That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public, and there is no further prohibition to repeat it.

There is a famous law about באפי תלתא "in front of three." That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public,  and there is no further prohibition to repeat it. The question on this is simple. Who is asking?  One of the three. He is asking "Can I repeat it, since it was said in front of three?"  Then just tell him, "No," and then there will no longer be three people making it known.

A similar situation arises in Gitin also in הלכות מכירה.

הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תנשאי לפלוני "This is your divorce, if you do not get married to Smith." If she gets married to Smith, there is no divorce-- and so she can't get married to Smith. That is--the marriage is not valid. So only if it is a valid divorce, can it be invalid.

Secular readers already know this as the "Liar's Paradox." It comes up in mathematics. The set of all sets. The Liar' Paradox was answered well by Dr. Kelley Ross based on the Kantian idea of the ground of validity.  The math thing I forget.

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On a side note: In my mind the best Halacha book is the Tur with the Beit Joseph (טור בית יוסף). Also the Hayee Adam (חיי אדם) by a disciple of the Gra. The Aruch Hashulchan (ערוך השלחן) is  a great halacah book also.
In the long run the only real halacha book is the Gemara itself because, that is in the final analysis the only thing that determines halacha. This is obvious to anyone who has ever learned even one word of the Shach, Taz, or Beit Joseph.The approach of all baali halacha is to find out what the Gemara holds. As Reb Chaim from Voloshin puts it "אין לנו אלא דינא דגמרא" ''We only are concerned about the Law of the Gemara.'' Nothing else matters. {That was in a letter he wrote about why he disagreed with some decision of some famous person. He said as I mentioned, that it does not matter how great or smart someone is. All that matters is what the Gemara says.  And he also said over what the Gra said "לא לישא פנים בהלכה" ''not recognize faces in halacah.'' That is a phrase used for a judge to decide a case on its own merits, not on who is being represented.}
[But of course, it matters what Rishonim thought. Obviously they were better at Gemara than we are. But we respect what they say  only because we believe they understood the Gemara better than we do.- which is perfectly true.]
The Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo is a short version of his Beit Yoseph and I think the Tur Beit Yoseph is better. Still there is one way to do the Shulchan Aruch itself which makes a lot of sense that is to do it with the Beer Heteiv and Shaari Teshuva. I did not learn the whole Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yoseph Karo in that way, but I did do a lot of Choshen Mishpat in that way --with the Beer Heteiv and Pischei Teshuva right on the page and  I found that a really great way of doing it.--Short and sweet and to the point.

For the Glory of God, a new song.

T29 A Minor [T29 in midi] A28  [A28 in midi format]

The Sitra Achra, the Dark Side

The problem with the Sitra Achra is the more you try to avoid it the more it runs after you.

Some people think there is not such concept as demons in the Torah even though they are quite well documented in the Ari and Zohar and the Talmud itself.
The trouble is people in  the religious world tend to think they are immune by the very fact of their being religious.

The dark side, evil, teachers of Torah are in fact devils in disguise. This is a serious problem in the religious world much more than in the secular world.

The reason is to a large degree is that there is a close connection between good character and holiness. Since the Jewish secular world, with all its flaws, tends to stress good character above all, therefore they tend to be more protected from the Dark Side than the religious who stress rituals at the expense of human decency.

[I am no expert on this subject and in fact I have no idea how to avoid the Dark Side at all. All I can say is all the supposed solutions seems to be in fact traps.]

Teshuva repentance in a practical sense seems impossible. For when one  tries to undo something he has done wrong the general result is to make things worse-as we see in the Torah by the people that tried to go to Israel after the events of the spies when it was decreed the generation of the desert should not enter the Land of Israel.

[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement

I do not have an essay about this in mind. But just for my own sake I wanted to jot down some quicke ideas about how Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement [{Learning the Ethics  of the Medieval Sages}, ]come to answer a problem that most people have not heard of but still is very much a part of the modern world. Enlightenment versus Counter Enlightenment.
If I would have energy to expand on this I would try to show briefly the two streams of enlightenment thought. It all started with Hobbes, but Enlightenment thought branched out into John Locke versus Rousseau. [And Kant and Hegel tried to bridge the gap between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment.] But Counter Enlightenment also branched out into two streams, the secular counter enlightenment (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pagan) and religious counter enlightenment Meistre, Hamann. Pentecostal.
My basic approach is to say that the Musar (Litvak) yeshiva movement which more or less was based on the Rambam and Saadia Gaon's approaches combine the best of both approaches.[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]

It would be hard to go into this in detail, but the basic idea is that in learning Musar one internalizes the ethics of the Law of Moses, that is the Oral and Written Law. 

Rambam הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הלכה ד'

You buy 50 crates of wine from Joe. [and you did משיכה and or הגבהה-you lifted  them if that was possible and if not then you pulled them.]  You owe him 50 dollars. Then you are taking with him and he finds out you have 50 sheep you want to sell.  The surprising thing is he can tell you I absolve you of your debt if you sell to me the 50 sheep, and if you agree then he acquires the sheep without doing any action.

So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.


In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind,  And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.

Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.

(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])


The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.

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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים  from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה.  הלוקח lifted  them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them.  The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell.  נמוכר  can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין

So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.



The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.

רב שך  says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.


I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.

 I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at. 
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.


The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as  guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.

It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a  משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from  loan, not a different kind of משכון

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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין  מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה.  (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין  שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק.  עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה  מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas





I hope  the above is clear. We can  see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters

Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are  monsters שדין יהודאיים, the so called teachers of Torah,  scourges sent by the Lord to punish a nation that had departed from the true faith,  drunk with lunacy and insanity.  They are best described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs. [Reb Nachman was a great tzadik, but he was not infallible, and he definitely opened to door to the kind of tzadik worship that is pure idolatry that infects his supposed followers. His emphasis of Shmirat Habrit mainly leads to more sin that it helps. Still if a tzadik should be judged by the misuse he is put to, then no tzadik would come out OK.]

The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.

As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform,  and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.

The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.

Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.

The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.

They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.

In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.

