borders of Israel  promised to Abraham extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. 

______________________________________________________________________________

 To the רמב''ם, the command of the תורה is to conquer the land of ישראל from the Canaanites. To the רמב''ן the command is to live in ישראל. However the רמב''ם agrees that one should live in ישראל. I admit I have never been able to figure out the approach of the רמב''ם. How could it possibly make any sense to conquer ישראל and the move somewhere else? 

And where is ישראל? The boundaries are stated in תורה. And yet right then and there, the בני גד ובני ראובן decided to live outside of those borders, and משה agreed with them.  This must be the reason for the רמב''ם. If it would be a command of the תורה to live in ישראל, why did משה not  tell them to do so. Why did משה agree that after they would help to conquer ישראל, then they could live on the other side of the Jordan river? It must be that that was okay. But you could  answer this that the borders of ישראל  promised to אברהם extend from the Nile to the Euphrates River. however the borders of ancient israel did not extend that far. 

לרמב''ם, מצוות התורה היא לכבוש את ארץ ישראל מידי הכנענים. לרמב''ן הציווי הוא לגור בישראל. אולם הרמב''ם מסכים שצריך לגור בישראל. אני מודה שמעולם לא הצלחתי להבין את גישתו של הרמב''ם. איך זה יכול להיות הגיוני לכבוש את ישראל ואז ללכת למקום אחר? ויש לתרץ את זאת. איפה ישראל? הגבולות מצוינים בתורה. ובכל זאת, באותו רגע, החליטו בני גד ובני ראובן לחיות מחוץ לגבולות אלה, ומשה הסכים איתם. זו חייבת להיות הסיבה לרמב''ם. אם זו תהיה פקודה של התורה לחיות בישראל, מדוע משה לא אמר להם לעשות זאת. למה משה הסכים שאחרי שהם יעזרו לכבוש את ארץ כנען, אז הם יוכלו לחיות בצד השני של נהר הירדן? כנראה שזה היה בסדר. אבל אתה יכול לענות על זה שגבולות ישראל שהובטחו לאברהם משתרעים מהנילוס ועד נהר הפרת

 In Torah it is important to have an idea about what is the main thing and what are  the side issues. Thus monotheism and good midot [to be a mensch] ought to be the foremost in everyone' mind. Monotheism is certainly the command to worship and serve God alone. But it also means to understand that God is completely ''other''.  HE is not  a close relative of people. He does not share any characteristics of people,  for all characteristics He created. He has nothing in common with any physical objects- no form nor substance. He is not composed of ingredients. He is not a composite.  

Jay shuts down Islam's Origins in ONE HOUR at "Calvary Chapel Chino Hills"!

 

 I have not discussed the State of Israel much, but I ought to make it clear that I feel it is important. --That is mainly because of the Ramban  [Nachmanidess] in his commentary of the Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam [Maimonidess]. That is where the Ramban [Nachmanidess/Moshe ben Nahman] states his view that living in Israel is one of the commandments of the Torah. But further more I think the State of Israel is also important because of the opinion of Reb Moshe Feinstein and Reb Aaron Kotler that held that for Israel the same law applies that applies to any legitimate government, ''The law of the land is the law''[bava batra 35]--[ but of course not when it contradicts  the law of the Torah.]

 Even though it is best to learn Torah in a Litvak yeshiva where one can hear a Gemara lesson from an authentic Talmid Chacham [rosh yeshiva], if one is lacking that, I suggest getting the basic set of books that go into the depths of the Talmud. They are the Chidushei Harambam by Rav Chaim of Brisk,  the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and the several others that are well known. [However it occurs to me that not everyone is familiar with the whole set so I might mention the others--they are the two disciples of Reb Chaim the Birchat Shmuel and the Shaarei Yosher and Even Haazel by I think the father in law of Rav Shach. ]

[However I should admit that when I was in the Mir in NY,  my main efforts were in the earlier commentaries --Pnei Yehoshua, Maharsha, Aruch Laner]-but in terms of hearing classes in Gemara I mainly heard from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum

So one should learn the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov, but only in conjunction with the regular Musar books of the Rishonim and in the context of a Litvak yeshiva.

 There are  great ideas of Rav Nahman of Breslov. However there is the importance of learning Torah that is lacking in that system. This was not because Rav Nahman himself did not know about it, but rather he was concentrating in his teachings on how to encourage and help people that were not yet able to learn in depth.  There is also in the teachings of Rav Nahman a lot of disparaging of science and philosophy and doctors. A lot of what he says is quite true seeing how much the social studies departments of universities have become saturated with pseudo science. Still, I think it is best not to throw out the baby with the bath water. Among the important ideas of Rav Nahman are hitbodadut--to speak with God as one speaks with a good friend. This is the real authentic meaning of prayer; not prayer from  prayer books, but prayer from the heart. BUT this great and important idea does work best only when one is grounded in a Litvak yeshiva where Torah is learned for its own sake. 

So one should learn the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov, but only in conjunction with the regular Musar books of the Rishonim and in the context of a Litvak yeshiva.

 I have been thinking that the after blessing after pizza and all kinds of cake if one has eaten more that the volume of three or four eggs is birchat hamazon which is for after bread. The reason is it is either פת הבאה בכיסנין [bread that comes in pockets] or just plain bread. And even if it is  פת הבאה בכיסנין, after an amount the equals three or four eggs, it is birchat hamazon anyway. Three or four eggs volume is the amount of a full meal.--as we see in the laws of tithes where the amount of a full meal makes the obligation of taking the tithe to come into force. [If three or four eggs is an argument between Rashi and the Rambam.]]

 I have not any success in convincing anyone at all about my approach to learning. however based on the off chance that anyone will listen I would like to suggest first of all learning Torah-in the narrow definition of the Rambam in his letter to Yemen. And I quote, ''Just like there is no adding or subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law.'' So you do not add prophets to the Old Testament. Even if Joe Shmoo down the street claims to be a prophet of God, and even if you believe it, still you do not add a new book to the Old Testament containing The Visions and Revelations of Joe Shmoo. So you do add nor subtract any books to the Oral Law--the tradition that was handed down by the sages of the Talmud and Mishna [i.e.,  the two Talmuds and the midrashim.][You can add explanations that make the intension clear but they are not The Oral Law" except in a second hand kind of way.]

There is an argument to support the Raavad in his argument against the Rambam in laws of marriage 12 law 9.     The argument is that the way the Rambam himself understands the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka  Bava Batra pg 130 is that it refers only to someone close to death. Also one can argue that the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife.

Here is the Rambam, if a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the Sages still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the Torah.  conditions about inheritance are not valid.

The Raavad writes there is no need for the Sages to make their law like the law of the Torah because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. 

Rav Shach tries to bring support to the Rambam from the law of R Yohanan ben Broka that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. he can say this son alone will inherit me. 

But the Rambam himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [laws of inheritance 6 law 2]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her since when she is married, only one person inherits her, and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the Rambam. After all, you do see with R Yohanan ben Broka that there can be a condition that applies to inheritance. So the sages wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the Torah, ]

___________________________________________________________________________________

There is an argument to support the proof for the ראב''ד his argument against the רמב''ם in הלכות אישות  פרק י''ב הלכה ט.     The argument is that the way the רמב''ם himself understands the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא  בבא בתרא דף ק''ל is that it refers only to someone close to death (שכיב מרע). Also one can argue that the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife. Here is the רמב''ם, If a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property, that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the חכמים still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the תורה.  Conditions about inheritance are not valid. The ראב''ד writes there is no need for the חכמים to make their law like the law of the תורה because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. רב שך tries to bring support to the רמב''ם from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. He can say, "This son alone will inherit me." But the רמב''ם himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her, since when she is married, only one person inherits her and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the רמב''ם. After all, you do see with ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that there can be a תנאי that applies to inheritance. So the חכמים wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the תורה, 

יש הוכחה לטענתו של הראב''ד נגד הרמב''ם בהלכות אישות פרק י''ב הלכה ט. הטענה היא שהדרך בה הרמב''ם עצמו מבין את דינו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא בבא בתרא דף ק''ל היא שהכוונה היא רק למישהו הקרוב למוות (שכיב מרע). כמו כן, ניתן לטעון שלדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא אין כל יישום במציאות עם הירושה שהבעל יורש מאשתו. הנה הרמב''ם, אם הבעל הסכים עם אשתו שלא יירש את רכושה, אין תוקף לתנאי זה. אף על פי שירושת בעל היא מדברי החכמים עדיין כאן עשו את הדין הזה שבעל יורש כחוק התורה. תנאים לגבי ירושה אינם תקפים. הראב''ד כותב שאין צורך שהחכמים יעשו את דינם כדין התורה כי ממילא אדם לא יכול להתנות לא להחזיק או לרשת משהו שעדיין לא בא לעולם. רב שך מנסה להביא תמיכה לרמב''ם מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שאפשר לבחור באחד מיורשיו לבדו לרשת אותו. הוא יכול לומר: "הבן הזה לבדו יירש אותי". אבל הרמב''ם עצמו כותב שדין זה חל רק על אדם הקרוב למוות [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. כמו כן, לא יכול להיות מקרה ממשי שבו אישה יכולה לומר שרק מישהו יירש אותה מבין כמה אנשים שיכולים לרשת אותה, שכן כשהיא נשואה, רק אדם אחד יורש אותה וזה בעלה.

איני אומר שאין הגנה לרמב''ם. הרי אתה כן רואה אצל ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שיכול להיות תנאי שיחול על ירושה. אז החכמים רצו לבטל את האפשרות הזאת על ידי שחיזקו את גזירתם כמו חוק התורה,

The approach of the Litvak Yeshiva World based on the Gra is this: to will sincerely believe in the Torah [the Tenach and the Two Talmuds and Midrash], to critically evaluate these teachings, and to attempt seriously to model their lives on its tenets. 

The approach of Rav Nahman of Breslov is: to adhere to the the Torah out of sincere conviction, but to disagree with important tenets; to attempt to recast the Torah in more personally palatable terms, and to work to redirect the Torah itself into more agreeable lines. The changes are real reforms, and sometimes redefinition into something more palatable.

This is honest and sincere but this still is not the same thing as straight unadulterated TORAH. And in spite of this the teachings of Rav Nahman are valuable and important --as long as one is aware that there can be slight or major deviations from straight Torah  

The problem I see in some Israeli cities is that there are no Litvak Yeshivot. Nor even kollels. Why specifically the Litvak brand? That is because [a a rule] that is where Torah is learned for its own sake, not for money,  nor for any agenda at all except to learn and keep Torah.

the problem with being too smart

 The Midrash says that the mother of Samuel the Prophet prayed that her son should not be too smart, nor dumb. You can see the problem with being too smart in a lot of intellectuals when their over extended minds mislead them. This is a point that Rav Nahman made in the Lekutai Moharan [The Le.M for short]. In particular you can see this in collage campuses where Harvard and Yale students and professors are cheering for Hamas. 

In philosophy however there was one philosopher who noticed the limits of reason and in fact that is the name of his book--The Critique of Pure Reason. The answer to the question "What is the limit of reason?" is the possibility of experience. i mean to say [from Kant] that outside of that realm of possible experience, reason collapses and starts to come up with self contradictions. --iI am not saying that is the end of the story. Rather there was the Friesian approach to Kant which to me makes the most sense. See the web site of Kelley Ross who shows some of the wider aspects of that approach in how it applies to faith. That aspect of the Kant Fries approach was first noticed by Otto.

There is a Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b.

