songs for the God of Israel

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Kabalah . Much of the formal structure of what we have from Isaac Luria comes from the pre-Socratics, Plotinus and Mani (founder of Manichaeism--the faith that Augustine broke away from).  It does not seem all that insightful when you know from where it comes.  On the other hand  once you have the formal structure, it seems often the mystics themselves had  some great insights. It is not a settled question me.

I made a detailed study of this once. Mainly the idea of the ten sepherot comes from a disciple of Plato. The contraction {"tzimtzum"} was from the presocratics. The "sparks of holiness" from Mani. Adam Kadmon also from Mani.

And most of what passes for divine spirit by so called kabalists seems to me to be mainly kelipat Noga. That is the Middle Zone [heichalai hatmurot] between holiness and unholiness that gives one great powers and knowledge about peoples secrets.


Mainly I think that Kabalah is a way of conceiving spiritual reality. And when one gets into it then the reality becomes real. It is like Kant's idea of the representation   of "the thing in itself." The representation is half supplied by the object and half by the observer. That is the believing in it makes it real. Not just the Kabalah but any spiritual reality system has this quality of being able to absorb people that believe it into itself.

Appendix: (1) Plato's disciple did not actually invent ten sepherot. At first there were nine. Only in the Middle Ages was a tenth added to account for the precision of the north star.  And you can see this scheme in the end of the Eitz Chaim. And while we do not think that the Ari was learning Manichaeism but all of these ideas were common in the Middle Ages when people had been learning Plotinius and Mani's beliefs were also wide spread and almost became the primary world religion at one time. All these ideas were put into the Zohar and that is where the Ari found them.

(2) I do not mean to deny the validity of the Ari. Rather I simply say he was seeing the Torah through the worldview of the time of the Zohar. But in any case if one want to learn Torah I think the best option is simply the traditional Oral and Written Law. That is the Old Testament and the two Talmuds. Not Kabalah.

(3) One of the central beliefs of Manichaeism was the notion that every human being had two warring souls: one that was part of the Light, and another that was evil. This was itself based on Zoroastrianism.  

(4) According to Mani through lust and the sin, the Darkness tries to imprison more and more bits of Light within matter. 

(5) Seeing how much of Kabalah incorporates beliefs of ancient religions made it less interesting to me. Unless I would have thought that Mani was a true prophet. I could keep on making excuses but at some point it seemed more interesting just to go back to learning straight authentic Torah and leave the deluded with their delusions.

(6) To get  better idea of what Torah is about I think it makes more sense to look at Maimonides and Saadia Gaon, Ibn Gavirol, and the Duties of the Heart. Though Ari still gives very important insights, still I would not take that as standard.

(7) Another aspect of Manichaeism that became an important part of  the teachings of the Ari is the שם ב'ן in which there was the breaking of the vessels and then the rebirth of the name מ''ה החדש Adam Kadmon after the tikun of the vessels in the form of the the sepherot that is well known.

In Mani we also find the three stages-the first creation. The breaking of the vessels. Then the second creation with Adam Kadmon being reborn. Then the final Redemption. All very well defined in Kabalah and in Mani.


For me this makes the approach of Saadia Gaon and the basically rationalist Jewsih philosophers of the Middle Ages more interesting than Kabalah. Though I have the greatest respect for the Ari and genuine Mystics still their visions do not define the worldview Torah for me.

(8) I spent a great deal of time learning the Ari and I think  that after a good solid background  in Talmud the Ari can serve as a kind of conduit for a kind of Divine light. So I do not want to discount its importance. But by and large it just leads people to delusions. That is its effect on 99% of those involved with it.  It gains mastery over men's minds by the astonishing completeness, minuteness, and consistency of its assertions. They lose themselves in it.

(9) For me I should say I found learning the books of the Ari and the Gra in Kabalah to be very helpful. The trouble without these books the world is drained of its mystery and magic. It becomes a secular  world. The world of  The Guide for the Perplexed is a secular world. The world of the Ari is full of holiness and mystery. And  I learned to find the magic and holiness in everything --especially Physics which to me reveals the greatness and wisdom of God.

People may think the concept of demons is a medieval fiction. but whether you agree with it or not it explains a lot. Let me explain: When we do some good deed it makes sense to say that this evokes some kind of special attention from God. But when we sin, we usually think of God as averting his attention from us. So then how do we ascribe punishment to Him as if he is punishing us directly? It is more natural to say that God has placed in the world a natural order of objective morality. We we rebel against it we are being punished by the natural process of what happens when a person disobeys the moral law. This explains we we are sometimes  afflicted with evils that seem to be out of our control. And we think there are angels that are the natural agents of protection.

Ideas in Talmud  Ideas in Bava Metzia  title page for ideas in bava metzia title page for ideas in shas

Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement

I have mentioned a few times about Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement --that is the movement directed towards getting people to learn medieval Jewish Texts about ethics. I mentioned also that I think Musar needs to be coupled with The Guide of the Rambam and the other basic texts of Jewish Philosophy from the Middle Ages.


Faith with Reason is not so much what I am thinking about but rather Fear of God coupled with Reason. That is  הלא יראתיך היא כסלתיך. (This is a verse from the book of Job. It means, "Is not your fear  your stupidity?)

 But even when I recommend Maimonides or other books of Jewish Philosophy I am not necessarily agreeing with everything they say. All I am saying is their works and texts are important to learn and to try to incorporate in my life.

The way I do that is one thing but others might have a different way of incorporating Fear of God and Reason into their lives. That fact was understood right at the beginning of the Musar movement, Reb Israel Salanter made it clear from the beginning that everyone has a different area of Musar they need to work pon and only they can know what it is. No one can tell them.
My own approach is tailored to my needs. I try to learn a little Musar, a little Talmud, a little Physics. And in each subject I try to find what is most appropriate for me. I suggest others do the same--but find what is applicable to them.

Tractate Shabat page 69. Rambam accidental sacrifices 7:3 and the Avi Ezri on that Halacha [i.e. Rav Shach's book on the Rambam]

I doubt if I can explain this right. But here is at least a first attempt. The way I put this when i was learning with my learning partner was this: we have this idea of Reish Lakish that an accident is only when he forgets that some kind of work is forbidden on Shabat. And if he forgets all 39 types then he brings 39 sin offerings. The Talmud asked then in what way did he remember Shabat? And it answers the Sabbath boundary. The problem the Talmud is addressing is what makes this case any different from when he forgot the Sabbath day completely and then has to bring only one sin offering no matter how many acts of work he did.  Now this is really the question of my learning partner but I am trying to put it in my own words. So the question is how has the Talmud answered anything? He knows Shabat but only in something that is not related to a sacrifice. Just the Shabat boundary. 

Talmud Bava Metzia, pg 104

[I am only here presenting my own ideas and those of my learning partner. I do not claim these books to be the best in "Lumdus" that are around. In my opinion, the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach deserves first place in terms of depth of thought.]
The Ideas in Bava Metzia needs a correction "possibility"אפשרות in Hebrew is feminine.  Thus it takes a feminine verb. [You can see this all the time in Tenach where such nouns are considered feminine. But there is an exception I think in Job
[for example in the beginning of the prayer of Havakuk chapter 3.] פלצות in the prayer of חבקוק is treated as feminine.[While on grammar, I think בורא נפשות רבות  are feminine. That it should be וחסרונן על כל מה שברא להחיות בהן נפש כל חי, ברוך אתה ה' חי העולמים. That is anyway what I do.]
I also noticed at page 104 the ideas need some clarifications. I was trying to present two ideas. One from my learning partner about the Rambam. And one from me about Rav Papa and how my idea can help understand the Rambam. But I don't think I presented these ideas clearly.






I would add a few other laws here and there (like electricity on Shabat), but if I have nothing new to say there does not seem to be any purpose. I am generally lenient when it comes to halaka. If there is a posek {Rishon} that is enough for me.. But not achronim. That is in any argument between any rishonim I always decide to be lenient.  And all the more so I pay no attention to any of the crazy added restrictions of the the religious world today which are all pure insanity and have nothing to do with Torah.