{Rambam laws of buying chapter 5 halacah 4 }

 If a person buys some goods, and then owes money. Then the buyer wants to sell stuff of his own {Rambam, Laws of Buying, chapter 5, halacah 4.} and then seller tells him, "Sell it to me, and your debt will be paid." At that point, the original seller does not have to do any act of acquisition. The Raavad as you can imagine disagrees with this (twice). The Gemara in Kidushin  says if this were so, then it would have to work for kidushin (marriage) also. And we know it does not. The Netivot has an answer for the Rambam and Rav Shach also. But  for now I just wanted to state what the problem is just for the sake of information. The problem is that in marrying a woman, one can not do so by a loan. This is  a famous halacha. That is to say: you loaned her money. Then you want to marry her. So instead of giving her a ring you say, "The debt you owes to me is forgiven." That does not work, and the reason is as the Gemara says הלוואה להוצאה נתנה  a loan is given to be spent. [That is the money of the loan already belongs to her.]

So what is the difference between this case and the above case of the buyer and seller? The buyer owes money. The seller then forgives the debt and the property of the buyer goes automatically to the seller.

I confess I did not understand Rav Shach's answer to this problem but I did see how he blew all the other proposed solutions out of the water. His seems to revolve on the money owed by the woman is forgiven as opposed to the money owed by the buyer which creates an act of purchase. I can see that the origins of the money owed in the two cases are different.One is in fact a loan. The other is money owed because of goods bought. Still I have  a hard time understanding why that would make any difference

Can a government force people to provide health care for others?

This goes to an argument between Richard Epstein and Dr. Michael Huemer. There is a legitimate argument for limited government. You have to see that debate. But the basic idea is the need for government is not the same as need for private institutions.
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
My notes on
http://www.breitbart.com/  have mainly been along the lines of Reb Nachman who said to avoid doctors.
There is a lot to go into about this, but the main idea I wanted to say today was simply without any elaboration, that government is not a social contract. That is, there is something different about the need for a government that is not the same as an extension of social contract theory either of the Rashbam in Bava Metzia, nor John Locke nor Rousseau. 

I have to say that Richard Epstein wins the debate here. But that means that since government is a ding an sich a thing in itself its rights of contract are not unlimited. That is more or less what Epstein would say and does say I think. But he is looking at Roman Law and the Constitution of the USA. I am looking into the very essence of government in itself that I think is limited. 

people can be idols and idiots. Sometimes the smartest are the worst.

The religious world seems to have a problem concerning idolatry. And it does not help that the concept itself is fuzzy. And even worse is when people try to define it in such a way that leaves out their particular version of idolatry. 
One particular problem is the accepted belief that is something is authentically Jewish, it  can not be idolatry. And if some is not Jewish, then it automatically comes under the suspicion of being idolatrous. 
But, in fact, an idol of a gentile can be nullified. That is if the gentile himself abandons its worship. Not  Jewish idol.
The basic problems with idolatry are three things. One is the idol itself, another is things offered to the idol and the last is things that are vessels or ornaments  made to serve the idol. People can be things offered to idols, and they do not have to agree to it. As in fact in the days when people were, in fact, offered to idols it was never the case that they agreed. Rather by the time they realized what was happening it was too late to turn around. By joining their cult, one  becomes a thing offered to their idol.

And people can be idols themselves as we see in Sanhedrin pg 63  האומר עבדוני ואמר כן חייב. (A person says, "Serve me" is killed for seducing to idol worship. A person that agrees and says "yes" is also killed for worshiping an idol.) That is not only is the person that says "Serve me" is an idol and is killed for being a מסית ומדיח, but also the person that agrees and says, "yes" is also killed for serving an idol.

Idols an the vessels that serve them and food and vessels offered to them are forbidden to derive benefit from. They are also unclean [טמא]. What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness if the people that served it nullify it? In all the above cases the uncleanliness disappears except for food offered to the idol. That obviously remains forbidden, but the uncleanliness is a doubt if it goes off.

An idol that is worshiped by gentiles can be nullified and an idol that is worshiped by Jews can not.  What happens to the טומאה uncleanliness? This all starts in Tractate Avoda Zara 52a. R. Yochanan asked  R. Yanai what happens to the uncleanliness of food offered to an idol. The question is asked why did he ask about food? Why not ask about vessels? Vessels are not a question since they can be made pure by dipping them in a river or fresh spring thus the "Tumah" uncleanliness also goes off. Why then did he not ask about the idol itself? The idol itself is not question for since its status as an idol can go off of it when people no longer worship it, then its uncleanliness also goes off. But food is a doubt because it has no way of getting clean by dipping it in a river or ocean or spring.

There the Rambam and Tosphot and the Raavad all hold vessels that were offered to the idol and vessels used to serve the idol can have their uncleanliness taken off. But Rashi explains in that Gemara that vessels can be made pure just like their use for idolatry can be nullified. So Rashi obviously is explains our gemara here as referring on to vessels that are used to serve the idol, not to vessels that were offered to the idol since their prohibition for use never comes off.

Thus it is important not to serve a Jewish idol since the uncleanliness and the prohibition can never come off. We also see this in Sanhedrin circa 65. When a Jew leaves serving  a Jewish idol he dies (because his source of life is cut off.)  We actually since this in gentiles also. Even a gentile when he leaves a cult that he was involved with, he looses his life source and dies spiritually--and sometimes physically. This you always see in people that break away from cults. They never get back on  track no matter how hard they try. Or they just go and join some worse cult.

Each of the different schools of Musar

Each of the different schools of Musar {Ethics} of Reb Israel Salanter emphasized a different facet or face of Musar.  And this tendency I have traced to different aspects of Musar in itself.
This can be confusing. And outside of that there were great people like Reb Chaim Solveitchik that simply did not let Musar into their yeshivas. To Reb Chaim, Yeshiva was for Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot. Full Stop. [This opinion, as far as I know, was shared by the Chazon Ish].

None of them liked the השכלה (Haskalah) which was the Jewish version of the Enlightenment.

The arguments against the Enlightenment itself seem to me to be appropriate the the Jewish version.
That is, starting from Jonathan Swift  up to and including Johann  Georg Hamann and Joseph de Maistre. I think you could include Allen Bloom, because in the long run his book is a critique on the Enlightenment from the aspects of seeings its bad effects (Closing of the American Mind.)

The most powerful critique is of course The Closing of the American Mind . Every sentence in that book contains a whole university education all in itself.

It is for this reason that I see the Rambam as giving a solution to this problem with his balanced approach (1) The Oral and Written Law of Moses (2) Physics (3) Metaphysics. That is he saw each of these as an important component of every persons's education. That is as universal and necessary. Sine qua non. Without which nothing else can happen.

My own approach to Musar is that it is like water. You need it but you do not want to drink so much as to overload your kidneys.
To me is is an essential vitamin, but I can not see how doing it hours every day [as the Musar movement intended] would help anything. There also seems to be no evidence that more that 30 minutes per day helps anything. 
While Reb Israel Salanter was certainly right about the need for character development, learning tons of Musar does not seem to help. If anything, it hurts. 
Instead, I suggest a Jewish version of the Boy Scouts, or like they have in Israel the "Tzofim" [Scouts].

That is to put it all together-- my idea of  a proper education is the Law of Moses [Oral and Written Law] Physics, Metaphysics, Survival Skills, Music.

There are problems with religion that the counter Enlightenment does not deal with very well. But the experience of living in the religious world has convinced me the truth of Reb Nachman who said most teachers of Torah were demonic.  תלמידי חכמים שדיין יהודאיים. Rav Israel Oddessar the founder of the Na Nach group certainly stressed this point and from what I have seen he was right on the money. So to my view this balanced approach of the Rambam make the most sense.

The problem is this. There are good arguments for the importance of keeping the Law of Moses, the oral and written Law. But as soon as one wants to do that, right away the Satan sends his messengers to mess the whole thing up. Most often the very desire to keep the holy Torah causes people more sin than if they had just remained secular. The way the messengers of Satan get into the door is by  a kind of scam in which they try present themselves as Torah teachers. My impression is that the best thing to do with them is to shoot them on sight. [If not for the problem that that would mess up the drive way or side walk.] The enlightenment did not arrive in a vacuum. Nor did the Rambam decide to combine faith with Aristotle and Plato because of some whim. He saw faith a reason as being so connect that one could not exist without the other. Faith as we see in the religious world  without Plato and Aristotle becomes fanatic insanity --not just for individuals but for whole communities. This is clear to anyone who has lived in a religious community. On the other hand Reason without the Revelation from Sinai is like a iron oven of ice.

Rambam: law of using an object dedicated to the Temple (7:9,10). Bava Metzia page 99, 43 a, tractate Meila page 20.

In terms of the law of Moses I wanted to mention that there is a sacrifice mentioned there for using something that was dedicated to the Temple in Jerusalem. It is one of the five guilt offerings. That is not the same as a sin offering.
The prohibition in the Torah come from the verse "You shall not eat in your gates.. and your vows."
So let us say you have money you have dedicated to the Temple. And you give it to a money changer or shop keeper to safeguard it. If it was wrapped in a way to show it should not be used and the money changer used it, he transgresses the prohibition. If it was not wrapped, and you said nothing to him about it, then no one transgresses the prohibition--to the Rambam. A teaching in pg. 43a the end of chapter המפקיד says you yourself did transgress. Why does the Rambam disagree? Because of a Mishna in Tracate Meila 20 that says simply the money changer does not transgress and stops at that. So we have no problem in understanding the Rambam. His opinion was that the Mishna in מעילה דף כ simply disagrees with the ברייתא. But what is the reasoning of the Rambam?
Rav Shach says the argument between the Mishna and the braita is this. The Braita holds if one gave money to a money-changer that was not wrapped up, it is meant as a loan, and thus when the changer gave it out, he meant it as a change in ownership. But since he had permission to exchange it, the prohibition goes back to the original owner who did not warn him that the money belongs to the Temple.  The Rambam holds however, based on that Mishna, that the money can be used by the changer, but not as a loan to the money changer. The money is not a loan. So at no point was there intention to take the money out of the possession of the Temple.

I should mention there are two types of מעילה. One is taking out of the possession of the Temple, and the other is deriving physical benefit from the object. In our case, there is no physical benefit, so the only question is that of taking the object of the the possession of the Temple.

This I think helps explain the Gemara in Bava Metzia 99 שואל One who borrows an ax of the Temple, if he chopped wood with it he transgress the prohibition, and if he did not chop, then he does not transgress. בקע בו מעל לא בקע בו לא מעל.The idea would be the same as in the case of the חלפן. When one borrows something there is no intention to take it out of the possession of the owner. So only when one uses the ax is does he transgress the prohibition of מעילה

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In terms of the תורת משה I wanted to mention that there is a קרבן mentioned there for using something that was dedicated to the Temple in Jerusalem. It is one of the five קרבן אשם. That is not the same as a קרבן חטאת.
The prohibition in the Torah come from the verse "לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך .. ונדריך."
So let us say you have money you have dedicated to the Temple. And you give it to a money חלפן or shop keeper to safeguard it. If it was wrapped in a way to show it should not be used and the חלפן used it, he transgresses the prohibition. If it was not wrapped, and you said nothing to him about it then no one transgresses the prohibition to the רמב''ם. A teaching in בבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א the end of chapter המפקיד says גיזבר did transgress. Why does the רמב''ם disagree? Because of a משנה in מסכת מעילה that says simply the חלפן does not transgress stops at that. So we have no problem in understanding the רמב''ם. His opinion was that the משנה in מעילה דף כ simply disagrees with the ברייתא. But what is the reasoning of the רמב''ם?
רב שך says the argument between the משנה and the ברייתא is this. The ברייתא holds if one gave money to a  חלפן that was not wrapped up it is meant as a loan and thus when the חלפן gave it out, he meant it as a change in ownership. But since he had permission to exchange it the prohibition goes back to the original owner who did not warn him that the money belongs to the Temple.  The רמב''ם holds however based on that משנה that the money can be used by the חלפן but not as a loan to the חלפן. The money is not a loan. So at no point was there intention to take the money out of the possession of the Temple.

I should mention there are two types of מעילה. One is taking out of the possession of the Temple and the other is deriving physical benefit from the object. In out case there is no physical benefit so the only question is that of taking the object of the the possession of the Temple.
This I think helps explain the גמרא בבא מציעא צ''''ט ע''א that says השואל an ax of the Temple. בקע בו מעל לא בקע בו לא מעל.The idea would be the same as in the case of the חלפן. When one borrows something there is no intention to take it out of the possession of the owner. So only when one uses the ax is does he transgress the prohibition of מעילה

בתורת משה יש קרבן של המשתמש במשהו שהוקדש לבית המקדש בירושלים. זהו אחד מחמשת קרבן אשם. זה לא אותו הדבר כמו קרבן חטאת. האיסור בתורה בא מן הפסוק "לא תוכל לאכל בשעריך מעשר דגנך .. ונדריך." אז בואו נגיד שיש לך כסף שאתה הקדשת לבית המקדש ונתתו לגיזבר והוא נותן את הכסף לחלפן או בעל חנות כדי להגן עליו. אם זה היה עטוף דרך להראות שזה לא אמור לשמש בו והחלפן השתמש בו, הוא עובר איסור. אם זה לא היה עטוף, ואתה אמרת לו לא כלום, על זה אז אף אחד לא עובר את האיסור לדעת רמב''ם. אבל ההוראה בבבא מציעא מ''ג ע''א בסוף פרק המפקיד אומרת הגיזבר עשה עבירה ומעל. מדוע רמב''ם לא מסכים? בגלל משנה במסכת מעילה שאומרת פשוט החלפן לא מעל נקודה. אז אין לנו בעיה בהבנת רמב''ם. דעתו היתה כי המשנה במעילה דף כ' פשוט חולקת על הברייתא. אך מהו ההיגיון של רמב''ם? רב שך אומר הטיעון בין המשנה ואת ברייתא הוא זו. לברייתא אם אחד  נתן כסף לחלפן שלא היה עטוף היטב זה נועד כהלוואה ולכן כאשר החלפן החליף את זה, הוא התכוון ברצינות כשינוי בעלות. אבל מאז הוא קיבל רשות ללכת להחליף אותו האיסור חוזר לבעלים המקורים שלא הזהירו כי הכסף שייך לבית המקדש. רמב''ם מחזיק בשיטה מבוסתס אולם על כי המשנה שהכסף יכול לשמש את החלפן אבל לא כהלוואה אל החלפן. הכסף הוא לא הלוואה. אז בשום שלב לא היה כוונה לקחת את הכסף מתוך החזקה של בית המקדש. אני צריך להזכיר ישנם שני סוגים של מעילה. אחד הוא לוקח מתוך חזקת  המקדש והשני נובע מיתרון פיזי מהאובייקט. במקרה שלנו אין שום תועלת פיזית. אז השאלה היחידה היא לקחת את האובייקט מרשותו של בית המקדש. זה עוזר להסביר את הגמרא בבא מציעא צ'' ט ע''א שאומרת השואל גרזן של בית המקדש. בקע בו מעל, לא בקע בו לא מעל. הרעיון יהיה אותו הדבר כמו במקרה של החלפן. כאשר אחד ישאל משהו אין כוונה לקחת את זה מתוך החזקה של הבעלים. אז רק כאשר האדם משתמש בגרזן הוא עובר על איסור המעילה.

מה שאני עושה כאן הוא לעשות יותר מאשר ספקולציות. אני אומר כאן יש לנו הוכחה על מה שקורה ב''מ צ''ט ע''א. כל העניין הזה כאן של רב שך עולה בבירור  אשר השואל אינו נוטל מתוך החזקה של בית המקדש

The basic idea here was mentioned before in my blog. But what I am doing here is to do more than speculation. I am saying that here we have a proof about what is going on in the Gemara Bava Metzia page 99. This whole idea here of Rav Shach shows clearly that borrowing is not taking out of the possession of the Temple. In fact the relation between our Gemara on Page 99 and what Rav Shach says about the exchange of meila is so clear I am surprised he did not mention it himself!

T 28 A major  t28 in midi

The Rambam understands Physics and Metaphysics as the way to fulfill the mitzvas of Love and Fear of God.

Besides the Rambam my own parents saw something important about Physics.
[Though the Rambam's definition of this was a little different than the modern day one. The Rambam openly wrote he was referring to the Physics of the ancient Greeks which means basically Aristotelian Physics. Still the approach and subject matter is that which the Rambam was referring to. The Rambam did also add Metaphysics-which he did also say meant that of the Ancient Greeks. 
But in that case he would have been referring to the subject as it was developed later by Plotinus.

But in these cases, he was not just referring to the writings, but to the subject itself. Similarly in his approach to the Oral Law he divides it into two sections. One is the actual learning of the material which he meant in the sense of learning the Mishne Torah (of the Rambam himself) itself. The other is the  reasoning it out, which is the kind of process we see Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and Rav Shach engaging in. [This process had its beginnings with Rav Joseph Karo, but really came to its summit in the book of Ideas in the Rambam of Rav Soloveitchik and the Avi Ezri. ]

The Rambam understands Physics and Metaphysics as the way to fulfill the mitzvas of Love and Fear of God. This is hinted in the Mishne Torah, but stated openly in the Guide.
[The way that this makes sense to me is by means of Reb Nachman's ideas about the hidden Torah in the work of Creation. And the Hidden Statement of Creation. At least, that is how it makes sense to me.  And it seems to me the Rambam must have been looking at this in a similar fashion, but so far without a copy of the Guide I can't remember a specific place where he might have said this.]

In any case, with the Rambam we get a very elegant way of serving God, that make a lot of sense. It is a balanced approach: The Oral and Written Law of Moses, Physics, Metaphysics. To me this approach has a lot of charm and beauty to it. Besides the fact that it is כיבוד אב ואם honor of my father and mother which is one of the 613, and not a minor one either. 

[You can add this this basic structure to some degree but what ever you add has the danger of being bitul Torah. Bitul Torah the sin of not learning Torah when one has the time to do so.]

(note 1) In the original Musar movement there was the idea of spending as much time as possible learning Ethics {Medieval Musar}, but as you can see that idea was not really accepted in its entirety by the Musar Litvak yeshivas because of the law of limited returns. While important it is, adding to it beyond a half hour daily does not seem to add much.

(note 2) On the side of those that think Physics and Metaphysics are forbidden and also all secular subjects  would have to say that (1) those that supposedly only learn Torah are jerks. I saw enough of this in Israel. Torah without Derech Eretz is not Torah. סופה בטילה. But I have to agree a lot of secular subjects are in fact bitul Torah.

(note 3) Just for the record when I say Physics I am mainly referring to Quantum Field Theory and the later String Theory.  Metaphysics however I think best to confine to Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus, though I see Hegel and Kant as being pretty important also.

(note 4) The Rambam is not referring to mysticism. Though at the time I was learning Musar and the Arizal, I thought he was. Now this is not to say there is no place for a mystic interpretation of the Guide. We know Rav Avraham Abulafia wrote a mystic commentary on the Guide. Still the Rambam in teh Guide itself says exactly what he meant by Physics and Metaphysics.

The attempt to crowd out and eliminate the white race does not stop at WASPs. It goes up to and includes white European Jews.

I tend to look at things in terms of religion just like economists tend to evaluate political issues base on economic considerations. But I feel my mode is more accurate because I believe that people's religious motivations are deeper and much more powerful than they even admit to themselves. 
Thus WASPs have had a hard time of it in the USA because their preachers have been giving them unrealistic messages. I am not saying this is the only problem. But you have to admit that it fits well with the  social justice problem. So if you put Sunday morning compassion for all mankind together with the weekday's social justice professors you get a lethal combination of idiocy.

t27 B flat major   t27 in midi format

learning Torah

The most attractive thing about learning Torah is that it constitutes a life lived for God. Or that is what it ought be be. It is not supposed to be a choice about how to go about making money. This is at least how the Chazal {חז''ל} sages of the Talmud understood it. The choice is supposed to be  along the lines of, "Should I spend my time running after things of this world, or should I devote my life to serving God?"
This aspect of Torah as a holy pursuit is what sparks in me a sense of outrage when I see it being made into a way of making money.  When I see the  religious people (I use the term "people" loosely. It is true they have human DNA, but so do my fingernails.)  being mainly based on  scamming of naive secular Jews, I get a sense of outrage that I feel others ought to share with me.
I feel the religious have turned something holy and precious--the Written and Oral Law of Moses, into something disgusting revolting and unholy and unclean.

Thus the problem of Halaca of using Torah for money is not the kind of focus of attention that I am interested in. Rather there is something about the whole religious world in itself that is perfectly revolting and immoral outside of the few fine and outstanding Litvak yeshivas in NY, or the general world of religious Zionism in Israel that emphases Torah along with Derek Eretz [Human decency]. (This is the same emphasis  as you have in NY Litvak yeshivas. It is just in Israel that the religious world is satanic as is obviously to anyone who has had any experience with them. I do not mean to be critical here of places like Ponovitch or the other few authentic Litvak yeshivas in Israel. The best advice I think is to stop funding the religious world which is highly demonic and does not contribute anything to the Jewish world. Great places like Ponovitch don't need the money. They will manage well on their own. And this way, by cutting off the funding, you stop funding the evil in our midst. ] 

One thing is studiously ignored in the religious world is the enormous human suffering inflicted on people by Torah scholars that are demons. This is swept under the carpet as if it did not exist.
The Talmud itself refers to this problem in the end of Shabat and it comes up in the Rambam, but Reb Nachman (ליקוטי מוהר''ן חלק א' פרק ח', י''ב, כ''ח ועוד הרבה) was the only person to make this an issue consistently. The trouble is not so much the character of the demonic Torah scholars with whom I have had the sad misfortune to encounter all too often. Rather it is the suffering they cause to others. And then, after all the damage they cause,  they have the gall to ask to get paid for their services?

This obviously does not refer to sincere Torah scholars that learn Torah for its own sake, and the difference is all too plain. That is why I am careful to recommend only the authentic Litvak yeshivas that I know are learning Torah for its own sake.

What is happening is think is this: People use Torah to gain money power and then go about using their power in horrible, horrific, ways. Everyone knows  Satanic teachers of Torah that make unclean everything they touch. This creates an opposite reaction. People then flee from Torah as if it alone was responsible for this.
This makes it difficult for me to explain the problem is with the demonic teachers that are sent to Earth in order for there to be free will. For if people would only see the Light of the Torah, there would no longer be free will. Everyone would run to learn and keep Torah.  Thus there has to be these agents of the Devil in order for there to be free will.

But people should know, demonic scholars do not learn and keep Torah at all. It is all a scam. The real authentic Torah is only found in authentic Litvak yeshivas.

Joseph Yozel Horvitz-- Trust in God

Faith a trust in God without effort on your own part is  a debate. Joseph Yozel Horvitz depended on Reb Israel Salanter that the Ramban held one needs no effort. But to find that in the Ramban has proven impossible. No one knows from where Reb Israel Salanter got this, However the Gra definitely held this way  --that no effort is necessary. This provided a foundation for Litvak yeshivas in NY. The general approach in NY was to learn Torah and depend on God for a living and shiduch, and not to get the false semicha [ordination]  that gives people the ability to use Torah as a shovel, [i.e. to make money]. In the Mir anyone that got Semicha was looked on as if he was a charlatan and could not really learn.

I hope this does not sound like I am claiming trust in God. I definitely lost that and so my entire service towards God is on a  different wave length. That is trying make up for losing trust. For once it is lost it does not return. The same with the Divine Light or "shechina". 
Trust for me worked as long as I hung onto it. 

In any case, in the Litvak kinds of Yeshiva Musar is learned I felt the real presence of God, the Shechina, and this leads to my general recommendation of making places like this or at least in ones home to have a spot dedicated to learning Torah and Musar.

Shabat: carrying in a public domain

Carrying in a public domain on Shabat is one of the 39 kinds of forbidden work.


Tosphot and Rashi say to be a public domain there must be 600,000 people walking through it. 
The Rif and Rambam do not require any amount of people. But the road does need to be 16 cubits wide. Thus to the Rif and Rambam no Eruv is valid. So is one stuck? I suggest one can depend on Rashi and Tosphot in a case of need along with not setting down the package in the public domain but just carrying through it and setting it down in private domain. Thus there are two reasons to be lenient. But I find  Rashi difficult because in no Gemaras is this 600,000 mentioned and the cities in Persia (where the Gemara is talking about carrying) did not have 600,000.






רש''י and תוספות that say one needs ששים רבוא people walking through the central road to make it a public domain. The reason for doubts about this is the רמב''ם and רי''ף that consider a public domain to be just what it sounds like as long as the road is wide enough.

But the thing that makes this the most curious is that fact that in all the גמרות in שבת and עירובין that deal with carrying in a public domain there never seems to be the slightest consideration of this ששים רבוא. And the Jewish cities in Persia did not have ששים רבוא. 





{That however leaves the question of pockets- that does not seem to be the same as carrying in one's hands. The object is not nullified to the garment, but neither is it the same as carrying in one hands. To carry in one's pockets I think would be forbidden because of a separate law -the lifting and setting of one's body is like the lifting and setting of the object and as Rava says in Shabat page 8 that means even carrying on one' head would be liable. 

So pockets are out but carrying in a way that you do not set anything down in the public domain along with Rashi and Tosphot could be a decent permission.


שבת: נושאת רשות הרבים. רש''י  ותוספות אומרים שצריכים ששים רבוא אנשים הולכים דרך כביש מרכזי כדי להפוך אותה לרשות הציבור. הסיבה לספק לגבי זה היא שהרמב''ם והרי''ף  שוקלים רשות הציבור להיות בדיוק מה שזו נשמע אלא שהכביש הוא צריך  להיות רחב מספיק. אבל הדבר שעושה את זה ביעתי ביותר הוא העובדה כי בכל הגמרות בשבת ועירובין  עם שנושאות בעניין רשות הרבים מעולם לא נראה  שיקול של ששים רבוא,  ובערים היהודיות בפרס לא היו ששים רבוא

I would like to think about pockets more but at this point the issue seems to be in doubt. 

I have lots of areas where I am lenient but I do not write about them because the issues are not 100% clear to me. So I hesitate to tell others though I am lenient for myself. The general things I am lenient about are תקנות דרבנן in which the reason for the decree is bull as per the Raavad and Tosphot and Gemara in Beitza 5 and Gittin end of ch 1


So if you are looking for lenient decisions the general way to do this is to look at the question is the law derabanan and if the reason for it is null. The other common thing I do is simply look for a lenient decision in the rishonim, geonim or in the Beit Yoseph or Rema. 

I am not saying one should look to be lenient in law. However at a certain point I began to see that people could be extra strict in Halacha and still be scum. The extra strictness maybe even hurt. 

Psychiatrists. they are intent on psychologizing the men they attacks: they deal not with what they say and do but with their alleged motives.

the-liars-liar

Psychiatrists.  Dr. Frances The person in charge of creating DSM-IV

Long after the DSM-IV had been put into print, Dr. Frances talked to Wired’s Greenberg and said the following:

“There is no definition of a mental disorder. It’s bullshit. I mean, you just can’t define it.”

BANG.

That’s on the order of the designer of the Hindenburg, looking at the burned rubble on the ground, remarking, “Well, I knew there would be a problem.”



This is doubly serious because they are intent on psychologizing the men thet attacks: they deal not  with what they say and do  but  with their alleged motives.

The way I calculate the Hebrew Calendar is not the same as the traditional method.

The way I calculate the Hebrew Calendar is not the same as the traditional method. To  my way of thinking the first day of the month is on what is called the Molad which is when the sun and moon are on the same longitude.  The basic issue really comes from the Gemara in Sanhedrin 10 and Rosh Hashanah around page 19 which seem to be  differing approaches (סוגיות חלוקות). I do not have a lot to say about this because the time I did this subject with my learning partner  I was not taking notes. I believe the chronological order was- we worked on the long Tosphot in Sanhedrin 10b very  thoroughly, and then the subject in Rosh Hashanah, and then we went to Bava Metzia.
[I apologize to the Jewish people for not taking notes at the time which would have been interesting as a very great learner was my learning partner.]  

Maybe a long essay here would be in order, but it would just be going through the basic subject with no new ideas.

Mainly, the idea is that there is no Sanhedrin to sanctify the new moon, and no record of Hillel the second doing so. So it makes sense to go with the Gemara in Sanhedrin that goes with the idea that when there is no beit din on earth to sanctify the new moon then from heaven it is sanctified. When is that? To the first opinion in Tosphot it is the Molad. But the other opinion that Tosphot defends is that it depends on when the new moon can be seen, which is hard to tell and there are no set rules for that.

The proof that the present day calendar was not in use during the time of the geonim is there are dates in their letters that are not according to the present day calendar. 

I admit, that if there would be authentic ordination סמיכה, then obviously we would go with the Sanhedrin. But there is no Sanhedrin, and you can not make up ordination that is not from Sinai out of thin air and pretend it is real. At that rate, why not just make up your own Rosh Hashanah also. If you want to ignore Torah Law, then, hey, go for it. But if it is Torah law we are interested in, then there is no Semicha and no authority to sanctify the new moon. So we have to go with R. Eleazar ben Azariah and the Gemara in Sanhedrin 10B.

I sadly have no Gemara to look up anything but from what I recall there is never a problem about the leap year because [if memory serves] all you need to Passover to occur in the Spring. [Certainly if you needed the beginning of Nisan to be in Spring, that would cause problems. But from what I know you only need either the 16th or 17th day of the month to be in Spring according to the Jerusalem Talmud. So Passover in fact always falls in the same month everyone else is doing it. The only difference is it will usually be one or two days before everyone else. ]

As Hegel pointed out, the other answers of the German Idealists were not very good, and some were simply nonsense.

I should mention that I prefer Neo Platonic thought myself as that looks to me to be the closest to reality. Not Plato alone nor Aristotle alone. Dr. Kelley Ross definitively goes in the Kant-Plato direction. But most of the great thinkers in history that form the basis of Western Civilization go with the Neo Platonic approach.

To Plotinus, Reason can perceive the forms, not just know them from some kind of implanted knowledge.

In any case, my own viewpoint in this direction I should admit was very much influenced by Rav Isaac Luria. When I was in the Mir in NY I spent a great deal of time between Gemara sessions in learning his Tree of Life [עץ חיים] which is thoroughly Neo Platonic. [The Tree of Life [עץ חיים] was actually written by Reb Haim Vital, but it is the teachings of the Ari.] [The Reshash/ Rav Shalom Sharaby I learned only later.] 
[The רש''ש Shalom Sharaby  made an important move back to Aristotle in saying in putting the order of the world horizontally in the time of תחיית המתים revival of the dead. That means saying the universals depend on particulars.]




 But Reality is also radically objective,--  the Schrodinger equation  is about as objective a law as anything that has ever existed as Dr. Kelley Ross wrote to me. In any case, the contradiction between reality being radically subjective and radically objective is exactly the type of thing that Hegel would have thought validates his system.

[I also want to add that to come up with the kind of Neo Platonic thought that is in the Rambam, the Ari, and Aquinas and Hegel is by no means a trivial feat. If you think that with simple faith in the Holy Torah and in Reason, you would have come up with this synthesis on your own then take a look at Hippolytus and see how hard it was to reconcile reason and faith and how radically different Plato is from the Neo Platonic synthesis of the Rambam.]


(note 1) The electron has no one value [energy or time, momentum or position in space] but rather a superposition of possible values until it is measured. This is proved by the fact that Nature violates Bell's inequality.
[Feynman makes the point even more clear with his path integral approach.] 


As I put this elsewhere: We know from Einstein locality (causality). This we know by GPS (global positioning satellite). And we know from Bell either that reality is subjective, or non local (one or the other but not both). But we already know from Albert Einstein, that reality is local. Therefore putting 2+2=4 together we know reality is local and subjective (the electron or photon is a superposition of possible values in space time and polarization until measured. At that time the wave function collapses to one space time value.)
I also should mention that we might have known this from the two slit experiment, but there might have been ways to explain that away. So it is in fact that Nature violates the Bell's inequality that proves the point.

Plotinus. Neo Platonic thought is the basis for Western Civilization

Avraham Rosenblum says:

Some aspects of Western Civilization are worth preserving and others not. A good deal of the literature and philosophy is worthless. Allen Bloom suggested just throwing out the entire Humanities and Social studies departments of most universities.

• JPW says:

  If you really are down on certain aspects of Western Culture, I strongly encourage you to go forth and develop a better one. Don’t gripe about the problem. Solve it.
  • Avraham Rosenblum: That is a hard challenge –especially after the greatest minds in history have worked on the problem before me.
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  • Brett Stevens says:

    Maybe there is something they have expressed that overlaps, which we have overlooked? Do you think that Platonism (not neo-Platonism) is the basis of Judeo-Christian metaphysical thought?
  • Avraham Rosenblum says:

    That is what I was thinking. But I tend more towards Neo-Platonic as did all the medieval thinkers and up to and including Hegel. Dr. Kelley Ross wants to return to a more pure form of Plato and Kant. But the basis of Western Civilization to me looks to be Plotinus and neo Platonic thought. And the the journal of Medieval Thought from Cornell they mention that even in Aquinas people have proven Neo Platonic influence.     
  • After Thought: The Ari, Shalom Sharabi, Yaakov Abuchatzaira, the Rambam are all clearly straight forward Neo Platonic thought--each one developing it in different directions. Shalom Sharabi in his scheme of things found a way to balance Plato and Aristotle as you can see in his order of the worlds after תחיית המתים which goes like Aristotle in which the universals depend on the particulars.
  • 
    

the Jewish religious world is that of the Sitra Achra (the Dark Side).

The major problem I see in the Jewish religious world is that of the Sitra Achra (the Dark Side).
That is to say that when people thirst for the spirit of God that is in itself not a bad thing. And I agree there is  a  mystic side to Torah as we see in the Gra and the Ari. Still this thirst for spirituality is hijacked to draw people into the Sitra Achra- to the degree that if there is any part of the religious world that is genuinely kosher I would be surprised. 

Still the side of attachment with God in the Torah is difficult to ignore. But it mainly seems to be connected with a pretty well defined path--that of learning Gemara with great intensity until one knows Shas pretty well and then delving into the writings of the Ari. When this is done right as in rare cases, it does open up a door of attachment and dekekut with God (as with Bava Sali). But as a rule the spiritual thirst seems to just get people involved in the Sitra Achra. It is kind of sad to see.

To the religious world, the main thing is to be religious, but not too religious so that the money keeps flowing from the plebeians to them. 
Obviously Reb Israel Salanter and the Gra saw this problem and suggested what I have to admit is probably the best solution to learn Musar Medieaval Ethics.That is the classical Musar Sefarim of the Middle Ages, and to learn Straight Authentic Torah.

In any case the arguments that forbid electricity on Shabat or cooking with electricity are amazingly flimsy and concocted out of thin air.

I just wanted to jot down a few ideas about electricity on Shabat--not a formal essay that I would have liked to have done.
Mainly the issue really boils down the the Gemara in Shabat chapter 3 about cooking with תולדות חמה or in חמי טבריה. [Heat generated by some derivative of solar energy, not fire]. The relevant sources are the Chazon Ish, and  the book of one of his disciples that disagreed with the Chazon Ish, and the Gemaras from where the Chazon Ish derives his law from. They are the gemaras about putting a bed or a candelabra that are made out of parts together. I was back at the Mir in NY for a sort time and looked at the Chazon Ish and was impressed. I then asked Rav Nelkenbaum about it and he said an אדם גדול told him the essay of the Chazon Ish on this subject is simply and plainly wrong.

That is the sum total of the relevant information I have about this subject. The only thing I might add is the argument between the Rambam and Raavad about a vessel that needs to be put together to be operative in laws of טומאה וטהרה but after thinking that over I did not think it was relevant. In any case the arguments that forbid electricity on Shabat or cooking with electricity are amazingly flimsy and concocted out of  thin air. 
As they say in Israel "If you want to be frum, (extra strict) then do it on your own חשבון (expense). Do not force it down the throats of others."

I was unaware of what was going on in the Christian world for a long time. It only occurred to me to notice something going on with what is known as Pentecostal. I imagine because I tend to look more at doctrinal difference between groups that I  was scarcely aware of their existence. Part of this is really not from lack of awareness, but more from the fact that Pentecostal people and groups do not like the name and so go by the more mild sounding "Evangelical."  It only occurred to me recently what really makes them different from every other group. It is the Pentecostal experience. This is way beyond what it sounds like. To them this is the one and only thing that separates a real christian from a fake.
I really only became aware of this after reading a Catholic critique on it.
I really can not tell exactly what they are thinking however from personal experience.

I was pretty solidly into the Torah point of view when I got to Israel, and when the Divine Light started shining, I thought little of it,  and thought it was just the common experience of everyone in Israel. To me experience of the Divine Light is nothing more or less that fulfilling the verse in Deuteronomy 11: 22 ''to be attached to God'' which is one of the 613  commandments.
At any rate, what I wanted to say today was simply this: To me it seems so hard to get to be a decent human being because people are basically depraved and vicious beyond belief. So in my mind, anything that people do to come to gain good character is praiseworthy. 

In other words my viewpoint is the good character is the center of gravity of the Torah. [Based on the אור צפון, the רש''ש Shalom Sharabi,  the Hafetz Chaim, and Rav Yerucham of the Mir in Europe.] So to my point of view, what ever it takes for anyone to come to good character is a good thing.

That is to say besides that people are depraved, I see most groups and especially most religious groups as adding to their inborn depravity a thousand fold. So anything at all on the side of getting people to be a little more honest, to lie a little less, to have a little more compassion on others, is already a great thing and a rare thing. For most groups encourage just the opposite under nice sounding slogans

Sadly Musar [Jewish Mediaeval Ethics] is subject to abuse and that tends to give it a bad rap. What to me makes this sad is that Musar gives the best and most compact explanation of what the Torah requires from a person in the most explicit simple and practical way possible.  That is it is like Bava Sali in the sense that it just tells you what Torah is about and leaves out all the Shtick that people like to add or subtract. There are tons of books supposedly about Torah, but most of them are false. They change the Torah in so many subtle ways that ignorant people can scarcely tell the difference.

t26 B flat major [t26 in midi format]

[t26 in nwc format]

Review of the same section or paragraph many times

The first thing that hit me when I got to yeshiva in NY [Shar Yashuv in Queens County--not Brooklyn] was the idea of review.

Mordechei Freifeld, the son of the Rosh Yeshiva Shelomo Freifeld emphasized this idea of review {חזרה} many times--especially when I would come and say how learning fast was important and I would bring proofs from the book בנין עולם (Building the World) and the Musar book אורחות צדיקים Paths of the Righteous. To some degree I in fact tried this over the years in yeshiva. I even remember in the Mir in NY I would take one paragraph of the Pnei Yehoshua and learn each one more than ten time--sometimes even 15 or twenty. [I had a pencil and would put a dot next to the beginning of the paragraph to note each time I had read through the whole thing.]

Moti Freifeld never changed in this respect and always emphasized review. When I discovered that Reb Nachman also empathized learning fast and getting through lot of material, Moti just kept emphasizing the importance of review all the more so.

I did not know it at the time; but it is the accepted custom in Lithuanian yeshivas to learn in depth in the morning and fast in the afternoon.

I think today that one has to gauge himself.  There is a "law of limited returns." That is a law that goes thus:There is a limit to how many times you can kiss your wife that will add to marital bliss.
So when the material was basically unfamiliar to me [like when I was doing Ketuboth, Yevamot and Nida] I would basically do each Tosphot twice and not more--because I discovered that after two time I got the basic idea and doing any more times did not add anything to my understanding.


My basic compromise about all this is based on a Gemara [Talmud] לעולם לגרוס אדם והדר ליסבר. Always one should learn in the way of "Girsa" (saying the words and going on further) and afterward to make sense of it all. That is: when the material is completely unfamiliar the best thing is just to go through the whole book from beginning to end a few times. Then when you already have some idea of what is going on, then to take some individual section that you noticed seems to be pivotal or a key to the understanding of the whole subject and to do that one section many many times. This I found to be helpful in Physics also.  

When I was learning with David Bronson  in Bava Metzia I found him to be unwilling to budge an inch on anything in Tosphot that was unclear. That led to my long essay in the beginning of my little booklet on Bava Metzia on these words in Tosphot [page 97B] "Even without Abyee we would have to say that the law of Rav Yehuda comes from Shmuel." I should admit we never found an answer to that and after about two or more weeks of just sitting and staring at those couple of words we finally decide to go on. Some years later as you can see in that book, I found a tentative answer. And after  that after getting the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach I found a better answer after about 10 years of wondering about that problem.


What I ended  up saying is that Shmuel hold from certainty is better because חזקא מעיקרא in Ketuboth would not have been enough to believe the woman. That I based on the analysis of Rav Shach about the Gemara in Nida page 2

SO I suggest two sessions in Talmud, and two in Physics. A fast one where one just says the words and goes on. The other in depth in which one finds the key ideas an works on those sections and ten times or more

[So it ended up the things I did the most review on were the Mahrasha, and the Pnei Yehoshua. Those were hard but also the fact that each paragraph or idea was short made the ability to do review practical. This is less practical with Tosphot.

I should add that review seems to work better in Torah because sections in Gemara and Mishna are more or less self contained. In Physics, it seems I need to spend a lot of time in getting the big picture before woring on details becomes practical. 

Jewish religious world

The trouble with the Jewish religious world is that their actions speak so loudly that no one can hear what they are saying. 

The trouble seems to be that Torah really only works well when it is learned and kept for the sake of God. When it becomes a means to make money, it turns to poison. And the first primary commandment in the religious world is to trick and cheat secular Jews and naive baali teshuva. The main hell holes are the yeshivas in Jerusalem and the West Coast the the USA.  

Reb Nachman from Breslov had  a term for religious teachers תלמידי חכמים שדיין יהודאיים. (Torah scholars that are demonic). It is really not from the Zohar. [Reb Nachman had to make a composite of this idea from the Zohar along with the rather severe complaints about Torah scholars that are hypocrites which are brought in the Mishna and Gemara]. In the Zohar itself we have a concept of שדיי יכו''ם and שדיי יהודאים. That is Jewish and gentile  demons. That seems to refer to people that simply are beyond repentance. That is is people with no conscience which are the majority of mankind. People are not naturally good. We are naturally depraved. According to the Rambam even natural law [the laws of the Attic Greeks he calls them] needed Revelation. [The Rambam had an easy option open to him to say natural law was accessible by human reason but he choose not to go down that path.]

In any case this is a real problem that needs addressing because without it, I believe everyone would run to the light of the Torah.
Reb Nachman I should mention brought up this theme with a great deal of consistency throughout the  ten year  period Reb Nathan knew him.  The first time is in Vol I chapter 8 (of Reb Nachman main work) which was I believe the first Hanuka lesson Reb Nathan heard from Reb Nachman. After that it comes up in ch. 12 and then 28 and then it is mentioned over and over until  very last Torah lesson Reb Nachman ever gave Vol II ch 8.[Reb Nachman did not use the same term every time.  Sometime it was דיינים שאינם כשרים judges that are not honest.]
.
Of course you can go overboard with this as some people do. After all there are sincere people that do try to learn and keep Torah for its own sake and a lot of them are in fact in the real Litvak yeshivas like Ponovitch and the three great NY yeshivas Mir Chaim Berlin Torah Vedaat. 

The Na Nach group of Breslov take it on principle that all well known Torah teachers are hypocrites  since they feel it takes  too much energy to try to choose which ones are OK. So they simply dismiss the whole lot. That is based on Reb Israel Odesser whose basic advice  they follow.  This rule  works well in practice, since it saves them from teachers of Torah that really are demons but it is hard to tell on the outside. Personally I think I also would have been saved from much trouble if I had followed that rule.  
[The actual subject of Jewish and Gentile demons is covered in the later chapters of the Eitz Chaim of the Ari, but the basic rule is to avoid trouble it is wise to simply avoid religious teachers and if you need a mikve to go to the ocean or a river. The Religious world is simly bad news]