There is a common element of disappointment with the religious world. It is as if many baali teshuva (newly religious) feel they have been taken advantage of

There is a common element of disappointment with the religious world. It is as if many baali teshuva (newly religious) feel they have been taken advantage of and been led down a sophisticated maze of deceit. This is generally true. That makes it hard to defend Torah when it is obviously used as a  device of deception to gain power and money. I have tried to deal with this issue in two ways. One is  abusus non tolit usum. That is a Latin phrase for "Abuse does not cancel use." {Thank you my Latin teacher in high school.} I also used The Guide for the Perplexed and the idea of Natural law of the Rambam and Saadia Gaon an the Obligations of the Heart to defend Torah. There was some essays I wrote a long time ago, but in essence I simply used the idea that there is objective morality based on Michael Huemer, Kelley Ross, and John Searle, and then the idea that this objective morality is recognizable or known to reason. For that I borrowed from Fichte and the Intuitionists--and also Dr Kelley Ross. (In that, I ignored the differences between knowing and recognizing.) (I probably could have used Hegel also if I was more familiar with his four books.) At that point, I really depend of the Rambam for the idea of the Law given at Sinai which is a step up from natural law. [Reb Nachman is also helpful in this area since he points out the abuses and does not paper over them like most try to do.]



But that is not at all the issue I wanted to deal with today. I went into a tangent but the actual idea I anted to mention is the Rivam [one of the baali Tosphot.] concerning the tithe. We know there is a rule that if the owner of the crop of grain finishes the work of tying up the stalks to sell them that he is not obligated to take the tithe. The obligation is only if he finishes the work with it in mind to use the crops for himself, not to sell. The Rivam hold that if he did indeed sell the grain that that reveals that that in fact was his original intention. We do not say he changed his mind. So it seems to me that when I or others drift away from learning Torah that must reveal something about our original state of mind. You do not say some bad things happened to make us change our mind but rather our original state of commitment was not as strong as we thought it was. We were learning Torah because we could. Everything seemed to be prepared to a make it easy. When the religious world turned out not to be all rosy and pink and fluffy, it was simple to go away.

But the further related point I wanted to bring out is מגלגלים זכות על ידי זכאי merit comes about through meritorious people and חובה על ידי חייב. I forgot the actual subject but in essence the idea is that sometimes one tends towards some sin or is destined for it in some way. But still the way it is brought about is through bad people. If baali teshuva who are basically innocent and intending good,are exposed to the negative side of the religious world then that is from negative people. That means their complaints are justified.--But it is not the whole picture. There is a another side of Torah which is precious and holy.

Generally I think of transcendence in Kantian terms and Schopenhauer. I am not sure what the American idea is. I never really got that straight. [This was not something treated in high school. My vague impression was the American approach  was tending towards empiricism--not rationalism. Most people did not talk about this much, and to the degree people were interested in that they went into Eastern religions. I though I was impressed with Chinese philosophy I did not see much in Eastern religions.--That is their taste for transcendence was with no limit. There was plain materialism one one side, and if that was not enough, then kids had to find the most exotic religion they could. The more weird, the better.]

[Hegel agreed but though the window into the transcendent was through dialectics which seems to be reason but also takes into account spirit.]


I think perhaps you could say that people were confused. The traditional Judaic-Christian  values did not seem to hold any water. Philosophy, whether European or British-American, was simply all about words and their meanings. If words had any meaning at all was thought to be untrue.
But people would not know their own motivations. They would hide the truth even from themselves.

The major thing was to go into "weird-kite" (weird-ism) as much as possible, and to be sure along the way to get ones needs met. If possible to use the weird-kite as a means to get those physical and spiritual needs met. The main religion was "Weird-ism". It did not matter to which major denominations or world religions it was. As long as it was weird, it was OK and even praiseworthy.

There is not enough time to go into the many variations this unquenchable thirst for weirdness takes even today. I'm sure my readers can supply their own examples in abundance. The trouble with all this is it rarely leads in the realm of holiness. In fact, it seems often to lead into the Sitra Achra (the Dark Realm) disguised as holiness. The more holy they claim to be the more you can be sure of just the opposite.
This would be the perfect spot to write down my solution to this problem--if only I had one! But I do have a workable approach based on my parents which is the Ten Commandments. That is the idea that good character leads to true transcendence in the realm of Holiness. [I really do not know how to put this any clearer. It was a very well known idea during the Middle Ages but since then was forgotten.]

T78 B flat major Not edited and I have no way of really telling how this sounds because of no earphones so I am just presenting it as is and hoping it is satisfactory.
I looked at it again and decided too much bass in the beginning and too high for violins in the end so I put there a piccolo. Still I assume it probably needs more editing.

yoke of Torah

I have been contemplating the problem of repentance  on sin which has this problem. You did a sin and then for some reason you became aware because of events in your life that that was a sin. At that point how can you repent? The problem is you are no longer in your initial position with a similar lack of knowledge. Now you know, and before you did not know. And repentance requires you to be in the original position and then not to make the same mistake.

I think this is is applicable to עול תורה (yoke of Torah). I have myself and heard of others that went out for various reasons from a context of sitting and learning Torah. In most cases I know about, the common feeling is that of regret, and thinking that if one had just sat and learned Torah that things would have worked out better. But how does one repent on something like that? The only reason מקבל עול תורה (accepting the yoke of Torah) ever works in the first place is because it is done from a standpoint of ignorance of whether it really works or not. Once one knows, then he is no longer approaching the issue from the same standpoint of innocence. Thus coming back to it does not really work since it is not done with the same purity of spirit.


[The general approach to yoke of Torah is to sit and learn Torah as much as possible, but it does not mean to use the Torah to make money. The basic assumption is actually very simple. It is this: If one sits and learns Torah, his needs will be taken care of with not effort. But if his needs are not in fact taken care of for some unknown reasons, then he should go out and find  job and not use Torah for money. That is the idea in a nutshell. This differs significantly from the religious world in which the primary goal in life is to use the appearance of Torah get secular Jews to give them money.]

{I consider Physics to be included in learning Torah based on the Rambam in Mishne Torah and the Guide where he spells out this idea. In fact, I think the general lack of physics in a normal yeshiva education is  alack that causes many other lacks and problems.]

 Perhaps the question should be just the opposite. Why does the ר''ש say what he says? Maybe the most simple explanation is like רב שך?
 To answer for רב שך you might say here that the ר''ש was forced into his position because of  the משנה תרומה פרק ד is where he intended to separate more and he did not see any difference between this and the case of separating 1/61 instead of 1/60? [In the difference between 1/60 and 1/61 he is intending to separate the right amount right then and there--not a little now and a little later.] But the רמב''ם held there is a simple difference, and so Rav Shach's explanation is the most simple.


אולי השאלה צריכה להיות בדיוק ההפך. מדוע הר''ש אומר מה שהוא אומר? אולי ההסבר הפשוט ביותר הוא כמו רב שך? כדי לענות בשביל רב שך אפשר לומר כאן כי הר''ש נאלץ לתוך עמדתו בגלל משנת תרומה פרק ד' היא מצב שהוא נועד להפריד יותר, והר''ש לא רואה הבדל כלשהו בין זה לבין המקרה של הפרדת אחת מששים ואחת במקום אחת מששים? אבל רמב''ם מעריך שיש הבדל פשוט, ולכן ההסבר שלו הוא פשוט ביותר

The Rambam for all I know might have looked at the Yerushalmi that says that mishna in Trumot ch 4 is when he intends to separate more  and thought then it makes sense why it is not truma or maaser.

The Mishna משנה in Truma (ch 4)

The general way of taking תרומה, the part of the crop that goes to the כהן, is by physically removing that percentage of the crop. The same goes for מעשר the עשירית that is given to the Levi.  This is what I think made the רמב''ם explains the  משנה in מסכת תרומה in a kind of forced way that does not seem to be in accord with its simple explanation. The  משנה in תרומה (ch 4) says simply, המפריש מקצת תו''ם מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום  אחר ר''מ אומר אף מוציא ממנו תרומה על מקום אחר
ר''ת תו''ם היינו תרומות ומעשרות  "When one separates a part of תרומה and מעשר from a stack of grain, one can not take from it ,"it" masculine gender, תרומה and מעשר to another place but only to itself.  ר. מאיר says: Also to another place.
The simple explanation is like the ראב''ד  that since the part he separated is not the full amount percentage, thus the entire stack is still mixed with טבל .  The reason is the general rule held by the sages "אין ברירה".  That means he can not take from this stack of grain one סאה, and then say, "This סאה is מעשר for nine סאה in this other stack." The reason? We can not say that in reverse there is choice to say what he now holds is טבל. This is certainly what the משנה sounds like and it goes well with the fact that ר. מאיר says he can do so because ר. מאיר  holds יש ברירה. But then the obvious question is then the same problem exists for that very same stack of grain. Why can he take a סאה and say "This סאה is מעשר for nine סאה in the stack?" If אין ברירה then אין ברירה. If there is no choice then there is no choice. So the רמב''ם in  תרומה says when one separates a partial amount of תרומה, he has to take תרומה from it, --from the grain he separated.  It does not have the category of תרומה at all. The question then the אחרונים  ask is: then what about the previous law in the רמב''ם תרומה פרק ג:ו  where it says if he separates 1/61 what he has separated is תרומה and he then goes and take the remaining amount that is needed to complete the right percentage? The ר''ש רבינו שמשון  brings the ירושלמי  that  says the משנה in תרונה  פרק רביעי case he intends to separate more. This the ר''ש says means when he does not intend to separate more, the part he has separated is straight טבל and does not have the category of תרומה at all. My question here is this. Is it possible the רמב''ם holds with ר''ש? 
I mean הלכה ז would be when he does not intend to separate any more; and הלכה ו   is when he intended to separate a complete percentage, but missed by a drop?
I saw that רב שך explains the רמב''ם exactly the opposite from the ר'ש and I am wondering why this is necessary?  רב שך says the רמב''ם holds when he does not intend to separate any more it has the full category of תרומה and מעשר; and when he does intend to separate more, it does not because תרומה and מעשר do not work in reverse. Then הלכה ו is simply not a case of working in reverse, but of simply then and there not separating enough at one time.

