z79 music file

 I find insights in the great philosophers when I get a chance to read them. But I am not saying everything they said was right. One example I recall from a few years ago was when I was reading Hegel and noticed when he wrote that matter is energy--point blank relativity! Another  time I was reading Hobhouse  in his critique on the Metaphysical State. [That was an attack on people that were building  a co we do not know nception of such a state and to do so were borrowing some ideas from Hegel.  Some of the attacks were true but one I recall was that Hegel had said matter is gravity. I do not remember exactly this minute what Hegel had said but it seemed to me to indicate that matter bend space and creates gravitational waves .

I might look this up to give you a better idea of what I mean. 

Another  place I noticed where a great philosopher had a great idea was where Kant said we can not know matter itself, only 0characteristics. Matter in Quantum Field Theory by itself is well understood. It is the "m" in the Lagrangian density or the Hamiltonian. But when it interacts it becomes infinite-an absurd conclusion.
 

I find also in tzadikim that it is not always the best idea to follow everything they say but rather to find the things that make the most sense and leave off the rest. 

And Leibniz said something similar about the followers  of Descartes -that they were not following his path by following every word he said. That in fact dishonored him. It was more people like Spinoza that were following his path  of rigorous logical inquiry that were really following his path.

You might say the same about Rav Nahman.

 During the time of Kant there was a debate whether to close the universities which had been mainly for teaching theology combined with secular studies on the side. One side of the debate was to have only tech schools. --i.e. vocation schools. The other side won--the liberal arts. To the determent of all.

 I say it is time has come for the vocation schools. Learning how to weld, solder, do the jobs that civilization depends on is worth a million PhDs in sex studies.

The right balance between faith and reason. Sinai and Athens.

 There was a great deal of effort during the Middle Ages to strike the right balance between faith and reason. Sinai and Athens. But after Kant, it seems that balance would have to find a different sort of synthesis.  In spite of the Rambam's noble efforts in the Guide for the Perplexed,  it is clear that that sort of balance is unsatisfying. (You might notice that when you read it.) This left me in a state of bewilderment until I discovered Leonard Nelson [founder of the second Kant-Friesian School]  and Kelley Ross.  The issue is that there are a great deal of questions in faith that do not get answers based on reason, nor on empirical evidence. Some seems answerable if you go with Rav Isaac Luria. That is if you put the simple explanation of the Torah into the world of Emanation and let this world be a poor shadow of that perfect world. But that still needs justification for it very existence. And justification that grasping it is possible by means other than reason or sense perception. And that is possible through the Kant Friesian School.  See the paper by Peter Sperber

I have been thinking about Hegel and Jacob Fries for a few days. I think both have been sadlly neglected.

The reasons I think for Hegel are that he was clear that he was in a middle position between the Left {progressives} and the Right - Throne Evangelicals. And the middle is always a hard position to hold onto since it can easily be construed and  tilted to one side or the other by those that do not want to understand.

The major new idea  of Fries of non intuitive immediate knowledge was neglected for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of that approach. For this idea gives a basis for the categories of Kant that otherwise  have weak justification. [And this can be expanded into faith. This is a better justification for faith than Kant's somewhat weak making room for it.] And it is better than Hegel's also since  faith really is not the same kind of thing as logical deductions. Hegel however was right that he did not think feelings were a good justification. [As many thought so in Berlin at the time. To those Hegel directed his criticism.] So that leaves us with  knowledge that is not based on reason and not on the senses--i.e. faith  

If I had more patience I would explain this at length, but for now I just wanted to make a short note of my question on Rav Josef Karo and Rav Shach in their answer for the Rambam.

 The מלאכה of a wife is owned by her husband. So this leaves me wondering a bit about the רמב''ם in Laws of Vows 12 law 10. The גמרא כתובות נ''ט itself I do not have with me, but from what I recall it goes more or less like this: A wife takes a vow to forbid the work of her hands to her husband. The husband should nullify the vow since he might divorce her and then not be able to remarry her. The גמרא asks: "Is it not a thing which has not yet come into her possession? (דבר שלא בא לעולם) THEN רב יוסף answers that saying she does not need to own that which she forbids, but אביי refutes his answer. For one can not forbid that which one does not own to someone else.  The גמרא then answers the original question saying she sanctifies the work of her hands [and her hands are in her possession.] Then the גמרא asks: "But her hands are under obligation to her husband." Answers רב אשי מתרץ : רבא said that Vows קונמות can override the obligation to her husband. So he only needs to nullify the נדר in case he divorces her. 

The רמב''ם says if a wife sanctifies her hands or vows the work of her hands, her husband should nullify the vow in case in the future he might divorce her, and the vow would become valid at that point, and then he could not remarry her. This at first glance looks to be in direct contradiction to the גמרא which said the vow does not even start on the work of her hands because it is a thing which has not yet come into her possession. The כסף משנה and רב שך  answer this elegantly, but in spite of that I am still left wondering.  

The כסף משנה says the point of רב אשי goes back on the original question of the גמרא, not just on the question that immediately precedes his statement. רב שך [Laws of buying and selling 22 law 9] shows that this means a vow  [קדושת הגוף, not קדושת דמים can come on something that is not in ones domain, but it needs at least to be owned by that person.] This is really a very powerful and beautiful answer. (If she says her hands are made holy that means the work of her hands goes to the בית המקדש. That is קדושת ממון. But when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that is קדושת הגוף. And that is the case that רב שך is saying the vow is valid because it is owned by her, but not in her רשות. But not being in her רשות is not a עיכוב to the vow as רב אשי says.) But I am still wondering this: At the time of the vow, she does not own the work of her hands. I mean to say this: we have retracted the original idea that the work of her hands is a thing that has not yet come into this world. It is owned by her and the only thing that might stop the vow is that it is not in her domain. To that רב אשי answers that  a vow that relates to קדושת הגוף, it does not need to be in her רשות. But again I am still wondering the מלאכה itself might very well be דבר שבא לעולם thing that has  come into existence, but even so who owns it? Not her, rather it is her husband. So again we come back to the original question: how could the vow be valid in the first place? 

There is an answer for רב שך. That is this: a woman can renounce her right to certain benefits she gets from her husband, and by doing so her husband is not required to provide those benefits and does not get certain rights that he has. One of those rights is the ownership of the work of her hands. So, in our case in laws of נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה  , she might not be saying openly that she will not get benefits from her husband. But by the very act of forbidding the work of her hands to her husband, she automatically does not get those benefits (מזונות support for food). At that point, in fact, the work of her hands does belong to her, and she can make a vow to forbid it since it is a thing that is in her possession.

 And I think that רב שך answer for the Rambam has to be true because in other places in the Rambam we find that for a נדר to be valid, the object does need to be owned by  person making the vow, but it does not need to be in their domain at the time of the vow.

The most well-known examples are the case a person owns an object that is being guarded by another person and that other person has denied the fact that the first own the object. In that case, the first person cannot sell that object because even though he owns it, it is not in his רשות. But in the seventh year [shemita] people that own fruit of the fourth year can put aside money in case that fruit is picked (unknowingly), that the holiness of the fourth year fruit will come onto that money. This is the case even though at the time it is picked, it is no longer in the domain of the owner. [Of course, the money has only קדושת דמים, but the point is that the holiness of the fruit can come on it even though the fruit is no longer in the רשות of the owner.]

 

Still there is one curious fact here that the גמרא holds the hands of the wife are under obligation to the husband [and that is the source of their question on the case when she says "ידי מקודשות לעושיהן"]. For this in itself is an argument on page כתובות נ''ח between רב הונא and ריש לקיש. And if she can say "I will not work and will not receive מזונות [food]," that is going according to רב הונא that her hands are not under obligation to her husband. But this is not a question on רב שך. It simply means that the סוגיא concerning נדרים is going like ריש לקיש  and in that case when the גמרא answers that קונמות (vows) can override obligation that means in our case that when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that means at that very second she owns the work of her hands and her husband is not obligated to support her. If we had been going to רב הונא she could have accomplished this same thing by simply saying "I will not get support and I will not work." But with ריש לקיש she needs to accomplish this by means of a vow.

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 [The work of a wife is owned by her husband. So this leaves me wondering a bit about the Rambam in Laws of Vows 12. 

The Gemara [Ketuboth] itself I do not have with me but from what I recall it goes more or less like this: A wife takes a vow to forbid the work of her hands to her husband. The husband should nullify the vow since he might divorce her and then not be able to remarry her. The Gemara asks is it not a thing which has not yet come into her possession? Rav Josef answers that saying she does not need to own that which she forbids, but Abyee refutes his answer. For one can not forbid that which one does not own to someone else.  The Gemara then answers the original question saying she sanctifies the work of her hands [and her hands are in her possession.] Then the gemara asks but her hands are under obligation to her husband. Answers Rav Ashi: Rava said that Vows can override the obligation to her husband. So he only needs to nullify the vow in case he divorces her.

The Rambam says if a wife sanctifies her hands or vows the work of her hands her husband should nullify the vow in case in the future he might divorce her and the vow would become valid at that point and then he could not remarry her. 

This at first glance looks to be in direct contradiction to the Gemara which said the vow does not even start on the work of her hands because it is a thing which has not yet come into her possession. The Kesepf Mishna and Rav Shach answer this elegantly, but in spite of that I am still left wondering.  The Kesef Mishna says the point of Rav Ashi goes back on the original question of the Gemara, not just on the question that immediately precedes his statement. Rav Shach [Laws of buying and selling 22]shows that this means a vow  [holiness of the body, not holiness of monetary value can come on something that is not in ones domain but it needs at least to be owned by that person.] This is really a very powerful and beautiful answer. (If she says her hands are made holy that means the work of her hands goes to the Temple. That is holiness of monetary value. But when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that is holiness  of body, not money. And that is the case that Rav Shach is saying the vow is valid because it is owned by her but not in her domain. But not being in her domain is not a stop to the vow as Rav Ashi says.)But I am still wondering this: At the time of the vow she does not own the work of her hands. I mean to say this: we have retracted the original idea that the work of her hands is a thing that has not yet come into this world. It is owned by her and the only thing that might stop the vow is that it is not in her domain. To that Rav Ashi answers that or a vow that relates to holiness of body, it does not need to be in her domain. But again I am still wondering the work itself might very well be דבר שבא לעולם thing that has not yet come into existence, but even so who owns it? Not her, rather it is her husband. So again we come back to the original question: how could the vow be valid in the first place? I did not think of this question at the sea shore but it just occurred to me at fleeting moment her and there. Sometimes at the sea and sometimes just day dreaming.

There is an answer for Rav Shach. [I thought of this a few days after I wrote the above essay.] That is this: a woman can renounce her right to certain benefits she gets from her husband and by doing her husband is not required to provide those benefits and does not get certain rights that he has. One of those rights is the ownership of the work of her hands. So, in our case in laws of Nedarim 12 halacha 10, she might not be saying openly that she will not get benefits from her husband. But by the very act of forbidding the work of her hands to her husband she automatically does not get those benefits (mezonot support for food). At that point, in fact, the work of her hands does belong to her, and she can make a vow to forbid it since it is a thing that is in her possession.

 And I think that Rav Shach's answer for the Rambam has to be true because in other places in the Rambam we find that for a neder vow to be valid the object does need to be owned by the person making the vow but it does not need to be in their domain at the time of the vow.

The most well-known examples are the case a person owns an object that is being guarded by another person and that other person has denied the fact that the first own the object. In that case the first person cannot sell that object because even though he owns it, it is not in his domain [reshut]. But in the seventh year [shemita] people that own fruit of the fourth year can put aside money in case that fruit is picked unknowingly that the holiness of the fourth year fruit will come onto that money. This is the case even though at the time it is picked, it is no longer in the domain of the owner. [Of course, the money has only holiness of money, but the point is that the holiness of the fruit can come on it even though the fruit is no longer in the domain of the owner.]

 

Still there is one curious fact here that the gemara holds the hands of the wife are und obligation to the husband [and that is the source of their question on the case when she says her hands are sanctified]. For this in itself is a argument on page 58 of Ketuboth between Rav Huna and Resih Lakish. And if she can say "I will not work and will not receive mezonot [food]," that is going according to Rav Huna that her hands are not under obligation to her husband. But this is not a question on Rav Shach. It simply means that the sugia concerning nedarim is going like Reish Lakish and in that case when the Gemara answers that Konamot vows can override obligation that means in our case that when she says the work of her hands is forbidden to her husband by a vow that means at that very second she owns the work of her hands and her husband is not obligated to support her. If we had been going to Rav Huna she could have accomplished this same thing by simply saying I will not get support and I will not work. But with Reish Lakish she needs to accomplish this by means of a vow.

]

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המלאכה של אישה היא בבעלות בעלה. אז זה משאיר אותי לתהות קצת על הרמב''ם בהלכות נדרים יב. את הגמרא כתובות נ''ט עצמו אין לי איתי אבל ממה שאני זוכר זה הולך פחות או יותר כך: אשה לוקחת  נדרה לאסור את עבודת ידיה לבעלה. הבעל צריך לבטל את הנדר כי הוא עלול לגרש אותה ואז לא יוכל להינשא לה שוב. שואלת הגמרא: "האין זה דבר שעדיין לא הגיע לרשותה? (דבר שלא בא לעולם) אז רב יוסף עונה שאינה צריכה להחזיק את מה שהיא אוסרת, אבל אביי מפריך את תשובתו. לא יכול לאסור את מה שאין לו למישהו אחר. אז הגמרא עונה על השאלה המקורית ואומרת שהיא מקדשת את ידיה [וידיה ברשותה] ואז שואלת הגמרא: "אבל ידיה מחויבות [משועבדות] לבעלה."  רב אשי מתרץ: רבא אמר [נדרים] קונמות יכולים לעקוף את החיוב לבעלה. אז הוא צריך רק לבטל את הנדר במקרה שיגרש אותה. הרמב"ם אומר אם אישה מקדשת את ידיה או נדרה מעשה ידיה מבעלה צריך לבטל את הנדר למקרה שבעתיד יגרש אותה והנדר יקבל תוקף באותה נקודה ואז הוא לא יוכל להינשא לה בשנית. זה במבט ראשון נראה כסתירה ישירה לחוק הגמרא שאמר הנדר אינו מתחיל על עבודת ידיה כי זה דבר שעדיין לא הגיע לרשותה. הכסף משנה ורב שך עונים על זה באלגנטיות, אבל למרות זאת אני עדיין תוהה. הכסף משנה אומר שהנקודה של רב אשי חוזרת על השאלה המקורית של הגמרא, לא רק על השאלה שקודמת מיד להצהרתו. רב שך [הלכות מכירה 22] מראה שזה אומר שנדר [קדושת הגוף, לא קדושת דמים יכול לבוא על משהו שאינו בתחום של האדם, אבל הוא צריך לפחות להיות בבעלותו של אותו אדם.] זה באמת תשובה מאוד חזקה ויפה.(אם היא אומרת ידיה מקודשות זאת אומרת מעשה ידיה הולך לבית המקדש. כלומר  זה קדושת ממון. אבל כשאומרת מלאכת ידיה אסורה לבעלה בנדר זה קדושת הגוף.  שהרי רב שך אומר שהנדר תקף כי הוא בבעלותה אך לא ברשותה. אבל אי היותה ברשותה אינו עיכוב לנדר כדברי רב אשי. אבל אני עדיין תוהה זאת: בשעת הנדר אין לה מעשה ידיה. אני מתכוון לומר זאת: חזרנו מהרעיון המקורי שעבודת ידיה היא דבר שעדיין לא בא לעולם. זה בבעלותה והדבר היחיד שעשוי לעצור את הנדר הוא שזה לא בתחום שלה. על כך עונה רב אשי שנדר המתייחס לקדושת הגוף, אינו צריך להיות ברשותה. אבל שוב אני עדיין תוהה שהמלאכה עצמה עשויה בהחלט להיות דבר שבא לעולם דבר שהתקיים, אבל למרות זאת מי הבעלים שלו? לא היא, אלא זה בעלה. אז שוב אנחנו חוזרים לשאלה המקורית: איך יכול להיות שהנדר תקף מלכתחילה

יש תשובה לרב שך. כלומר, אישה יכולה לוותר על זכותה להטבות מסוימות שהיא מקבלת מבעלה ועל ידי כך בעלה אינו נדרש לספק את ההטבות הללו ואינו מקבל זכויות מסוימות שיש לו. אחת מאותן זכויות היא הבעלות על מעשה ידיה. לכן, במקרה שלנו בהלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י', ייתכן שהיא לא אומרת בגלוי שהיא לא תקבל הטבות מבעלה. אך מעצם איסור עבודת ידיה על בעלה, היא אוטומטית אינה זוכה להטבות אלו (מזונות, תמיכה באוכל). באותה נקודה, למעשה, מעשה ידיה אכן שייך לה, והיא יכולה לנדור ולאסור שכן מדובר בדבר שברשותה. ואני חושב שתשובת רב שך לרמב"ם צריכה להיות אמת כי במקומות אחרים ברמב"ם אנו מוצאים שכדי שנדר יהיה תקף, החפץ צריך להיות בבעלותו של אדם הנודר אבל הוא לא צריך להיות ברשותו בזמן הנדר. הדוגמאות הידועות ביותר הן המקרה של אדם בבעלותו חפץ הנשמר על ידי אדם אחר ואותו אדם אחר הכחיש את העובדה שהראשון הוא בעל החפץ. במקרה כזה האדם הראשון לא יכול למכור את החפץ הזה כי למרות שהוא הבעלים שלו, זה לא ברשות שלו. אבל בשנה השביעית [שמיטה] אנשים שבבעלותם פירות של שנה ד' [נטע רבעי] יכולים לשים בצד כסף למקרה שהפרי נקטף מבלי לדעת שקדושת פירות השנה הרביעית תבוא על הכסף הזה. זה המצב למרות שבזמן בו הוא נבחר, זה כבר לא ברשות הבעלים. [כמובן שלכסף יש רק קדושת דמים, אבל העניין הוא שקדושת הפרי יכולה לבוא עליו למרות שהפרי כבר לא ברשות הבעלים.] ובכל זאת יש כאן עובדה קשה שהגמרא מחזיקה שידי האישה משועבדות כלפי הבעל [וזה מקור שאלתם על המקרה כשהיא אומרת "ידי מקודשות לעושיהן"]. לכך כשלעצמו יש ויכוח בדף כתובות נ''ח בין רב הונא לריש לקיש אם תוכל לומר "לא אעבוד ולא אקבל מזונות". כלומר, לפי רב הונא, אין ידיה חייבות לבעלה. אבל זו לא שאלה על רב שך. זה פשוט אומר שהסוגיא לגבי נדרים הולך כמו ריש לקיש ובמקרה כזה כשהגמרא עונה שקונמות (נדרים) יכולים לעקוף שיעבוד,- זה אומר בענייננו שכאשר היא אומרת מלאכת ידיה אסורה לבעלה ע"י נדר זה אומר שבאותה שנייה היא הבעלים של מעשה ידיה ובעלה אינו מחויב לפרנס אותה. אם היינו הולכים לרב הונא היא הייתה יכולה להשיג את אותו הדבר על ידי כך פשוט לומר "לא אקבל תמיכה ולא אעבוד". אבל עם ריש לקיש היא צריכה להשיג זאת באמצעות נדר

 Hegel consciously built om previous philosophers. He took the good and disregarded what he considered to be mistakes. And that is what I try to do.

I am not saying everything in the Talmud is all right. I am looking for objective morality.

 

You might find things in the Talmud or even in the Old Testament that are you might object to. If possible I try to reconcile these things to reason. But if that is not possible. I disregard them. 

However morality based only on Reason I also find to be problematic. There are those who think Marxism is the most rational of all moral and political systems.  And if we would go by pure logic, they might be right. But when I was growing up it was considered an axiom that in Physics or any subject, if one's theory is perfectly logical, but the results of experiment show it to be wrong, then it is wrong. And Communism is a good example of that. The millions of those murdered under Stalin and Mao show that somewhere the logic of Communism went haywire.

So that might not show any system to be perfect. But it is best to start with the Medieval Approach of Faith with Reason. [And just to add a little substance to my claim here I would like to mention the modified Kantian approach of Leonard Nelson the founder of the second Friesian School where you have this idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge- i.e., knowledge not based on reason nor on sense perception. This mainly refers to the categories  of Kant but can also be understood as faith.]