But  how can I attack what has no halakic basis (electricity on Shabat is a good example)? If people want to make up restrictions, because it makes them feel holy, what can I do?

Being extra strict I began to notice has no connection with being a normal decent human being. The extra strict types of people I think do not understand the Torah requires both obligations between man and his fellow man and also between man and God.

I also suggest that this is the exact reason why all the great Lithuanian yeshivas  like the Mir learned in a basic seven year cycle the tractates that had to deal with obligations between man and his fellow man {נשים נזיקין} and they learned Musar also [normative ethics].
On BM page 104
I was looking over what I wrote about cleanliness  and leaning. I think at least at the end of that essay I need to explain that when I was putting the opinion of the Ri and Rav Shimshon ben Avraham together I was intending to explain Rashi. That is leaning in the case of a strong  or weak tree with not make the person that is leaned on by the Zav to be unclean. Only if the Zav moves him as in the case of the weak tree.

[I should mention that in Elul usually some other tractates than the major ones are studied. For example in my first Elul period in Shar Yashuv in NY we learned Rosh HaShanah about the way to blow the Shophar. [That is the last page of Rosh Hashana].]



Another important issue in Bava Metzia is on page 100A with the second tosphot and the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot. The issue is that in Tosphot they are going with the idea found in in Nida 2b) that a "חזקה" steady state of now (חזקה דהשתא) can only defeat a previous steady state חזקה מעיקרא if combined with some other חזקה. That is not how Tosphot understands the gemara in Nida itself on the page over there. But it might very well be in fact how the Rashbam understands this because of his opinion on a divorce document that has witnesses but no time written in it. This last subject is the object of a debate between Tosphot, the Rambam, and the Rashbam. See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri where he goes into this in the Rambam Laws of Gittin chapter 1.
Now you might say in Bava Metzia Tosphot intends his answer to be two separate answers. [I do not have a Bava Metzia to be able to look this up but I hope someday that God will grant to me a Bava Metzia so I can look more carefully in Tosphot to see what he means.]
In any case , just to introduce you to the topic let me mention the basic issue. Rambam Laws of Divorce ch 1:25 says if there are witnesses on the document, it needs to have the  date. The Ramban (Nachmanides) says it always needs the date. The Rashbam says even if it has witnesses, it does not need the date.
The issue is: why is there a date on the document? Because of the daughter of his sister that is brought to court for having sex with another man while being married. Thus, we require every divorce to have the time in it- so he does not write a document after the act with a dater before the act and thus try to show she was not married at the time. But then the question from tractate Nida comes up. She is not married now, so the state now (חזקה דהשתא) goes backwards. In Nida, the Gemara says the state now only can work backwards if it has something else helping it. At any rate, we can see what the Rashbam was thinking -the case of the divorce is the same as the mikve. There is a state of the mikve or the woman  now, but the state of being first חזקה מעיקרא defeats the later state (חזקה דהשתא) unless the later state has some help. Therefore the document is valid, and it is as if it has a time written onto it which is right now. So at least the Rashbam is clear.

I also had to take out one idea on Bava Metzia page 104 that I heard from someone. But now it looks that it really made no sense, so I deleted it.
.

Shabat 68b 69 a.
Rabbi Yochanan says if one forgets a work or it punishment that is called accidental. Reish Lakish said knowing it is forbidden but forgetting the punishment is called on purpose. Rather accidental is only when he forgot the work and its punishment.



The Mishna says 39 types of work are forbidden and enumerates them. Why tell the number? We can all count. To tell us if he does all 39 in one span of forgetting, he brings 39 sin offerings. That is OK to Rabbi Yochanan. but what about to Reish Lakish. He is gong like Rabbi Akiva in terms of boundries.




Maimonides. Laws of accidental sacrifices 7. Halacha 3. He says the law is like Rabbi Yochanan that forgetting a kind of work on Shabat or its punishment counts as accidental. That is he can bring a sin offering. If he forgets all 39 types of work then he brings 39 sin offerings. The son of the Rambam was asked in what way does he then remember Shabat? [He is called Rabbi Avraham by mistake. He is Rav Avraham. Neither he nor his father has semicha.  If someone would call me "doctor" that would not be a compliment. I have no Ph.D so why call me such a name? That last people to have semicha lived in the beginning of the time of the Talmud. That is why we call Rabbi Yochanan "Rabbi" and his student was Resih Lakish until Rabbi Yochanan gave him semicha and he was called Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish. But after the middle of the time of the Talmud no one has the right to be called "rabbi" because no one has or can have semicha.]

He answered either his father meant he forgot all "or" as in this or that but not both. That is either he forgot all the punishment for all 39 but knows they are forbidden. Or he forgot that all 38 are forbidden and one he forgot the punishment but remembered it is forbidden.

To Reish Lakish the Talmud had the same problem but answered he remembered Shabat by the fact of the Shabat boundary is forbidden from the Torah to Rabbi Akiva.

Rav Elazar Menachem Shach said we could answer for the Rambam that he knows the 12 mile boundary is forbidden from the Torah.

My point here is this. Even if Rabbi Yochanan would hold by Rabbi Akiva about the 2000 yard boundary how would that help us? [Nor does 12 miles help either.] It could very well be that he does not consider knowledge of a boundary to be called knowing about Shabat when it comes to brings a sin offering?

Think about the arrow. To Reish Lakish knowing punishment is considered a lot but to R. Yochanan it is considered little. So something that is little to Reish Lakish to Rabbi Yochanan might considered nothing.


Appendix for the public-- 39 types of work are mainly things that go into making bread or planting crops. But there are a few extra like writing and carrying in a public domain. lighting a fire is one of them also but electric lights are not fire. Nor is cooking with electricity considered cooking. It has to be fire. You can see this in the end of chapter 3 of Shabat. Cooking with a magnifying glass is not cooking. תולדות החמה is not cooking. It has to be תולדות אש to be considered cooking. But driving a car uses fire. The spark plug does make fire in order to ignite the gas in the four parts engine. That is- the gasoline is made into a gas in one chamber. Then the spark plug makes a spark that ignites it and it expands and that is what drives the car.

____________________________________________________________________________



שבת סח: סט ע''א
רבי יוחנן says if one forgets a אב מלאכה or its עונש that is called שוגג. But ריש לקיש said knowing it is forbidden but forgetting the עונש is called on purpose. Rather accidental is only when he forgot the work and its עונש.



The משנה says ל''ט אבות מלאכות are forbidden and enumerates them. Why tell the number? We can all count. To tell us if he does all ל''ט in one העלמה, he brings ל''ט חטאות. That is OK to רבי יוחנן, but what about to ריש לקיש? He is going like רבי עקיבא in terms of תחומים.




רמב''ם. הלכות שגגות ז:ג. He says the law is like רבי יוחנן that forgetting a אב מלאכה on שבת or its punishment counts as שוגג. That is he can bring a חטאת. If he forgets all ל''ט types of work then he brings ל''ט חטאות. The son of the רמב''ם was asked, "In what way does he then remember Shabat?"

He answered either his father meant he forgot all מלאכות או עונשן as in this or that but not both. That is either he forgot all the punishment for all ל''ט but knows they are forbidden. Or he forgot that all ל''ח are forbidden and one he forgot the עונש but remembered it is אסורה.

To ריש לקיש the תלמוד had the same problem but answered he remembered שבת by the fact of the תחום שבת is forbidden from the תורה to רבי עקיבא.

רב אלעזר מנחם שך said we could answer for the רמב''ם that he knows the י''ב מיל boundary is forbidden from the Torah.

My point here is this. Even if רבי יוחנן would hold by רבי עקיבא about the אלפיים yard boundary how would that help us? It could very well be that he does not consider knowledge of a boundary to be called knowing about שבת when it comes to brings a חטאת?