 Perhaps the question should be just the opposite. Why does the ר''ש say what he says? Maybe the most simple explanation is like רב שך?
 To answer for רב שך you might say here that the ר''ש was forced into his position because of  the משנה תרומה פרק ד is where he intended to separate more, and he did not see any difference between this and the case of separating 1/61 instead of 1/60? But the רמב''ם held there is a simple difference, and so his explanation is the most simple.




הדרך הכללית של לקיחת תרומה, (החלק של היבול שהולך כהן), היא על ידי הסרה פיזית של אחוז מהיבול. כן לגבי מעשר  שניתן ללוי. זה מה שאני חושב גרם לרמב''ם להסביר את המשנה במסכת תרומה בדרך שלא נראית להיות בקנה אחד עם ההסבר הפשוט שלה. המשנה בתרומה אומרת בפשטות,המפריש מקצת תו''ם מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום איר אחר. ר''מ אומר אף מוציא ממנו תרומה על מקום אחר. ר''ת תו''ם היינו תרומות ומעשרות.  (כאשר אחד מפריד חלק התרומה ומעשר מתוך ערימה של תבואה, הוא לא יכול לקחת ממנו תרומה והמעשר למקום אחר אבל רק לעצמו. ר מאיר אומר: גם למקום אחר. ההסבר הפשוט הוא כמו ראב''ד כי מאז החלק שנפרד אינו אחוז מלוא הסכום ולכן הערימה כולה עדיין מעורבב עם טבל. הסיבה לכך היא הכלל שבידי החכמים אין ברירה. כלומר, הוא לא יכול לקחת מהערימה של תבואה  סאה אחת ואז לומר סאה זה מעשר לתשע סאה בערימה אחרת. הסיבה? אנחנו לא יכולים לומר כי בכיוון ההפוך למפרע יש בחירה להגיד מה שהוא מחזיק כעת הוא טבל. זהו בהחלט איך המשנה נשמעת וזה הולך טוב עם העובדה שר. מאיר אומר שהוא יכול לעשות זאת משום שר. מאיר מחזיק יש ברירה. אבל אז השאלה המתבקשת היא אז אותה הבעיה קיימת באותה ערימה של תבואה. למה הוא יכול לקחת סאה ולומר "סאה זו מעשר  לתשע סאה בערימה?" אם אין ברירה, אז אין ברירה. אז רמב''ם בתרומות פרק ג' הלכה ז' אומר כאשר אחד מפריד כמות חלקית של התרומה הוא צריך לקחת תרומה ממנה, מן התבואה שהיא מופרדת. (זו לא  בקטגוריה של תרומה בכלל.) השאלה אז האחרונים לשאול אז מה לגבי החוק הקודם רמב''ם תרומות פרק ג'  ה''ו שבה כתוב אם הוא מפריד 1/61 מה שהוא הפריד הוא תרומה, ואז הוא הולך לקחת את הסכום הנותר כי הוא צריך להשלים את האחוז הנכון. ר''ש (רבינו שמשון) מביא את הירושלמי שאומר משנה בתרומה הפרק הרביעי  היא מקרה שבכוונתו להפריד יותר. ר''ש אומר כשהוא אינו מתכוון להפריד יותר, החלק שהוא הפריד הוא  טבל ואינו משויך לקטגוריה של תרומה בכלל. השאלה שלי כאן היא זו. האם זה אפשרי שרמב''ם מחזיק עם ר"ש? אני מתכוון הלכה ז' תהיה כאשר אין בכוונתו להפריד עוד, והלכה ו' היא כשאר הוא מתכוון להפריד אחוז שלם אבל חיסר מקצת? ראיתי כי רב שך מסביר את רמב''ם בדיוק ההיפך מן ר'ש ואני שואל למה זה הכרחי? רב שך אומר רמב''ם מחזיק כאשר אין בכוונתו להפריד עוד יש לו את הקטגוריה מלאה של תרומה, ומתי שהוא מתכוון להפריד יותר זה לא תרומה ומעשר בגלל שתרומה ומעשר לא חלים למפרע. ואז הלכה ו' הוא פשוט לא מקרה של למפרע אלא שבו במקום הוא לא מפריד מספיק בבת אחת. 

Music for the glory of God.

t78 B flat major

To me Northern and Southern heroes all were great men. I am not against the North, but certainly not against the South. So in my opinion, if the South does not want them,  R. E. Lee statues ought to be placed in Washington DC, preferably next to the Lincoln and the Washington Monument. Both sides were fighting for the preservation of the Constitution as they understood it.

You can ask from a Torah point of view if the war was justified at all? A possible argument could be made from Herodotus and Thucydides about the need to preserve the State.  Cyrus and Darius could walk over just about anyone they wanted to because of the sheer vastness of their state. The Magi or anyone else simply and to give up and join in. The alternative was annihilation.The only thing that could and did stand in the way of the Persian empire was the combined power  of Hellenas, Athens and 300 Spartans. Since  שלום המדינה peace n prosperity of the State is one of the major goals of Torah as the Rambam makes abundantly clear in the Guide, the preservation of the Union does become a valid Torah Principle.

"To be involved in words of Torah" is not the same thing as to say lots of words of Torah.

I think the mitzvah of learning Torah is a time thing, not a verbal thing. The reason I say this is that we already know from the Yerushalmi (One of two Talmuds. That is the Jerusalem Talmud) that learning Torah has no שיעור למטה (no minimum size.)  So it is like making a scratch on one's skin because of sorrow on losing a loved one. That is a prohibition from the Torah. And it also has no minimum size. So if two witnesses tell a person, "Do not make a scratch from sorrow, because if you do, you will transgress the prohibition of שריטה and get 39 lashes,"  and he does so anyway and does it a lot, he still gets only one set of 39 lashes. The reason? Because there is no minimum size.
This is directly opposite to the prohibition of קרחה pulling out one's hair from sorrow and/or not from sorrow. The reason is that the five places of the beard have a minimum size in five different places. (I.e. 40 hairs that have a minimum length of being able to be held between two fingers.) So if warning is given--that is only one warning- and the person goes on to pull out the hair of his beard, then he gets 5 sets of 39 lashes. The reason is קרחה (puling out the beard) has a minimum size.
So clearly since  learning Torah has no minimum size, there is nothing to separate one word of Torah from another except the time factor, not how many words of Torah he says.

Practically speaking-when I was learning with David Bronson, he was usually the learning partner that did the saying of the words, for the simple reason that he was the one that had done the homework--the pre shiur (pre session) preparation. I just sat and listened. But listening is also being involved in words of Torah.

To some great degree I feel vindicated in not learning much as much Torah as  I would like to because of being in any yeshiva I think is not good nowadays since they have all been taken over by the Sitra Achra.. Since I have to do it on my own I figure I have a good excuse for not learning as much as I would be doing in a yeshiva situation. {There are only a few places left that are still learning authentic Torah like Ponovitch an the NY Litvak yeshivas. But the genuine Torah places are so rare you can count them on one hand.}

(1) There are a few concepts I picked up in yeshiva which are valuable and even though I have fallen away from them, they are still important to explain to those that might benefit.
One is the idea of Bitul Torah. [Not learning Torah when you can be learning.]] In other words you might be a working guy. That is great. But if you do not actually need the money then you are in fact not allowed to work because that is time that could be spent learning Torah.

The does not mean one is required to be learning Torah all the time. Rather it means when time is available then one is in fact required to be learning Torah.

You see this in all the obvious places in the Yerushalmi and the Rambam but somehow or other the idea rarely gets across to people--including me.
(The Rambam considers Physics to be in the category of learning the Oral Law as you can see in his discussion of dividing the day into three parts.))




(2) הכרת הטוב gratitude was another concept I was introduced to right away. The most clear expression of this is the Musar book חובות לבבות Obligations of the Hearts. This you also see in Rashi when aaron struck the Nile River and it became blood.  Rashi says there that Moses refused to strike the river because it had once done  a favor for him.

(3) דיני ממונות [laws about money] was obviously learned well at the Mir, but this also translated into deed as well as learning.

(4) Speaking the truth-the absolute truth at all times with utter total disregard for one's own advantage was another concept I picked up. I could tell lots of personal stories how that concept helped me in miraculous ways during the years.

t77 music files

 T-77 D major  {I am assuming this  still needs a good deal of editing.}

t77 midi file

I thought that it might be a good idea to mention the events surrounding R. Yohanan and Ilfa. There is a lot to learn from that event but it seems to me that I was more in the shoes of Ilfa than R. Yohanan.
Nowadays the kind of test that Ilfa faced seems to have morphed . Certainly "parnasa" [livelihood] is a test and always has been, but today there are more kinds of things which draw one away from Torah. Mainly they are along the lines of, "Sure learning Torah is a good thing, but come and do this more important mitzvah that is even greater than learning Torah." Or "Come do this mitzvah so that your Torah will be more real and authentic and even better." There are countless of ways for the evil inclination to seduce one away from Torah. After all all the Satan has to do all day is think up new ways to draw people from Torah and make up deep sounding teachings that seem to imply how other things are better than Torah and then inspire his agents with these deep lessons.

The basic events were as follows. R Yohanan and Ilfa were sitting and learning Torah. דחק להם שעתא. The hour pressed upon them. (That is: they were starving yeshiva students.) They discussed going out for סחורה (to work). They were sitting near a stone wall. R. Yohanan heard two angels discussing whether to topple and push down the wall on top of them. One angel said "Let's push this wall down on them since they are thinking of leaving learning Torah to do business." The other angel answered "No. Let's leave them alone because for one of them עומדת שעתא the hour stands. (i.e. one of them will still continue to sit and learn)." Ilfa went out and became a business man. In the meantime R Yohanan continued to learn Torah and eventually became the Rosh Yeshiva (head of the yeshiva).
When Ilfa returned from one business trip he encountered R Yohanan and tried to show that he was still learning Torah even while doing business. He said, "Show me anything in the Tosephta  and  I will show you were it is hinted at in the Mishna."  Then the Gemara brings that legal discussion.

The implications of these events are vast and few people are willing to heed the lessons. There is not question that what Ilfa did was perfectly justified. Still we see there is some level of appreciation of Torah that R Yohanan must had had. That is sometimes the real test is not whether you are sitting and learning. It is rather, "Do you appreciate the Torah enough? Or are you willing to give it up for a few bucks?"

My own appreciation of Torah was reinforced by a small book בניין עולם  which brings the Gra on the Mishna in Peah who brings the Yerushalmi. A very important aspect of that discussion is the question "What is the minimum amount of a mitzvah or a sin?" This comes up concerning  לא ירבה לו סוס and שריטה and קרחה.(note 1)




There is a lot to go into about this but the basic idea is that the Yerushalmi says even one word of learning Torah is worth more than all the other mitzvot.

But the Mishna not not say that learning Torah has an infinitesimal measure. Rather "No measure." Thus it is like שריטה that one would get one set lashes for lots of שריטות because it has no שיעור. This is different from things that have  a שיעור  like קרחה. Thus for קרחה one gets five sets of lashes even though there was only one התראה issued--because it has a שיעור.
There is much to think about here but in short it is not as if every word of Torah is a separate mitzvah. Rather is one sits an learns for example a whole day in the Mir Yeshiva in NY or Chaim Berlin, then he gets a  big mitzvah. That is the same as if he did lots of שריטות. He gets one big sin. It is not as if he did lots of little sins. So with Torah that has no minimum measure, sitting and learning a whole day is a big mitzvah, not lots of small mitzvot.

I should mention that people that use Torah to make money are generally enemies of those that learn Torah for its own sake. So the fact that people are sitting and learning does not make them friends to Authentic Torah. For all we know they might be doing it for the money and ease of life style and to get out of the IDF  and the prestige. In fact to get out of the IDF was the one main motivating factor is the formation of 99% of all Israel yeshivas.
This is the trouble with the religious system. It is a breeding ground for anti Torah and anti Israel zealots. The fact that people learn Torah all day says nothing about their integrity or true purpose. if fact 99% are in it for the ease and comfort of lifestyle of sitting and chatting all day and getting paid to do so.

With the exception of Ponovitch and its off shoots most yeshivas there have no interest in Torah at all.

No lower measure  also means as it does for peah--that one fulfills it with an infinitesimal amount.that one fulfills the mitzvah by saying one word of Torah.

(note 1) If one does many scratches  שריטות there is one set of lashes. But for קרחה even with just one warning there are five sets. The reason שריטה has no שיעור.

the idea of minimum measure comes up in truma and maaser. if one gives less than 10% it has not the legal category of maaser. the rambam writes the same about truma in laws of truma ch 3 halach 6 and 7. the trouble is halacha 6 where it is truma and it is unclear what the difference is--unless you go to the Yerushalmi. there it is clear the difference is if one intend to take more truma or not. Rav Shach explains the Rambam thus: If his intention is to take more then it does not have the category of truma at all. If not it is truma. That is the opposite of how the Rash [rabainu Shimshon explains the yerushalmi.]

הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א

To understand the רמב''ם it is necessary to make a distinction between איסור הנאה and איסור למזבח.
In that way the רמב''ם is clear. He says in הלכות איסורי מזבח that any object that is נעבד is אסור למזבח. It makes no difference if the object belongs to him or not.  But in terms of אסורי הנאה he says in הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' that most surprising of laws. He says even on one's own animal, if he is עובד  it, it does not become forbidden in הנאה unless he does at least a small  מעשה. Clearly he is saying that if he bowed down to his own animal, the animal does not become forbidden in הנאה  and it is even מותר באכילה. It is possible to miss this point of first reading because of the order the רמב''ם  places the subject. At first he says one does not make forbidden in הנאה  anything that  אין בו תפיסת אדם even an animal unless he does a small act like שוחט סימן אחד. When do we say this. On his own objects. But objects that belong to another, even if he does a complete שחיטה  he does not forbid the animal or whatever object it might be. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו.

What this means is vast. It means that he is looking at the statement of רב הונא as referring to only his own animal and he is deciding the law as  רב הונא. But it also means that he looked at the statement of Rav Amram אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו  and decided the law like that also. He decided both statements are true and do not contradict.
Thus he must have had a different version of the statement of רב הונא.
רב הונא said in חולין page מ' ע''ב when a person bows down to the animal of his friend he does not make it forbidden but if he is שוחט סימן אחר he does make it forbidden. The version of  the רמב''ם  must have said: "When a person bows down to his own animal he does not make it forbidden בהנאה but if he is cuts one סימן he does make it forbidden."

This is as many things in the Rambam very easy to miss. Or perhaps I should say I missed this entire thing until today. To me it seems amazing and phenomenal. In one second the whole approach of the Rambam became clear to me and how he deals with the different gemaras that are part of this sugia. Maybe I should write down the Gemaras as background information, but at any rate, the basic point of what the Rambam holds and how he looks at the Gemara in Hulin is clear.



רמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' כדי להבין את הרמב''ם יש צורך לעשות הבחנה בין איסור הנאה ואיסור למזבח. בדרך זו  הרמב''ם ברור. הוא אומר בה' איסורי מזבח כי חפץ שהוא נעבד הוא אסור למזבח. זה לא משנה אם החפץ שייך לו או לא. אבל במונחים של אסורי הנאה הוא אומר בהלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' גם על בעל חי של עצמו, אם הוא עובד את זה, זה לא גורם לו להיות אסור בהנאה אלא אם כן הוא עושה לפחות מעשה קטן. ברור שהוא מכוון שאם הוא השתחווה לבהמה שלו, הבהמה אינה הופכת להיות אסורה בהנאה וזו אפילו מותרת באכילה. אפשר לפספס את הנקודה הזו בקריאה הראשונה בגלל הסדר שהרמב''ם מציב את הנושא. בהתחלה הוא אומר אחד לא עושה איסור הנאה בדבר שאין בו תפיסת אדם אפילו חיה אלא אם הוא עושה מעשה קטן כמו שוחט סימן אחד. אבל זה באובייקטים שלו. אבל חפצים ששייכים לאחר, גם אם הוא עושה שחיטה גמורה הוא אינו אוסר את החיה (או כל אובייקט אחר). אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו. פירוש הדבר הוא שהוא מסתכל במשפט של רב הונא כמתייחס רק הבהמה שלו, והוא מחליט החוק כפי רב הונא. אבל זה גם אומר שהוא הביט בחוק של רב עמרם אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו והחליט החוק ככה גם. הוא החליט  שהטענות נכונות ואינן סותרות. לכן הוא בטח קיבל גרסה שונה של ההצהרה של רב הונא. בגרסה שלנו רב הונא אמר בחולין דף מ' ע''ב כאשר אדם משתחווה אל חיה של חברו הוא לא עושה את זו אסורה אבל אם הוא שוחט סימן אחד הוא עושה את זו אסורה. הגרסה של רמב''ם בוודאי אמר: "כשאדם משתחווה אל בהמה שלו הוא לא עושה את זה אסורה בהנאה, אבל אם הוא חותך  סימן אחד שהוא עושה את זו אסורה.

Rambam עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א'

To understand the Rambam it is necessary to make a distinction between איסור הנאה and איסור למזבח.
In that way the Rambam is clear. He says in הלכות איסורי מזבח that any object that is נעבד is אסור למזבח. It makes no difference if the object belongs to him or not.  But in terms of אסורי הנאה he says in הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' that most surprising of laws. He says even on one's own animal, if he is עובד  it, it does not become forbidden in הנאה unless he does at least a small  מעשה. Clearly he is saying that if he bowed down to his own animal, the animal does not become forbidden in הנאה  and it is even מותר באכילה. [It is possible to miss this point of first reading because of the order the Rambam places the subject. At first he says one does not make forbidden in הנאה  anything that  אין בו תפיסת אדם even an animal unless he does a small act like שוחט סימן אחד. When do we say this. On his own objects. But objects that belong to another, even if he does a complete שחיטה  he does not forbid the animal or whatever object it might be. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו.

What this means is vast. It means that he is looking at the statement of רב הונא as referring to only his own animal and he is deciding the halacah as  Rav Huna. But it also means that he looked at the statement of Rav Amram אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו  and decided the halacah like that also. He decided both statements are true and do not contradict.
Thus he must have had a different version of the statement of Rav Huna.
Rav Huna said in Hulin page מ' ע''ב when a person bows down to the animal of his friend he does not make it forbidden but if he is שוחט סימן אחר he does make it forbidden. The Rambam's version must have said  when a person bows down to his own animal he does not make it forbidden בהנאה but if he is cuts one סימן he does make it forbidden.

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p129 t74 D major midi t74 mp3

p129 in midi format

Musar [learning the books of Ethics written during the Middle Ages

I noticed that Rav Shach mentioned Musar twice in his introduction to the Avi Ezri. He even goes so far as to bring the idea that without good character and fear of God, all one's Torah learning is negative and poison.

Musar, after it got mixed with kabalah, takes a  different direction than the Musar of the early Middle Ages. For example, the attitude of  the Rambam and his son's and grandchildren's Musar books  have very different attitudes than later books of Musar. A lot of fanaticism gets introduced after  the Middle Ages. [Muar of the Middle Ages held of the approach of Faith with Reason, Reason with Revelation.]
Later books can mix up people.
However this is not to imply anything negative about the Ari (Heaven forbid.)
My feeling about this is that if one feels ready to learn the Ari (Isaac Luria) and has  been through Shas a least a few times, then the best thing is to learn the Ari straight. [The main thing I think is the Tree of Life though my learning partner, David Bronson, thinks that the  מבוא שערים is even more essential.]

[Though I am myself ashkenazic, I can not stress enough to avoid all the ashkenazic sitra achra [dark side] books of mysticism written after the 1600's.] The only commentary on the Ari from the ashkenzic world  is the Gra. So for good commentary on the Ari, the best thing is the Gra, Rav Shalom Sharabi (Yemen) and or Rav Yaakov Abuchazeira.

The truth be told I do not think it is possible to get the "spirit of Torah" outside of a Litvak Musar yeshiva. I have absolutely no respect for synagogues at all. If one is not in the area of a genuine Litvak yeshiva then the best thing is to learn at home. 

Not enough attention is place on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.

Not enough attention is place on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.  It is almost inevitable that one gets involved in learning the Ari that he get caught up in some kind of occult activity. People find supposed proofs in his writings for all kinds of very stupid activities; or sometimes just the opposite. They attack true tzadikim thinking of themselves as having privy information about some deep secrets of the Torah revealed by the Ari.

public school is a waste of time.

My impression of education is basically that public school is a waste of time. It is best to limit oneself to the basic program of the Rambam--the Oral Law, the Written Law , Physics and Metaphysics. Even the Metaphysics thing I would limit it to what the Rambam meant by it--that is the book of Aristotle called Metaphysics. Most of secular education I think is bitul Torah [wasting time which could be spent learning Torah]. [The main thing to learn as far as the Oral and Written law is concerned in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which contains the prime essence of Torah in its pristine glory.]
Not that the religious world is any better. Most of what passes for Torah in the religious world is Torah of the Sitra Achra." [Dark Side Torah](The demons have Torah also. This is what passes for authentic Torah in the religious world.)

In terms of Torah learning my impression is to do in depth learning right away. That is what Reb Shelomo Freifeld did when he made his yeshiva Shar Yashuv. The idea there was to plunge into the depth of the Gemara right away. I was not happy with that at the time but since then I have seen that when people do not learn how to learn right away, they never get it.

[As for Physics I do not have a lot to say except it is best not to make random detours. The best thing is to go to Quantum Field Theory as soon as possible.[What is as soon as possible? That is after doing Quantum Mechanics and Calculus, and Functional Analysis.]
It is true that the Rambam wanted his Mishna Torah to be learned straight but that does not exclude the importance of going into it in depth as Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and Rav Shach did as you can see in the law of learning Torah where 1/3 is for the Oral Law and another third is for in depth learning.

Gitin page 4a

I should mention that I gained a great deal of respect for Tosphot from my learning partner David Bronson. If not for him I might have been satisfied with asking a question on Tosphot and then going on. So in answer to my question on Tosphot Gitin page 4a let me just say that Tosphot is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me 100 shekalim and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
If anyone on the blog' sphere has read my little book on Shas they would have already have seen me go into the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what Tosphot is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you ow me 100 shekalim and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then Tosphot is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that Tosphot is thinking that even to R. Elazar the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But Topshot is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. So now what looked to be an unanswerable question on Tosphot now becomes clear. Tosphot suggest that even R Elazar agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the halachic category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a halachic category that he has to pay.

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So in answer to my question on תוספות  let me just say that תוספות is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
This is like  the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what תוספות is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then תוספות is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that תוספות is thinking that even to ר. אלעזר the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But תוספות is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. What תוספות suggests that even ר. אלעזר agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the דין category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a הלכה category that he has to pay.


 התשובה לשאלה שלי על תוספות. תוספות הוא חושב בכיוונים האלה. נניח שאדם אחד מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר לשני אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים והשני אומר כן! אז מה הדין? הוא חייב לשלם, למרות שאולי מעולם לא היה כל הלוואה בכלל. כלומר יש חלות הדין גם אם לא היה אף פעם חלות קניין. וזה לא אותו דבר כאדם שכותב שטר שבאמצעותו הוא מחייב את עצמו לשלם כסף. זה כמו ההבדל החוקי בשגגות בין טעות במציאות וטעות בדין. אז זה מה תוספות חושב. נניח שאדם מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר "אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים", והשני אומר "לא היו דברים מעולם", ושני עדים באים ואומרים "לווה ופרע", הוא חייב לשלם כי כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע, והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אז נכון שאנחנו מאמינים שיש הלוואה. אבל יש גם חלות דין. כלומר יש עכשיו חוק שהוא חייב לשלם גם אם מעולם לא היה הלוואה. הדין הוא חל. ותוספות  גם חושבים מה זה עושה שטר להיות שטר?  אנו יודעים כבר כי שתוספות חושבים שגם לר' אלעזר החתימה של שני עדים עושה את השטר להיות שטר. אבל תוספות חושבות בנוסף. הוא חושב שיש שני היבטים של שטר. האחת היא כי היא מעידה על מה שכתוב שקרה. אבל יש גם את הדין של שטר. מה שתוספות מרמזים הוא שגם ר' אלעזר מסכים כי עבור שטרי מכר, עדי חתימה כרתי, כי הם נותנים את המסמך דין והקטגוריה של שטר. באותה מדה  הודאת פיו יוצרת קטגוריה בהלכה כי הוא צריך לשלם. זה חלות דין

representative democracy

I first ran into the idea of feedback  in electricity and it seems like a good analogy. [I was learning that as part of the idea of the Rambam of learning Physics.]

The idea of feedback seems to be central to Calvin in his establishment of representative democracy in Geneva and in its outskirts.

[It has been noted before me that representative government did not originate with Athens , nor Rome, nor John Locke but rather Calvin. Athens was not a representative government but rather a democracy.]
The thing which is interesting to me is the complain  of Shmuel the prophet about the sin of setting up a king. You can not say that Shmuel was saying bad kings are bad, but even good kings. After all Shmuel only anointed two kings, Saul and David. And he was saying to Israel that their desire to have a king was a terrible sin in the sight of God. Unless we understand him to be ignorant he must have been referring even to the two kings that he set up.

That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.

I thought today that at least once I ought to jot down a basic idea that I heard from Reb Shelomo Freifeld about learning. And it was also emphasized by his son Motti. That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.  Rav Freifeld might have said this in reference to each chapter of the Gemara but this idea I usually applied to much smaller sections of Gemara. For example  Tosphot and the Maharsha and the Pnei Yehoshua I would in general try to just say over ten times. I had a pencil that I would jot down a small dot for every time I had repeated a Pnei Yehoshua or a Tosphot.
This was usually done as part of the in depth sessions.

It is true I have mentioned on many blogs the idea of learning fast without review which I saw originally in Musar books, but that I never really applied in my yeshiva years--even in terms of fast learning. Even fast learning to me meant to review the Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot a few times and then go on.
It was only later that I started doing Physics, that learning fast made a lot more sense to me in order to get the big picture.

There was almost never a time in yeshiva that my struggle to make progress was looked kindly upon. Both Shar Yahuv and the Mir stressed learning in depth. I once made a siyum [finishing] of Shabat and the basic reaction of even my closest friend [Shelomo Berger ] was "How many times did you review it?"
That is to say learning in depth was embedded in the culture to the degree that fast learning was looked upon as superficial. My own feeling was that the in depth thing is great but I also wanted to get the "big picture." Not the big picture in the way of Reb Chaim or Rav Shach which is to go through Shas through one sugia. Rather I simply wanted  a clear idea of each tractate as a whole.
Years later I have begun to see how right they were. I have noticed that people that do not know how to  get into the essence of a sugia when they are young never get it.

Gitin page 4a

The problem is this. תוספות at first suggests that to ר. אלעזר one needs עדי מסירה for both money and גיטין to make a חלות קניין. Then he suggests maybe not for money since הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. But that rule does not suggest there can be a חלות קניין by means of words, nor does it suggest any kind of קניין for money at all. It only says that we believe there was  a חלות קניין because of his words.



הבעיה היא זו. תוספות בהתחלה מעלה כי לר. אלעזר  צריכים עדי המסירה  לחלות קניין כסף ולגיטין. אחר כך הוא מציע שאולי לא לכסף בגלל שהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אבל הכלל הזה אינו מציע שיכולה להיות חלות קניין באמצעות מילים, ואינו מציע שום סוג של קניין  כסף בכלל. הוא רק אומר שאנחנו מאמינים שהייתה  חלות קניין בגלל דבריו


I believe that תוספות meant to answer this question. That is why he brings up the issue of חב לאחרים.  That is he is saying I know the law of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי  does not mean that הודאת פיו makes a חלות קניין. But it might because, after all, we would not believe  הודאת פיו if it was a case of חב לאחרים.

אני מאמין כי תוספות נועד לענות על שאלה זו. זו הסיבה שהוא מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. כלומר הוא אומר אני מכיר את החוק של הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי אין זה אומר כי הודאת פיו עושה חלות קניין. אבל זה יכול להיות ראיה, שאחרי הכל, לא היינו מאמינים הודאת פיו אם זה היה מקרה של חב לאחרים.

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 תוספות suggests  that  ר. אלעזר should hold that both חלות גיטין and a חלות כסף should happen only by עדי מסירה. He is not thinking of שטרי ראיה but rather שטרי קניין. Then he wants to backtrack, and to say this: to ר. אלעזר all שטרות even to make a חלות are valid with just עדי חתימה. But we would still need עדי מסירה For גיטין because אין דבר שבערווה פחות משיים.
Then he wants to bring a proof from הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. On this I asked that הודאת  פיו  does not accomplish a חלות. Then I suggested that תוספות must be thinking of this objection and thus brings up the subject of חב לאחרים. The basic idea is in גיטין and קידושין one creates an obligation for others, but money might be different.  I do not understand why that is relevant. It is true that one can obligate himself money without any transaction just by a document. But it still has to be a valid document. But a more serious question is that the answer of תוספות  goes against the very same premise that תוספות is trying to prove. תוספות is trying to prove the validity of a שטר can be brought about by עדי חתימה. That means the validity of a document of גיטין קידושין or שטר מכר. But the brings a proof that גיטין וקידושין are different than קנייני כסף

 תוספות מעלה כי יכול להיות שר. אלעזר מחזיק ששני חלות גיטין וכן חלות שטרי מכר צריכות לקרות רק על ידי עדי המסירה. הוא לא חושב על שטרי ראיה אלא שטרי קניין. אז הוא רוצה לחזור בו, ולהגיד את זה:  לר. אלעזר כל שטרות אפילו לעשות חלות תקפות גם על ידי עדי חתימה. אבל אנחנו עדיין צריכים עדי המסירה עבור גיטין וקידושין כי אין דבר שבערווה פחות משניים. ואז הוא רוצה להביא ראיה מן הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי.  שאלתי כי הודאת פיו אינה משיגה חלות. ואז הצעתי שתוספות חושב על זה ובכך מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. הרעיון הבסיסי הוא שגיטין וקידושין  יוצרים מחויבות לאחרים, אבל קניין כסף יכול להיות שונה. אני לא מבין למה זה רלוונטי. זה נכון שאדם יכול לחייב את עצמו בכסף בלי שום עסקה רק על ידי מסמך. אבל זה עדיין צריך להיות מסמך תקף. אבל שאלה רצינית יותר היא כי התשובה של תוספות נוגדת את ההנחה שאותה תוספות מנסה להוכיח. תוספות מנסה להוכיח את תוקפו של שטר יכול להיות על ידי עדי חתימה. כלומר, את תוקפו של מסמך של גיטין קידושין או שטר מכר. אך מביא הוכחה לכך גיטין וקידושין הם שונים מאשר קנייני כסף.

Gitin page 4 a

 תוספות in גיטין page ד' ע''א. He says ר. אלעזר says you need עדי מסירה for both גיטין and also ממון. And then suggests maybe not. Maybe in money issues one might not need עדי מסירה because הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. I do not understand תוספות. When do you say הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי is when the obligation came about through some valid transaction. That is to say. One person comes to court and says,to another, "You owe me מאה שקלים." The נטען says, "לא היו דברים מעולם." Then two witnesses come in and say "לווה ופרע". He is obligated because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע and הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. That is  a case where we say the חיוב came about because of a real loan, not because he says he is obligated. But here תוספות is suggest because of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי he would be obligate even though there are no עדי מסירה because his words alone would obligate him. But that is not in fact the thing that הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי tells us.



 תוספות גיטין דף ד' ע''א. הוא אומר ר. אלעזר אומר צריכים עדי מסירה עבור גיטין וגם לשטרי ממון. ואז הוא שואל אולי לא. אולי בנושאים של כסף אולי לא צריכים עדי מסירה משום הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אני לא מבין את התוספות. כאשר אומרים הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי זה כאשר ההתחייבות באה על דרך עסקה תקפה. אבל הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי זה שאדם אחד בא לבית המשפט ואומר להנטען "אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים". הנטען אומר, "לא היו דברים מעולם". ואז שני עדים באים ואומרים לווה ופרע. הוא מחויב כי כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. זהו מקרה שבו אנחנו אומרים החיוב הושג בזכות הלוואה אמיתית, לא בגלל שהוא אומר שהוא מחויב. אבל כאן תוספות הוא מציע בגלל הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי שהוא יהיה מחוייב למרות שאין עדי מסירה. זה בגלל שדבריו לבד יחייבו אותו. אבל זה לא עצם הדבר שהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי מספר לנו.

A simple way to explain the problem is this. Tosphot at 1st suggests that to R. Elazar one needs עדי מסירה For both money and gitin to make a חלות קניין. Then he suggest maybe not for money since הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. But that rule does not suggest there can be a חלות קניין by means of words, nor does it suggest any kind of קניין for money at all. It only says that we believe there was  a חלות קניין because of his words.

trust in God

When I went to yeshiva in the first place I was not thinking about trust in God for making a living. But I also was not thinking of using Torah for that purpose either (--May God save us). Rather, I was thinking of fitting in, and whatever other people do for making a living while learning Torah, that is what I would do also. It was only later that I discovered this idea of accepting the yoke of Torah. That is;- when one accepts the yoke of Torah, then all other distractions are removed from him. And that worked well along with trust in God. At some point I left that idea, and had it in mind that I would work for a living. And then everyone that was using Torah for money was asking my wife, "Why is he not working?" and encouraged her to get a divorce. So I no longer see people using Torah to make money [the cult the Gra put into excommunication "cherem"] as friends. [They seem more like enemies.] But I also see that my own leaving the strict path of "Just Torah and Trust in God" also led to disaster.

What it seems like to me today is this. That this path works. One that accepts the yoke of Torah, all other distractions are, in fact, removed. But it only works once. One can not leave it, see bad results, and then return.


In a practical sense I think leaving the strict Litvak path was a disaster for our family. So in spite of the fact that phonies and frauds use the appearance of Torah to make money by collecting charity for their supposed :"learning Torah" -still the value of the real thing remains.
What this means is that the fact that the Gra put that cult into excommunication  means that that cult are enemies of the Jewish Family and of the Torah. Appearances to th contrary I have found the Gra to be 100% correct. They have fine sounding words, but Acta Non Verba (actions, not words.)
I would be amiss if i did not mention that Reb Nachman I think as not included in the Cherem and in fact I think it is a great thing to be in Uman on Rosh Hashanah--even if he never mentioned the burial site as a place to be for Rosh Hashanah as he did for the Tikun Haklali.

The main problem as far as I can see is that there is an essential and fundamental flaw in the Jewish religious world that is somewhat ignored. The leaders and teachers look human but are actually demons as Reb Nachman pointed out long ago. This mainly applies to the cult the Gra put into Cherem but the problem has spread.

what constitutes a valid divorce.

There is a lot of stuff going on in Gitin about what constitutes a valid divorce.

The interesting thing is that apparently the Rif and Rambam both said that R. Elazar who said עדי מסירה כרתי [the witnesses that see the giving of the document cause the divorce to be real] really meant אף עדי מסירה כרתי [also the witnesses that see the giving of the document cause the divorce to be real]] which is a surprise to me. [R. Meir said the witnesses on the document cause it to be real and valid. So the argument is only in that R Meir disagrees with R Elazar. But R Elazar agrees with R Meir.]


[Not that I ever learned that tractate very well anyway.] In any case, I saw Rav Shach brings up the larger subject of what constitutes any valid שטר (document). And he says that a valid document to be valid at all needs witnesses. But כתב ידו [one's own handwriting] also counts as a valid document.

That is he says that famous Rambam about  a document that says שדי קנוי לך ("My field is acquired to you") is valid even with no witnesses- is talking about כתב ידו (handwritten).
This is what leads to the famous practice in Litvak yeshivas that when someone asks for a loan, they write a small note, "I owe you $10." (for example). [That practice is based on two principles. (1) One should not make or receive a loan without a document or witnesses. (2) The other is כתב ידו (a handwritten document has the category of a valid document) is מחייב (obligates).]

[I have not spent much time on this. I went to the doctor and he said I have a damaged kidney, so my health has not been what would be considered optimal. That was exactly at the time another terrible problem in my life was solved.]

The main issue I am hoping  to get to is תוספות in גיטין page ד' ע''א. He says ר. אלעזר says you need עדי מסירה for both גיטין and also ממון. And then suggests maybe not. Maybe in money issues one might not need עדי מסירה because הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. I do not understand תוספות. When do you say הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי is when the obligation came about through some valid transaction. That is to say. One person comes to court and says you owe me מאה שקלים. The נטען says לא היו דברים מעולם. Then two witnesses come in and say לווה ופרע. He is obligated because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע andהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. That is  a case where we say the חיוב came about because of a real loan, not because he says he is obligated. But here תוספות is suggest because of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי he would be obligate even though there are no עדי מסירה because his words alone would obligate him. But that is not in fact the thing that הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי tells us.

Keeping one theology simple and in accord with Reason.

Keeping one theology simple and in accord with Reason.

I recall Steven Dutch having some great essays about this subject. One point of his that I vaguely recall is  the simplest theology wins.But I would have to look up his essays again to remind myself. In any case, I think one other point of his is that it helps to have reason on your side.

Thus it seems Christians throwing out Aquinas was not the smartest move. [I only say this because at least I did a drop of work on Aquinas. I just never got to St. Augustine--though I am aware that some of St. Augustine's good ideas were accepted into the Jewish world. Like time and space being creations.] [Even Aquinas I had a very limited ability to spend time on.] Dr. Ross also has some interesting thoughts on the subject.]. In any case it is a good idea to keep things simple and limit one's claims in areas he knows nothing about as Kant said.


Hegel was clearly trying to do what Aquinas had tried before him.

In any case the combination of Reason with Faith was a hard thing to get to as you can see from Hippolytus . It is a very specific approach of the Middle Ages. And for  Protestants to throw out that approach I think was a terrible mistake.


The basic approach of Reason with Faith you can see in Philo how it can result in something far from Torah. It was really the Rambam and Saadia Gaon that made a reasonable combination.

[I might mention that the Ari and Reb Nachman both go a long way in making the bridge between human reason and Torah.] That is in at least making it as understandable to human reason as possible.

I would have trouble explaining my own position because as the basic structure I go with the Rambam. But the Rambam himself is a neo Platonic thinker which means that one can fill up missing gaps in his structure with insights from the Ari and Reb Nachman

Reb Israel Salanter was absolutely right about the Musar Movement.

My basic idea of what Torah is about is to things: Good character and devakut [attachment with God.]. Thus anything which leaves to either of these results, I consider good. [Attachment with God is one of the 613 commandments.]

The trouble with the devakut thing is the tendency is for self deception. People that are part of a religious tradition believe they are good because they are part of that tradition. Not because they actually are good or decent people at all. And the more spiritual it is the more there is a tendency to let in a surge of immorality,. People begin to believe they are Divine. A small part of large creek in an ocean of divinity. Especially their leaders they think of as divine. Worship of their leaders is not uncommon. The "great leader" thinks his unrelated wishes are Divine Revelations. They have no law but their own will and twist the holy Torah any way they please in their pretense to be knowledgeable. There is no stopping their grossest desires. The thin film that divides religious fervor from passion and delusion is dissolved and  erased.

As for good character I think Reb Israel Salanter was absolutely right about the Musar Movement.[That is to learn Medieval Ethics.] In fact, it was in my learning Musar that I began to realize how much the Torah requires good character. Still, Musar was subject to debate and many people thought it was a distraction from Torah learning. I am not sure. Rav Shach credits Reb Israel Salanter a lot but I am not sure if that means the approach of combining Musar with yeshivas or if it is general agreement with Rav Salanter. I just can not tell..

Spartans

What was it about those Spartans? A king of Sparta (Demaratus) that had been thrown out of Sparta (and bore no love for Sparta anymore. He was stateless and was welcomed by Darius.) told Xerxes -1.7 million men against 300 Spartans is not an even contest. There simply was no way Xerxes could win. [The number 1.7 was obtained by crowding 10,000 men into a walled space. Doing this many times in succession resulted in the number 1.7 million. That is the number given by Herodotus. Recent historians put the numbers much less from one million to 600,000]

 Demaratus told Xerxes, the most important thing to the Spartans was to obey the law. And they only had one law. Never Retreat.

I think there was something about Sparta that had a lot to do with training. In the Armada of Xerxus there were plenty of Ionians and other people of the exact same ethnic group as the Spartans. (Dorians were in the Armada of Xerxes.) So it was not DNA. It must have been training and mental attitude.


Xerxes is more well known in the Jewish world as Akashverosh. The reason this is not known is that Xerxes in the way Herodotus  was translated into Latin. But the actual pronunciation sounds exactly like Akashverosh in Hebrew. He was the son of Darius. Mordechai does not seem to be in the picture when Xerxes was considering to invade Europe or not. [Neither Haman nor Mordechai appear as advisers.]

I might mention that that expedition came as the result of a few very forceful dreams warning Xerxes what would happen to him if he did not undertake that war. He then placed his adviser Artabanus on his throne and he got the same warning.  [A warning to people that listen to insistent dreams.] [Artabanus was the same person that killed Xerxes later.]

I was never convinced by the "Black is beautiful" slogan.

I was never convinced by the "Black is beautiful" slogan. I thought black is in fact kind of ugly. But I also did not identify any kind of agenda behind the slogan. Only time has shown that it was not as innocent as it sounded.

As it turns out there is a great deal of hidden animosity towards white people. This even exists in the Jewish world as I sadlly began to notice when Sefardim seem intent on finding some fault with Ashkenazim and then pounce on it as soon as they imagine they have got it. The trouble is it is not all Sefardim. There does not seem to be any way of telling. It would be easy to deal with if it was uniform. But it is not. 

music file T71

t71 in midi   

רמב''ם ב הלכות אישות כ''ג: ג.

An idea of רב שך  concerning the רמב''ם in הלכות אישות כ''ג:ג. The רמב''ם says when the husband מתנה שאין לו זכות in the פירות of her נכסי מלוג, then land is bought with them and he eats the fruit of the fruit. The question of the רא''ש is that that does not fit with the גמרא כתובות פ''ג ע''ב. at all.
 גמרא כתובות פ''ג ע''ב. A question was raised. A husband removes himself from any right to the fruit of the fruit. Has he remove himself from the everything--that is also the fruit, or not? It must be he removes himself from everything because if he did not remove himself from the fruit and he eats it then from where comes the fruit of the fruit? But then according to that reasoning what about the משנה that says  ר. יהודה says he always eats the fruit of the fruit.  When he removes himself from the fruit he still eats the fruit of the fruit. How can that be? So it must means some of the fruit was left over. So in our case some of the fruit remained unused. From this גמרא the רא''ש asks on the רמב''ם הלכות אישות כ''ג: ג. The גמרא is clear that she has let over from the fruits, and if that happens, then land is bought with it and the husband eats the fruits of the land. That is פירי פירי. It can not mean that the husband left over from it, because he has no right to it in the first place after he סילק את זכותו  from them.  That means she might leave over from the fruits. If so then we sell them and buy land and he eats the fruits of the fruits. But it does not seem to mean she must sell the fruits. רב שך shows how there existed another version of the גמרא. The original version was this: They asked if he removes himself from the fruit of the fruit does he eat the fruit?  The answer must be yes. If that was not the case then  from where would the fruits of the fruits come from? Answer. he left some of the fruits.
I want to show how important it is that the גמרא means the husband leaves over from the fruit. For if that is the right גירסה, then the רמב''ם comes out perfectly, because the husband anyway has made a condition that he has no זכות in  the fruit. So the only thing it could mean is the he lacks some זכות in the fruit. Frankly I can not see how any other version of that גמרא could possibly make any sense. Just think about it in the version we have with רש''י. The גמרא is bothered by the question: from where the the fruit of the fruit would come from if there is no fruit, היינו he eats the fruit? That means it should be perfectly happy with the opposite scenario of his eating the fruit of the fruit, but not the fruit. But then that is the exact thing the גמרא asks on! The beginning of the גמרא does not and can not fit with the end. The only reasonable version is that that רב שך מציע. And if that is the case then we are left with the original question; what could it mean he leaves over from the fruit if he anyway removed himself from it? So to make sense of  this the רמב''ם had to say the the husband lacks ownership in the fruit. He can eat it but he does not own it.




רמב''ם ב הלכות אישות כ''ג: ג. רמב''ם אומר כאשר הבעל מתנה שאין לו זכות  בפירות של נכסי מלוג שלה, אז קרקע נרכשת איתם והוא אוכל את הפרי של הפירות. שאלת הרא''ש היא שזה אינו מתאים עם גמרא כתובות פ''ג ע''ב. עלתה שאלה. בעל מסיר מעצמו כל זכות הפרי של הפרי. האם הוא הסיר את עצמו מן הכל - (גם פרי), או לא? זה חייב להיות הוא מסיר את עצמו מכל מה שכן אם הוא אינו מסיר את עצמו מן הפרות והוא אוכל אותם, אז מאיפה מגיע הפרי של הפרות? אבל אז בהתאם לזה מה לגבי המשנה שאומרת ר. יהודה אומר שהוא תמיד יאכל את הפרי של הפרות. היינו כשהוא מסיר את עצמו מן הפרי הוא עדיין יאכל את הפרי של הפרות. איך זה יכול להיות? ולכן הוא חייב להיות שהפירוש שחלק הפרי נשאר. אז במקרה שלנו גם כן כמה פירות נותרו ללא שימוש. מכאן הרא''ש שואל על רמב''ם הלכות אישות כ''ג: ג. הגמרא ברורה כי אם היא מותירה מהפרות,  אז קרקע נרכשת עם זה ובעל אוכל פרותיהם. כלומר פירי פירי. זה לא יכול להיות שהבעל השאיר, משום שאין לו שום זכות עליה מלכתחילה לאחר שהוא סילק את זכותו מהם. כלומר, היא השאירה  מהפרות. אם כך שזה קרה אז אנחנו מוכרים אותם וקונים קרקע והוא אוכל פירותיהם של פירות. אבל זה לא נראה שהיא חייבת למכור את הפירות. רב שך מראה כיצד התקיים גרסה אחרת של הגמרא. הגרסה המקורית הייתה זו: הם שאלו אם הוא מסיר את עצמו מן הפרי של פירות האם הוא יכול לאכול את הפירות? התשובה חייבת להיות כן. אם זה לא היה המצב, אז מאיפה  הפרות של הפרות באים? תשובה. הוא השאיר כמה פרות. אני רוצה להראות כמה זה חשוב כי הגמרא אומרת הבעל משאיר מפרי משום שהבעל ממילא עשה מצב שאין לו זכות בפרי. אז הדבר היחיד שהוא יכול להיות הוא, הוא חסר קצת זכות בפרי. למען האמת אני לא רואה איך כל גרסה אחרת של אותה הגמרא יכולה לעשות נכונה. רק תחשוב על זה בגרסה שלנו עם לפי רש''י. לגמרא  הטרידה  השאלה: מהיכן הפרות של הפרי יבואו אם אין פרי, היינו הוא שאכל את הפרות? כלומר, זה צריך להיותשהגמרא תהיה שבע רצון לחלוטין עם התרחיש ההפוך שהוא רשאי באכילת הפרי של פירות, אך לא את הפירות. אבל  זה הדבר המדויק שהגמרא שואלת! תחילת הגמרא לא יכולה להתאים עם הסוף. הגרסה הסבירה היחידה היא שרב שך מציע. ואם זה המקרה, אז נותרנו עם השאלה המקורית; מה זה יכול להיות שהוא משאיר מעל מפרי אם הוא ממילא הסיר את עצמו ממנו? אז כדי להבין את זה הרמב''ם מחזיק הבעל חסר בעלות בפרי. הוא יכול לאכול את זה אבל הוא אינו הבעלים זה. היינו הוא אוכל את הפירות? הוא יכול לאכול את זה אבל הוא אינו הבעלים זה.

The major thing I added here was to show how only the Rambam's way can get the Gemara to make sense.
It's things like this that gives me a great deal of confidence in the Rambam about other things.

religious teachers

I do  not recommend religious teachers even when they claim to be teaching Torah. The main reason is experience and also from what I have heard from many other people in Israel.  Even in the religious world it is well known that most supposed teachers of Torah are false prophets. They tend to destroy Jewish families rather than build them. They are a kind of test that one who really wants to come to Torah has to go through.

Reb Nachman in fact dealt with this problem in his magnum opus but it is generally ignored.
In any case the fact that people give themselves a title does not mean that the rest of the Jewish people think anything good about them. On the contrary--they already have a bad reputation for ruining families and causing divorce, and their reputation gets worse by the day. Their actions speak louder than their words.

The problem however is a little different than the way Reb Nachman puts it. Or perhaps better said--Reb Nachman was right about the particulars, but I believe he missed the global issue. That is to say he was right to identify most teachers of Torah as agents from the Dark Side. But the larger issue is why do people get attracted to them? This has to do with anti-nomianism. Anti Law. Secular society mainly  says do what you like. but the spirit of man wants to soar above this world. So the Dark Side laws a trap such. So people that parade themselves as something higher and able to bring one higher in fact bring people into the very dungeons of the Dark Side itself.

[Solution is mainly to learn Torah on your own at home. There is also the fact that the NY Litvak Yeshivas tend to be about straight Torah. So given the possibility of learning in an authentic Lithuanian kind of yeshiva this warning would not apply. In fact if possible it is highly recommended to attend a decent Litvak yeshiva. I would have to say Ponovitch in Bnei Brak. 

Trust in God

Trust in God has a drawback that when one does not get what he trusts in God for, then questions arise. Thus I have tried to limit the actual amount of trust in God. This might be a mistake but it seems to be the only option once things stopped going my way.

I am not saying trust in God doesn't work. It works and it works and it works. It makes not difference one's doctrines or degree of righteousness. That is not the issue. The issue is one can fool himself to believe he is trusting in God, when in fact trusting in the system.--And why not since anyway everything is going his way. But in the religious world what passes for trust is often self deception.

Faith in God

Faith in God I think has little to do with doctrines. But it is not completely unrelated to doctrines either. Mainly, doctrines help to direct one's faith towards God. That is so that one should not (by accident) be putting one's faith in some aspect of the Dark Side.


Thus this idea of faith in more like personal trust in God more than faith in any set of doctrines.

[I must have mentioned this a long time ago. But basically the idea  of faith in God from a Torah standpoint is to learn the Oral and Written Law and to believe in God to take care of one's needs with a minimum of effort. But it does not mean to make Torah into a charity box. That issue of using Torah for money has been disguised as trusting in God for too long. People say they are trusting in God when in fact they are using Torah as a means to make money. Not everyone of course. My impression of the great Litvak yeshivas of NY and Bnei Brak is that in fact they are quite sincere in their trust in God and only accept charity from the State of NY or the State of Israel in order to learn Torah. That seems to me to be perfectly fine.]



I also suggest to learn with faith. That is in learning the four major subjects that the Rambam emphasized: The Oral Law, the Written Law, Physics and Metaphysics-to not think if you understand or not. Rather to say the words and go on, and believe that God will eventually grant to you to understand.

To come to Torah, I think, to a large degree depends on learning in a Litvak yeshiva for a kind of esoteric reasoning. After the Gra came into the world, it seems to me that it is impossible to come to Torah except through the path that is based on his approach. Every other approach always seemed to me to be people using Torah to make money (the Torah for Money approach ) and pretending to be interested in what the Torah says. In spite of the numerical quantity of people supposedly learning Torah, it is all make believe learning. Not authentic Torah. So in essence one does need to be in either an authentic NY Litvak yeshiva or Ponovitch or some off shoot of Ponovitch.   [If that is not possible, then the best idea is simply to get the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and plow through it.]  

A wife can have a few kinds of property.

 A wife can have a few kinds of property. One is נכסי מלוג -property she brings into the marriage that is written into the ketuba that she takes out of the marriage. The other is נכסי צאן ברזל stuff not written in the ketuba. The husband אוכל פירות eats fruit.
This is important to know because it is often confused with the issue of מעשה ידיה [work of her hands] which is actually owned by the husband.  In other words- there is a big difference between property she brings into the marriage,- and a salary she gets for working or profits she makes in business. There is another issue of a present given to her on condition the husband can not use it.
One can go through the entire tractate of Ketubot and still not have these issue clear. The reason is this. There is an essential argument between the Rambam and the Rif about what it means for the husband to "eat fruit." And that issue comes up only in one very obscure place: a thief steals a calf of an animal of נכסי מלוג.

Rav Shach brings up the very important point that the Rambam says the thief pays the wife the כפל (double).  The reason is that the fact that the husband eats the fruit does not mean he owns the fruit.

The reason I bring this up is that it comes up in Bava Metzia chapter 8 השואל. There the issue is what is the category of a husband with the property of his wife - a borrower or a guard? 
My question is to what kind of property does that Gemara refer to?

[The Rif also holds the thief pays the double כפל of the ולד calf  to the wife, but if he stole the actual cow itself of מלוג he pays the double to the husband. That is he thinks of the double as fruit of the cow The Rambam on the other hand seems clear that either cow of the calf-in any case the thief pays the double to the wife. Rav Shach's point is simple. Whether you go by the Rambam or the Rif it does not matter because it is an open Gemara that the thief pays back the double for the calf to the wife. כתובות עט: הגונב וולד בהמת מלוג משלם תשלומי כפל לאשה משום דפירי פירי לא תקנום חכמים
But if the calf which is פירי fruit is owned by the husband then why would the thief pay the wife? So no matter how you look at it from the Rambam or the Rif, the husband only eats the fruits but does not own the fruits of נכסי מלוג or נכסי צאן ברזל. The reason I probably missed this point completely when I was doing Ketubot perhaps is the fact that Tosphot seems to be pretty clear on page 47 that the husband actually owns the fruit. See Ketuboth 83 and 79B for the related sugiot. 
]
[If anyone actually owns a copy of Bava Metzia they might look up the Rosh over there because I recall in the commentary on the Rosh in the regular Vilna Shas there is a long note about the issue of the husband's status in  as a borrower or  a guard. Also there s a Tosphot there that I never had time or opportunity to go into in depth.  ]


As I think about this  few hours later, I still wonder. After all the husband takes the fruit from the buyer of the field if his wife sold it. That is also to the Rambam. This is not a question so much as a point to consider. Also in terms of the Tosphot on page 47 of Ketubot, he does not actual say the husband owns the fruit but rather that it is like הקונה דקל לפירותיו. That does seem that he owns the fruit. But I am not sure. I still need to think about this.
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Besides the issues that I am wondering about in Bava Metzia I want to mention how the Rambam learn the Gemara in Ketubot which forms the main issue here. The actual gemara in chapter הכותב  on page 83 says If a husband writes to his wife I have no fruit of the fruit does he get the fruit? The gemara answers it is obvious he has removed himself from the fruit also because otherwise if he still can eat the fruit then from where would the fruit of the fruit come from?The way our Gemara continues is this Then according to you what about this statement of R. Yehuda.... Rather it must men she left over property. Rashi indicates that version. But you can see fro Rashi there existed another version in which the gemara answer the husband left over.  That is he could eat the fruit but did not and instead bought property with it and from the fruit of that property he removed himself.

"What is it with me? I taught Torah for free. So must you teach Torah for free". מה אני בחינם אף אתם בחינם

Teaching Torah for pay.

There are several issues here. One is teaching Torah. The Mordechai brings this (That Hashem said: "What is it with me? I taught Torah for free. So must you teach Torah for free." מה אני בחינם אף אתם בחינם) in reference to the problem of paying for "melamdim." [teachers of Torah.] 
 [The Mordechai was a friend of the Rosh and both learned from Rabbainu Gershom.]

The other issue which I brought up here  a few times is learning Torah for pay. That issue is much more well known as being a debate between the Rambam and the Keseph Mishna.

I have tried  in the past to explain that the basic difference between the Rambam and the Tashbatz [which is the source of the Beit Yoseph] refers to the question: Is it allowed to accept charity for learning Torah?, not if one can use it as a means to make money. It is thus not considered "working."  

Normally speaking I would try to justify the practice of learning and teaching Torah for money-- except for a great deal of really bad experiences I had with people doing just that. [At least they looked like people. I am not so sure anymore.]  I mean to say,- I would (like the Beit Yoseph) try to find excuses. But today, I am less likely to justify the practice because of the types that ruin the whole thing by making a business of it.

In terms, of the Rambam at the end of laws of Shemita, he says, "For one who accepts the yoke of Torah, there is removed from him the yoke of working." But that does not say he can use Torah as a shovel to dig with--to make money.
Nor is שכר בטלה  (being paid for time one takes away from his regular job) a legitimate excuse. The reason is שכר בטלה is defined in the Gemara as שכר הניכר recognizable wages. That is one has a regular job, and then takes time from it to judge a case. It does not refer to being able in theory to have  a job.  

The legitimate way of learning Torah after marriage is in general where the wife agrees to work in order to support her husband's learning Torah. Or the father in law. This seems to me to be the only real way that learning after marriage is permitted and practical.

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The basic issues in Pirkei Avot are in chapter one and two. דאשתמש בתגא חלף ("One who uses the crown, passes away.") from Hillel. Then in chapter two כל תורה שאין עמה מלאכה סופה בטלה וגוררת עוון וסופו יורש גהינם. ("All Torah that does not have work with it is in the end worthless and brings sin and the end of it is the person that does so goes to Hell.") That is brought as a explanation of טוב תורה עם דרך ארץ ("Torah is good with a job"). 
But the actual commentary of the Rambam on Pirkei Avot that explains that early mishna is later on in chapter four.There the Rambam goes into an unusual amount of detail about yeshivas and roshei yeshiva that say it is  a mitzvah to give them money. He could hardly have been more clear nor more insulting if he had tried. 


In any case, the Beit Yoseph does justify the practice of supporting yeshivas. He does base it on the Tashbatz, but he goes even further. 

So after all that what could I add? Only that it is good to learn Torah, and the best thing is not to use it for money, but to trust in God to send to you your needs.

yoke of Torah

My basic impression of where things went wrong in my life is: "There is removed from  anyone who accepts the yoke of Torah the yoke of the state and the yoke of work. When one removes from himself the yoke of Torah there is placed on him the yoke of the state and the yoke of work." [Pirkei Avot.]
But this is at most a vague impression. It is not as crystal clear as perhaps it ought to be.
This was also suggested by my learning partner and it does make some sense.--But in a complicated way.

I tried to suggest on this blog before without in specific reference to myself what I think makes the issue cloudy. [I have no idea who reads this blog so the people reading it now might not have seen this. In any case, I suggested that once one has removed the yoke of Torah from oneself then trying to get back to it not only does not work but even backfires and makes things even worse that they already are.]

Mainly to make it short-even though getting to Israel was a big and important step and learning the books of Reb Nachman also is  a great thing, still within that context I am afraid that my spending most of my doing other stuff rather than learning Torah I think could legitimately be called פורק עול תורה. [Not that this is what Reb Nachman intended, but it certainly is the inevitable effect of getting involved with that group. Also I want to mention that Reb Nachman's idea of spending time taking with God in one's own language as a friend is great idea but the tendency is to then start getting off track from one thing into another into another etc and etc. An then even trying to get back into Torah just creates קושיות questions that do not have any answer. For example one might see that other people supposedly learning Torah are far from human perfection.

In any case, I was thinking to mention at the beginning of this day that in any case my idea today of accepting the yoke of Torah would  be as it usually is understood--Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot, but I would have to add Physics and Metaphysics based on the Rambam. This has a great deal of support from Reb Nachman himself I should mention in his idea of the Ten Commandments  being hidden ten statements by which the world was made.
The thing to be aware of if you are interested in this idea of accepting "the yoke of Torah" is the fact of the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication. That means in essence that though many places pretend to learn Torah--and that is  a snare and a trap- the only valid place where one can learn Torah that is authentic is a Litvak yeshiva. Everything else is not just fraud but also dens of the Sitra Achra which affect people's character traits and also there seems to be some kind of spiritual toxo plasmosis parasites.