There is a a law in the Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b. The Gemara brings a case where a cow was exchanged with an ass, and the cow was present, but the ass was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.   Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shumel, the owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Mari bar Yechezkeil said ''Pay no attention to what Yehuda said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The Rambam writes in laws of sales 20 law  14 in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an ass. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.  The owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the Rambam brings the statement of Mari who disagrees with Rav Yehuda and right away the statement of Rav Yehuda. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the Rambam is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the ass, still since the ass is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the ass, the previous owner must bring proof.  While Mari is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of Mari is when he says ''domain''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as Rav Yehuda with whom he is disagreeing. 

this is clearly very relevant to bava mezia page 100a but i do not recall that sugia. i recall writing about it in my little booklet on bava metzia chapters 8 and 9 but i have no recollection of what i wrote. while i am at it i might mention that this idea here i jut put into a different book on shas

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 I am confused about a רמב''ם that does not seem to be in accord with the גמרא in כתובות ע''ו ע''ב. The גמרא brings a case where there a cow was exchanged with an חמור, and the cow was present, but the חמור was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.   רב יהודה said in the name of שמואל, the owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. מרי בר יחזקאל said ''Pay no attention to what יהודה אחי said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The רמב''ם writes in בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד   in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an חמור. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.  The owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the רמב''ם brings the statement of מרי who disagrees with רב יהודה and right away the statement of רב יהודה. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the רמב''ם is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the חמור, still since the חמור is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the חמור, the previous owner must bring proof.  While מרי is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of מרי is when he says ''רשות''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as רב יהודה with whom he is disagreeing. 

 הרמב''ם לא נראה כמתאים לגמרא בכתובות ע''ו ע''ב. הגמרא מביאה מקרה שבו הוחלפה פרה עם חמור, והפרה הייתה נוכחת, אבל החמור עדיין היה ברפת של בעליה. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל, בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה חי בזמן ההחלפה. מרי בר יחזקאל אמר ''אל תשים לב למה שאמר יהודה אחי. אלא שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה.'' הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד של מי שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה. למשל פרה הוחלפה עם חמור. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה בחיים בזמן ההחלפה. כאן מביא הרמב''ם את דברי מרי החולק על רב יהודה ומיד את דברי רב יהודה. כדי להבהיר את שאלתי, הרשו לי להבהיר שהרמב"ם אומר אף על פי שבעל הפרה הוא עכשיו בעל החמור, עדיין כיון שהחמור נמצא ברפת של הבעלים [הקודמים] של החמור, הבעלים [הקודמים] חייבים להביא הוכחה. ואילו מרי אומר שבעל הפרה צריך להביא הוכחה. חוץ מזה, הכוונה של מרי היא כשהוא אומר ''רשות'' פירושו בעלות, לא בקרקע של. אחרת הוא היה אומר בדיוק אותו דבר כמו רב יהודה שהוא לא מסכים איתו

I was at the sea shore and on the way back it occurred to me that the law in the Rambam laws of gifts 8 law 6 (if one says if my wife gives birth to a  son he will take 100 zuz and if he gives birth to a daughter she will get 200 zuz.) might refer to a kinyan sudar [handkerchief]. But that is not how the Magid Mishna explains it there [and he says it refers to a person dying] because of the gemara in Gitin page 40 side b that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the Rambam brings that law in laws of gifts chapter 4. The Rashba however brings the Magid Mishna that there might be a difference between a kinyan sudar and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is derabanan [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the Torah explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a kinyan sudar is from the Torah as a valid exchange [halifin]. Thus it makes sense to say that the Rambam is referring to a kinyan sudar which is clearly more powerful than a document.

_________________________________________________________________________________

 The Rambam  writes הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: If one says, "If my wife gives birth to a  son, he will take מנה.  If she gives birth to a daughter, she will get מאתיים. This might refer to a קניין סודר [handkerchief]. But that is not how the מגיד משנה explains it there. [He says it refers to a person dying שכיב מרע]. The reason the מגיד משנה explains this differently is because of the גמרא in גיטין מ' ע''ב that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the רמב''ם brings that law in laws of giftsהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. The רשב''א however brings the מגיד משנה that there might be a difference between a קניין סודר and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is מן הרבנן [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the תורה explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a קניין סודר is from the תורה as a valid exchange [חליפין]. Thus it makes sense to say that the רמב''ם is referring to a קניין סודר which is clearly more powerful than a document.