Think about the arrow. To ריש לקיש knowing העונש is considered a lot but to רבי יוחנן it is considered little. So something that is ידיעה קטנה to ריש לקיש to רבי יוחנן might considered כלום.

_______________________________________________________________________

 שבת סח: סט ע''א רבי יוחנן אומר שאם אחד שכח אב מלאכה או עונשה שזה נקרא שוגג. אבל ריש לקיש אמר כשבן אדם יודע  שזה אסור, אבל שוכח את העונש שזה נקרא על מזיד. לא נקרא שוגג רק כאשר הוא שכח את העבודה ועונשה. המשנה אומרת ל''ט אבות מלאכות אסורות ומונה אותם. למה לומר את המספר? כולנו יכולים לספור. לומר לנו אם הוא עושה את כל ל''ט בהעלמה אחת, הוא מביא ל''ט חטאות. זה בסדר לרבי יוחנן, אבל מה לגבי לריש לקיש? הוא הולך כמו רבי עקיבא  בתחום שבת.
רמב''ם, הלכות שגגות ז: ג. לדבריו, החוק הוא כמו רבי יוחנן. היינו ששוכח אב מלאכה בשבת או העונש שלה נחשב שוגג. כלומר הוא יכול להביא חטאת. אם הוא שוכח את כל ל''ט סוגי עבודה  אז הוא מביא ל''ט חטאות. בנו של רמב''ם נשאל, באיזה אופן הוא זוכר אז שבת?

הוא ענה גם אביו אומר שהוא שכח את כל מלאכות או עונשן כמו זה או זה, אבל לא שניהם. זה או שהוא שכח את כל העונשים על כל ל''ט אבל יודע שהם אסורים. או שהוא שכח  של''ח אסורות ואחת שכח עונשה אבל נזכר שזה אסור. או נזכר בתולדות.

לריש לקיש התלמוד ענתה שהוא נזכר שבת על ידי העובדה שזכר שתחום שבת אסור מן התורה לרבי עקיבא. רב אלעזר מנחם שך אמר שאנחנו יכולים לענות לרמב''ם שהוא יודע  גבול י''ב מיל אסור מן התורה. הנקודה שלי כאן היא זו. גם אם רבי יוחנן יחזיק ידי רבי עקיבא על אלפיים או י''ב מיל, איך זה יעזור לנו? זה יכול מאוד להיות שהוא אינו רואה את הידע של גבול להיקרא ידיעה על שבת כשמדובר בהבאת חטאת? תחשוב על החץ. לריש לקיש ידיעת העונש נחשב הרבה אבל לרבי יוחנן זה נחשב קטן. אז משהו שהוא ידיעה קטנה לריש לקיש לרבי יוחנן יכול להיות שהוא נחשב לאפס.

It is not IQ. It is (IQ) *(capacity for work).

What makes for success? It is not IQ. It is (IQ) *(capacity for work). I saw this in my own life many times.

This is my guess based on Bryan Caplan.

I mean my own IQ is small. But I also saw that with lots of work, I could get father than people with genius IQ's. But I also have a very low  ceiling of how far work can get me. And I have very high respect for smart people. My learning partner in Talmud  finds things that I would never see even I would learn the page a thousand times. What happens in Lithuanian yeshivas is there is a kind or appreciation for these two factors coupled: (a) זיצ פלעש the ability to work--in yeshiva jargon that is called the ability to sit and concentrate for many hours and (b)  smartness.

But what we learn from this is simple. For someone like me that is not smart, the main thing is to concentrate on one thing-- if you want to get anywhere. I mean the "smartness thing" there is not much I can do anything about.

And this idea of concentrating on one thing at a time has been a great help for me. For example in understanding Tosphot I have found it useful to stay on one Tosphot for a long time, since it seems to me impossible to penetrate the deeper meaning of Tosphot without doing this. and even very smart people have a disadvantage in this because they are so smart they think they understand Tosphot right away when they have completely missed what is going on. Smartness I have seen can be  terrible disadvantage.

Sing to God all the earth

q66  l98 great title black hole mathematics  [q66 in midi] [q66 nwc][l98 in midi] [l98 nwc] black hole in midi [black hole nwc] mathematics in midi [mathematics nwc] [q96 mp3 e flat major] [q96 midi e flat major]\[q96 e flat major nwc]q96 F major mp3 q96 midi f major q96 f major nwc

 Mathematics and Physics are the natural laws by which God made the world and embedded into the world and told the world these are my laws --obey them. He told light to obey the laws of relativity. He told electrons to obey quantum mechanics. He told the planets to obey General Relativity. So these laws are the laws of God.So they definitely have Torah inside of them. But we do not know the Torah inside of them. So they are the secrets of Torah.

But furthermore I hold the Zohar is not the secrets of Torah.  I have respect for the great tzadikim like the Ari and the Remak and the Gra ,


In any case I think the Zohar got everything off track. And I think it would make a good deal of common sense to get back to the kind of rational Judaism that the Rambam and Saadia Gaon had in mind. Not that we have to take everything they said at face value. Nor do we have to ignore the great tzadikim like the Ari who did have great insights into Torah. Rather we simply have to switch tracks back to the Rambam and away from the Zohar.

 The Islamic 'way of war' was based on pin prick, ultra violent raids (Razzias) meant not Just to kill people, but to intimidate and demoralize the infidel by, among, other things making population terrorized, fearful More often than not, the tactics succeeded in 'softening up' the local population and paralyzing their will so that they became 'like deer in the headlights' during the next, and then the next, and then the next raid by the 'Ghazis.' 'Terrorism' was not a tactic, it was a long-term strategy. (See invasions and conquests of N.Africa and Byzantium and India.) Physical damage was less the immediate point than psychological warfare. Our contemporary jihadis have already succeeded in nullifying our First Amendment to the degree that his newspaper dares not reprint 'blasphemous' cartoons or other criticisms of 'The Prophet.' You 'get away from the fear' by Submitting (which is what Islam actually means). 

Comment by Lawrence Frank in http://www.econlib.org/


The effects of submission are severe.  The tendency is to partake less than noble characteristics of Muslims. There is a point where you have to stand up for your own identity.

That is in plain English is you don't invite someone into your home that means you harm. And Muslims mean harm. 

Now to some degree I realize that all this has happened because of a weakening and rupture of Christendom. I mean to say that before the Reformation, there was a kind of difficult union between Faith and Reason. Afterwards each went it merry way. But in that there was a weakening of each.
And this same event occurred in the Jewish world also.


Therefore the best solution is to rekindle the essence of Judaic-Christian civilization. That is by learning Torah, i.e. the Oral and Written Law. In particular I have in mind Israel Salanter's ideas of learning the basic books of ethics from the Middle ages before the rupture between faith and reason began.

The reason the Muslim invasion of Europe was stopped 500 years ago was because the Christians fought back and stopped them at Vienna. Now they are being invited back.

And that was not the first time Muslim needed to be stopped by force. The Crusades were a direct result of Muslim attacks on the Eastern Roman Empire centered in Constantinople and also their attacks on Europe. Spain had been a Christian nation until Muslims conquered it piece by piece until driven out by force. But until today Spain shows the effects of Muslim rule. It is like a 3rd world country that just happens to be in Europe.

The modern world has lost the meaning of life. And also there is no guide to life. No example to follow. No wise teacher. Just frauds and charlatans. Faceless labor and domination of the elite is what characterizes the modern age. What I suggest is to find the moments of rupture. To find the original meaning of the Torah. But moments of rupture are many in the Torah tradition, so it is not easy to define exactly what we are looking for. Prophecy as in the age of the prophets? The wisdom of the sages?

Without beating around the bush, let me say the best of Lithuanian  yeshivas
have in fact been able to redeem from the past those treasures worth preserving, that is the Rishonim. Medieval authorities. And wisely avoided most of what came later as being misguided delusions.
The main criterion should be authenticity.




The Christan world also encountered moments of rupture. Mainly the Reformation.
[I don't intend to address Christians. This is however not just a side comment. It does show a kind of parallel to our own situation. Also the problem with rupture is you can't return to the pre-rupture state. In the Reformation, both sides lost many good aspects by reason of the break.]

There are traditions that it is good to break away from. Sadly terrorists have managed to link up with their true origins. But that kind of authenticity is not what I am after here. I am more interested in authenticity from the Side of Good and Light. Not from darkness and evil and death as in Islam.


So what we need is not traditionalism, or religious fanaticism but authenticity.
To find the breaks in the past and mend them.

This might sound like I have a solution for this problem. But I don't. I have been in a couple of authentic yeshivas like the Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, and the Mir  in NY and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway. But these authentic kinds of places are few and far between, and most attempts to recreate such things are futile.

It is hard to find someone who can teach Torah for its own sake and students that want to learn Torah for its own sake.

My suggestion is then since most people like myself are not close to authentic yeshivas is to have a hour a day of learning fast to get through the Old Testament,  and the entire Talmud with every single word of the Gemara, Tosphot, Mahrasha, and Maharam from Lublin. And then another hour of learning in depth that is to stay on one Tosphot for a couple of months until the shell starts cracking and you can see the depths and light inside. {But don't get paid for this. Getting money for learning ruins the effect. It is the same as if you would get paid for praying.}

Two hours is not a lot. You then  have the rest of the day to go to university (for a vocation or natural sciences--no pseudo sciences please.) and then go surfing.

Continued from yesterday about the Talmud in Shabat 68b and 69a

My learning partner  said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of Rabbi Yochanan  and Reish Lakish.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of punishment makes it accidental. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page 68B was Rabbi Akiva was using
 the slippery slope argument. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered informal fallacy." But it does not have to be  a fallacy. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences (like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions )", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Munbaz all Munbaz had to do was to say to Rabbi Akiva I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid--because it does not logically follow. Munbaz did not do that but it could be Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish would do that.

The trouble here is that Munbaz learns his law from a verse and and Rashi says he means it as a gezera shava גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact Rabbi Akiva would have a good reason to say his objection to Munbaz. But Rashi also says Munbaz means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש In which case Munbaz would be right. The question is what is Rashi doing? Is it a gezra shava or a binyan av and why not saying it is a simple hekesh?
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My learning partner  said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of רבי יוחנן  and ריש לקיש.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of עונש makes it שוגג. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page ס''ח ע''ב was רבי עקיבא was using
 the טיעון מדרון חלקלק. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered כשל לוגי בלתי פורמלי." But it does not have to be  a כשל לוגי. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between רבי עקיבא and מונבז all מונבז had to do was to say to רבי עקיבא "I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid because it does not logically follow. מונבז did not do that but it could be רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש would do that.

The trouble here is that מונבז learns his law from a פסוק and and רש''י says he means it as a גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact רבי עקיבא would have a good reason to say his objection to מונבז. But רש''י also says מונבז means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש in which case מונבז would be right. The question is what is רש''י doing? Is it a גזרה שווה or a בניין אב. And why not say it is a simple היקש?



 השותף למידה שלי אמר שמצד שני זה יכול להיות שמדובר בחוות הדעת האמיתית של רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש. אחרי הכל אין שום סיבה להם לקשור התינוק שנשבה יחד עם נושא האם חוסר הידע של עונש עושה את זה שוגג. אלה עשויים  להיות משתנים בלתי תלויים. ומה קרה בדף ס''ח ע''ב היה שרבי עקיבא היה באמצעות טיעון מדרון החלקלק. כלומר, "אם אתה מחזיק ככה גם בוא לקחת אותו לגבול עליון." וזה בדרך כלל נחשב כשל לוגי בלתי פורמאלית. אבל זה לא צריך להיות כשל לוגי. אם אני אומר לקומוניסט "הסוג של מערכת החשיבה שלך היה מוביל לתוצאות רעות כמו הרצח של בין עשרים ל חמישים מיליון", הוא יצטרך להראות מדוע אלה לא היו עקב המערכת הפוליטית. אז בוויכוח בין רבי עקיבא ומונבז, כל מה שמונבז היה צריך לעשות הוא להגיד לרבי עקיבא "אני לא מחזיק כי  צריכים לקחת את דעתי על עד סוף הגבול החיצוני. מונבז לא עשה את זה אבל  יכול להיות שרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש היו עונים את זה. הבעיה כאן היא שמונבז לומד המשפט מפסוקים, ורש''י אומר שהוא אומר את זה כגזרה שווה שאומר שאתה לוקח את כל החוקים ממקום אחד למקם השני ואותם  במקום השני למקום הראשון. כך שלמעשה לרבי עקיבא הייתה סיבה טובה לומר הטיעון כנגד מונבז. אבל גם רש''י אומר מונבז אומר שזה כמו בניין האב. זה לא היה עושה  הבדל גדול  אבל אנחנו בכלל מסתכלים על זה כמו היקש ובמקרה כזה מונבז יהיה תקין. השאלה היא מה רש''י עושה? האם זה גזרה שווה או בניין האב. ולמה לא אומר שזה פשוט היקש?

I had two things to discuss. One in in Shabat page 69. There we have the regular argument between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what one brings a sin offering for. To Reish Lakish he has to not know it is a sin and he needs to not know about the punishment. If he knows it is a sin but does not know the punishment that is considered he did it on purpose and he can't bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and says he brings a sin offering in either case. What my learning partner brought up is it seems that both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan don't hold from this (either opinion) and they are only giving a justification for Rabbi Akiva. For on page 68b they openly hold from Munbaz. This seems like an area that needs to be investigated. On page 69 all that happened was the Talmud asked what is considered "accidental" to the Sages [and Rabbi Akiva] and they both answered as above. That is,- they were saying what Rabbi Akiva would hold. They were not saying  they hold . [This is not to say we don't hold by this. It is still curious. The Rambam does say that ignorance of the punishment is also considered accidental but that is because that is how Rabbi Yochanan understood Rabbi Akiva. That is not necessarily the actual opinion of Rabbi Yochanan.]


My learning partner also said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of Rabbi Yochanan  and Reish Lakish.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of punishment makes it accidental. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page 68B was Rabbi Akiva was using
 the slippery slope argument. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered informal fallacy." But it does not have to be  a fallacy. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences (like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions )", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Munbaz all Munbaz had to do was to say to Rabbi Akiva I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid--because it does not logically follow. Munbaz did not do that but it could be Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish would do that.

The trouble here is that Munbaz learns his law from a verse and and Rashi says he means it as a gezera shava גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact Rabbi Akiva would have a good reason to say his objection to Munbaz. But Rashi also says Munbaz means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש In which case Munbaz would be right. The question is what is Rashi doing? Is it a gezra shava or a binyan av and why not saying it is a simple hekesh?







The other thing is in Bava Metzia, On page 104 we have the Mishna saying if it is not מכת מדינה (a strike on the country) the owner of the field does not reduce the amount owed by the serf (who pays a %) or the renter (who pays a fixed amount). On page 106 the Mishna says if it is a מכת מדינה (a strike on the country) then the amount owed is reduced.  Rav Papa says the first two mishnas in that chapter are talking about both a serf and  renter. The later mishnas are talking about one or the other -not both. First I don't understand Rav Papa. The later mishna is  a mirror image of the second one. He must mean then that you don't lower the sum if it is not a strike on the country for both. And if it is, then only one is exempt.
The Rambam chap 8 of laws of rent.says both are exempt in a strike on the county and all the other rishonim disagree and say it is only the renter who is exempt.
I should mention the language of the Mishna in both places is not clear, The mishna talks about מקבל a serf in both places and then talks about him not owing his rent money? A serf pays a %, not rent.

What I wish to ask here is page 106 when there is a case that it is not  רובא דבאגה [most of the fields in the valley have been struck] which Rav Yehuda says is considered a strike on the country. Rather all the fields of the owner have been struck. The person working the land wants a reduction. We don't give it to him.
Who is asking? The renter or the serf? To the Rambam it could be both. To the other rishonim at first glance it seems it has to be the renter because only he is the one where if there is  a strike on the country that gets  a reduction. But I think even then the Gemara might be asking about the serf. Maybe he wants a reduction because of the bad luck of the owner even if he would not get one because of a strike on the country.

That is all I have to say today. Also I wonder why my essay about my parents did not evoke more attention. I thought heroic deeds require remembrance. I thought people would like to know about my parents who were amazing role models. Here we are in a generation where they are no role models. I though telling the truth about my parents would evoke lots of attention.


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I had two things to discuss. One in in שבת ס''ט. There we have the מחלוקת between רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש about what one brings a sin offering for. To ריש לקיש he has to not know it is a sin and he needs to not know about the עונש. If he knows it is a sin but does not know the punishment that is considered he did it במזיד and he can't bring a sin offering. רבי יוחנן disagrees and says he brings a sin offering in either case. What my learning partner brought up is it seems that both ריש לקיש and רבי יוחנן don't hold from this  שיטה and they are only giving a justification for רבי עקיבא. For on page :סח they openly hold from מונבז. This seems like an area that needs to be investigated. On page ס''ט all that happened was the תלמוד asked what is considered שוגג to the רבנן ורבי עקיבא and they both answered as above. That is they were saying what רבי עקיבא would hold. They were not saying that they hold of this.

The other thing is in בבא מציעא, On page ק''ד ע''ב we have the משנה saying if it is not מכת מדינה the owner of the field does not reduce the amount owed by the serf who pays a אחוז or the שוכר who pays a סכום קבוע. On page ק''ו the משנה says if it is a מכת מדינה then the amount owed is reduced.  רב פפא says the first two משניות in that chapter are talking about both a מקבל and  שוכר. The later משניות are talking about one or the other,  not both. First I don't understand רב פפא. The later משנה is  a mirror image of the second one. He must mean then that you don't lower the sum if it is not a מכת מדינה for both. And if it is, then only one is exempt.
The רמב''ם הלכות שכירות פרק ח says מנכים לשניהם in a מכת מדינה and all the other ראשונים disagree and say it is only the שוכר  who is מקבל ניכוי.
I should mention the language of the משנה in both places is not clear, The משנה talks about מקבל a serf in both places and then talks about him not owing his שכירות? A מקבל pays a אחוז, not שכירות.

What I wish to ask here is ק''ו ע''א when there is a case that it is not  רובא דבאגה which רב יבודה says is considered a מכת מדינה. Rather all the fields of the owner have been struck. The person working the land wants a reduction. We don't give it to him.
Who is asking? The שוכר or the מקבל? To the רמב''ם it could be both. To the other ראשונים at first glance it seems it has to be the שוכר because only he is the one where if there is  a מכת מדינה that gets  a ניכוי. But I think even then the גמרא might be asking about the מקבל. Maybe he wants a ניכוי because of the bad luck of the בעל השדה even if he would not get one because of a מכת מדינה.

 בשבת ס''ט. יש לנו מחלוקת בין רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש על מה שמביאים חטאת. לריש לקיש צריך להיות שהוא לא יודע שמה שעושה  הוא חטא והוא צריך לא לדעת על עונש. אם הוא יודע שזה הוא חטא, אבל לא יודע את העונש שזה נחשב שהוא עשה את זה במזיד ושהוא לא יכול להביא חטאת. רבי יוחנן אינו מסכים, ואומר שהוא מביא חטאת בכל מקרה. מה השותף הלמידה שלי אמר שנראה כי שניהם (ריש לקיש ורבי יוחנן) לא מחזיקים מהשיטה הזאת, והם נותנים רק הצטדקות לרבי עקיבא. בעמוד סח: הם מחזיקים בגלוי כמונבז. זה נראה כמו אזור שצריך להיחקר. בעמוד ס''ט כל מה שקרה היה שהתלמוד שאל מה נחשב "שוגג" לרבנן ולרבי עקיבא, ושניהם ענו כאמור לעיל. זה מה שהם אומרים שרבי עקיבא היה מחויב להחזיק, הם לא אומרים שהם מחזיקים בזה

 בבא מציעא, בדף ק''ד ע''ב יש משנה שאומרת אם זה לא מכת מדינת בעל השדה אינו מפחית את הסכום המגיע לו מן הצמית (מה שבלשון התלמוד נקרא מקבל שנותן אחוז מן העבודה שלו לבעל השדה בתור שכירות). בעמוד ק''ו המשנה אומרת אם הוא מכת מדינה בעל השדה מנכה את הסכום המגיע. רב פפא אומר שני  משניות הראשונות בפרק שמדברות על שוכר ומקבל (צמית). משניות מאוחרות  מדברות על זה או זה, לא את שניהם. ראשית אני לא מבין רב פפא. המשנה המאוחרת יותר היא תמונת ראי של הראשונה. הוא בטח אומר אז שלא להפחית את הסכום אם הוא לא מכת מדינה לשניהם. ואם כן היא מכת מדינה, אז רק אחד הוא פטור. הרמב''ם הלכות השכירה פרק ח' אומר מנכים לשניהם במכת מדינה, וכל שאר הראשונים לא מסכימים ואומרים שרק שוכר מקבל ניכוי. אני צריך להזכיר את השפה של משנה בשני המקומות לא ברור, משנה מדבר על מקבל (צמית) בשני מקומות ולאחר מכן מדברת על ניכוי שכירות? מקבל (צמית) משלם אחוז, לא שכיר. מה שאני רוצה לשאול כאן הוא ק''ו ע''א כאשר יש מקרה שזה לא "רובא דבאגה". (רב יבודה אומר "רובא דבאגה" נחשב מכת מדינה). אלא  כל השדות של בעל השדה נפגעו. האדם עובד את האדמה רוצה הפחתה. אנחנו לא מעבירים אותו אליו. מי שואל את הניכוי? שוכר או מקבל? לרמב''ם זה יכול להיות שניהם. לראשונים האחרים במבט ראשון זה נראה שזה צריך להיות השוכר כי רק הוא זה שאם יש מכת מדינה שמקבל ניכוי. אבל אני חושב שגם אז הגמרא בטח שואלת על מקבל. אולי הוא רוצה ניכוי בשל המזל הרע של בעל השדה, גם אם הוא לא יקבל ניכוי בגלל מכת מדינה.

 השותף למידה שלי אמר שמצד שני זה יכול להיות שמדובר בחוות הדעת האמיתית של רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש. אחרי הכל אין שום סיבה להם לקשור התינוק שנשבה יחד עם נושא האם חוסר הידע של עונש עושה את זה שוגג. אלה עשויים  להיות משתנים בלתי תלויים. ומה קרה בדף ס''ח ע''ב היה שרבי עקיבא היה באמצעות טיעון מדרון החלקלק. כלומר, "אם אתה מחזיק ככה גם בוא לקחת אותו לגבול עליון." וזה בדרך כלל נחשב כשל לוגי בלתי פורמאלית. אבל זה לא צריך להיות כשל לוגי. אם אני אומר לקומוניסט "הסוג של מערכת החשיבה שלך היה מוביל לתוצאות רעות כמו הרצח של בין עשרים ל חמישים מיליון", הוא יצטרך להראות מדוע אלה לא היו עקב המערכת הפוליטית. אז בוויכוח בין רבי עקיבא ומונבז, כל מה שמונבז היה צריך לעשות הוא להגיד לרבי עקיבא "אני לא מחזיק כי  צריכים לקחת את דעתי על עד סוף הגבול החיצוני. מונבז לא עשה את זה אבל  יכול להיות שרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש היו עונים את זה. הבעיה כאן היא שמונבז לומד המשפט מפסוקים, ורש''י אומר שהוא אומר את זה כגזרה שווה שאומר שאתה לוקח את כל החוקים ממקום אחד למקם השני ואותם  במקום השני למקום הראשון. כך שלמעשה לרבי עקיבא הייתה סיבה טובה לומר הטיעון כנגד מונבז. אבל גם רש''י אומר מונבז אומר שזה כמו בניין האב. זה לא היה עושה  הבדל גדול  אבל אנחנו בכלל מסתכלים על זה כמו היקש ובמקרה כזה מונבז יהיה תקין. השאלה היא מה רש''י עושה? האם זה גזרה שווה או בניין האב. ולמה לא אומר שזה פשוט היקש?

A Book on Bava Metzia  Book on Shas  both were updated. i added a bit. Also I saw one idea was not written very well in the older versions, So I had to go back and explain things.


Title page of book on Bava Metzia



Title page for book on the Talmud

If I would have to reduce my parent's idea of a proper education into one phrase I would say it would be: "Torah and vocation and survival skills."

My Dad was born to Jewish immigrants from Poland right after World War I.  There is a story behind this. In Poltusk, Poland, there was a Jewish family, the Rosenblums. The father was Altar Rosenblum. One of his boys left the old country and immigrated to  to NY and started a bakery on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. He was  married to a Jewish girl from another Polish village. His younger brother, Yaakov, came to join him. When Yaakov arrived it was suggested that he marry the sister of the wife of the first brother. So they sent for Rivka. When she came, Yaakov and she got married. Their second son was Philip. He was sent to public school along with his older brother Alex and younger sister Ruth. He had a choice to go into doing the violin professionally, or to go the Michigan State University for Mechanical Engineering. He chose the latter. He also applied to Cal Tech and was accepted. (California Institute of Technology). That was the top university in the USA for technology at the time. MIT was second. But Philip's parents were poor immigrants so he decided to go to Michigan instead since it was $100 less expensive. By the time he graduated from Michigan his parents could also pay for Cal Tech so he went there for his master's degree.

Then World War II started. So he volunteered for the USA Air Force. He was sent to France to set up an Air Force base for the Allied airplanes. Because of his experience in engineering, he was able to sent up a system where people that knew nothing about planes would be trained in fixing just one small part of  a plane. So when damaged and planes would arrive he had a system in which he had a whole team that each member knew just one portion of the plane and they could get almost any plane up and back into action with a few hours. His main obligations were for a group of B-29 Bombers. He was the captain of the group. (In Air Force terminology that means  flight commander- the leader of a pack of B-29 bombers going into battle.)
After the war, he met my mother, Leila Freeman. She was also from a family of immigrants from Poland. (Dorthy Solomon and Isaac Freeman were her parents.) They lived in NJ. Philip met her on a beach. He was with a group of  friends, and someone suggested that they go over  say hello to the group of girls that was at the beach at the same time.

He worked at the time for the USA Army at Fort Monmouth NJ. That is where he invented a kind of camera that could focus Infra Red rays into a coherent image. And that is when he had a article written about him in Life Magazine.

They had three boys. I am the middle. My first memories are from public school in Newport Beach California where they had moved. Philip had been recruited by  again to build a camera for the highly secret U-2 project. So he flew off to Area 51 every week. Later he was asked to join the SDI project at the height of the Cold War  (Star Wars). So we moved to Beverly Hills which was in commuting distance from TRW where his laboratory was located.

The main thing that I was hoping to get to was the main thing in this narrative was family vacations, skiing, sailing, and going to the beach every weekend. This was their way of parenting. We just would spend time together as a family. And they never argued. There was an amazing love and aura of peace and wholeness about them.  Their main principle was to be  a "mensch"--a decent human being.
We  believed in Torah--the Oral and Written Law of Moses. [That means to say that we went to a very good Reform Temple in Hollywood, but we placed much more emphasis on Torah that the official Reform doctrine.] But I should mention that we were not religious fanatics. And my parents also thought that it is not good to be a crazed, religious fanatic.  Learning Torah and keeping Torah is important. But their idea of what it means to learn and keep Torah was  based on how their were taught by their parents who were simple working Jews from Eastern European Shtettles. And that was very far away from religious fanaticism.

Their approach was balance. And that is an approach that I try to keep to.

I was philosophically inclined and as a teenager I would talk to my mother about my ideas when I got home from school. I also showed interest in Physics and my parents encouraged me in this direction. All my years in High school I had a college textbook of Collage Physics that I read from time to time. But I have no talent in that direction.  I tried to explain this to my Mom  I said that I thought I would try to go into the violin thing. She said, "If so then you have to spend at least 6 hours a day practicing." But even a lot of practice had a "law of limited returns" for me. So I was not good at anything I tried my hand at.  At some point I got interested in learning Torah more than what had been in our home and wanted to go to yeshiva. My parents were against this. And time showed that they were right. There are two kinds of Torah learning. One is what is called לשמה for its own sake. That means one does not make money from it or get other kinds social benefits. The other kind is for social benefit and money. They thought that yeshivas were mainly about the later--that is to use Torah for some alternative benefit. And this they thought was wrong.
To some degree they are right. But as for the two yeshivas were I learned I think that both places were very much into learning Torah for its own sake.

They also had a concern about making an honest living and not depending on charity. Plus the whole idea of being in yeshiva and learning only Torah implied a kind of lack of balance or fanaticism that they disapproved of.  Later on I began to appreciate their point of view.  But this was all my own fault. Neither yeshiva in NY was saying anything about being fanatic. My first Rosh yeshiva (Rav Friefeld) told me to spend half a day going to university. (And Reb Shmuel Berenbaum also had nothing against university if it for making a living. That is what he told me openly word for word.) And the second place {The Mir in  NY} also was simply concentrating on learning Torah but no one said it could be used as means to make  a living.

My Dad had a major principle, i.e.,  to be self sufficient.


I think if I had known about the way of learning of the Talmud in Tractate Shabat page 63A of saying the words and going on-- I probably could have gone into Physics. The trouble I think was I did not have method of learning by which I could understand. I discovered that that even if I don't get it at first it gets absorbed by osmosis.

I think I had a spiritual connection with my parents. This is something you see in the Ari and I definitely felt it.

This is all the bare outline. There is more to tell about our trips to go skiing and sailing but perhaps I will leave that to another time since it seems like almost a new topic.

More details:
1) My Dad left TRW before the scandal about the Russian spy emerged. {That was the event in which the KGB found found a janitor inside of TRW who was able to steal the plans for the SDI project.} My Dad's reason for leaving was that there were many very talented engineers being trained by USA universities in more modern technologies and that they were going to be hired and that he was going to be fired. So he left before that could happen. The scandal about the Russia spy emerged afterwards and then TRW went under.
2) Then my Dad tried his hand at different projects. He made improvements in our home in Beverly Hills and sold it at a profit. And began to do the same with other real estate properties. And he invested heavily in the Stock Market and never took the advice of any stock broker. He said, "The fastest way to lose money on the stock market is to take the advice of stock brokers." He investigated every company he invested in. His business abilities were inherited by my brothers.

3) My mother got sick and died right after I went to yeshiva. This was a terrible blow to my father and us brothers. It is very hard to describe my mother. Mainly she took her responsibilities towards her husband and her children with the highest degree of serious that any human being can summon. And this included her loyalty and love towards her own parents and sisters.
That means she spent all of her time raising her children properly, cleaning house, getting us to school and then after school violin and piano lessons and working herself on part time jobs  like typing as secretary. It was on the way to a violin lesson when she told me how she wanted to be buried--in  plain pine box. She never had the chance to get old but she did ask me and my brothers never to put her in an old age home. This she said every  time when that I or my brothers asked her what we could do for her in gratitude of all she was doing for us.
She and my Dad had a horror about being dependent on other people's favors. Self sufficiency was their prime directive.
The idea of self sufficiency came up in many situations. For just one example I was not allowed to use teh ski lift until I could walk up the mountain on my own two feet and ski down. And that is exactly what I did. Only then was I allowed to go up on the ski lift. Another example was the slide rule. You can do calculation instantly with the slide rule. But my Dad did not let me use it until I could do the same kind of calculations by hand. That is to say my brothers and I were taught to be self sufficient. That was the reason also that we were sent to join the boy scouts in order to learn outdoor skills. But again I should mention my parents had a very abundant quantity and quality of common sense. They would never send us to the boy scouts today and would be horrified even if we would want to go on our own.

If I would have to reduce their idea of a proper education into one phrase I would say it would be: "Torah and vocation and survival skills."

The modern world can't confront Islam. It [Islam]does not fit into any category that people can understand. In the modern world we are used to cherishing freedom of religion. And Islam is a religion. It goes against everything the West accepts as basic fundamental rights to try to dictate to others that their religion is bad. The easiest thing is to blame Israel. That at least has the advantage of being something people can understand and relate to.

What else could the world do? Call it a political system? It is not that [though it has political goals].

The problem is not so much how to confront Islam, but rather an identity crisis of the West itself.
People don't know who they are anymore. In Christendom people knew who they were. Christians. And in the USA for about 200 years people knew who they were and what they stood for. Freedom and Democracy for all. Jews knew who they were. And Communists also.
None of this applies anymore. Americans are embarrassed of their heritage. Christendom is such an obsolete concept I can't even remember how to spell it.

I would like to deal with this problem in more depth but suffice it to say the modern world is facing problems that it can't understand and does not even have the conceptual categories to define the problem.
This is bad news. Once this happened before. The old world had passed away in World War I. The kings and old categories were gone. In that vacuum grew Nazism and Communism.

My solution to this dilemma is simple. Learn Torah. I mean the Oral and Written Law of Moses.


I can imagine that some people might not like this. It is strong medicine. But it is about the only thing I can think of that would give Western Civilization a chance to get back on its feet.

The world is shedding old categories, and entering a new phase. In  restless sea one needs a map. But not any map will do. The Law written on Two Tablets of Stone is what the world needs. [There is more to the Five Books of Moses than that but that is the essence. And the essence of Torah is what people need.

The Musar (Ethics) movement has a connection with Kant.

The Musar (Ethics) movement has a connection with Kant.

The problem that Musar ((Ethics)) was meant to address was the disconnect between obligations between man and his fellow and and obligation between Man and God.  The idea of Israel Salanter was that by learning mediaeval books of ethics one tends to correct this disconnect.
Kant was also concerned with the problem of radical evil. He thought there are only two principles. One decides to act in accord with objective morality, and then he is totally good. Or he or she decides act only for self interest, and then he or she is totally evil. {This would mean that one decides to act only in the interest of the group he or she is a part of, that is also totally evil. This explain what is wrong with Islam--in that personal morality is not important. The spread of Islam by the sword is the major thing.} Kant in an uncharacteristic way saw a solution to this dilemma. His solution was surprisingly close to that of Israel Salanter, i.e. to be part of a community that the requirement for membership is commitment to objective morality. That is a Musar Movement.

But any movement  can be hijacked sadly. Still the basic approach of Musar I think is right, and it is important to find people of like mind. [If I had been smart, I would either have stayed in the Mir Yeshiva in NY which was a Musar Yeshiva, or even in Israel after I made aliyah, I could have gone to the Lithuanian yeshiva of Rav Fievelson the the Old City of Safed --but sadly enough I did not have to foresight to see how important Musar is.]

In Tana De'Vei Eliyahu: God said to Elijah,  the prophet, "I will let you know some of my traits. Sometimes you have people that have not a drop of Torah or good deeds in them, and yet when they turn to me and are involved very much in praying to me, then I pay attention to them, as it says in the verse 'He turns to the prayer of the empty one.'"

1.) Tana De'Vei Eliyahu  is one of the standard Midrashim. It has similar status and authority as the Midrash Raba and Tanchuma.

2.) The idea of "private conversation"is first that it is private. It is in a place where no one else is around. Also it is not from  any prayer book. It is ones own words that one says to God.

3.) I should mention that this is the only kind of prayer I feel has any  validity. The standard prayers I think are a waste of time. If one is learning Torah then he is not obligated in the standard prayers. That is a regular Halacha in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch. If one is involved in learning a vocation the time that is most important is right when he gets up in the morning. To spend that time running to shul to half heatedly say words he does not mean and then to start his studies means he will not get very far. This is why in fact people that do this can't do anything well. This is because all their efforts and energy is not going into real prayer and not going into their work either.

4.)  prepare a pack lunch and go into the forest every day all day long to talk with God. I actually tried this for  a few years in Safed. I don't this anymore. But I still feel that when things are confusing for me that there is no other address to go to but to God directly.

A Song for God   h55  [h55 in midi] This might need some editing. I am not sure. It seems a little short.

q64 [q64 in midi]  j100  [j100 midi]

Today in an ironic way is the yartzeit [day they died] of both my father and Reb Aaron Kotler. [Kislev 2 on the Hebrew calendar]. My father did not want me going to yeshiva. He believed in the Oral and Written Torah but that was not the issue. He thought learning Torah is a great thing. The reason he did not want me going to yeshiva was he thought all yeshivas are rabbinical schools or they use the Torah to make money.


To Reb Aaron the most important thing in the world was to make yeshivas.

The result of his efforts was the Lakewood yeshiva in NJ and several kollels in different American cities. One, for example, in Los Angeles. I was there at the beginning of the kollel of Lakewood in LA. They asked me to go to people I knew in Beverly Hills to ask for money for them. Why? Because it is a mitzvah to learn Torah. {That is they were saying since they learn Torah people ought to give them money. We will learn in short order that that is not really what they think. Rather they want people's money, and have found a way to con them to give it to them. A there are always people around to oblige them. A sucker is born every minute.}


This is a hard issue to  resolve. On one hand I never intended to use the holy Torah for money and I thought the type of yeshiva I was going to was really trying hard to learn Torah for its own sake and not for money.

On the other hand I learned the hard way that my father was right. I was for some years in Israel after learning at the Mir in NY. After a period in Israel my wife and I decided to return to California. When we got to LA the people in the Lakewood Kollel told my wife to divorce me because I was learning Torah.
Thereby giving me direct proof that my father was right all along. But not just that but since then I have seen many others proofs to my father's position.
So what we have from this is in fact it is a great thing to learn and keep Torah and the more effort one puts into this the better. But we also learn that there are people that claim to be learning Torah and claim that it is  a mitzvah to give them money. One should avoid these types as much as possible. They are extremely dangerous. And they give  a bad name to Torah. After people experience religious teachers, no wonder they are turned off from Torah. Who would not be? It is up to people that care about Torah to remedy this situation and do what ever is possible to stop this scam.

[No offence to Reb Aaron. He should not be held responsible for all the jerks that came out of his yeshiva. He was after all only intending for the sake of Heaven. But by the same token we could say why blame communism for the millions that Stalin murdered? Or why blame Nazism for what Hitler did in the name of Nazism? Maybe it was a few jerks that did not understand Nazism?]

So what I think is that we already know that kollels are against the Torah. If the Torah itself says this is forbidden and people choice not to listen and pretend that what they are doing is Torah then why blame the Holy Torah? 

 Once people think they are God's gift to mankind the trouble begins. [I should mention my critique here is not against Reform or Conservative groups whom I have generally found to be upright. Not am I criticizing people that learn Torah for its own sake as should be. And many people like that are around in Israel and in NY yeshivas. One bad batch does not spoil everyone else.

What I suggest is we can admire greatness. But we need vision to recognize greatness. In my father and mother were real greatness. The kind of greatness that lives according to Torah --not just learns it.

That is what I suggest is that my father was a more accurate representation of how the Torah wants people to live. The more so called "strict" approaches I think are not accurate and also wrong.

Not all cults are created equal. Some cults are great for keeping people out of worse cults.
And if this is all that would be good about some cult  that would be enough but sometimes a cult even has positive value.  "tzadik"s are often some delusional leader who has enough magnetism to delude others.


The best scenario I can see is not to join any of the cults. But even if one does that is not always a bad thing. I was for example a  part of Rav Shick's {Moharosh} group for about 6 years and I think I got positive benefit out of it. But if I had been smart I would have just stuck with the basic Litvak Mir Yeshiva --straight Judaism approach-- .

Songs of thanksto God for his Kindnesses on me and also for the things that were from his judgments.

h41 [h41 midi][h41 nwc]  h39 [h39 midi ][h39 nwc]  h37 [h37 midi] [h37 nwc] h36 [h36 midi] h28 [h28 midi] [h28 nwc]  h11 [h11 midi] [h11 nwc]  h4 [h4 midi] h4 nwc  h24 edited  [h24 midi] h24 nwc mathematics [mathematics midi] mathematics nwc  CHS CHS midi chs nwc

The major concern of the Torah  is in commandments between man and his fellow man. I get this idea from a few places. The Chafetz Chaim, Rav Shalom Sharabi, and some of the disciple of Israel Salanter like the Alter of Slobadka, and Rabbainu Yerucham of the Mir.

In the Alter of Slobadka you can see this in I think the first or second chapter of the book of his collected writings.
The Chafetz Chaim said this on the verse והלכת בדרכיו ותשמור מצוותיו. First walk in his ways (which we know that means "Just like  he compassionate so too must you be compassionate.") and then keep his mitzvot.

Shalom Sharabi gives a deep explanation of this in his book the נהר שלום:  We know the Torah and mitzvot are compared to clothing and bread and wine. The Torah is drink and food of the soul. The mitzvot are the clothing of the soul. So then what is the soul? It is one character traits--the מידות. And that is the meaning of the  verse חסרון לא יוכל להמנות what is lacking can't be filled. We can do repentance on lack of Torah and miztvot. But we can't repent on the lack of a good character trait because that is like the soul is lacking a limb. It can't be replaced.

This was the idea of Israel Salanter [the Musar Movement]--that Torah has these two aspects and I think he saw that too many people sacrifice one aspect for the sake of the other.


I think that my father and mother were better at the between man and one's fellow man than anyone I have heard of. But they did not talk about it. And they did did not advertise it. Nor did they preach it. They just did it and by their actions showed me an example of human greatness that I have not seen surpassed or even heard of anyone that has done better.  Thought when it comes to other aspects of Torah I have great respect for people that were able to learn and and pray. But as far as keeping the  Torah as a whole--not just some parts and ignore the rest-I think my parents were beyond anything I have heard of or seen. 

The Rambam and Creation Ex Nihilo This is a good essay about this important topic and I thought to bring it to others since I have mentioned a few times the basic characteristics of Monotheism as understood by Maimonides and never brought my sources. So here for those interested is the essay from which  I based my views.  See the son of the Rambam for more details about this.

Ideas in Bava Metzia-I made new corrections--in grammar etc.

Ideas in Talmud This has a new section at the end where I had a debate with my learning partner about  a Rambam

There are two aspects of Torah--the between man and his fellow man part and the between man and God. My parents excelled at the former. And I admit this is hard balance to keep. Some people - mainly Reform and conservative Jews are  mainly interested in the aspect of Torah that is between man and his fellow man. And they are right about that. That is the most essential aspect of Torah.

The problem is that part does not cancel the other part. And that is where the troubles begin. Some people notice that in fact there are plenty of things that the Torah requires of us that are strictly between man and God. E.g. the whole Temple service which takes up  a good part of the book of Leviticus, Shabat, etc.

The trouble is that when people start to notice these other parts of Torah,  the between man and his fellow man parts tend to disappear.

 I don't think there is any good solution to this problem because men are programmed to be able to concentrate of only a very small set of principles in their daily lives. 613 principles are just too much.
So people try to distill the essence of Torah and package it. And they don't usually get it right at all.
The approach that was tried by Israel Salanter seem was intended to address this problem. That is he looked at the books from the Middle Ages that addressed both of these aspects of Torah and he saw that they were in fact very effective in helping a very great tzadik, Shmuel from Salant, to reach the kind of balance that the Torah intends.

So the Musar approach I think I would have to agree with.--with one addition. That is books of השקפה also from the Middle Ages. That is the Rambam, and the other thinkers that were interested in defining the basic world view of Torah.  But if there is much today that reflects this I doubt. To some degree the Religious Zionists have this approach but only approximately. While they do try to find this balanced approach still, I am not sure if they have reached it. The Mir Yeshiva and the normal straight Lithuanian yeshivas where I learned also seemed to be close to it, but not exactly. But these last two approaches seem to be about the closest I can imagine to striking this balance.


[The Religious Zionists are right that the Torah is very interested in getting Jews to Israel. That is the reason the Red Sea was split and it also is the subject of prophecies of all the prophets. The normal Litvak yeshivas however are lot better when it comes to learning Torah. But the fact that one group emphasizes one good trait and the other emphasizes  another good trait is no reason to complain about either group.

In Kant we find  a kind of "apperception" perception that sees oneself . From this we know the unity of consciousness. It is the same faculty of synthesis by which we know universals {synthetic a priori.}  This forms the basis of the transcendental deduction. (note 1) So now we can understand the Rambam about knowing God, who is the thing in itself, the ding an sich. That is knowing God is a kind of knowing that we know things in themselves. That is why it is called knowing. It is the faculty by which we know unconditioned realities.





Let's call this apperception. It can't be the thing which recognizes universals as we know the Rambam holds God has no universals. So it is the kind of knowledge by which we know our inner self. And that implies a strong connection. We have more than an emotional connection with ourselves; we are ourselves. So this connection with God is more than an emotional connection. It means a kind of oneness with God, as if we and God were one.

[I know I am borrowing from Schopenhauer. ]

In any case what we have here is good use of the faculty that Kant says gives us direct knowledge of the existence of the ding an sich, but not its characteristics. So when Maimonides tells us we can know that God exists he can be understood in this Kantian type of way.

And this resolves a conflict about Maimonides. There are people that think the Rambam limited reason. {"Rather in the Guide and elsewhere in his ethical writings, Maimonides goes to great pains to deny that human beings have any innate metaphysical, and especially, moral intuitions." Mark R. Sunwall.} There are others who pointed out the proofs of God's existence as showing that the Rambam did not limit reason. Well as far as God's existence is concerned we can use Kant's idea of a perception to show he did think reason puts us in direct contact with the ding an sich.






When I saw in the Rambam this remarkable statement לא הצם והמתפלל הוא הנרצה אלא היודעו I was struck with it power. {It is not the one who prays and fasts who is desirable to God but rather the one that knows God.}

To understand this statement I think one needs the anonymous commentary on the first four chapters of the Rambam's משנה תורה Mishne Torah. He asks one verse says do the mizvot in order to love and fear God. Another one says love and fear God in order to do the mitzvot. This is a contradiction. Answer: There are two kinds of Love and Fear. For example there is fear of God's punishment and there is awe of God's greatness. So one verse tells us to have the  lower love and fear in order to do the mitzvot and the other verse tells us do the mitzvot in order to come to the higher love and fear.
Thu the mitzvot have a purpose. They are not the goals in themselves. And the purpose is this kind of love and fear.
So it seems to me that what we  call דביקות "devekut" [attachment with God] is at least some component of what The Torah requires of us.

(note 1) Synthesis is required to explain the mineness and togetherness of one’s mental states, and by linking synthesis to the application of the categories, Kant argues we could not have the experience of the mineness and togetherness of our mental states without applying the categories. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy