tyranny of the proletariat, or of the modern substitute for the proletariat--blacks and queer

 The world is divided between John Locke's liberalism [individual right, individual freedom] against the modern versions of Marxism [tyranny of the proletariat, or of the modern substitute for the proletariat--blacks and queer. ]

The way out of this mess is the mediaeval formula: faith with reason. Sinai and Athens.

But Athens has some problems, so instead I suggest the Kant-Friesian School of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross. And Sinai and faith also are prone to abuse, so I suggest and emphasis on the Gra and Rav Israel Salanter and Musar.

But how to go about walking the path of the Gra when the whole religious world ha been infiltered by the Dark Side? That I do not know except to try to keep Torah as an individual and avoid the religious.

Spacetime Thermodynamics I - Aron Wall

 

''The law of the country is the law'' Bava Batra [circa 35] does not mean in a case where it contradicts Torah. So women that get a divorce and then use that as a weapon to bankrupt their x's are violating Torah. Furthermore, they  transgress גונב נפש ומכרו מות יומת ["One who steals a soul and sells it shall be put to death."] when they use the court to take the children.  And the lashon hara [slander] that they engage in forever after has no conceivable permission. [However, there are times when speaking negatively is ok e.g., when one needs to warn someone not to be around a friend who is having an evil influence.]  

A New Look At The Path Integral Of Quantum Mechanics | Edward Witten

High on my list of precautions would be to avoid stupid places, hanging out with stupid people, and doing stupid things. This alone can spare you a world of grief.

 see this link to self defense.

 There is a great lesson to learn from Henry II. He did not repent because of religious leanings. Rather he realized that things were going terribly wrong in his life. Everything. [His kingdom was being invaded by the king of Scotland.  His own family was offering England to the king of France.]  At some point it occurred to him that the cause was not this rational explanation or the other. It was just one thing--the murder of Thomas Becket. And so he made his way barefoot and blooded to the cathedral and the grave of Becket, and had the monks beat the living daylights out of him. Five lashes given by each of the hundred monks. 

The very next day word came to him that the king of Scotland had been captured.

  In the Gemara Yeruhalmi in the first chapter of Gitin [on the mishna that if a  kuti is one of the witnesses on the divorce doc. it is okay] is brought the reason why the Kutim [Samarians]were not Jewish--because they intermarried with the priests of the high places--[even though those priests themselves were born Jewish.

This comes from the law that any object that is brought as a gift to an idol, can not be nullified. 

Today that religious leaders are themselves worshiped a objects of adoration and praise, thus the people serving  and worshiping them lose their soul.

I see the Litvak seminaries for girls in Bnei Brak do not want give graduation diplomas to girls that are after that off to get a secular education. This makes sense to me since the girls would be going into ''education'' which means ''critical race theory''. The humanities and social studies departments of universities ought to be closed. [Allan bloom pointed in 1990 the crisis but now there  is no crisis. these two parts of the modern university are poison.]

Friesian school of Leonard Nelson - the best route to take for modern philosophy

 The New Friesian school of Leonard Nelson [https://www.friesian.com] needs some clarity in the writings of the  frieian.com of Kelley Ross. One major point of clarity that Dr. Ross brings to the subject is that non intuitive immediate knowledge is not infallible. [It can need modification in view of new evidence. --evidence that has stronger prima facia likelihood].

This clarity would have avoided the seeming problem of Special Relativity. [And that is what caused the defection from the group of nelson to the Berlin group of Reichenbach.]

[Another important aspect of Kelley Ross is that he joins Fries with Schopenhauer.]]

You might think that this ought to be obvious but even in Germany where there is renewed interest in Kant, they go off on a tangent with Hermann Cohen and the neo-Kantian which is another dead end.

Problems in modern philosophy

 The line of thought of Plato and Aristotle  got to be a part of Torah thought in the Rishonim [authorities from the middle ages.] But there are problems in this as pointed out by Berkley and Thomas Reid. Nevertheless, when I saw the problems in modern philosophy, I more or less retreated to the Rishonim. Still the problem remained, though I tended to ignore them. But to get some sort of answer for the mind body problem which remained in the enlightenment until Kant  is important. And the developments since Kant seem futile. So to get to some kind of answer for problems that remained in Kant, I think the New Friesian School of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross seems to be the best. [See this link]

To get an idea of what bothered me about British American ''analytic philosophy" see Robert Hanna. See this link [I had not read Hanna when in high school, but still the problems in analytic philosophy and continental philosophy seemed apparent to me.]

Why did Hegel not seem like the right track? Mainly because the dialectic approach of Socrates is just  one sub category of ways that reason  gets to the truth of things. [There are lot of ways. We see this in Physics and math where every new discovery come about by some different approach.] And not every idea contain its opposite unless any kind of logic is impossible. "Hot" does not mean "cold". Furthermore the off shoots from Hegel are more like alchemy than any kind of building up anything. the idea of melting down lead to find the core of gold is wrong. So to destroy western civilization in order  that the gold underneath becomes apparent  does not work.  

Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88

 I have not had time to consider how to express my notion here. But just to do the best that I can right now let me say that there is something hard to understand in the Rambam in Laws of Maaser chapter 2 law 1 and 2. The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of maaser depends on one's intention at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in tithes from the Torah. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. 

this is based on the Gemara in Bava Metzia page 88 which says that a buyer is not obligated from the Torah but only by decree.

Rabbainu Tam says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the Rambam but Rabainu Tam does not mention intention.

Rav Shach brings some clarity on here. He brings the mishna [maaser I:5] that selling grain makes it obligated but if he is bringing it home then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not "tevel". But that does not explain from where the Rambam derives the idea of intention. 

(I am not sure if the Rambam is posek (deciding) like the simple explanation of that mishna. It might be that he explains that mishna as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in laws of maaser chapter 3 law 1 that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean until he reaches home, but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

_____________________________________________________________

 There is something hard to understand in the Rambam in הלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א . The thing that is hard to understand is from where does he derive the idea that the obligation of מעשר depends on one's כוונה at the moment of smoothing the stack of grain. What I mean by  this question is this: He writes when one finishes the work on the grain, if his intention was for his own use, then he is obligated in מעשר from the תורה. But if his intention was to sell it. then he is obligated only by a decree. Also, the buyer is obligated from the Torah if he finishes the work himself.  But if he bought the grain after the work on it was finished by the seller, then he is obligated only by a decree. This is based on the גמרא in בבא מציעא page פ''ח which says that a buyer is not obligated from the תורה but only by decree. רבינו תם says if the work was finished by the seller that is when the buyer is not obligated. That is similar to the רמב''ם, but רבינו תם does not mention intention. רב שך brings some clarity on here. He brings the משנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה  that מוליכן לשוק makes it obligated, but if he is bringing it home, then he can eat from it in a casual way until it gets to his home. so to be obligated there needs to be the finishing of the work and also getting to his home. Otherwise it is not טבל. But that does not explain from where the רמב''ם derives the idea of intention בגמר מלאכה. 

(I am not sure if the רמב''ם is פוסק  like the simple explanation of that משנה. It might be that he explains that משנה as referring to what his intention is at the time of finishing the work, i.e. smoothing of the stack of grain. After all, he does not mention that one can eat from the grain until he reaches home.   For he write in הלכות מעשר פרק ג הלכה א that if his intention  is to bring the grain to his  home, he can eat from it in a casual way. It sounds like he must mean ""until he reaches home", but it is not clear to me why he does not say this openly.)

יש משהו קשה להבין ברמב"ם בהלכות מעשר פרק ב' הלכה א'. הדבר שקשה להבין הוא מנין הוא שואב את הרעיון שחיוב מעשר תלוי בכוונה של האדם ברגע החלקת ערימת התבואה. כוונתי בשאלה זו: הוא כותב כשמסיימים את המלאכה על התבואה, אם הייתה כוונתו לאכול אותה, הרי הוא חייב במעשר מהתורה. אבל אם כוונתו הייתה למכור אותו. ואז הוא חייב רק בגזרה. וכן, הקונה חייב מהתורה אם סיים את המלאכה בעצמו. אבל אם קנה את התבואה לאחר שסיים המלאכה בו על ידי המוכר, הרי שחייב רק בגזירה. זאת על סמך הגמרא בבא מציעא דף פ''ח שאומר שקונה אינו חייב מהתורה אלא רק בגזרה. רבינו תם אומר אם הסתיימה המלאכה ע"י המוכר הרי שהקונה אינו חייב. זה דומה לרמב''ם, אבל רבינו תם לא מזכיר כוונה. רב שך מביא כאן קצת בהירות. הוא מביא את המשנה מעשר פרק א' משנה ה ''שמוליכן לשוק'' מחייב אותו, אבל אם הוא מביא אותו הביתה, אז הוא יכול לאכול ממנו בצורה סתמית עד שזה יגיע לביתו. אז כדי להיות חייב צריך להיות סיום העבודה וגם להגיע לביתו. אחרת זה לא טבל. אבל זה לא מסביר מהיכן שואב הרמב''ם את רעיון הכוונה בגמר מלאכה. אגב אני לא בטוח אם הרמב''ם פוסק כמו ההסבר הפשוט של אותה משנה. יכול להיות שהוא מסביר את המשנה הזאת כמתייחס למה שהכוונה שלו בזמן סיום העבודה, כלומר החלקה של הערימה של דגן. הרי אינו מזכיר שאפשר לאכול מהתבואה עד שיגיע הביתה. שהרי כותב בהלכות מעשר פרק ג' הלכה א' שאם כוונתו להביא את התבואה לביתו, יוכל לאכול ממנו בדרך אגבית. זה נשמע כאילו הוא בטח מתכוון ל""עד שהוא מגיע הביתה", אבל לא ברור לי למה הוא לא אומר את זה בגלוי

The illusion that Ukraine is winning is going to evaporate as soon as Russia gets serious.

It makes more sense to arrange peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.  The illusion that Ukraine is winning is going to evaporate as soon as Russia gets serious. As for the 50 billion dollars, do not worry. The Ukrainian army will not see a cent of it. [Anyone who has had any experience with Ukraine is aware that there is no chance in hell that the money will get to it intended destination.] [But if there will ever be peace talks, they should be more than paper as were the peace agreements in 2014 which were ignored by the Ukraine as soon as they were signed.]

 I can see why people have to take tests in high school and college.--That is for for them and for the future kinds of work they will do. You have to know your real abilities rather than what people tell you; like when they say, "You are so good at everything." But I hated  tests. And I think the reason is that I do not absorb information like others. I do not "learn". I absorb. That is one reason I found my element in the Litvak world of yeshivot . While of course, I had to take a test before I was accepted at the Mir Yeshiva in NY, still after that, there were no tests. And if you have ever been in  a Litvak yeshiva, you know what I mean. The atmosphere is that of intense learning all day and all night. But no tests. Everyone learns at their own pace.

[And I can see why Conversation number 76 in the Conversations of Rav Nahman appealed to me. He said "Say the words in order (of the book you are learning) from start to finish" 

the woke movement is based on the Frankfurt School

 the woke movement is based on the Frankfurt School but if you point this out the result is denial since none of the woke have heard of Marcuse and the One-D Man. Never the less, it i those ideas that have produced the movement. Just that the ideas are presented as new without citing the sources. 

I was on my way to the sea and I heard an Israeli song about ''Ok beit hamikdash [Temple] how can we build you again? With faith and understanding בית המקדש איך נבנה אותך מחדש באמונה בהבנה  and it occurred tome that in fact that would be a good idea. in fact there is a specific commandment in the Torah tobuild the beit hamikdah. So why does no one do it? or even want to do it?

Hegel was against this doctrine of Jacob Fries.

 A bit too much faith can come under the title ''non intuitive immediate knowledge,'' and I suspect that that was one of the reasons why Hegel was against this doctrine of Jacob Fries [as modified by Kelley Ross and Leonard Nelson].

But there is a way to justify this approach of Fries.  Michael Huemer points out the flaw of many philosophical systems-- that is they start out with premises that are shaky at best. And in that way they differ from the exact sciences. While the exact sciences also start with premises, their premises are almost obvious from the start--though they can be modified or changed a evidence against them grows. 

 In this way faith and reason can work together-- reason can modify faith.

SEE THE web site of Kelley Ross ''friesian.com'' . Why Fries, Leonard Nelson and K. Ross are important is that problems in Kant resulted in many new approaches, many of which led to dead ends. The most fruitful that I can see is this Leonard Nelson's ''The New Friesian School".   

A good place to see the problems of analytic philosophy is Robert Hanna [blog at against academic philosophy]. 

A good place to see problems in Hegel is Hobhouse [The Metaphysical State].

I could go on, but in the end my point will remain the same -that the best thing in philosophy today is Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross's New Friesian School. 

רמב''ם הלכות מעשר א' הלכה ט''ו The mishna tractate trumot chapter 4

 There is an argument between the Rambam and the Raavad concerning a case when one takes only a fraction of what he is obligated in Truma and maaser [tithe]. [He is obligated to take a tenth  for maaser from the Torah, and one fiftieth for truma from from the word of the scribes.] To the Rambam nothing has happened. The act of separating is not valid and he has to separate truma and maaser even from what he took. For an example there is 100 seah of tevel and he takes  five seah. He has to take a half a seah on what he took and clearly 9 seah on the stack of grain. To the Ravvad the separation is valid and what he took is valid and on the stack of grain itself he can go and take another five seah because we depend on ''breira''. [ we say what he separates now is thought to have come from the part of the stack that has not yet been fixed].There is a slight proof for the Raavad because Reissh Lakish in the Yeruhalmi holds the mishna that says this law is referring only to truma. so he holds the mishna means that the act of separation is valid and that it can not be valid in the case of maaser and so he says the mishna does not refer to maaser. [The mishna tractate trumah chapter 4 says המפריש מקצת תו''מ מפריש ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר] so even though the poskim hold the mishna refer to both truma and maaser till the meaning is the the separation is valid.

___________________________________________________________________

 There is an argument between the רמב''ם and the ראב''ד concerning a case when one takes only a fraction of what he is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. [He is obligated to take a tenth  for מעשר from the Torah and one fiftieth for תרומה from from the word of the scribes.] To the רמב''ם nothing has happened. The act of separating is not valid and he has to separate תרומה and מעשר even from what he took. For an example there is מאה סאה of טבל and he takes  חמש סאה. He has to take a half a סאה on what he took and תשע סאה on the stack of grain. To the ראב''ד the הפרשה is valid and what he took is valid and on the stack of grain itself he and takeS another five סאה because we depend on ''ברירה''. [ We say what he separates now is thought to have come from the part of the stack that has not yet been fixed].There is a slight proof for the ראב''ד because ריש לקיש in the ירושלמי holds the משנה that says this law is referring only to תרומה. So he holds the משנה means that the הפרשה is valid and that it can not be valid in the case of מעשר and so he says the משנה does not refer to מעשר. [The משנה says המפריש מקצת תו''מ מפריש ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר]. So even though the פוסקים hold the משנה refer to both תרומה and מעשר Still the meaning is the the הפרשה is valid.

יש ויכוח בין הרמב''ם לראב''ד על מקרה שבו אחד נוטל רק חלק ממה שהוא חייב בתרומה ובמעשר. [חייב ליטול עשירית למעשר מהתורה, ואחד מחמישים לתרומה מדברי סופרים.] לרמב''ם לא אירע כלום. מעשה ההפרדה אינו תקף וצריך להפריד תרומה ומעשר אפילו ממה שלקח. לדוגמא יש מאה סאה של טבל והוא לוקח חמש סאה. הוא צריך לקחת חצי סאה על מה שלקח ותשע סאה על ערימת התבואה. לראב''ד הפרשה תקף ומה שלקח תקף ועל ערימת התבואה עצמו הוא ולוקח עוד חמש סאה כי אנחנו תלויים ב''ברירה''. [אנו אומרים שמה שהוא מפריד כעת נחשב למקורו מהחלק של הערימה שעדיין לא תוקן]. יש הוכחה קלה לראב''ד כי ריש לקיש בירושלמי מחזיק את המשנה שאומרת את החוק הזה, שהכוונה רק לתרומה. אז הוא מחזיק שהמשנה אומרת שהפרשה תקפה ושזה לא יכול להיות תקף במקרה של מעשר, ולכן הוא אומר שהמשנה לא מתייחס למעשר. [המשנה אומרת "המפריש מקצת תו''מ מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום אחר"]. אז למרות שהפוסקים מחזיקים את המשנה מתייחסת גם לתרומה וגם למעשר, עדיין המשמעות היא שההפרשה תקפה

new music file z100 for orchestra

 z100  z100 nwc

 It is possible that the problem in the USA is the woke indoctrination that stems from  the anti-enlightenment traditions [anti reason], and that the rise of China stems from its adoption of the enlightenment tradition stemming from Hegel. [Marx was after all in the Hegelian tradition.]

See Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind that in fact traces the difficulties in the USA education system to this contradiction between the Enlightenment philosophers and the Anti Enlightenment ones.

The rise of the USA was during the time it was firmly embedded in the Enlightenment with John Locke. But after the 1960's this has all been changing.

Now China and Russia teach their students Calculus and Quantum  Mechanics. The USA teaches its students "gender pronouns".  Where this will lead to is fairly clear, 

to avoid WWIII

 I am concerned about the decision in Washington to send Patriot batteries to Ukraine. I am not sure why a war between Russia and the USA does not seem to bother anyone. I thought to avoid WWIII would be on the top of everyone's agenda. 

And it is not true that the average Ukrainian does not want Russian rule. I asked Ukrainians in Uman about this over the period of many years, and they always said to me that things were better under the USSR than after Ukrainian independence when things were in a state of lawlessness and chaos.

The Kant-Fries school is important because it shows and corrects many of the flaws in Neo-Kantian thinkers. A side benefit i that it shows a connection between faith and reason.

 I see in Germany there are large efforts to go mining and digging into Kant and some of his major commentators: Hermann Cohen [in Germany] Allison, Strawson, Sellars in the USA.

I asked Dr Kelley Ross  [of The Kant-Fries School ] and this was his answer:

I wrote: Let me  say she [Bauman] is saying that the categories of Kant are not a ''thing in itself''' but rather the structures that make thinking possible.

Dr Ross: "The categories do apply to things in themselves, but we don't know how.  Once they are "schematized" with space and time, they make phenomenal objects possible.  But then causality, in particular, can mean free will among things in themselves; but the evidence for that only comes with morality.""

I wrote : ""She [Charlotte Bauman] shows there is a difference between the early Hermann Cohen which was like this and the later Cohen that Nelson was disagreeing with."

KR: "As soon as Cohen rejects things in themselves, then really nothing is left of Kantian philosophy.  Whether that is "early" or "late" doesn't make much difference to me."

I wrote : "That is as well as I can understand her point of view right now. Why this is relevant to the Friesian school is that in this way the categories are not derived, but given and thus similar to non intuitive immediate knowledge."

Kelley Ross: "Kant thought that the categories are somehow derived directly from the forms of logic, which is what people call the "metaphysical deduction" of the First Critique.  This is nonsense.  His move is a leap of imagination, not inference, and his epistemology has nothing to explain it.  Before Fries, one could only appeal to Platonism for a more sensible explanation.

If the "early" Cohen was more like Kant, he is still stuck with Kant's problems and improbabilities.  I doubt that Bauman fixes that up. "

The Kant-Fries school is important because it shows and corrects many of the flaws in Neo-Kantian thinkers. A side benefit  i that it shows a connection between faith and reason.

One benefit about the combination of faith a reason is that one can have faith that is false. [just like when reason can be flawed.] When one combines faith reason it is more likely to hit the truth.

One can see what happens in Philosophy by means of the mathematical notion of flabby sheaves. There is loss of exactness in a case where one wants to go from a smaller domain into the whole space. There is then loss of exactness. And this is what happen in philosophy when  people do not look at the big picture-or refuse to acknowledge the role that faith plays in coming to truth. [This is hinted at in Torah:אנחנו מאלמים אלומים בשדה ] We were gathering sheaves in the field. For to correct the problem of loss of exactness one must go to the stalks that make the sheaves,--but you do not worry about gluing the stalks together.

 The new drone attack inside Russia is no surprise since Ukrainians freely went to work in Russia with no visa until this year. I knew Ukrainian people in Uman that  went to work in Russia. The border was open in both direction until recently..   I even knew of a sad case where someone  in Uman [Ukraine] was a travel agent and arranged trips for a large gathering and then simply took all the money and disappeared into Russia. Or so he thought, until some of the people he had cheated tracked him down. I forget how that ended, but for sure the cheater was not served tea and cookies  

new music file z99

 z99

Gemara Nida2. The Mishna says a person went into a mikve [pool] and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled [based on the  assumption that that mikve was okay] are impure. R Shimon says in a private domain they are in doubt. In a public domain they are pure. The Gemara asks from this braita: ''a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for separating truma, and was found to be sour. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' R Hanina from Sura says the teaching about barrel is R Shimon. And both learn from sota. What is the case with Sota? Even though she is in doubt, she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the pure things are impure. But then just like sota they should be considered pure in a public domain? No, because for in a public domain there is no privacy. That is why the sota is ok there. But for a mikve what difference is there in a public domain if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from sota they should be pure in a public domain? No because here there are two status's  to make impure. R Shimon also learns from sota. Just like sota in a public domain is pure, so are the pure things. But then in a private domain they should be impure. No, because there  is valid suspicion on her in  private domain.

The question that Rav Shach asks here [in Laws of Truma 5:24 ] is that once you come on two status's, you do not need the answer of sota. Also, I ask that the Gemara asks on the first Tana that since we learn from sota, the law should be like sota  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a Gezera shava. אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on R Shimon? Since he learns from Sota. the law of the pure things should be like sota in all cases. And also, I would like to ask that if we are learning from a gezera shava or הקיש,  then what type of answer could it be that sotaa is different because of such and such a reason. Is that not the whole point of a gezera shava,- to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like R Shimon. The braita says for three days it is ok, and after that a doubt. But if it would be R Shimon  it should be a doubt right away in a private domain and ok in a public domain.

[What I am getting at is that in fact Rav Shach is right that even though the gemara puts this together, it seems clear that these are two separate answers, ]

I know there i a lot here that might be unclear but I am really tired from being at the sea the whole day. But just tp help a little bit let me say:

A sota is a woman who was  warned by her husband not to be in a private place with a certain man, and she did so anyway. She is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the waters in the Temple--or she can refuse and admit her guilt, and is divorced.  

The "two status's" means the fellow that went into the mikva was impure, and the mikve is now not okay. That is two against one status that we know in the past it was ok That is sstatus of impure, plus status now against status of the past. You might have run into this subject in Ketuboth page 9

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from sota is  a doubt about purity in a private domain is impure, and in a public domain it is pure. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of truma. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly R  Shimon agrees there is not privacy in a public domain. so why does he disagree with the firt tana [as the Gemara itself usually asks in similar type of arguments]. And certainly the first tana agrees that the  reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota. And also, if that is the reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota, perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of mikve just a doubt?   

_____________________________________________________

________

גמרא נידה ב ע''ב The משנה says a person went into a מקווה and it was found lacking the full volume all the טהרות which were handled based on the  assumption that that מקווה was okay are impure. ר' שמעון says in a רשות היחיד they are in doubt. In a רשות הרבים they are pure. The גמרא asks from this ברייתא a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for תרומה and was found to be sour. For three days the תרומה is ok. After that it is a doubt. ר' חנינא from סורא says the teaching about barrel is ר' שמעון. And both learn from סוטה. What is the case with סוטה? Even though she is in doubt she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the טהרות are impure. But then just like סוטה they should be considered pure in a  רשות הרבים? No, because for in a רשות הרבים there is no privacy. That is why the סוטה is ok there. But for a מקווה what difference is there in a רשות הרבים if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from סוטה they should be pure in a רשות הרבים? No because here there are two חזקות  to make impure. ר' שמעון also learn from סוטה. Just like סוטה in a רשות הרבים is pure So are the טהרות. But then in a  רשות היחיד they should be impure. No because there  is valid suspicion on her in  ברשות היחיד. The question that רב שך asks here is that once you come on two חזקות you do not need the answer of סוטה. Also I ask that the גמרא asks on the first תנא that since we learn from סוטה, The law should be like סוטה  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a גזירה שווה ולכן אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on ר' שמעון? Since he learns from סוטה. the law of the  טהרות should be like סוטה in all cases. And also I would like to ask that if we are learning from a גזירה שווה or הקיש  then what type of answer could it be that סוטה is different because of such and such a reason? Is that not the whole point of a גזירה שווה to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like ר' שמעון. The ברייתא says for three days it is ok and after that a doubt. But if it would be ר' שמעון  it should be a doubt right away in a רשות היחיד and ok in a רשות הרבים.

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from סוטה is  a doubt about טהרה in a private domain is טמא and in a רשות הרבים it is טהור. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of תרומה. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly ר' שמעון agrees there is not יחוד in a רשות הרבים so why does he disagree with the תנא קמא  as the גמרא itself usually asks in similar type of arguments. And certainly the תנא קמא  agrees that the is reason for suspicion in a רשות היחיד for the סוטה. And also if the is reason for suspicion in a  רשות היחיד for the סוטה perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of מקוה just a doubt.   

תוצאות התרגום

גמרא נידה ב' ע''ב המשנה אומרת שאדם נכנס למקווה ונמצא חסר נפח, כל הטהרות שטופלו על סמך ההנחה שהמקווה היה בסדר טמאות. ר' שמעון אומר ברשות היחיד הם בספק. ברשות הרבים הם טהורים. שואלת הגמרא מברייתא שזו שונה מחבית יין כדי להשתמש בה לתרומה ונמצאה חמוצה. במשך שלושה ימים התרומה בסדר. אחרי זה יש ספק. ר' חנינא מסורא אומר שההוראה על חבית היא ר' שמעון. ושניהם לומדים מסוטה. מה המקרה עם סוטה? למרות שהיא בספק היא נחשבת בהחלט לא בסדר עד שהיא שותה. אז כל הטהרות טמאות. אבל אז בדיוק כמו סוטה הם צריכים להיחשב טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא, כי ברשות הרבים אין פרטיות. לכן הסוטה בסדר שם. אבל בשביל מקווה מה הבדל יש ברשות הרבים אם נמצא חסר? אבל למרות זאת כיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה הם צריכים להיות טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא כי כאן יש שתי חזקות לעשות הטהרות טמאות. גם ר' שמעון לומד מסוטה. בדיוק כמו שסוטה ברשות הרבים היא טהורה כך גם הטהרות. אבל אז ברשות היחיד הם צריכים להיות טמאים ודאי. לא כי יש עליה חשד תקף ברשות היחיד. השאלה שרב שך שואל כאן היא שברגע שאתה בא על שתי חזקות אתה לא צריך את התשובה של סוטה. וכן אני שואל שהגמרא ששואלת על תנא הראשון שכיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה, הדין צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. (אני חושב שהם מתכוונים שאם נלמד על ידי גזירה שווה אין גזירה שווה לחצאים.) אז למה הם לא שואלים את אותה שאלה על ר' שמעון? מאז הוא לומד מסוטה. חוק הטהרות צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. וגם אני רוצה לשאול שאם אנחנו לומדים מגזירה שווה או הקיש אז איזה סוג תשובה יכול להיות שסוטה שונה בגלל סיבה כזו ואחרת? האם זה לא כל העניין של גזירה שווה להכניס את הדין של מקרה אחד לתיק אחר למרות שהם שונים? כמו כן ברצוני לשאול שבכל מקרה, ההוראה על החבית אינה כמו ר' שמעון. הברייתא אומרת שלשה ימים זה בסדר ואחרי זה ספק. אבל אם זה יהיה ר' שמעון זה צריך להיות ספק מיד ברשות היחיד ובסדר ברשות הרבים.

אני רוצה להוסיף שכל ההשוואה של החבית המשמשת לתרומה עם סוטה או המקווה קשה להבנה. מה שאנו למדים מסוטה הוא שספק לגבי טהרה בתחום הפרטי הוא טמא וברשות הרבים זה טהור. נראה שאין לזה קשר להפרשת תרומה. גם את ההבדל בנימוק קשה להבין כי בהחלט ר' שמעון מסכים שאין יחוד ברשות הרבים אז למה הוא חולק על התנא קמא כמו שהגמרא עצמו שואל בדרך כלל בסוג דומה של טיעונים. ובהחלט תנא קמא מסכים שיש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה. לכן אם יש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה אולי כל מקרה אחר צריך להיות טהור לחלוטין? מדוע ההיגיון הזה רק גורם לכך שהמקרה של מקוה הוא רק ספק

Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings.

 Ukrainian cities having to deal with winter now is a frightful thought. I was in one unheated place for winter there, but I had electricity, so I could sit by a small fan heater, and then later I could turn it off and crawl under a ton of blankets. But that was a ground wooden structure which naturally preserves heat]. But Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings. [The minority are Stalin built buildings which are easy to see since they have less stories than the larger Krutchev and Breshnev built buildings which are the very tall buildings that you see all over the place there.] These without heating in winter would be like walking into a freezer of a refrigerator.

I think it is time for a negotiated peace. 

The Soviets had built a sort of central heating system for whole cities. They wrote whole textbooks on the Physics of super heated water that had a totally different sort of nature than regular heated water. [I actually used to learn one of these textbooks as part of my Physics studies.] And this system was used to heat all these apartment buildings throughout whole cities. But the down side of this is it is easy to "take out/" 

My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force

Dec 7 Pearl Harbor. My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force and I recall seeing his uniform had lots of medals but he never told what sorts of operations they were for except one. That was the onehe got for setting up a   US  air force base in France where damaged planes could come in and get repaired in short order. Other than that he never talked about what other missions the other medals were for.

 After a day at the beach I am tired. But I would like to mention a important point. The Gemara in Nida pg 2b says if one goes into a natural body of water [like a mikve] and it was found lacking the proper volume is not clean. [R Shimon said the pure things made after that are in doubt if in a private domain and pure in a public domain.] The Gemara asks from the teaching about a barrel.  One puts aside a barrel of wine to use for truma and later was found to have soured. For the first three days the truma is truma. After that is a doubt. Rav Hanina from Sura said the teaching on the barrel is R. .Shimon.

The Gemara then explains why. While at the sea it occurred to me that even before the explanation of the gemara the teaching of R Shimon in the Mishna and the braita do not seem to correspond. Another point that Rav Shach brings is the explanation of the Gemara is a bit disjointed

The gemara says both the sages and R Shimon learn from sota, and in the middle of this explanation they insert that the sages are learning from two status's opposed to one, The man was not clean and the mikve is now not okay, while one status is that originally the mikve was ok,

This explanation has no need to learn from sota. 

Rav Shach thus say that these are two separate explanations and it was  Rav Hanina that said one [תרתי לרעיותא] while and according to that one, the barrel teaching is R Shimon. But to the explanation from sota the barrel can be also the sages, This answers why the Rambam decides the law like the sages and also barrel.  

So reason can help understand Torah, but not override it.

 What is authoritative? Sola Scriptura. So reason can help understand Torah but not override it. It is the major theme of the Middle Ages to find the right balance between Reason and Revelation. But when it come down to a direct conflict, the actual words of God in the Five Books of Moses and the Prophets must take precedent over the faulty and fallible reason of man. And what are prophets is not open. The word of God has not become irrelevant as time ha gone on. Nor have we advanced beyond God.

We need the Gemara to derive and understand the words of Torah, but not override them.

  

 There is the thesis anti thesis synthesis of Hegel which is one way to get to the truth of things. He gets it from Socrates [as Dr Kelley Ross pointed out] who for some reason was always able to ask the right question to get to the opposite principle than the one that was suggested.   In some of the shorter dialogs this gets to just that--contradiction. In some however progress is made.

And from what I saw in the Logic of the Encyclopedia this is the foundation of his whole system. But he also said there is not just one method of gaining ground in Philosophy. [That is why some have claimed he never had this method.]  

Mainly Hegel wants from this method to get to the conclusion that logic and reason permeates everything, There is no where beyond reason. --For in plain terms God made everything through his wisdom and reason. [That is not how Hegel would put it.] [Hegel also wants that reason can get to absolute truth by itself, not needing empirical evidence]

The reason I bring this up is that the only two areas I have done any study in science are math and physics and in fact progress is never made by the same method that the previous bit of progress was made.

Well obviously areas out from the possibility of experience [not possible experience]: areas that do not come under where when how why the categories. But the categories are not known by the categories- but they are known, Immediately after the Critique was published this was more or less along the lines of the original critics like Schultz.   So what Fries did was to postulate non immediate intuitive knowledge, Though Hegel and Fries were not saying the same thing, but I see this non intuitive knowledge as one more means of getting to the absolute truth in a different way than the dialectic. Just like Hegel had said: there is not just one way.

[fries disagreed  with kant on the transcendental deduction. fries felt that perception can not tell us anything about a priori principles.]  

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud hold the same view.

 I have noticed that when Christians defend their faith, they sometimes are unaware of the background that Jesus lived in. One instance is ''netilat yadaim'' [ washing before bread, or fruit that has been washed and is now wet, or before the three prayers]. It has nothing to do with coming from the market back home. The last two requirements are not generally observed except for before the morning  prayer. [There is however no good reason why these are not observed.] The first one has two reasons, one in Hulin chapter 8  מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה ("The first washing is a good deed, the middle washing is allowed, the last washing after the meal is an obligation."). Since it is clear the disciples were  not washing before bread, so it must be that Jesus held with this opinion: the first washing is a good deed,-not an obligation. 

Plus i should add here that just  because the religious fanatics (Pharisees) yelled at Jesus means nothing. Just as when religious fanatics yell at people nowadays it means nothing. They yell when they have no source in the Law  to defend their insane restrictions.  Have you ever been in Mea Shearim? Do you really think women have to walk on the opposite side of the street according to the Law? That is just the nature of religious fanatics- to make up their own restriction and yell at everyone else that is not following them. It has nothing to do with Torah.

סרך תרומה [[to cause priests to be used to washing for truma] is the other reason given for washing hands, That is the reason many consider it as an obligation. But if one holds the first reason from the Talmud in Hulin chapter 8, then it is only a good thing to do, not an obligation.  

Washing of cups however is different and that is in tractate Kelim. Some vessels [made from clay] can receive impurity from inside only. That is relevant to when the Temple was standing, but now with no temple, it make no difference.

See Mark 7 verse 1.

But Jesus also held with the authority of the scribes as in Mathew he said, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in the seat of Moses, so all that they say to do that you must do.... " [but there are many hypocrites among them etc.]

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud holds the same view. I do not think the sages thought they could override the commandments except in time of emergency like Eliyahu on Mount Carmel where he brought sacrifices outside of the Temple. or in a case of, "Do not do" שב ואל תעשה for the sake of some other overriding reason. In any case, in Avot Derav Natan on Pirkei Avot we see this amora [Rav Natan] says on the Mishna openly that the decrees of the scribes can not override the Torah. This is however clear only in the correction of the Gra there on the girsa.[language.]

At any rate, see R Shimon ben Yochai in Bava Metzia 119 that we go by the reason for a verse, not the literal meaning. [so one can take a guarantee of a loan from a rich widow.]

As for ''it is a karban that which you derive benefit from me.'' can be said to anyone and is valid. If one say it to one' father, that is the complaint of Jesus. However it is Biblical. One can forbid one's property to another, That is from Parshat Nedarim [vows] in the Book of Numbers, and at any rate if you have to give money toyour parents, then the neder [vow] does not apply anyway. see. tractate nedarim   

new music file for strings, oboe and bassoon z98

 z98

crisis of faith

 I was going through a crisis of faith for a few days about ten years ago. I had realized that there were problems in understanding Torah. In many places it seems wrong, And in other places, it seems immoral, In some places, I could find answers. For an exemplar: Noah's flood  can be explained by the Ari- Isaac Luria as referring to the female waters. But at some point, it seemed I was making too many excuses. Plus, my experience in the religious world left a lot to be desired. It seems the more religious people are, the less moral they are. But at that point, I discovered the web site of Kelley Ross which bring the view of Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson about non intuitive immediate knowledge which in many ways can be understood as faith or knowledge which is beyond reason. That is to say,  that reason has a limit. It can only tell us things within the area of possibility of experience. That was Kant's new idea, Kant  reasoned thus: that reason can only be sure of contradictions that arises from definitions and axioms. Experience or induction can only tell us things by induction . But Kant reasoned that there is knowledge beyond that, that is there is apriori knowledge.- knowledge that is beyond definition and experience  but even that has to be within the realm of possibility of possible experience. Fries saw the flaw in Kant that Kant had tried to mend by his Copernican revolution that knowledge can be known only by the categories of the mind. Fries saw that any knowledge to be true had to be based on knowing axioms which are not depended on the mind, but can be known by inner looking. introspection. I.E. Non intuitive immediate knowledge. Now Hegel saw the same flaw in Kant, and tried to answer this by his gothic structure of all reality, but this did not work for me since  Hegel held there is nothing beyond reason. But I felt that reason itself has to start from axioms which are not based on reason, but rather that all reason must start with axioms known beyond reason that reason can not prove.

My questions about the Torah and the religious world were deep. After all, Torah itself is monotheism and good midot character traits  But if the religious had neither, there were serious problem. But this went deeper since reason by itself when it goes into the realm beyond the possibility of experience comes up with self contradictions  and even makes self contradictions in people that attempt to go beyond the bound of experience. So the problem with the religious world seem a natural flow from the nature of their assuming they know that which they don't know. 

 Even though I agree with anyone who can put their trust in God and sit and learn Torah as is the basic approach of the Gra and the Litvak yeshivot which go by him, still I feel that a more balanced approach suits me in which I go by the medieval authorities like Ibn Pakuda that see learning Physics and Metaphysics as a part of learning Torah. But in order to fulfill this approach, I really can not be sitting in any yeshiva, and I have to do this on my own. [In any case, I was only really part of the Yeshiva world as long as I was socially acceptable .... a young  student right out of high school with rich parents. What is not to like? But after my wife left me, I was thought to be undesirable, and never found anywhere that would allow me to sit and learn Torah. So with little choice, I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. At least, they were looking at my grades and abilities, not my social status. At any rate, I learned from that experience that the religious world does keep some rituals, not the moral obligations of the Torah. 

 In Israel it looks like Degel HaTorah [which is the party of the Litvaks that go by the Gra] will be part of the new government. On one hand this makes me happy because I agree with those people who it and learn Torah for its own sake and believe they deserve support. [From what I understand the stipend for a person sitting in kollel and learning Torah was about $200 per month and now will go up to about $300 (1500 shekels)]. But I also feel a twitch of regret that I had tasted the joy of Torah and the light in the Litvak world but did not manage to stick it out, and went into the more secular way of doing Physics at Polytechnic of NYU. 

Is accepting a stipend for learning Torah Ok? I know it is not to the Rambam, but you can see in the responsa of the Geonim that the great yeshivot in Iraq [Babylon] did receive stipend from the community.

Even in the Gemara itself you see this in the page in Hulin right before Reshit Hagez where there was a sack of gold dinars placed at the steps of the yeshiva of Rav Ami and he grabbed it for the yeshiva. Also the story about two amoraim walking in some city  and one noticed the beautiful synagogue, and the other rebuked him saying, "Were there no students of the yeshivot to support that they spent the money on buildings?"

But I can see the point of the Rambam also when Torah becomes  a business it is a disaster.

So if possible I would suggest that the money for yeshivot ought to go only to the Litvaks who learn Torah for its own sake. I can not see how this could be implemented but that is what I think would be the bet policy.

a Levite who has his own produce

  There are lots of questions about a Levite who has his own produce [grain from his own field]. I mean to say that the regular way of taking tithes is one takes ''truma'' [1/50], then the first tithe [1/10] [maaser] and gives that to a Levite, Then the Levite takes a tenth and gives that to a priest. And even after that, there is maaser sheni [the second tithe], and takes that to Jerusalem and gives a basket of that to the Temple and the rest he eats himself with his family. But does a Levite also separate the first tithe of his own produce? And even though the normal order is that truma is first taken, what happens if it was not? Does the Levite take truma of what was given to him? Or even of his own produce? These are all questions that Rabbainu Shimshon [one of the first authors of Tosphot] and the Rambam deal with, but the Rambam's approach seems hard to understand.

I would like to bring the Mishna and Sifri Zuta and the R. Shimshon  and then the three places where the Rambam deals with these questions.

המשנה בתרומה פרק א' משנה ה

אין תורמים ממעשר ראשון שניטלה תרומתו

a person can not take truma from the first tithe from which it's truma was taken. 

 R. Shimshon (the Rash) brings on that mishna the Small Sirfi [Sifri Zuta] that says מנין לבן לוי שרצה לעשות ממעשר ראשון תרומה גדולה שעושה תלמוד לומר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' מכאן שאם רצה לעשותו תרומה לאחרים עושה יכול אף שניטלה תרומתו יהא עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים תלמוד לומר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשו בתוכו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשו בתוכו אינו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים 

"How do we know that a Levite that wants to take the great truma [large truma] from his first tithe that he can? the verse says '...for the tithe of the children of Israel, that which they lift up [bring] to the Lord.' [The word that the Torah uses there is they lift up which always refers to truma, not the tithe]] from here if one wants to make it truma for others he can. You might say even if it's truma was already taken one might make it truma for others [therefore] the verse says 'it's holiness in it' as long as it's holiness is in it one can make it truma for others- but when it's holiness is not in it one can not make it truma for others."

R. Shimshon explains the meaning of the mishna thus, if one has maaser rishon from which it's trumat maaer [tithe of the tithe] was taken but this first maaser was separated before the truma was taken, and thus i not obligated in truma, even so its tithe of the tithe was separated so it can not be made trumafor other grain. but as long as the tithe from the tithe was not yet taken, it can be made truma for other grain.

This is to be plain enough.

But the Rambam's approach is hard to understand.  he writes in laws of trumot 3 laws 21 and 22  בן לוי שהיה לו מע''ר שא ניטלה ממנו תרומתו והניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך הוא בטבלו מה שעשה עשוי שנאמר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' תרומה מלמד שהוא עושה את כולו תרומה לאחר 

הפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר תחלה ואחר כך הניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר ויתנו לכהן לר עשה כלום שנאמר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשיו בתוכו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשיו בתוכו אינו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים

This seems very different from R. Shimshon because of these words: עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר

This seems clearly as Rav Shach and the Chazon Ish explain that he mean he can make it trumat maaser for other grain, not truma.

 And this has to be the true explanation of the Rambam because later he writes that if one takes truma from maaser rishon from which the tithe of the tithe was not separated yet, his truma is not truma. I do not know how this could have been made more clear. [Clearly the Rambam did not have the same version of the Sifri as the Chazon Ish in fact deletes the word the "great" from "the great truma" ]

This is clear. [Up until here is all what Rav hach writes himelf. Now is my small addition] But the commentary of the Rambam on that Mishna in Trumot seems hard to understand

I was at the sea and thinking about that commentary of the Rambam, and I think he means this. if a levi has his own ground and grows grain on it, that grain is obligated in truma without a doubt and also in trumat maaser. Let us say someone gives to this Levi maasser rishon. He can not take truma  from the maaser rishon that was given to him for the sake of hiss own produce. He first gives the trumat maaser from what was given to him, and then takes truma and trumat maaser from his own produce [after he of course had called a name of maaer rishon on some part of his own produce.]  This is the language of the Rambam on that mihna, ואמרם ממעשר ראשון שלא ניטלה תרומתו כשיהיה לו ללוי זרע מאדמתו הוא חייב בתרומה בלי ספק וגם ישו מעשר שלקחו מישראל אין ראוי לו להוציא ממנו שיעור התרומה החייבת לזרעו ושיתננה לכהן לפי שיש לכהן באותו מעשר חוק וזכות והיא תרומת מעשר אבל יוציא תרומת מעשר ואחר כך יוציא ממנו התרומה החייבת לזרעו

There is a point here that the Rambam seems to make: that one can not take  truma from the maaer that was given him not just because it is not obligated in truma but also because it would lessen the amount of the trumat maaser and would be taking truma from what is actually obligated in trumat maaser 

________________________________________________________________________________

ש המון שאלות על לוי שיש לו תוצרת משלו [תבואה מהשדה שלו]. אני מתכוון לומר שהדרך הקבועה של נטילת מעשר היא שלוקח תרומה, ואז מעשר ראשון ונותן את זה ללוי, ואז הלוי לוקח עשירית ונותן לכהן. וגם אחר כך יש מעשר שני ולוקח את זה לירושלים ונותן סל מזה לבית המקדש ואת השאר הוא אוכל בעצמו עם משפחתו. אבל האם לוי מפריד גם את מעשר ראשון מתוצרתו? ולמרות שהסדר הרגיל הוא שלוקחים תרומה קודם, מה קורה אם לא? האם הלוי לוקח תרומה ממה שניתן לו? או אפילו מתוצרתו שלו? כל אלו שאלות שרבינו שמשון והרמב''ם עוסקים בהן. אני רוצה להביא את המשנה וספרי זוטא והר''ש ואחר כך את שלושת המקומות שבהם עוסק הרמב''ם בשאלות האלה.\המשנה בתרומות פרק א' משנה ה. אין תורמים ממעשר ראשון שניטלה תרומתו. הר''ש מביא על המשנה ההיא ואת ספרי זוטא שאומר מנין לבן לוי שרצה לעשות מעשר ראשון תרומה גדולה שעושה תלמוד לומר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' מכאן שאם רוצה לעשות תרומה עושה יכול אף  שניטלה תרומתו יהא עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים. תלמוד לומר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשו בתוכו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשו בתוכו אינו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים. ואז רבינו שמשון מסביר את משמעות המשנה כך, אם יש מעשר ראשון שממנו נלקחה תרומת מעשר אבל מעשר ראשון זה הופרד לפני שנלקחה התרומה מן התבואה, ולפיכך אינו חייב בתרומה, גם כך הופרדו התרומת מעשר שלו. אז לא ניתן לעשות את זה תרומה עבור דגנים אחרים. אבל כל עוד לא נלקחה התרומת מעשר, אפשר לעשותה תרומה לתבואה אחרת. זה כדי להיות ברור מספיק.אבל גישת הרמב''ם קשה להבנה. הוא כותב בהלכות תרומות פרק ג הלכה כ''א וכ''ב בן לוי שהיה לו מע''ר שלא ניטלה תרומתו והניחו בטבלו להיות מפריש עליו והולך   מה שעשה עשוי שנאמר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' תרומה. מלמד שהוא עושה את כלו תרומה לאחר. הפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר תחלה ואחר כך הניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר ויתנו לכהן לא עשה כלום שנאמר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקשיו בתוכו עושה אותו תרומה תרומה לאחרים אין קדשיו בתוכו אינו עושה אותו תרומה אחרים. זה נראה מאוד שונה מרבינו שמשון בגלל המילים האלה: עד שיעשה כלו תרומת מעשר. זה נראה בבירור כפי שרב שך והחזון איש מסבירים שהוא מתכוון שהוא יכול לעשות את זה תרומת מעשר לתבואה אחרת, לא תרומה. וזה צריך להיות ההסבר האמיתי של הרמב''ם כי אחר כך הוא כותב שאם לוקחים תרומה ממעשר ראשון שעדיין לא נפרדה ממנו התרומת מעשר, התרומה שלו אינה תרומה. אני לא יודע איך אפשר היה להבהיר את זה יותר. אבל פירוש הרמב''ם על אותה משנה בתרומות נראה קשה להבנה. אני חושב שהוא מתכוון לזה. אם יש ללוי קרקע משלו ומגדל עליה תבואה, התבואה ההיא חייבת בתרומה בלא ספק וכן בתרומת מעשר. בוא נגיד שמישהו נותן לו מעשר ראשון. הוא לא יכול לקחת תרומה מהמעשר ראשון שניתן לו למען תוצרתו שלו. תחילה הוא נותן את התרומת מעשר ממה שניתן לו, ואחר כך לוקח את תרומה ותרומת מעשר מהתוצרת שלו [אחרי שהוא כמובן קרא בשם מעשר ראשון על חלק מהתוצרת שלו.] זו השפה של רמב''ם על המשנה ההוא, ואמרם ממעשר ראשון שלא ניטלה תרומתו כשיהיה לו ללוי זרע מאדמתו הוא חייב בתרומה בלי ספק וגם כן יש לו מעשר שלקחו מישראל. אין ראוי לו להוציא ממנו שיעור התרומה החייבת לזרעו ושיתננה לכהן לפי שיש לכהן באותו מעשר חוק וזכותה תרומת מעשר. אבל יוציא תרומת מעשר ואחר כך יוציא ממנו התרומה חייבת לזרעו

יש כאן נקודה שנראה שהרמב''ם עושה: שאי אפשר לקחת תרומה מהמעשר שניתן לו לא רק משום שאינו חייב בתרומה אלא גם משום שהדבר יפחית את כמות התרומת מעשר. היה נוטל תרומה ממה שחייב בפועל בתרומת מעשר.