הרמב"ם כותב הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: אם יאמר "אם אשתי תלד בן, ייקח מנה. אם היא תלד בת, היא תקבל מאתיים. זה יכול להתייחס לקניין סודר [מטפחת]. אבל לא כך מסביר זאת המגיד משנה שם. [הוא אומר שזה מתייחס לשכיב מרע]. הסיבה שהמגיד משנה מסביר זאת אחרת היא בגלל הגמרא בגיטין מ' ע''ב שאם יכתוב אדם במסמך ''אתן כזה וכזה'' שאינו תקף, ואין התחייבות שנגרמה על ידי אותו מסמך. והרמב''ם מביא את הדין הזה בהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. הרשב"א לעומת זאת מביא את המגיד משנה שאולי יש הבדל בין קניין סודר למסמך. עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם בעצמו כותב שתוקף המסמכים הוא מן הרבנן [מהחכמים, לא מהתורה אלא במקום שבו התורה אומרת במפורש שצריך מסמך כמו בגירושין.] ואילו קניין סודר הוא מהתורה כחילופין. לפיכך הגיוני לומר שהרמב''ם מתייחס לקניין סודר שהוא בבירור חזק יותר ממסמך

 In the ketubah there is a clause ''I will work.'' But in any document, if one writes ''I will do such and such a thing'' it is קניין דברים acquisition of words which has no validity.  So why is it in the ketubah-- because of the obligation that exists anyway. Even though the obligation to provide for a wife is an argument if it is from the Torah or the words of the scribes, still there is no doubt that there is such an obligation which amounts to about two kilograms of flour every week. 

there is a lot to go into about all this which i might get to someday. 

 When Christians talk about Bible Studies for Wednesday night [or some other time they get together during the week], they do not ever learn the Old Testament in depth, and most of the time not even the New Testament except for the letters of Paul.  But that just goes to show that Christianity is really based on Paul. But that requires a belief that Paul understood the approach of Jesus better that any of the actual people that heard and saw him, and wrote down his teachings directly from first hand knowledge.  But if they want to learn Paul as an authority on Jesus, well so be it. But then, why is it that the ''Bible Studies''never include the Old Testament.

[One place where you can see the problem of not learning the Old Testament is when Christians try to take a verse from the Old Testament to show something is morally wrong, but ignore other verses. When they take the words of the Old Testament to be authoritative, they are depending on Jesus. When they ignore the Law of Moses, they depend on Paul. But this weakens their position . You can not have it both ways. Either the Law of Moses means what it  says, or it does not. I ask them to make up their minds.]

I might add here that the way I see morality of the Old Testament is that it is based on a synthesis of faith and reason. This is as we see in the Talmud where there is a great deal of discussion about how to understand the verses of the Law of Moses based on reason. Very few times is any discussion based on the idea that someone's opinion is halacha le'Moshe miSinai [a law to Moses from Sinai]. [There are a few places where it is considered that a law is halacha to Moses from Sinai. More often it is just clear that some things are in fact ''from the Torah''; e.g., things like the 39 types of work on the sabbath, or the many laws about the temple or marriage]. Rather all discussions are based on the idea of how can we reconcile seemingly contrary verses or later teachings that themselves were based on verses.

I hope that Christians start to learn the Old Testament in depth, not superficially. In fact, I recall that there was once a long time ago a father who read to his family a few chapters of the Bible at the dinner table every night until the family had finished the Bible several times over.

The issue about the need for knowledge in the writing of  the get [divorce] or kidushin is unclear to me like I wrote a few days ago. The main point of confusion is the Ramban brought by the Ran that for a get one needs both for her sake and the husband should write it. That is how the Ramban gets out of the problem about why he could not say to a messenger [or two] to go and tell so and so to write a get and give it. The answer מילי לא מימסרי לשליח ''words are not given to a messenger'' clearly does not work as the Ramban himself noted. After all you can tell a messenger to take trumah or to write a document of ownership and give it to someone--and lots of things that require intension. But if you need the man to write the get, then that should be that. I noticed that Rav Shach deals with this issue, and I imagine many of the other Achronim also try, but to me the whole issue is unclear. [I might just give up. Or i might wait until i can gain clarity by learning further on.]

 I get the impression that most people do not have an idea about  learning Torah. They see it is only applicable to people that want to use it to make money.

And I think that the fact that people in kollel use Torah to make money adds to this misimpression.

 But it should be obvious that learning Torah is incumbent on every person, and that no one should use it to make money. 

But while I am on the subject, I would like to suggest and offer here my approach. That is- I think people should learn in depth in the morning right when they wake up and learn fast in the afternoon when it is harder to concentrate.  So the morning should be like in the great Litvak yeshivot-- with staying on one page of Gemara for a few weeks. That is either in depth with Reb Chaim of Brisk or Rav Shach or the other great sages of the Litvak world [i.e., Birchat Shmuel, Shaari Yosher of R. Shimon Shkopf etc.] The afternoon for getting through Shas with Tosphot and Maharsha. Also there should be a few sessions in Mathematics and Physics-- to get through fast the basic material. [I mean to get through it,-- and then review.]

 Kant's synthesis between empirical knowledge and rational knowledge has been a problem as soon as the ink was dry on the first Critique as was immediately noted by Schulze  and Maimon. The answer to their objections I have thought was best answered by Jacob Fries until I noticed what I think is the similar answer given by Reinhold. [I saw this answer in a paper by   Peter Sperber]. Schulze had objected to a sort of circularity in Kant  [that  sense perception works by way of cause and effect. The object outside of oneself causes the perception. But if causality is the only thing that makes perception possible, then it can't be part of perception.][The problem is that without causality, perception is pure delusion] and Salomon Maimon had objected to any possible contact between a priori concepts and empirical senses. The answer is there are concepts that are known immediately without have to go through  reasoning process--they are the categories of where, when, how, why, etc.

Kidushin page 9

 I have been puzzled about a Rambam that says if one writes a document of marriage and it is given to a messenger of the woman, then it must be written with the agreement of the messenger. The Magid Mishna brings there [Laws of Marriage chapter 3-law 18] that the Ramban disagrees with this and says it has to be written with the knowledge and agreement of the woman. This is just like the fact that  a husband  can not say, ''Tell so and so to write a divorce doc and give it to my wife.'' The Ramban is bringing this from a Gemara in Kidushin page 9 that says a doc of marriage has to be written with the knowledge of the woman. [ That is an argument there, but this is the agreed upon conclusion.] What is the puzzle about this to me is the general law, ''Words are not given over to a messenger.''  That means one can appoint a messenger to do things, but not to say things. And for a divorce doc  to be for a particular woman requires the husband to say so. But this in itself is the source of my confusion. Why is it that a scribe could not write a doc of divorce for a particular man and wife?  If we say a scribe  is ok to write the doc, then why should he have to hear it from the husband. If we say the verse says that the husband himself has to write it, then why should a scribe be ok-- even if the husband tells him to write it?

 The sages of the Gemara [Talmud] said that Gog and Magog [Armageddon] would come three times against Israel and that at the third time they will reach Yerushalaim [Jerusalem]. That is based on Yechezkel [Ezekiel] chapters 38 and 39. Then in the next chapters, Yechezkel [Ezekiel] goes into the dimension and building  of the third temple. Now it is clear that Russia, China and Iran are aligned against Israel. So even if Israel would be able to finish off Hamas, that would do nothing to take care of the larger threats. [That is, even if Israel would have any specific targets inside of Gaza. But there is no such thing. The entire population is determined to destroy Israel. There is no specific target.] So what ought to do is to learn Gemara, Rashi and Tosphot every day as the sages said: ''What should one do to be saved from Armageddon--learn Torah.'' [But to learn Torah as a mitzvah means not to take money for doing so. To get paid for learning negates the value.] [And I might add here my basic approach to learning Torah. It is divided into in depth learning in the morning and includes the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Mathematics, and Physics. The afternoon or evening is for fast learning, I.E., to get through the Talmud with Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, and then the Yerushalmi, plus getting through the basic math and physics, Algebraic Topology, Quantum Field Theory, String Theory. There should also be a few hours for exercise.][string theory is important as the only viable explanation of gravity. To see what i mean, take a look at Feynman's papers on Quantum Gravity showing that it is not renormalizable.]

[People are too discouraged from the hard subjects because of lack of faith in God. They ought to believe that by saying the words and going on, that they will eventually understand. This is like the same way trust in God works in other areas where one does a minimum amount of effort and trust God to do the rest.]

 There is a sort of Achilles heel in Breslov in that in spite of the tremendous advice of Rav Nahman, there is a kind of tendency for it to take people away from straight Torah. The advice really works best in a context of a place that is devoted to learning Gemara.--i.e. a regular Litvak yeshiva.  This is hinted at in a letter Rav Nahman wrote to his group in Breslov מאסתי בישיבת ברסלב ''I have become disgusted with Yeshivat Breslov'', -Even though the intension of the letter was to say that he was upset with the town and would no longer dwell there, still there is a hint in that letter.

In the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] Rav Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [There is such a thing a being too smart.]]

Rav Nachman of Breslov said the trait of wisdom spread out [like all the other ten sephirot] until God established a limit for it. You can see this idea in other places in the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] where R' Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [''The main thing is to be simple and straight, for too much smarts tricks a person..]] You can see this same idea in Kant where he wants to expand the role of reason into synthetic a priori [ i.e., what other philosophers call ''universals;;]--but he does place a limit on this role of reason. The limit is that it is applicable only in the realm of possible experience.  [The way to see this is to think of a computer. A bathtub full of computer chips is not a computer. To have knowledge of the real world, one's own computer chips--his way of sensing time space color etc. have to be ordered and structured.[Space and time are the forms of intuition aka sense perception. They are not concepts of reason.] But we do not have sense perception outside of our 3-d world.]

 My basic idea of what to do in these horrific times is to learn Torah. But I should add that I have a very limited idea of what ''Torah'' is--that is only the actual Oral and Written Law. This is like the Rambam wrote, ''Just like one can  not add nor subtract from the Written Law, so one cannot add nor subtract from the Oral Law.''-which is only the actual set of books written down by the Tenaim and Amoraim [Sages of the Talmud and Mishna]. After them, there is no authentic tradition. [The idea here is that just like if one would come along today and claim to prophecy, no one would or should believe him or her because we already have the prophets, and that age is finished. So it is with the Oral Law, that age is finished. So no one could come along after the finishing of the Talmud and claim they found a lost book of the Oral Law, nor make up his own ideas in Torah and call them the Oral Law.]

[Since learning Torah is equal to all the other mitzvot [and out weighs them as shown in Nefesh Hachaim vol 4], thus one ought to take as an obligation on oneself to get through the entire oral and written law, Tenach, the two Talmuds [with Rashi, Tophot and corresponding commentaries], and all the midrashim. Also to have an in depth session in the AVI EZRI of Rav Shach, Mathematics and Physics.] 

the third temple.

 The Third Temple is not well  understood by many people including myself. But today i saw a book by a fellow Izhak Cohen [in a yishuv called Elad] who brings the Rashi and Ramchal on the verses in Ezekiel and does a great job in laying it all out in detail. However to actually build it would require a red cow without which there is no way of getting out of tumat met [uncleanliness that come from touching a dead body.] [But I imagine nowadays that should be fairly easy by genetic modification]

[ii admit to having read Ezekiel and also seeing the Ramchal without having the slighted understanding until this morning when I looked at that book.]

One of the major reasons the third temple is not understood in the Mishna and Gemara talk only about the second temple. The parts of the gemara that are relevant to the third temple are only the parts about sacrifices

for some odd reason the chapters in ezekiel which explain all about the third temple are almost never studied by anyone.

Of course Muslim would nor be pleased with us jews for making a third temple, but we are in any case not winning any popularity contests in the muslim world. our mere exitance is a thorn in their side. Christians also would not be in favor of this because the last chapters of revelations seem to indicate a third temple that would not be for sacrifices. all the more so Paul is down on keeping the commandments of the torah which include building a temple. however paul anyway go into the new testament for reasons that do not seem valid since he had no first hand information about anything that jesus ever said or did.