השלחן ערוך כותב כי עדים צריכים להעיד בעל פה, לא בכתב (חושן משפט פרק כ''ח). אבל כדי לאמת מסמך, בחושן משפט סימן מ''ו סעיף ז' הרמ''א אומר שאפשר להעיד בכתיבה בשם הריב''ש (יצחק בן ששת). ואף על פי כן, לאחר שכותב השלחן ערוך (פרק מ''ו הל''ו) אם אחד הוא עד, ואז פתאום לא יכול לדבר, הוא אינו יכול להעיד על תוקף חתימתו (אפילו בכתב). והרמ''א אינו חולק שם. מַדוּעַ? רב שמואל רוזובסקי עונה את זה. רב יוסף קרו סבור כמו תוספות שמסמך עם עד אחד בלבד אינו נחשב כמסמך תקף, ולכן כדי לאמת אותו, צריך להעיד בעל פה, לא בכתב. נראה שזה מרמז שרב קרו סבור שמסמך שנכתב בניגוד להסכמת הלווה גם אינו נחשב כמסמך, ולכן גם שם יש להעיד על תוקפו בעל פה, בעוד שהרמ"א סבור שאפשר להעיד בכתב על תוקפו. ----בהתחלה היה נראה לי קשה להבין למה רב שמואל מתכוון בזה שיש מסמך שיש לו תוקף ועדיין צריך לאמת אותו. הוא לא מסביר למה הוא מתכוון בדיוק. עם זאת, עלה בדעתי שהוא חייב לסבור שהשלחן ערוך סבור כמו הרמב"ם שאף מסמך אינו תקף מדין התורה, רק דברי הסופרים הופכים מסמכי הלוואה לתקפים בכלל. אבל אפילו אז, צריך לאמת אותם כאשר המלווה מגיע לבית המשפט כדי לגבות את התשלום שלו. לכן, תמיד צריך להעיד על תוקפו של מסמך בעל פה, כי הפסוק "מפיהם" מרמז "ולא מפי כתבם". עם זאת, הרמ"א חייב לקבוע שמסמכי הלוואות ועסקים תקפים מהתורה. מכיוון שהם כבר תקפים, אז אפשר להעיד על תוקפם בכתב. [רק כאשר מסמך נכתב עם רק עד אחד, אז אין לו תוקף מהתורה, ולכן צריך להעיד על תוקפו מדברי הסופרים בעל פה.] ויכוח זה בין השלחן ערוך לרמ"א מבוסס על תוספת כתובות עמוד כ'. דעה אחת היא ש"שטר" שנכתב ללא הסכמת הלווה אינו נחשב כמסמך, ורב קרו מסכים לכך, והרמ"א חולק על כך. דעה נוספת היא שמסמך עם עד אחד בלבד אינו נחשב כמסמך. גם השלחן ערוך וגם הרמ"א מסכימים

The Rav Joseph Karo (author of the Shulchan Aruch) writes that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing (Choshen Mishpat chapter 28, law 11). But to validate a document, in choshen mishpat chapter 46 law 7 the Rema says one can testify by writing in the name of the Rivash (Izhak ben Sheshet). And yet later on when the Shulchan Aruch writes (chapter 46 law 36)if one is a witness, and then suddenly became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the Rema does not disagree there. Why? the rav Shmuel Rozovski [Rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach] is this. Rav Joseph Karo holds like Tosphot that a document with only one witness does not have a valid category of a document, and therefore to validate it, one needs to testify verbally, not in writing. This seems to imply that Rav Karo holds a document written against the consent of the borrower is also not considered to be a document, and therefore there also one must testify for it’s validity verbally, while the Rema holds one can testify in writing about its validity. It seemed to me at first hard to understand what Rav Shmuel means by a document having validity and yet still needing to be validated. He does not explain what he mean exactly. However, it occurred to me that he must hold that the Shulchan Aruch Rav Karo holds like the Rambam that no document is valid from the law of the Torah, only the words of the sages makes documents of loans valid at all. But even then, one needs to validate them when the lender comes to court to collect his payment. Therefore one must always testify for the validity of a document verbally because the verse from their mouth which implies not from their writing. However the Rema must hold that documents of loans and business are valid from the Torah. Since they are already valid, then one can testify as for their validity in writing. Only when a document was written against with only one witness, then it has no validity from the Torah, so one has to testify as for its validity from the words of the sages verbally. This argument between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema is based on Tosphot Ketuboth page 20.One opinion is a doc written without consent of the borrower does not have the status of a document and Rav karo agrees with this and the Rema disagrees. Another opinion is a document with only one witness does not have the status of a document. Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema agree. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The שלחן ערוך writes that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing ( חושן משפט פרק כ''ח ). But to validate a document, in חושן משפט סימן מ''ו סעיף ז' the רמ''א says one can testify by writing in the name of the ריב''ש (יצחק בן ששת). And yet later on when the שלחן ערוך writes (chapter מ''ו lawל''ו ) if one is a witness, and then suddenly became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the רמ''א does not disagree there. Why? the רב שמואל רוזובסקי is this. רב יוסף קרו holds like תוספות that a document with only one witness does not have a valid category of a document, and therefore to validate it, one needs to testify verbally, not in writing. This seems to imply that רב קרו holds a document written against the consent of the borrower is also not considered to be a document, and therefore there also one must testify for it’s validity verbally, while the רמ''א holds one can testify in writing about its validity. ----It seemed to me at first hard to understand what רב שמואל means by a document having validity and yet still needing to be validated. He does not explain what he mean exactly. However, it occurred to me that he must hold that the שלחן ערוךholds like the רמב''ם that no document is valid from the law of the תורה, only the words of the סופרים makes documents of loans valid at all. But even then, one needs to validate them when the lender comes to court to collect his payment. Therefore, one must always testify for the validity of a document verbally because the verse "מפיהם" which implies ולא מפי כתבם. However, the רמ''א must hold that documents of loans and business are valid from the תורה. Since they are already valid, then one can testify as for their validity in writing. Only when a document was written against with only עד אחד, then it has no validity from the תורה, so one has to testify as for its validity from the words of the סופרים verbally. This argument between the שלחן ערוך and the רמ''א is based on תוספות כתובות page כ''. One opinion is a שטר written without consent of the borrower does not have the status of a document and רב קרו agrees with this and the רמ''א disagrees. Another opinion is a document with only one witness does not have the status of a document. Both the שלחן ערוך and the רמ''א agree.

השלחן ערוך חושן משפט סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו

הש''ך (חושן משפט מ''ו ס''ק ז') שואל שאלה על הרמ''א בשלחן ערוך. הגר"א עונה על זה בצורה אחת ורב שמואל רוזובסקי עונה על זה אחרת על סמך תוספות בכתובות דף כ' ד''ה ר''י. הנושא בקצרה הוא זה. השלחן ערוך והרמ''א כותבים שהעדים צריכים להעיד בעל פה ולא בכתב. אבל כדי לאמת מסמך, הרמ''א אומר שאפשר להעיד בכתב. ואף על פי כן, כשכותב השלחן ערוך חושן משפט סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו אם הוא עד, ופתאום לא יכול לדבר, אינו יכול להעיד על תוקף חתימתו (אפילו בכתב). והרמ"א אינו חולק על כך. מדוע? ----תשובתו של הגר"א קצרה, אבל רב שך מסביר זאת כך. הרמ"א סבור כמו (הריב"ש) רב יצחק בן ששת שעד יכול לאמת את חתימתו על ידי כתיבה. זה בא כמו רב כהנא בגיטין דף ע"א צד א' שאומר שחירש יכול לכתוב, "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי," וזה תקף. אבל אדם שאינו יכול לדבר אינו יכול לתת עדות כי חוסר היכולת לדבר הוא פגם בגוף. לכן, כדי להעיד לגבי תקפות החתימה של אדם אנו זקוקים לעדים תקפים, ואם יש לנו את זה, אז הם יכולים לכתוב שהחתימה תקפה. אבל מי שאינו יכול לדבר אינו עד תקף כלל. הבעיה שאני רואה היא שרב כהנא לא אומר כלום על תוקף חתימתו. הוא מדבר רק על חירש שנותן פקודה בכתב לגרש את אשתו. אני יכול להזכיר שלמרות שר' יוחנן חולק על רב כהנא, עדיין יש ר' יצחק בדף ע''א ע''ב שמסביר את המשנה שם בהתאם לרב כהנא. אז נוכל לראות מדוע הריב''ש (ר' יצחק בן ששת) החליט כמו רב כהנא נגד ר' יוחנן

The Shach asks a question on the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch . The Gra answers it in one way and Rav Shmuel Rozovski of Ponovitch answers it differently based on a Tosphot in Ketuboth page 20. The subject in short is this. The Shulchan Aruch and Rema write that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing. But to validate a document, the Rema says one can testify by writing. And yet later on when the Shulchan Aruch writes if one is a witness, and then became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the Rema does not disagree there. Why? The answer of the Gra is short, but Rav Shach explains it thus. The Rema holds like the Rivash [Rav Izhak ben Sheshet] that a witness can validate his signature by writing. This is coming like Rav Kahana in Gitin 71 side a who says a deaf person can write, ‘’Write and give a divorce to my wife, and it is valid. But a person who cannot speak cannot give testimony because not being able to speak is a defect of the body. So, to testify as for the validity of one’s signature we need valid witnesses, and if we have that then they can write that the signature is valid. But one who cannot speak is not a valid witness at all.] The problem I see is that Rav Kahana says nothing about validating one’s signature. He only speaks about a deaf person giving a command in writing to divorce his wife. I might mention that even though R. Yochanan disagrees with Rav Kahana still there is R. Isaac on page 71 side b who explains the Mishna there to be in accord with Rav Kahana. {So we can see why the Rivash [Issac ben Sheshet] decided like Rav Kahana against R. Yochanan.} ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The ש''ך asks a question on the רמ''א in the שלחן ערוך. The גר''א answers it in one way and רב שמואל רוזובסקי answers it differently based on a תוספות בכתובות דף כ'. The subject in short is this. The שלחן ערוך and רמ''א write that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing. But to validate a document, the רמ''א says one can testify by writing. And yet later on when the שלחן ערוך סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו writes if one is a witness, and then became unable to speak, he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the רמ''א does not disagree there. Why? The answer of the גר''א is short, but רב שך explains it thus. The רמ''א holds like the (ריב’’ש) רב יצחק בן ששת that a witness can validate his signature by writing. This is coming like רב כהנא in גיטין דף ע''א side a who says a deaf person can write, ‘’Write and give a divorce to my wife, and it is valid. But a person who cannot speak cannot give testimony because not being able to speak is a defect of the body. So, to testify as for the validity of one’s signature we need valid witnesses, and if we have that, then they can write that the signature is valid. But one who cannot speak is not a valid witness at all.] The problem I see is that רב כהנא says nothing about validating one’s signature. He only speaks about a deaf person giving a command in writing to divorce his wife. I might mention that even though ר’ יוחנן disagrees with רב כהנא still there is ר' יצחק on דף ע''א who explains the משנה there to be in accord with רב כהנא. {So, we can see why the ריב''ש יצחק בן ששת decided like רב כהנא against ר’ יוחנן.}

כתובות תוספות בדף כ' ע''ב מביא את הירושלמי. יוצא מהירושלמי שגם אם העדים על שטר הלוואה לא זוכרים כלום, הם עדיין יכולים להעיד על חתימותיהם וזה כמו האי גאון שהובא בשיטה מקובצת, אבל לא כמו הרמב''ם. אני חושב שהדרך להסביר את ההבדל הזה היא שלדעת רש''י תוספות ורמב''ן שטר בהלוואה יש תוקף מהתורה, וזו לדעתי הסיבה של האי גאון. כיוון שהשטר תקף גם בלי שאף אחד אמר דבר בבית המשפט, אז כדי להוסיף לו תוקף נוסף, די לעדות בעדים על תוקף חתימתם. אולם לדעת הרמב"ם, לשטרי הלוואות אין תוקף מהתורה, אלא חכמים נתנו להן תוקף כדי שלא תיסגר הדלת בפני אנשים שרוצים ללוות כסף. הרשו לי להביא כאן את ירושלמי. המשנה אומרת ר' יהודה הנשיא אמר שכאשר שטר של הלוואה מגיע לבית דין, העדים עליו צריכים להעיד על תוקף חתימתם, וגם להביא מישהו אחר שיעיד על כל חתימה. אבל חכמים אמרו שדי אם כל עד יעיד על תוקף חתימתו. הירושלמי אומר שאם איש אינו זוכר את ההלוואה, אין ויכוח בין ר' יהודה לחכמים. שניהם מסכימים שהעדים מעידים על חתימותיהם ומביאים עדים אחרים לאותה מטרה. אם שני העדים זוכרים את ההלוואה, אין ויכוח. כולם מסכימים שהם מעידים על ההלוואה, וזה מספיק. הוויכוח הוא כאשר הם שכחו את ההלוואה ורק לאחר שהשטר הזכיר להם עליה, הם זוכרים. בעיני ירושלמי השטר יכול להיות תקף גם אם אף אחד לא זוכר את ההלוואה כלל, וזו דעת האי גאון. בעיני הרמב"ם מקרה זה אינו תקף כלל. הוא מתבסס על הגמרא שלנו ועל העובדה שהשטר ממילא פסול מהתורה. הגמרא שלנו מביאה את המשנה ואומרת שרב הונא אמר שצריך לזכור את ההלוואה. ר' יוחנן אמר שאם זוכרים את ההלוואה על ידי כתב האישי שלהם, זה מספיק. הרמב"ם פסק את הדין כמו ר' יוחנן והגמרא שלנו

Ketuboth page 20 side Tosphot brings the Yerushalmi. It comes out of the Yerushalmi that even if the witnesses on a doc of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like Rav Hai Gaon brought in the Shita Mekubetzet, but not like the Rambam. I think the way to explain this difference is that Rashi, Tosphot and Ramban hold a document on a loan has validity from the Torah, and this is I think the reason of Hai Gaon. Since the doc is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the Rambam, documents of loans have no validity from the Torah, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the Yerushalmi. The Mishna says R Judah Hanasi said when a document of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. the Yerushalmi says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the document. To the Yerushalmi the doc can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of Hai Gaon. To the Rambam this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our Gemara and the fact that the doc is anyway no valid from the Torah. Our Gemara brings the Mishna and says Rav Huna said they need to recall the loan. R. Yochanan said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal document, that is enough. The Rambam decided the law like R Yochanan and our Gemara.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- כתובות תוספות בדף כ' ע''ב brings the ירושלמי. It comes out of the ירושלמי that even if the witnesses on a שטר of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like האי גאון brought in the שיטה מקובצת, but not like the רמב’’ם. I think the way to explain this difference is that רש''י תוספות ורמב''ן hold a שטר on a loan has validity from the תורה, and this is I think the reason of האי גאון. Since the שטר is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the רמב’’ם, שטרי of loans have no validity from the תורה, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the ירושלמי. The משנה says ר' יהודה הנשי said when a שטר of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. The ירושלמי says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the שטר. To the ירושלמי the שטר can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of האי גאון. To the רמב’’ם this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our גמרא and the fact that the שטר is anyway invalid from the תורה. Our גמרא brings the משנה and says רב הונא said they need to recall the loan. ר’ יוחנן said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal שטר, that is enough. The רמב’’ם decided the law like ר’ יוחנן and our גמרא.

za85 c minor midi format ditto in nwc format

בבא מציעא כ''ח

מי שמוצא חפץ אבוד שיתבלה עם הזמן נדרש למכור אותו, והכסף שייך לבעל החפץ (ונשמר לעתיד שיקבל את חפצו). בינתיים, המוצא יכול להשתמש בכסף. הוא נחשב כמי ששאל חפץ של מישהו אחר, ולכן אם הוא מאבד את הכסף בכל מקרה עליו להחזיר. בבא מציעא כ"ח ע"ב כ"ט ע"א וכ"ט ע''א. זה כמו רב יוסף שמחזיק במי ששומר על חפץ אבוד שאינו חייב לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא עסוק בשמירה שלו. לכן, הוא כמו שומר בשכר, ואז מכיוון שהוא גם יכול להשתמש בכסף, הוא עולה מדרגה אחת להיות שואל של הכסף שיש לו מידה גדולה יותר של אחריות לשמור על הכסף. כך קבעו ר' חננאל והר''ם את החוק (הלכות גזלה ואבדה פרק י''ג הלכה י''ז). {תוספת חולקים על כך וקובעים שהוא כמו שומר שלא מקבל שכר.} זה סותר את בבא מציעא מ''ג שבו יש לך מקרה של אדם שהפקיד צרור כסף לא קשור אצל חלפן כספים. מכיוון שהוא יכול להשתמש בכסף, יש לו את הקטגוריה של שומר בשכר שאחראי אם הכסף אבד בגניבה, אך אינו אחראי לדברים בלתי נמנעים כמו אם הסירה (שהיה עליה) טבעה. כך רב נחמן פסק את החוק והרמב"ם פסק במקרה זה כמו רב נחמן. [הבעיה היא שהיתר להשתמש בכסף במקרה אחד (מוצא) הופך אותו ללווה או שואל, ובמקרה השני לשומר בשכר.] הסיבה ניתנת על ידי רבינו אפרים והמגיד משנה ששומר הכסף של החפץ האבוד צריך לעלות ברמה שונה משומר בשכר ללווה מכיוון שהוא מקבל את היתרון של אי-הצורך לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא מעורב בשמירה ובטיפול בחפץ, ואז הוא גם מקבל אישור להשתמש בחפץ. רב שך הציע ששמירה על החפץ האבוד נדרשת על פי התורה, ולכן זה הופך אותו לאחראי יותר. עם זאת, תשובה זו נראית קשה. הסיבה היא שההבדל בין שומר בשכר ובין שואל הוא שכל התועלת הולכת לשואל, בעוד שבמקרה של שומר בתשלום, בעל החפץ מקבל תועלת מסוימת. זו, אחרי הכל, הסיבה שהוא משלם את השומר. אבל בשני המקרים שלנו כאן תועלת מסוימת הולכת לבעל הכסף ולכן בשני המקרים השומר צריך להיות שומר בתשלום, לא לווה או שואל. הסיבה היחידה שהוא יכול להפוך ללווה היא שהוא מקבל תשלום נוסף אך התועלת עדיין תגיע לבעל החפץ האבוד. מכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה לא אומר שאין תועלת לבעלים. אחרי הכל, הסיבה היחידה שהתורה דורשת מהמוצא לשמור על הכסף היא לטובת בעל החפץ האבוד. עם זאת, אני יכול לראות את הרעיון שמכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה יוצר דרגה גבוהה יותר של אחריות

A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. Bava Mezia 28b and 29 a. This is like Rav Joseph who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how the Rabbainu Chananel and Rambam decided the law. (laws of theft or loss chapter 13 law 17) {Tosphot disagrees holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of Raba.} This conflicts with Bava Metzia page 23 where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money changed can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat it was on sank. This is how Rav Nachman decided the law and the Rambam decided in that case like Rav Nachman. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by Rabbainu Ephraim and the Magid Mishna that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is after all why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. just because ethe Torah requires him to guard thee lost object that does not means that no benefit comes to the owner. after all the only reason the Torah requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I ca see the idea that since the torah requires him to guard the lost object tah t makes ahigher degree of responsibility. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. בבא מציעא כ''ח ע''ב כ''ט ע''א and 29 a. This is like רב יוסף who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how ר' חננאלand הר''ם decided the law. {תוספות disagrees and holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of.} This conflicts with בבא מציעא מ''ג where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money change can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat )it was on( sank. This is how רב נחמן decided the law and the רמב''ם decided in that case like רב נחמן. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by רבינו אפרים and the מגיד משנה that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is, after all, why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. Because the תורה requires him to guard the lost object, that does not mean that no benefit comes to the owner. After all, the only reason the תורה requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I can see the idea that since the תורה requires him to guard the lost object that makes a higher degree of responsibility.

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תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי מביא דיון בין ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש שקשה להבין. שאלת ריש לקיש: שלפי דעת ר' יוחנן שמי שאינו כהן שגנב תרומה מאבי אמו שהוא כהן, ואחר כך יורש את הדוד, צריך לשלם לכל שבט הכהנים. ריש לקיש מחזיק שהוא מחזיר לעצמו. ריש לקיש שואל אם ר' יוחנן צודק, אז המשנה המאוחרת שאומרת מי שגנב ואכל תרומה שהוא הקדש חייב לשלם קרן אחד (סכום עיקרי) ושתי חמישיות, צריך לומר, הוא מחזיר שלוש". ר' יסא אמר בשם ר' יוחנן שהגניבה כלולה. הרידב''ז מסביר שלהראב''ד, הנקודה של ריש לקיש הייתה שהוא צריך להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור תרומה. הסיבה לשניים היא שכל מקרי גניבה דורשים תשלום כפול. בסך הכל יהיה זה פי שלושה מהערך המקורי. אבל איך זה טוב לריש לקיש? במקרה של המשנה השנייה הגנב אינו כהן. אז למה לא להחזיר שלושה? ריש לקיש יכול לענות שתרומת הקדש אינו רכוש הכהנים. הרי המקרה הוא כזה שכהן קיבל תרומה, ואז הקדיש אותה לבית המקדש. אז הוא בוודאי אינו הבעלים שלה יותר. הבעלים היחיד הוא בית המקדש, ולכן הוא מחזיר קרן אחת להקדש. הבעיה עם התשובה הזו היא שהיא עובדת באותה מידה גם עבור ר' יוחנן. אני חושב שהתשובה היא שריש לקיש טוען שלמרות שהתרומה שייכת למקדש, היא עדיין תרומה, ולכן עליו להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד להקדש, ושניים לשבט אם צריך להחזיר תרומה גנובה לשבט. אבל ריש לקיש טוען כאן שתרומה גנובה אינו מוחזר לשבט אלא לבעלים הפרטי, וכאן לאחר שהכהן נתן אותו למקדש, הוא אינו שייך לאף כהן פרטי

The Talmud Yerushalmi Trumot chapter 6 brings a discussion between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish that is difficult to understand. The question of Reish Lakish is that according to the opinion of R. Yochanan that one who is not a kohen who stole trumah from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. Riesh Lakish holds he pays back himself. Reish Lakish asks if R . Yochanan is correct, then the later mishna which says one who stole and ate truma that is hekdesh must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” R. Yesa said in the name of R Yochanan that the theft is included. The Ridvaz explains that to the Raavad the paint of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three kerens [main amounts] one for hekdesh and two for truma. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to Reish Lakish? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the Ridvaz, Reish Lakish can answer that the trumah of hedesh is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received trumah, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one keren to hedesh. The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for R Yochanan. I think the answer is that Reish Lakish claims that even though the trumah belongs to the temple, it still is trumah, and so he should pay back three kerens, one to hekdesh, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen trumah to the tribe. But Reish Lakish might claim here that stolen trumah is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the kohen gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual kohen.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי brings a discussion between ר’ יוחנן and ריש לקיש that is difficult to understand. The question of ריש לקישis that according to the opinion of ר’ יוחנן that one who is not a kohen who stole תרומה from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. ריש לקיש holds he pays back himself. ריש לקיש asks if ר’ יוחנן is correct, then the later משנה which says one who stole and ate תרומה that is הקדש must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” ר' יסא said in the name of ר’ יוחנן that the theft is included. The רידב''ז explains that to the ראב''ד the point of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three קרניים [main amounts] one for הקדש and two for תרומה. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to ריש לקיש? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the ridvaz, ריש לקיש can answer that the תרומה ofהקדש is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received תרומה, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one קרן toהקדש . The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for ר’ יוחנן. I think the answer is that ריש לקיש claims that even though the תרומה belongs to the temple, it still is תרומה, and so he should pay back three קרניים, one to הקדש, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen תרומה to the tribe. But ריש לקיש might claim here that stolen תרומה is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the כהן gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual כהן----------

רב שמואל רוזובסקי היה ראש הישיבה המרכזית של פונוביז' לפני רב שך. הוא מביא הוכחה שמעילה [השתמשות פריט המוקדש למקדש] כוללת אחריות על גזל.] ההוכחה שהוא מביא היא בירושלמי תרומה פרק ו' משנה ראשונה ושניה. הגמרא שם אומר שאם גנב תרומה מאבי אמו שהוא כהן, אז ר' יוחנן אומר שהוא מחזיר את הסום לשבט היינו הכהנים. אבל ריש לקיש אמר שהוא מחזיר לעצמו [אם הוא היורש היחיד. שאל ריש לקיש על ר' יוחנן מהמשנה המאוחרת: "אם גנב תרומה של הקדש, הוא מחזיר שתי חמישיות וסכום אחד מלא, הקרן ." אם ר' יוחנן יהיה צודק, יש להחזיר שלושה. ר' ייסא אמר הפסוק שאומר להחזיר על מעילה פירושו שהגזלה נכללת בתשלום. הרידב''ז הסביר שאלת ריש לקיש היא שיש להחזיר שלושה סכומים מלאים, האחד עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור גניבת תרומה, (ותשלום הגניבה הוא תמיד שני סכומים מלאים, כלומר מלוא הסכום וכפלו. (אבל כפל לא חל על הקדש.) הרידב"ז מסביר שהרמב"ם קובע שהשאלה היא שיש להחזיר שלוש חמישיות, אחת עבור הקדש, אחת עבור תרומה, ואחת עבור שבועת הכחשת הגניבה. אבל אף אחת מההסברים לא נראית כמספקת הוכחה לרב שמואל רוזובסקי. כל מה שמקבלים מהירושלמי הוא שכאשר יש מעילה, גם הגזלה נכלל. אבל בכל מקרה, כאשר מעילה לא תחול, גם גזלה לא תחול. מה שאנחנו צריכים הוא מקרה שבו מעילה לא תחול וגזל יחול. [כאן אני מניח שזה מה שרב רוזובסקי התכוון אליו. עם זאת, ייתכן שזה לא כן. יכול להיות שרק אני צריך את המסקנה הזו כדי להסביר את התוספות קידושין דף נ''ה.] עם זאת, אנו יכולים להבין זאת מהמשנה עצמה אם הגרסה הנכונה היא שמעילה חלה במקרה של נפח של זית, בעוד שגזלה חלה כאשר נפח זה חסר, אך יש שווה פרוטה. הערה אגב, ברצוני לציין שבאופן שבו הריב"ז מסביר את הראב"ד, איני רואה כיצד תשובתו של ר' ייסא עונה על השאלה על ר' יוחנן. השאלה הייתה בדרך של ר' יוחנן, עלינו לדרוש שלוש כמויות מלאות (קרניים), כלומר אחת עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור תרומה. כעת, משגזלה כלולה בהקדש, עדיין יש לנו שתי קרניים עבור התרמה. כיצד עברנו משלוש קרניים לקרן אחת בלבד?

Rav Shmuel Rozovski was the major rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach. He brings a proof that meila [using an item dedicated to the temple] includes liability for robbery.] The proof he brings is the Yerushalmi tractate Truma chapter 6 the first and second mishna. The Gemara there says that if one stole truma from the father of his mother who is a priest [kohen], then R. Yochanan says he pays back the tribe of kohanim priests (descendants of Aaron). Reish Lakish said he pays back himself [since he is the only inheritor. Reish Lakish asked on R Yochanan from the later Mishna: “If one stole trumah of hedesh, he pays back two fifths and one full amount.” If R. Yochanan would be right, three should be paid back. R Yeesa said the verse that says to pay back for meila means the theft is included in the payment. The Ridvaz (Rav Yakov David of Sluzk and later Safed) explains the Yerushamli thus. To the Raavad, the question of Reish Lakish is three full sums should be paid back, one for hedesh and the other for theft of trumah, and payment of theft is always two full amounts i.e. the full amount and its double. (But double does not apply to hedesh.) The Ridvaz explains that the Rambam holds the question was three fifths ought to be paid back, one for hedesh, one for trumah and one for thee oath denying the theft. But neither explanation seems to provide a proof for Rav Shmuel Rozovski. All you get from the Yerushalmi is that when there is meila, the robbery is included. But in any case, where meila would not apply, neither would robbery. What we need is a case where meila would not apply and robbery would apply. [Here I assume that that is what R. Rozovski meant. However that might not be the case. It could be only I need this conclusion in order to explain Tosphot in Kidushin page 55.] However we can get this from the mishna itself if the correct text (version) is that meila applies in a case of a volume of an olive, while robbery applies when that volume is lacking, but there is a an amount of a coin called a pruta. On a side note, I would like to mention that in the way the Ridvaz explains the Raavad, I can not see how the answer of R Yeesa answers the question on R Yochana. The question was in the way of R Yochanan we should require three full amounts, i.e. one for hedesh, and two for truma. Now that robbery is included in hedesh, we still have two full amounts for the truma. How did we go from three to one full amount alone?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- רב שמואל רוזובסקי was the major ראש ישיבה of פונוביז' before רב שך. He brings a proof that מעילה [using an item dedicated to the temple] includes liability for robbery.] The proof he brings is the ירושלמי tractate תרומה chapter ו' the first and second משנה. The גמרא there says that if one stole תרומה from the father of his mother who is a כהן, then ר' יוחנן says he pays back the שבט היינו כהנים. BUT ריש לקיש said he pays back himself [ IF he is the only inheritor[. ריש לקיש asked on ר' יוחנן from the later משנה: “If one stole תרומה of הקדש, he pays back two fifths and one full amount (קרן .” If ר' יוחנן would be right, three should be paid back. ר' ייסא said the verse that says to pay back for מעילה means the גזלה is included in the payment. The רידב''ז (ר' יעקב דוד מסלוצק and later צפת) explains the ירושלמי thus. To the ראב'’ד, the question of ריש לקיש is three full sums should be paid back, one for הקדש and the other for theft of תרומה, and payment of theft is always two full amounts, i.e. the full amount and its double. (But double does not apply to הקדש.) The רידב’’ז explains that the רמב''ם holds the question was THAT three fifths ought to be paid back, one for הקדש, one for תרומה and one for the oath denying the theft. But neither explanation seems to provide a proof for רב שמואל רוזובסקי. All you get from the ירושלמי is that when there is מעילה, the robbery is included. But in any case, where מעילה would not apply, neither would robbery. What we need is a case where מעילה would not apply and robbery would apply. [Here I assume that that is what רב רוזובסקי meant. However that might not be the case. It could be only I need this conclusion in order to explain תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה.] However, we can get this from the משנה itself if the correct גירסה is that מעילה applies in a case of a volume of an olive, while robbery applies when that volume is lacking, but there is an amount of a פרוטא. On a side note, I would like to mention that in the way the רידב’’ז explains the ראב’ד, I can not see how the answer of ר' ייסא answers the question on ר' יוחנן. The question was in the way of ר' יוחנן we should require three full amounts, i.e. one for הקדש, and two for תרומה. Now that robbery is included in הקדש, we still have two full amounts for the תרומה. How did we go from three to one full amount alone? [Zichron Shmuel is the book which brings the ideas of Rav Shmuel Rozovski which I bring here.]

הסתכלתי על ההוכחה של ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל דף ש' ] שגזילה נכללת במעילה [חפצי המקדש], ולכן אם יש מקרה שבו מעילה אינה חלה, עדיין ישים גזל. אבל ההוכחה באה מהירושלמי (תרומה פרק ו') ושם כתוב אם גונב תרומה של הקדש, אז הוא משלם את הערך הרגיל של החפץ, אבל מוסיף שתי חמישיות, האחת לתרומה והשנייה למעילה. אם החפץ שווה פרוטה, אבל אין לו נפח של זית, אז לר' ינאי הוא משלם חמישית וזה הולך לכהן. אם יש לו נפח של זית, אך אינו שווה פרוטה, החמישי הולך להקדש (אוצר המקדש). אם זו הגרסה הנכונה, אז ר' שמואל הגיוני. אבל הגרסה של הגר''א והרמב''ם היא הפוכה. אם יש לו ערך של פרוטה, אך חסר לו הנפח, אז הוא הולך להקדש. אם יש לו את הנפח, אך לא את הערך הכספי הנכון, הוא הולך לכהן. בגרסה זו, אין שום דבר שמצביע על כך שגזל כלול במעילה. אלא, הוא אינו אומר דבר על גזל, וגם אם גזל היה נכלל, לעולם לא היה מקרה שבו אחד (מעילה) חל והשני (הקדש) לא

I was looking at the proof of Reb Shmuel Rozovski [Zichron Shmuel page 300] that robbery is included in meila [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where meila does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the Jerushalmi Talmud (Trumah chapter 6) and there it says if one steals trumah of hekdesh, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for truma and the other for meila. If the object has the worth of a pruta, but does not have the volume of an olive, then to R Yanai he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a pruta, the fifth goes to hekdesh (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then Reb Shmuel makes sense. But the version of the Gra and the Rambam is the opposite. If it has the worth of a pruta, but lacks the volume, then it goes to hedesh. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in meila. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other. __________________________________________________________________________________I was looking at the proof of ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל page ש' ] that גזילה is included in מעילה [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where מעילה does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the ירושלמי (תרומה chapter ו') and there it says if one steals תרומה of הקדש, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for תרומה and the other for מעילה. If the object has the worth of a פרוטה, but does not have the volume of an זית, then to ר' ינאי he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a פרוטה, the fifth goes toהקדש (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then ר' שמואל makes sense. But the version of the גר''א and the רמב''ם is the opposite. If it has the worth of a פרוטה, but lacks the volume, then it goes to הקדש. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in מעילה. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other.____________________

za83 F Minor midi file za83 nwc file

היה ראש ישיבה של פונוביץ לפני רב שך. שמו היה ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. היום התבוננתי בכמה מרעיונותיו ושמתי לב שהוא סבור כדלקמן: לדעת הר"ם, אדם שגונב מהקדש [פריטים המוקדשים למקדש] צריך להחזיר את ערך הפריט, לא בגלל עבירה של שימוש בחפצי קודש אלא פשוט בגלל עבירה של גניבה. אבל למרות זאת, הוא לא משלם כפליים כי הפסוק בתורה פוסל אותו מלשלם כפליים. עבור הרבא''ד, עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי שהיה שווה הפריט בגלל מעילה, לא בגלל גניבה רגילה, [ואם גנב בטעות אז עליו גם להחזיר חמישית ולהביא קרבן, קורבן אשם]. אולם רב שמואל אומר שגם הר''ם וגם הראב''ד מסכימים שאם גנב את הקדש, אז עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי בגלל גזל, לא מעילה. כלומר, הראב''ד אינו חולק על הר''ם במקרה זה. בגלל זה, ניתן להבין את התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א שקובע שפקיד בית דין (גזבר) שלוקח את הקדש שברשותו למשמרת ונותן אותו לאדם אחר בכוונה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של הקדש והוא מאבד את קדושתו. הסיבה היא שמדובר במקרה של גזל, לא גניבה בהסתרה כמו גנב בלילה. לכן הגזבר אחראי על גזל וזה לא מקרה של מעילה. לכן, החפץ יוצא מלהיות הקדש. מה שאני מתכוון כאן הוא שאם החטא היה מעילה, אז הוא היה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של מעילה רק אם היה מוסר אותו בטעות כמו ר' יהודה בקידושין נ''ה

There was a rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach. His name was Reb Shmuel Rozovski. I was lookinng at some of his ideas todayת and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the Rambam, a person that steals from hedesh [items that are dedicated to the Temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items, but rather simply because of the transgression of stealong. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the Raavad, he has to pay back the main amount the item was worth because of meila, not because of normal theft, [and also if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacriifice, a guilt offering.] However Reb Shmuel says both the Rambam and Raavad agree if he robbed hedesh, then he has to pay back the main amount because of rebbery, not meila. i.e., the Raavad does not disagree with the Rambam in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand Tosphot in Kidushin page 55 that holds that a officer of the court that takes hedesh that is in his possesion for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpse, takees the object out of the category of hedesh, and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by consealment like a thef in the night. And so, the gizbar is liable for robbery, and this is not a speacial case of meila. Therefore the obkject goes out of being hedesh. What I mean here is that if the sin would be meila, then he would take the object out of the categotry of meia only if he gave it away by mistake like R. Judah there in kidushin page 55.===============================================There was a ראש ישיבה of פונוביץ before רב שך. His name was ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. I was looking at some of his ideas today, and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the הר’’ם, a person that steals from הקדש [items that are dedicated to the temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items (meila), but rather simply because of the transgression of stealing. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the ראב''ד, he has to pay back the main amount that the item was worth because of מעילה, not because of normal theft, [and if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacrifice, a guilt offering.] However, רב שמואל says both the הר’’ם and ראב''ד agree if he robbed הקדש, then he has to pay back the main amount because of robbery, not מעילה. I.e. the ראב''ד does not disagree with the הר’’ם in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand תוספות in קידושין that holds that a officer of the court that takes הקדש that is in his possession for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpose takes the object out of the category of הקדש and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by concealment like a thief in the night. So, the גזבר is liable for robbery, and this is not a special case of מעילה. Therefore, the object goes out of being הקדש. What I mean here is that if the sin would be מעילה, then he would take the object out of the category of מעילה only if he gave it away by mistake like ר' יהודה in קידושין נ''ה.

היום הסתכלתי על הגמרא בקידושין דף נ''ה, ועלה בדעתי שתוספות נראית במבט ראשון כקובעת את ההלכה כר' מאיר שאומר "הקדש {חפץ שהוקדש לבית המקדש} בכוונה יוצא לחולין, אבל בטעות הוא לא".[הקדש במזיד מתחלל] זה הפריע לי, כי הגמרא עצמה מבהירה שההלכה היא כמו ר' יהודה, שבשוגג הקדש מאבד את קדושתו, אבל במזיד הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל בדרך חזרה מהים, עלה בדעתי למה התוספות מתכוון. הוא אומר שהוויכוח בין ר' יהודה לר' מאיר מתייחס רק לשימוש בקודש. השימוש בקודש בידיעה שהוא קדוש הוא הוויכוח. לר' יהודה נשאר הקדש. אבל תוספות כאן בקידושין דף נ''ה מתייחס לגניבת הקדש. לשיטת תוספות, אם הגזבר גונב אותו בכוונה (על ידי מתן אותו ביודעין לאדם אחר), זה מוציא אותו מקטגוריית הקדש גם לר' מאיר וגם לר' יהודה

I was looking at the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 today and it occurred to me that Tosphot seems at first glance to decide the law to be like R. Meir who holds “Hedesh {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be secular, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the Gemara itself is clear that the law is like R. Judah that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Tosphot intends. He is saying that the argument between R. Judah and R. Meir refers only to using Hedesh. Using hedesh while knowing it is hedesh is the argument. To R. Judah it stays hedesh. But Tosphot here in Kidushin page 55 refers to stealing hedesh. To Tosphot if the gizbar intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of hedesh to both R. Meir and R Judah.--------------------------------------------------------------------------I was looking at the גמרא in קידושין דף נ''ה today and it occurred to me that תוספותseems at first glance to decide the law to be like ר' מאיר who holds “הקדש {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be חולין, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the גמרא itself is clear that the law is like ר' יהודה that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what תוספותintends. He is saying that the argument between ר' יהודהand ר' מאיר refers only to using הקדש. Using הקדש while knowing it is הקדש is the argument. To ר' יהודהit stays הקדש. But תוספות here in קידושין דף נ''ה refers to stealing הקדש. To תוספותif the גזבר intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of הקדש to both ר' מאיר and ר' יהודה.

אני חושב שקיבלתי קצת בהירות לגבי תוספות והר''ם לגבי מעילה. מה שהייתי רוצה לומר הוא זה. יש טיעון תלת כיווני לגבי מעילה: (1) הר''י (רבינו יצחק) בתוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר''ם בפירושו על המשנה. אבל לכולם, אם משהו היה הקדש (קדוש על ידי הקדשה לבית המקדש) והוא יוצא מעצם היותו הקדש, ​​אז מי שמשתמש בו אינו אחראי על מעילה. (רק זה שגרם לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו חייב.) אם משהו הוא הקדש, ​​ומישהו משתמש בו, הוא חייב. השאלה היא מה יכול לגרום לחפץ לצאת מלהיות הקדש? (זה מתייחס לחפץ רגיל, אבל לא לבהמה ולא לכלים ששימשו להכנת הקורבנות.) לר''י (רבינו יצחק) עבור גזבר (פקיד בית דין) להשאיל חפץ של הקדש (שהוקדש למקדש) לא גורם לו לצאת מקטגוריה של הקדש, ​​אבל נתינתו כן גורמת לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו. [זוהי מסקנתו הסופית. אבל בהתחלה הר''י חשב שאפילו השאלה של החפץ גורמת לו לאבד את קדושתו.] נראה שעשיית זאת בכוונה, או בטעות, אינה משנה. (2) תוספת בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א. אם הגזבר בטעות חושב שהחפץ שייך לו, והוא משאיל או נותן אותו, הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל אם הוא יודע שזה הקדש (של המקדש) ונותן אותו, הוא מאבד את קדושתו. כל מי שמשתמש בו לאחר מכן אינו חייב. (3) הרמב"ם מסתמך על הגמרא בקידושין עמוד נ"ה שמשווה פדיון בהמה שעתידה להיות קורבן ואין בה מום, למי שגורם לחפץ הקדש לאבד את קדושתו. (בדרך כלל, אי אפשר לפדות בהמה שהוקדשה להיות קורבן אלא אם כן יש בה מום.) לר"ם, אם הקצין (גזבר) יודע שהחפץ הוא הקדש והשתמש איתו בכל זאת, החפץ נשאר הקדש. זה כמו דעת ר' יהודה בקידושין עמוד נ"ה. אבל, אם הגזבר לא ידע או שכח שזהו הקדש והשתמש איתו בטעות, החפץ מאבד את קדושתו. זה בניגוד לדעת ר' מאיר שסובר ההפך. ר' מאיר סבור שאם והשתמש איתו ביודעין, אז הוא מאבד את קדושתו, לא אם והשתמש איתו בטעות ושכח שזהו הקדש.

Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna מסכת מעילה

t I think I have gained some clarity about Tosphot and the Rambam about trespass. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about trespass: (1) The RI (rabbainu izhak) in Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna. But to everyone, if something was hedesh (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being hedesh, then anyone that uses it is not liable for trespass. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is hedesh, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being hedesh? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the RI (Rabainu Izhak) for a gizbar (officer of the court) to loan out an object of hedesh (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of hedesh, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the RI thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose it’s holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a. If the officer (gizbar) by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is hedesh (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) Rambam bases himself on the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of hedesh to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the Rambam, if the officer (gizbar) knows the object is hedesh and gives it out anyway, the object stays hedesh. This is like the opinion of R. Judah in Kidushin page 55. But if the officer did not know or forgot it is hedesh and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of R. Meir who holds the opposite. R. Meir holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is hedesh. --------------------------------------------------------------------I think I have gained some clarity about תוספות and the ר’’ם about מעילה. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about מעילה: (1) The ר''י (רבינו יצחק) in תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר’’ם in his commentary on the משנה. But to everyone, if something was הקדש (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being הקדש, then anyone that uses it is not liable for מעילה. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is הקדש, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being הקדש? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the ר''י (רבינו יצחק) for a גזבר (officer of the court) to loan out an object of הקדש (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of הקדש, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the ר''י thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose its holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א. If the גזבר by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is הקדש (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) רמב''םbases himself on the גמרא in קידושין page נ''ה that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of הקדש to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the ר’’ם, if the officer (גזבר) knows the object is הקדש and gives it out anyway, the object stays הקדש. This is like the opinion of ר' יהודה in קידושין page נ''ה. But, if the גזבר did not know or forgot it is הקדש and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of ר' מאיר who holds the opposite. ר' מאיר holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is הקדש.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ג ע''א. הגמרא אומרת אם פקיד בית דין שמונה לטפל בכסף או בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש (גזבר) נותן צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים, הפקיד חייב לפי דין מעילה. זהו החוק הקובע כי אסור להשתמש בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש לכל שימוש אחר מזה שלשמו נועדו. הרמב"ם כותב בהלכות מעילה פרק ז', הלכה י': אם אדם מוסר צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים או לבעל חנות, לא הוא ולא החלפן הכספים חייבים. זה נראה בסתירה מוחלטת לגמרא. תשובתי מבוססת על תוספת (בבא מציעא צ''ט ע''א). בתוספות, רבינו יצחק אמר שהפעם היחידה שיכולה להיות מעילה אחרי מעילה היא כאשר גזבר אחד נותן לאחר, והשני לאחר, וכן הלאה. כל אחד אחראי משום שהחפץ מעולם לא יצא מרשות המקדש למרות שכל אחד שימש לשימוש אישי. יש לציין: הרמב"ם לעולם אינו אומר שהוא מדבר על גזבר. אלא, הוא כותב שאדם (פרטי) שיש לו כסף שמוקדש למקדש בחבילה שאינה קשורה נותן אותו לאחר, אף אחד לא אחראי. הראשון משום שלא אמר לאחר להשתמש בכסף, והוא מעולם לא הוציא אותו מרשות המקדש, מכיוון שהכסף עדיין לא הגיע לידי גזבר. אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שבתוספת ישנן שתי דרכים להיות אחראי על מעילה, או הוצאה מרשות הקדש, או שימוש בחפץ אפילו כשהוא עדיין ברשות הקדש. אבל, הוצאה מרשות הקדש בכוונה תחילה או בשוגג אינה משנה דבר-----------בעיה אפשרית בתשובתי כאן היא שהרמב"ם מביא את אותה תוספתא כמו שתוספות, שאומרת שאם אדם אחד משתמש בהקדש (חפץ השייך למקדש), ואז מוסר אותו לאחר והוא משתמש בו וכן הלאה וכן הלאה, כל אחד אחראי על מעילה. כעת, התוספות אומרות שזה מתייחס לפקידי בית המשפט (גזברים), והרמב"ם כותב זאת בפשטות ללא כל אינדיקציה להבחנות כמו שתוספות עושה. אבל הרמב"ם אומר שזה מתייחס לבהמה של הקדש, ולכן אין בעיה בתשובתי שבמקרה שלנו אנחנו מדברים על כסף. בכך שאין מעילה אחרי מעילה, ואף אחד מהם לא מתכוון להוציא את החפץ מתחום המקדש.

Bava Mezia 43 side a. If an officer of the court who is appointed to take care of money or objects that are dedicated to the temple (a gizbar) gives a bundle of money that is not tied up to a money changer, the officer is liable to the law of trespassing. That is the law that states that one must not use objects dedicated to the Temple for any use other than that which they were intended for. The Rambam writes (laws of trespassing chapter 7 law 10) "If one gives over a bundle of money that is not tied to a money changer or storeowner, neither he nor the money changer are liable." This seems in direct contradiction to the Gemara. My answer is based on Tosphot (Bava Mezzia page 98 side A). In Tosphot, Rabainu Izhak said the only time there can be trespassing after trespassing is when one officer gives to another and that other to another and so on. Each is liable because the object never left to domain of the Temple even though it was used for personal use by each one of the officers. So, the Rambam never says he is talking about a officer. Rather he writes that a person that has money of that is dedicated to the Temple in a bundle that is not tied gives it to another, neither is liable. That first one because he did not tell the other to use the money, and he never took it out of the domain of the Temple, since the money has not yet gotten into the hands of a officer. [I would like to add here that in Tosphot there are two ways to be liable for trespassing, either taking out of the domain or possession of the Temple, or using the object even while it is still in the possession of the Temple. But taking out of the domain of the Temple on purpose or by accident makes no difference.]A possible problem with my answer here is that the רמב''ם brings that same תוספתאthat תוספות זbrings that says that if one person uses hekdesh (an object that belongs to the Temple), and then hands it over to another and he uses it and so on and so forth, each one is liable for trespassing. Now, תוספותsays this refers to officers of the court(גזברים) , and the רמב''ם writes this plainly with no indication of any distinctions like תוספות makes. But the rambam says it refers to an animal of hedesh and so there is no question on my answer in our case where we are talking about money. In that there is no trespass after trespass and neither intends to take the object out of the domain of the temple. --------------------------------------------בבא מציעא דף מ''ג ע''א. If an officer of the court who is appointed to take care of money or objects that are dedicated to the temple (a גיזבר) gives a bundle of money that is not tied up to a money changer, the officer is liable to the law of מעילה. That is the law that states that one must not use objects dedicated to the Temple for any use other than that which they were intended for. The רמב''ם writes laws of מעילה chapter 7 law 10. if one gives over a bundle of money that is not tied to a money changer or storeowner neither he nor the money changer are liable. This seems in direct contradiction to the Gemara. My answer is based on תוספות . In תוספות , רבינו יצחק said the only time there can be מעילה after מעילה is when one officer gives to another and that other to another and so on. Each is liable because the object never left to domain of the Temple even though it was used for personal use by each one of the officers. So, the רמב''ם never says he is talking about a officer. Rather, he writes that a person that has money of that is dedicated to the Temple in a bundle that is not tied gives it to another, neither is liable. That first one because he did not tell the other to use the money, and he never took it out of the domain of the Temple, since the money has not yet gotten into the hands of a officer. I would like to add here that in תוספות there are two ways to be liable for מעילה, either taking out of the domain or possession of the הקדש, or using the object even while it is still in the possession of the הקדש. But, taking out of the domain of the הקדש on purpose or by accident makes no difference.---------A possible problem with my answer here is that the רמב''ם brings that same תוספתאthat תוספות brings that says that if one person uses הקדש (an object that belongs to the Temple), and then hands it over to another and he uses it and so on and so forth, each one is liable for trespassing. Now, תוספותsays this refers to officers of the court(גזברים) , and the רמב''ם writes this plainly with no indication of any distinctions like תוספות makes. But the רמב''ם says it refers to an animal of הקדש ,and so there is no question on my answer in our case where we are talking about money. In that there is no מעילה after מעילה and neither intends to take the object out of the domain of the temple.

za82 midi music file. F major za82 nwc file za82 orchestra version za 82 orchestra version nwc file

בשלב מסוים הגמרא שואלת כיצד רב נחמן יסביר את המשנה בקידושין כ"ח. הסיבה לכך היא שאנו אומרים שתחילת המשנה מתייחסת למטבע, וסופה להחלפה באמצעות פירות. הגמרא עונה תשובה לפי ר' יוחנן, אבל אז מה יענה ריש לקיש? אני שואל מדוע לא לומר שריש לקיש שמחזיק מטבע אינו גורם להחלפה, בדיוק כפי שהוא אומר לגבי קניין כסף, מטבע אינו גורם לרכישה, אלא הרמה או משיכה של החפץ הנרכש. אני שואל מדוע לא לומר שריש לקיש חולק על כל ההנחה. אלא, רק הרמה או משיכה. אפילו לרכוש באמצעות החלפה---------------------------אני חושב שכדאי להוסיף כאן שרב נחמן לומד את סוף המשנה כהחלפת שור בפרה, ולא בשר שור בפרה. רק ב"אולי הייתי חושב" הגמרא צריכה לומר שהמשנה מתייחסת לבשר. ואנחנו שואלים לפי הנחה זו כיצד רב נחמן היה מסביר את המשנה. אבל, למעשה, רב נחמן לא מקיים הנחת ה"אולי חשבתי" אבל סבור שהמשנה אומרת "החלפת שור בפרה", לא בשר

bava mezia page 46 n and kidushin 28

The Gemara, at some point, asks how would Rav Nachman explain the Mishna in Kiddushin 28 . The reason is we say the beginning of the Mishna refers to coin, and the end to exchange by exchange. The gemara answers an answer that goes according to R. Yochanan, but then what would Reish Lakish answer. I ask, "Why not say that Reish Lakish holds coin does not cause exchange, just like he says by normal acquisition that coin does not cause acquisition, rather picking up or pulling the acquired object?" I ask why not say Reish Lakish disagrees with the entire assumption. Rather, only picking up or pulling causes acquisition Even by means of exchange? I think I might add here that Rav Nachman learns the end of the Mishna as exchange of ox for a cow, not meat of an ox for a cow. Only in the "I might have thought “does the Gemara have to say that the Mishna refers to meat. And we ask according to that assumption how would Rav Nachman explain the mMishna . But, in fact, Rav Nachman does not hold with that "I might have thought “ and holds the Mishna says “exchange of a ox for a cow”, not meat. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------The גמראat some point asks how would רב נחמן explain the משנה onקידושין כ''ח . the reason is we say the beginning of the משנה refers to coin and the end to exchange by exchange. The גמרא answers an answer that gores according to ר' יוחנןbut then what would ריש לקיש answer. I ask why not say that ריש לקיש holds coin does not cause exchange just like he says by acquisition that coin does not cause acquisition, rather picking up or pulling the acquired object. I ask why not say ריש לקיש disagrees with the entire assumption. Rather, only picking up or pulling. Even to acquire by means of exchange? I think I might add here that רב נחמןlearns the end of the משנה as exchange of ox for a cow, not meat of an ox for a cow. Only in the "I might have thought “does the גמרא have to say that the משנה refers to meat. And we ask according to that assumption how would רב נחמן explain the משנה. But, in fact, רב נחמן does not hold with that "I might have thought “ and holds the משנה says “exchange of a ox for a cow”, not meat.

Robert Hana has eexposed the fallacies of the so called analytic philosophy but the his idea of forward to Kant is hard to swallow. (See his books on The Rise and Fall of Analytic Philosophy.) If I could, I would gladly claim that Kant or Hegel or Schopenhauer had the truth whole truth and nothing but the truth, but so far i can not see any way to do so. Kant had some important points but also some things that seem off to me. Schopenhauer also seems to have gotten some very important points but other points seem no so well thought out. the universal trait of all people leaning towards Kant is that they despise Hegel and I can not see their point about that either. while it is true that Hegel is obscure and seems incapable of writing any sentence less than 100 words, still the points are powerful. It might be so that just one of the German idealists had the whole truth and none of the others had anything. but i can not see that at this point. Rather, I think philosophy in order to go forwards has to take into account all the German Idealists from Kant and Fries and Hegel up until Schopenhauer.

קידושין כ''ח ע''א וע''ב. תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז. ההבדלים הבסיסיים בין רש''י, תוספות והרמב''ם לגבי החלפה. לרש''י יש רק שתי קטגוריות: כלים או חפצים נעים [מטלטלים]. אין קטגוריה נפרדת של פירות. לפיכך, לרב נחמן רק כלים יכולים לגרום לרכישה בהחלפה או להירכש בהחלפה. לרב ששת כל המיטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה, ולהירכש בהחלפה. לתוספות יש שלוש קטגוריות: כלים, מיטלטלין ופירות. כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה ולהירכש באמצעות החלפה. ניתן לרכוש מיטלטלין בהחלפה, אך לא לגרום להחלפה. (זה דומה לאופן שבו רב שך מסביר את הראב''ד בהלכות אישות פרק א') הוא סבור שבהחלפה, אף אחד מהחפצים אינו גורם לרכישה. אלא, כאשר אדם אחד מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו. כאשר השני מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו.) עבור תוספות, פירות אינם ניתנים לרכישה וגם לא לגרום לרכישה על ידי החלפה, אולם כאשר הם מוחלפים שווים תחת שווים, אז הם יכולים להרכשה על ידי החלפה ולגרום להחלפה [תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז]. כל זה שונה מאוד מהרמב''ם שסבור שיש שני סוגים של חליפין: שווה תחת שווה, או מטפחת. עבור הרמב''ם, אפילו פירות יכולים להרכש על ידי החלפה. כל המטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה כאשר הם מוחלפים במטלטלין אחרים. אבל כלים לבדם יכולים לשמש כרכישה כבאמצעות מטפחת או נעל.

Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there a re two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.​-------------------------------------------------------------------Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there are two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''ב. תוספות - המילים הראשונות ולרב נחמן". בקיצור, רבינו תם קובע כי פירות שווים גורמים או נרכשים על ידי חליפין. תוספות שואלים על כך מן הגמרא. הגמרא אומרת שאם מטבע יכול לשמש להחלפה, וזו תהיה כוונת המשנה "כל מה שנעשה כסף עבור אחר", ברגע שאחד רוכש, גם השני רוכש. אז למה יכול להתייחס סוף המשנה, המתייחס להחלפה של שתי חיות? אחרי הכל, אין כאן מטבע. הגמרא עונה שסוף המשנה ואומרת לנו שניתן להשתמש בפירות כהחלפה. הגמרא שואלת על כך והלא רב נחמן מחזיק בפירות, שלא ניתן להשתמש בהם להחלפה. התשובה של תוספות יכולה להיות שהמשנה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. תוספות עונה שהמשנה אינה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. אבל תוספות מרחיק לכת ואומר שאפילו בדרך שבה רב יהודה מבין את המשנה, זה גם לא מתייחס לשווה בשביל שווה. אבל השאלה על זה היא למה בכלל להזכיר את רב יהודה? למה זה יהיה נחוץ בכלל? הרי השאלה הייתה רק על רב נחמן. הסתפקנו בתשובת רב יהודה הייתי בים ועלה בדעתי מדוע תוספות מעלה את הרעיון שאפילו אם נלמד את המשנה כ"כל הנישום", זה עדיין לא שווה תמורת שווה. אני חושב שהסיבה היא שאם חליפין עובד בעבור תמורת פירות כאשר הערך הכספי של כל אחד שווה תמורת שווה, אז אפילו רב יהודה לא היה צריך לבוא על התשובה "כל הנישום". הוא היה יכול לומר ש"כל הנעשה" יכול להתייחס לפירות ולכל החפצים הנעים כאשר זה שווה תמורת שווה. עם זאת, אני חייב לציין שיש ויכוח בין המהרש"א למהר"ם שיף לגבי מה התכוונו תוספות לומר כשהוא מעלה את תשובתו של רב יהודה. שתי התשובות נראות לי סבירות, אולם אני חושב שהתשובה שלי היא פשוטה יותר. כלומר, אם רבינו תם היה צודק והמשנה הייתה יכולה להיות שווה תחת שווה, אז רב יהודה לא היה צריך להגיע לתשובה קשה לגבי המשנה כאשר תשובה פשוטה יותר הייתה זמינה

Bava Mezia page 46b. Tosphot first words and to Rav Nachman”. In short, Rabainu Tam holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. Tosphot asks on this from the Gemara. The Gemara says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the Mishna “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the Mishna which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The gemara aanswers the end of the Mishna tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The Gemara asks on this from Rav Nachman who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the Mishna is referring to a case of equal for equal. Tosphot answers the Mishna is not refering to a case of equal for equal. But Tosphot goes further and says even in the way Rav Judah understands the Mishna, it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention Rav Judah at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on Rav Nachman. We were satisfied with the answer of Rav Judah. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why tosphot brings up the idea that even if we learn the Mishna as "all that is evaluated" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equal then even rav judah would not have had to come onto the answer for "all that is evaluated". He could have said all that is made could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. however, I must mention that there is an argument between the Maharsha and the Maharam Shif about what Tosphot means to say by bring up the answer of Rav Judah. Both answers seem reasonable to me however I think my answer is simpler. that is if Rabainu Tam would be right then Rav Judah would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the mishna when a simpler one was available.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''ב. תוספותfirst words and to רב נחמן”. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why תוספותbrings up the idea that even if we learn the משנה as "כל הנישום" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equalת then even רב יהודהwould not have had to come onto the answer כל הנישום . He could have said "כל הנעשה" could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. However, I must mention that there is an argument between the מהרש''א and the מהר''ם שיף about what תוספות means to say by bring up the answer of רב יהודה. Both answers seem reasonable to me, however I think my answer is simpler. That is, if רבינו תם would be right and the משנה could be a case of equal for equal, then רב יהודה would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the משנה when a simpler one was available. in short rabainu tam holds qequal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. tosphot asks on this from the gemara. the gemara says if coin can be used for exchange and that would be the intension of the mishna all that is made monney for another, once one acquires the other also acquires. then what could the end of the mishna which refers to exchange of two anumals be refering to. after tall, there is no coin here. answer the end tell us fruit can be used in exchange. the gemara asks ogfn this from rav nachma who holds friuit canot be used for exchange. the answer could be that the mishna is refering to a case of equal for equal. tosphot answrs the mishna is not refer to a case of equal for equal. but tosphot goes further and says even in the way rav juda understands the mishna, it is also not refering to equal for equal. why would this be neccessary at all? after all the question was only on rav nachman. we were satisfied with the answer of rav juday.----------------- In short, רבינו תם holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. תוספותasks on this from the גמרא. The גמרא says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the משנה “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the משנה which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The גמרא answers the end of the משנה tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The גמרא asks on this from רב נחמן who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the משנה is referring to a case of equal for equal. תוספות answers the משנה is not referring to a case of equal for equal. But תוספות goes further and says even in the way רב יהודה understands the משנה , it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention רב יהודה at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on רב נחמן. We were satisfied with the answer of רב יהודה.

ברמב"ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הוא מביא את חוק החליפין. אבל במקרה של רכישה בכסף בפרק א' הוא לא מביא את חוק החליפין. נראה מכך שהחלפת חפצים אינה רכישה בכסף. למרות שמה שיש לו ערך כספי נחשב לפעמים ככסף, עדיין ישנם מקרים שבהם זה לא כך, למשל פדיון עבד עברי צריך להיות באמצעות כסף, לא מה ששווה כסף. דוגמאות נוספות הן בדיני גניבה שבהן יש ויכוח האם אפשר לשלם במה שיש לו ערך כספי. לכן, כאשר הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לשאת אישה בהחלפה, פירוש הדבר החלפה בכלים כמו מטפחת, לא החלפה שווה תחת שווה. כאן אני רק מזכיר בקצרה את מה שאומר רב שך בתחילת חוקי אישות

In the Rambam laws of sale chapter 5 he brings the law of exchange. but in the case of acquisition by money in chapter 1 he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the Gemara says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what Rav Shach says in the beginning of laws of marriage.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the רמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' 5 he brings the law of exchange. But in the case of acquisition by money in chapter א' he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the גמרא says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what רב שך says in the beginning of laws of marriage.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "כל מה שנעשה ערך כספי באחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש אותו, השני רוכש את החליפו. כיצד זה? אם אדם מחליף שור בפרה, ברגע שאחד רוכש אחד, השני רוכש את השני." הגמרא שואלת שנראה שהמשנה מתכוונת שמטבע יכול לגרום להחלפה, (ואנחנו יודעים שזה לא המצב). אז רב יהודה אומר שזה אומר שאם אדם מעריך חפץ ברגע שהוא רוכש את הראשון, השני רוכש את השני. [כלומר, החלפה זו צריכה הערכה.] הגמרא שואלת בנקודה זו שה"הייתי חושב" היה נכון לפחות לפי לוי שחליפת מטבע יכולה לגרום לקניין. אז איך הבינה הגמרא את המשנה בנקודה זו? אחרי הכל, לדוגמה שהיא נותנת אין לה שום רלוונטיות למטבעות. (הדוגמה היא פרה תמורת שור.) תשובה. המשנה פירושה שמטבעות יכולים לגרום להחלפה, וגם פירות. (הדוגמה של שור לפרה היא דוגמה לפרי.) אבל עבור רב נחמן שמחזיק פירות לא יכולים לגרום להחלפה, מה יכולה להיות הכוונה? כאן תוספות שואל על רבינו תם שאולי המשנה קידושין דף כ"ח מדברת על החלפה שווה תחת שווה, ובמקרה כזה פירות יכולים לגרום להחלפה לפי רבינו תם. הוא עונה שזה לא יכול להיות כך, מכיוון שסוף המשנה צריך להיות כמו ההתחלה, וההתחלה בבירור אינה שווה תחת שווה. אני לא מבין מדוע זה כך. לפי הייתי חושב (הוה אמינא) אנחנו מדברים על החוק שניתן להחליף מטבע. "כל מה שהופך לערך כסף עבור משהו אחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש את החפץ, השני רוכש את החפץ המוחלף." היכן אנו רואים כאן שלא מדובר על שווה תמורת שווה?תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו של תוספות על רב נחמן היא שאולי רב יהודה אומר שהחליפין צריך להיות שווה עבור שווה, (שכן אחרת למה צריך להעריך את השווי הכספי של כל חפץ?) ולכן גישתו של רב נחמן שונה והוא חייב להחזיק "כל הנעשה דמים נאחר" פירושו כלים שאינם שווים עבור שווים. עם זאת, ברור שתוספות לא עונה כך. הוא גורס שאפילו דעתו של רב יהודה, שכאשר הוא אומר "כל הנישום דמים באחר", משתמע מכך שהם אינם שווים בערכם

Bava Mezia page 46 side a and b. The Mishna says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The gemara asks that it seems the Mishna means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So Rav Juda says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first the other acquires tthe second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] the gemara asks at this point that the hava amina (I would have thought) was at least true according to Levi or Rav that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the Gemara understand the Mishna at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The mishna means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to Rav Nachman who holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the Mishna mean? Here Tosphot asks on Rabainu Tam that perhaps the Mishna in Kidushin page 28 is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to Rabbainu Tam. He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the mishna has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (hava amina) we arre talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of Tosphot on Rav Nachman is that perhaps Rav Judah means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of Rav Nachman is different and he must hold “All that is made monetary value in other” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that Tosphot does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of Rav Judah is that when he says one must evaluate the worth of each object, that implies they are not equal in value. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. The משנה says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The גמרא asks that it seems the משנה means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So רב יהודה says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first, the other acquires the second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] The גמרא asks at this point that the הווה אמינא (I would have thought) was at least true according to לוי (or Rav) that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the גמרא understand the משנה at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The משנה means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to רב נחמןwho holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the משנה mean? Here תוספות asks on רבינו תםthat perhaps the משנה in קידושין page כ''ח is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to רבינו תם . He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the משנה has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (הווה אמינא) we are talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of תוספות on רב נחמן is that perhaps רב יהודה means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of רב נחמןis different and he must hold “כל הנעשה דמים נאחר” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that תוספות does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of רב יהודהis that when he says "כל הנישום דמים באחר", that implies they are not equal in value.

What's Wrong with Stereotypes? Michael Huemer Aug 3

MICHAEL HUEMER AUG 3 1. Opposition to Stereotyping I keep hearing that “stereotyping” is bad, and that it’s good to undermine stereotypes. For instance, if you have a TV show with a brilliant surgeon, you should make them a woman. Or black. Or, best of all, a black woman. Because that will defy stereotypes and thereby make the world a better place. If you make a picture of some business people in a meeting, you have to make sure that it does not reflect what most business meetings actually look like; rather, you should gender balance it and make sure to have three different races represented (see above photo). If someone tells a joke that relies on stereotypes about a group, that is “offensive” and hence evil. I guess because it reinforces the stereotypes? Or maybe it’s just evil to rely on a stereotype for anything. Back when James Damore was fired from Google, it was partly because he cited research to the effect that women tend to be higher than men in the traits of “agreeableness” and “neuroticism” from the 5-factor model of personality. In doing so, he was reinforcing stereotypes, which all decent people know to be evil. If a statement sounds like a stereotype, that alone is enough to categorically reject it. Most of the people who believe this have a predictable political orientation, and so you can usually count on a certain amount of hypocrisy. Thus, certain stereotypes are fine. You can stereotype white men as privileged oppressors, you can stereotype Republicans as uneducated, etc. It’s all a matter of stereotyping the right group in the right way. As long as your stereotype reinforces your political side, it’s cool. But I digress. My question: what exactly is supposed to be wrong with stereotypes? Why not use and reinforce them? 2. Problems with Stereotypes A. What are stereotypes? First, what is a stereotype? Usually, people are talking about stereotypes about groups of people (e.g., women, black people, doctors). (I guess you could also have “stereotypes” about any class of object, but we don’t care about non-human objects.) As far as I can tell, a “stereotype” is just a widely shared belief about what a certain class of people tend to be like. Aside: Maybe there are a few other conditions, such as: it can’t be something definitional, it has to differentiate the group from other groups, and it should be a statistical generalization. Thus, it isn’t a “stereotype” that bachelors are unmarried, or that black people tend to have two legs. But let’s not worry about all the details of the definition. What is wrong with using or reinforcing such beliefs? B. Are they false? Maybe the problem with stereotypes is that they tend to be false, or to lead people to make false judgments. On the face of it, this would be surprising. In general, people tend to form beliefs about observable reality based on observations, which generally tend to reflect that reality. If most people think that the winter is colder than the summer, that’s probably because the winter is colder than the summer. If people tend to think that humans generally have two arms, that’s probably because humans generally have two arms. Etc. Could it be that, when it comes to groups of people, we have a general tendency to go wrong about everything—that when we think a group has feature F, in general, the group usually doesn’t have F? This is possible, but it would be pretty surprising. Btw, notice that I’m talking about beliefs about observable (or otherwise easily accessible) properties of observable objects. It’s not so surprising that people get things wrong about unobservable things, like God or the origin of the universe. Or maybe it’s not quite that the group doesn’t have F at all; maybe it’s just that stereotypes tend to exaggerate real differences, so the group that is stereotyped as having F will have less F than people tend to think. These are common critiques of stereotypes among educated people. One might say there is a stereotype that stereotypes are inaccurate. These critiques, however, have the character of articles of faith—almost none of these educated people who are too smart to fall for crude stereotypes has ever actually checked on whether stereotypes tend to be accurate or not. It happens that we have evidence about this. Over 50 studies have been performed on the accuracy of demographic, national, political, and other stereotypes. The results are unequivocal: Stereotypes are not generally inaccurate, nor are they generally exaggerations. The truth is the exact opposite: stereotypes are generally accurate, except that they tend to understate real differences. There is basically no evidence that stereotypes tend to lead to inaccurate judgments. Psychologist Lee Jussim describes stereotype accuracy as “one of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology”. See his paper for a general review of the evidence. (See also his blog post.) For example: A 2011 paper titled “Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size” reported results of a study in which they asked ordinary people to guess how men and women would perform on a series of cognitive tasks. The scientists then compared the ordinary people’s expectations to the reality. This is a straightforward test. It turned out that people’s guesses were correct about the direction of gender differences (which sex would perform better on which tasks) but that the actual gender differences were larger than people thought. Notice that this is the opposite of what educated, progressive, right-thinking people would presumably predict. But again, this really should not be at all surprising if you’re thinking non-ideologically. Human beings can observe each other. Most of us have had many interactions with men and women. It would be bizarre if, despite that, we kept having beliefs about gender differences that had no correlation with reality. C. Are they oppressive? Maybe the problem is that stereotypes—whether accurate or not—are oppressive. Maybe they stop individuals from attempting or succeeding in things that would defy the stereotypes, when they would otherwise have succeeded. This could be true, but it isn’t self-evident. One way this could work is that other people would judge you based on stereotypes and would refuse to take into account your own individual characteristics. This is another one of those things that educated, progressive people assume without checking the evidence. In fact, studies find individuating information (specific to individuals) has massively greater effects on people’s judgments of others than stereotypes do. Given a society of millions of people, I’m sure there are some people who are deterred from attempting something due to stereotypes, and who are thereby worse off. So that is a cost. On the other hand, there can also be costs to not having stereotypes—e.g., perhaps some people would be encouraged to do things that they would not be suited to, and they would thereby be made worse off. As a general rule, truth is good. Knowing the truth about things that are relevant to your interests can make you worse off sometimes, but in general, it makes you better off. So, given the accuracy of stereotypes, stereotypes are probably beneficial. But whether they are or not, trying to suppress them is a fool’s errand. Normal people won’t stop noticing group differences just because elites try to hide them; normal people will just conclude that the elites are dishonest propagandists. D. Stereotype threat Stereotype threat is a theory in psychology that says that the existence of stereotypes tends to cause people to act in ways conforming to those stereotypes. Particularly negative stereotypes. E.g., it is said that if you remind people of their race before giving them a scholastic aptitude test, then the black students will tend to perform worse, due to stereotypes about their race. If you remind people of their sex, then the women will supposedly perform worse on the math questions than they otherwise would. Some people claim that this effect actually explains the entire gap in test scores between blacks and whites. Of course that’s false (it derives from a simple misunderstanding of a graph in the original study—progressives then just kept passing on this misunderstanding to each other). The effect only (at most) slightly increases already-existing gaps. In Progressive Myths, I discuss several problems with the stereotype threat literature. Here is just one interesting point: There have been many studies of the stereotype threat effect. Most of them are done in the lab. Some of them use more realistic conditions than others, and four of them have been done using actual administrations of standardized tests. The more realistic the test is, the

I have been thinking about Kant and the later German idealists and I think the issues they deal with are important, and yet I do not think that any one of them alone can be taken as the right answer, Rather I think each of has some good points and yet can not be considered to have the whole picture. To take Kant himself as the right approach misses the obvious problems in his system that were noticed right away almost before the ink was dry on the first edition of the Critique. But to take of the later ones also ignores the very reason that each one in turn appeared bright for a time and then disappeared. Hegel of course did not disappear but there is at least the one lack that he never solved—that reason has to start somewhere. The best solution to that problem is Fries with the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge, but besides that Fries is much less impressive than Hegel. [Hegel, is I think the same kind of system as Plotinus, except Plotinus starts with the One and goes down while Hegel starts at the bottom and goes back up until the Absolute Subject.] [And I also must mention that none of the German Idealists saw the importance of John Locke and the Constitution of the USA which was based on him.] The German idealists were best in dealing with philosophical problems, not political problems. [I just noticed an old few ideas I wrote about the system of the USA that I bringg here just forr added context about John Locke. A lot of the USA is based on the Magna Carta and Simon DE Montfort (Provisions of Oxford) and John Locke and the two-tiered parliament system of England. Pluss a lot of the Bill of Rights is based on issues that England had to deal with and resolve that were incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the USA. I might mention that the American Colonists never wanted to separate from England until the King refused intervene in favor of the colonies. The main grievance was toward Parliament. Besides that, there has to be a basic DNA structure in people for them to be able to accept such a system. Unless you have Anglo-Saxon DNA, it is doubtful how well this system could work elsewhere. There is something in the Anglo Saxon DNA which take the written law as absolute and binding. While in the USSR the only reason the system worked at all was the tendency to ignore the written rule and just strive toward what worked]

רב שך סבור שיש רק שני סוגים של חליפין, שווה לשווה, או רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [לרב שך החלפת מחט בשריון היא שווה בשווה מכיוון שזה רוצה מחט והשני רוצה חליפת שריון.] רב שך סבור שהחליפין חל על נישואין לאישה, ולא על רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [זה דומה לתוספות ר''יד שסבור שקידושין באמצעות מטפחת שווה יותר מפרוטה שייך לקדש אישה.] לפי זה, עלינו לומר שכאשר רב נחמן אמר בבבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב ובקידושין כ''ח ע''ב שפרי לא יכול לעשות חליפין, הוא בטח מתכוון שהוא לא יכול ליצור חליפין, אלא שהוא יכול להתקבל באמצעות חליפין. כדי להבהיר את הערתי כאן, הרשו לי להביא כמה נקודות. ראשית, רב שך מדבר רק על הגישה של הרמב''ם. ברור שתוספות ורבינו תם שונים לחלוטין. כמו כן, אנו יודעים שהחוק הוא כמו רב נחמן, שפירות אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין [פירות לא עבדי חליפין], אלא רק כלים.זה לדעת הרמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק י''ג אבל מהו כלי? עבור תוספות, כלי הוא כל דבר שניתן להשתמש בו. אבל עבור רב שך, זה חייב להתייחס למה שיכול ליצור רכישה, לא למה שניתן לרכוש, משום שהוא סבור שאישה יכולה להרכש על ידי חליפין של שווה לשווה. גישה זו של רב שך, שאני חייב להזכיר, אינה דומה לתוספות, שיש חליפין שווה לשווה, וסוג אחר שאינו שווה לשווה, אך עדיין אינו רכישה על ידי מטפחת או נעל---------- ייתכן שיעזור להבין את מה שרב שך אומר אם אזכיר את ההבהרה של שמואל רוזובסקי שהבעיה היא האם משהו גורם לרכישה כמו במקרה של רכישה באמצעות מטפחת (סודר), או שאין שום מושא שגורם למעבר בכלל. פשוט בהחלפה, אחד רוכש את מושא האדם השני, והשני רוכש את מושא של הראשון. ועדיין, אפילו עם ההבהרה הזו, מוזר שרכישה באמצעות סודר לא תעבוד כדי לקדש אישה למרות שזוהי רכישה מוחלטת באמצעות קניין סודר, בעוד שרכישה באמצעות החלפה תקנה אישה, למרות שזוהי רכישה לא על ידי כסף שטר וביאה. ולפי רב שמואל רוזובסקי חליפין אינו גורם קניין לשני כל אלא כל אחד קונה את החפץ שהוא מגביה. לפי זה אם אחד נותן חפץ לאישה ואומר זה לך ובמקומו את מקודשת לי אין בזה הגבה ומשיכה לאישה. ולהפך אפשר לראות דין של תוספות רי''ד שדווקא קהערה מאוחרת יותר. אני רואה עכשיו שרב שך לומד את רעיון החליפין בצורה שונה מרב שמואל רוזובסקי. הוא אומר שהגישה של הרמב"ם היא שהחלפה שווה בערך שווה היא כמו רכישה במשיכה או הגבהה שבה החפץ הראשון שנלקח הוא שגורם לרכישת החפץ השני, ולכן אין ספק לגבי הגישה של רב שך. הוא מסביר את כל זה בבירור בתחילת הלכות אישותניין סודר עוזר.. ------------------------------------------------לאחר שכתבתי את האמור לעיל, הבנתי שלמעשה זה פתוח ברמב"ם עצמו. בתחילת פרק חמשה בהלכות מכירה הוא טוען שניתן לרכוש פירות על ידי חליפין שווה תחת שוהז-כמו -השאלה שיש לי לגבי גישה זו של הרמב"ם היא שהיא לא נראית מתאימה לגמרא. הגמרא עצמה מדברת תמיד על רכישה באמצעות חליפין ואינה מזכירה אפילו פעם אחת את הגורם לרכישת חליפין. אז מהיכן הרמב"ם היה שואב את גישתו---- עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם מבין את כל הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה על ידי חליפין---------ההבדל הוא שגרימת רכישה היא תת-קבוצה של היכולת להירכש באמצעות רכישה. זה כמו העובדה שהחלפת כסף אינה גורמת לרכישה. רק משיכה או הרמה יכולים לגרום לרכישה. לכן, אנו רואים שהרמב"ם מבין את הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה------ ם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץ---------------------יש לציין כאן שרש''י ותוספות לומדים את הוויכוח בין רב נחמן לרב ששת באופן שונה מהרמב''ם. עד כה אמרתי שלפי הרמב''ם, החוק רב נחמן הוא שפירות ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין, אך אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין; בעוד שלרב ששת הם יכולים גם לגרום לחליפין. לפי רש''י הם (רב נחמן ורב ששת) נבדלים בכך. רב ששת קובע שכל החפצים המטלטלים ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום גם להם. עבור רב נחמן רק כלים שניתן להשתמש בהם ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום לחליפין. עבור רש''י, שור או פרה נחשבים כנכללים בחפצים המטלטלים. רב נחמן התכוון להוציא רק פירות ממה שיכול לגרום לחליפין, אך חוץ מזה, כל החפצים המטלטלים יכולים לגרום לחליפין, או אולי רק כלים שמישים. אבל הרמב''ם כותב, "אפשר להחליף כלים בכלים, בהמה בבהמה, אפילו מחט בשריון או טלה בסוס, אבל אם הוא מחליף פרי בפרי, ניתן להחיל על כך את חוק המרמה." (אם ההחלפה הייתה יותר מחמישית מערכה, ההחלפה בטלה). האם טלה ניתן לשימוש ככלי או כמו חפצים ניידים אחרים? אני מתכוון שהוא אולי מתכוון שרק כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה והוא אולי יטען שטלה כלול, או שאולי הוא מתכוון שכל החפצים הניידים מלבד פרי יכולים לגרום להחלפה

Bava Metzia 46

Rav Shach (laws of marriage 1:2)holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To Rav Shach exchange of a needle for a suit of armor is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of armor.] Rav Shach holds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. ([This is like the Tosphot R'id who holds acquisition by handkerchief that is worth more that a pruta can acquire a wife.])According to this, we must say that when Rav Nachman said in Bava Metzia 46 and Kidushin 28b that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First Rav Shach is only talking about the approach of the Rambam. Clearly, Tosphot and Rabbainu Tam are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like Rav Nachman that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. (Rambam laws of sale chapter 13) But what is a vessel? To Tosphot, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to Rav Shach this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of Rav Shach I must mention is not like Tosphot that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. It might help to understand what Rav Shach is saying if I mention the clarification of Shmuel Rozovski that the issue is if something causes a acquisition as in the case of acquisition by a handkerchief, or if there is no object causing the transition at all. Simply in the exchange one acquires the object of the other person, and the other acquires the object of the first person. Still even with this clarification it is odd that acquisition by handkerchief would not work to marry a wife even though it is absolutely acquisition by money while acquisition by pure exchange would acquire a woman though it is a different kind of acquisition. (Later note.) I see now that Rav Shach learns the idea of exchange different than Rav Shmuel Rosovsky. He says that the approach of the Rambam is that exchange equal value for equal value is still like an acquisition by money in which the first object tat is picked up is what causes the second object to be acquired and therefore there is no question about the approach of Rav Shach. He explains this all clearly in the beginning of laws of marriage After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the Rambam himself. In the beginning of chapter five in laws of sale he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like Rabbainu Tam. So, when he holds like Rav Nachman that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired by exchange. The question I have on this approach of the Rambam is that it does not seem to fit with the Gemara. the Gemara itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the Rambam have derived his approach?It occurred to me that the rambam understands the entire gemara as referring to causing acquisition by exchange[The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the Rambam understands the Gemara to be referring to causing acquisition.] However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between Tosphot and the Rambam because Tosphot makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the Mishna that sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object. I might mention here that Rashi and Tosphot learn the argument between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet differently than the Rambam. So far I have been saying according to the Rambam, the law of Rav Nachman is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to Rav Sheshet they can also cause exchange. According to Rashi, they differ in this. Rav Sheshet holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to Rav Nachman only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To Rashi, a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. Rav Nachman mean to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. However, the Rambam writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold thanot a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit? now i would like to add here that ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [laws of marriage 1:2] holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To רב שךexchange of a needle for a שריון is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of שריון.] רב שךholds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. According to this, we must say that when רב נחמן said in בבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב and קידושין כ''ח ע''ב that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First רב שךis only talking about the approach of the רמב''ם. Clearly, תוספות and רבינו תם are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like רב נחמן that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. But what is a vessel? To תוספות, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to רב שך this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of רב שךI must mention is not like תוספות that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the רמב''ם himself. In the beginning of chapter five in הלכות מכירה he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like ר' תם. So, when he holds like רב נחמן that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired bהThe question I have on this approach of the רמב''ם is that it does not seem to fit with the גמרא. Theגמרא itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the רמב''ם have derived his approach?y exchange. [The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the רמב''ם understands the גמרא to be referring to causing acquisition. However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between תוספות and the רמב''ם because תוספות makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the משנהthat sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object.---------I might mention here that רש''יand תוספות learn the argument between רב נחמן and רב ששתdifferently than the רמב''ם. So far I have been saying according to the רמב''ם , the law of רב נחמן is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to רב ששת they can also cause exchange. According to רש''י they differ in this. רב ששת holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to רב נחמן only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To רש''י , a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. רב נחמן meant to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. He writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold that a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit?