The main thing in terms of Reb Nachman is to decide what was a reaction as opposed to what was an essential principle.

The path of reaction is not a bad path. That is to identify one's own faults and to strive to correct them. In the absence of some tzadik  that could guide people, this seems like the closest one can get to figuring out in what areas he of she needs to do the most work

You use your best judgement to see what kinds of actions seem to be the direct and immediate causes of bad things to happen to you and you try to work on those areas.

This is I admit a kind of בדיעבד ad hoc [after the fact] kind of scheme. It is not a Pro-Active Approach. But it seems the best thing to do in the absence of any other kind of reliable guide.
Reb Nachman seems to have taken this approach in his being against doctors. It is clear that he was reacting to the dismal state of medicine in his days [though it is arguable if there really has been much progress since then.] Reacting to  a bad situation and making some kind of corrective measure is clearly the idea behind measures taken by the sages to make laws to safeguard the Torah.

The Rambam in the Guide says many of the Laws of the Torah are in fact Divine safeguards against flaws in human nature.

The main thing in terms of Reb Nachman is to decide what was a reaction  as opposed to what was an essential principle.

בבא מציעא י''ד:ב תוספות says the argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד is the same as their argument as on page ק''א. But on page ק''א the גמרא concludes that there really is no argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page ק''א there is no argument and on page י''ד there is, how can תוספות say it is the same law in both places?


בבא מציעא י''ד: ב תוספות אומר הטיעון בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד זהה לטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. אבל בעמוד ק''א הגמרא מסכמת כי באמת אין שום טיעון כי הם דברו על מצבים שונים. אז אם בעמוד ק''א אין ויכוח ובעמוד י''ד קיים ויכוח, איך תוספות יכול להגיד שזה אותו דבר ואותו החוק בשני המקומות?

To answer this question, it is possible to answer that תוספות holds there is no argument between רב and שמואל on page י''ד  and that that is the exact explanation of their argument on page ק''א. That is  in the שיטת תוספות  ידו על העליונה means he gets the קרן ושבח and ידו על התחתונה means  he gets only the קרן and the first case is when the שדה is עשוי לטעת and the other case is when it is not.


כדי לענות על שאלה זו, אפשר לענות  שתוספות מחזיק שאין ויכוח בין רב לבין שמואל בעמוד י''ד, וכי זהו ההסבר המדויק של הטיעון שלהם בעמוד ק''א. כלומר לפי שיטת התוספות ידו על העליונה אומר שהוא יקבל את הקרן ושבח, וידו על התחתונה אומר שהוא מקבל רק את הקרן.  המקרה הראשון הוא כאשר השדה הוא עשוי לטוע והמקרה השני הוא כאשר הוא לא.

Bava Metzia page 14b Tosphot says the argument between Rav and Shmuel on page 14 is the same as their argument as on page 101. But on page 101 the gemara concludes that there really is not argument because the spoke about different situations. So if on page 101 there is no argument and on page 14 there is how can Tosphot say it is the same law in both places?

I think that there have been others that have thought the idea of a synthesis between Torah and Reason is in some need a revision after the 800 years since the Guide for the Perplexed. The basic problem starts with the fact that 20th century philosophy is obviously false and based on mistaken ideas. The ideas starts out innocuously enough with some good  suggestions from Frege about expanding the category  of a priori. But then it devolved into pure incoherent nonsense. The Ari [Isaac Luria] did not fare much better.
So the first task is to identify what needs to be rejected.

The Nefesh HaChaim of Reb Chaim from Volloshin certainly does a great job in terms of one half of this problem. And The Rambam in the Guide does a great job with the other half. The problem is really how to put both together.
The point almost all religious people are affected by the delusion of moral superiority along with a assortment of various fantasies.. Non religious people have their own set of different kinds of delusions. Finding the right balance is essential,- along with some way of safeguarding that balance.

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. The רשב''ם holds  בפרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף

The proof of רב שך that the רמב''ם hold by the רשב''ם is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the רמב''ם would be holding like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the רשב''ם. If he can pay back any שווה כסף Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

Besides that to seems to me that the רמב''ם states the הלכה openly like רש''י and the רא''ש that the thief must pay back money. If he could also pay back שווה כסף I think the רמב''ם would have to state that.

רמב''ם ה' גניבה פרק א' הלכה י''ד. הרשב''ם מחזיק בפרק השואל שהגנב יכול להחזיר שווה כסף. ההוכחה של רב שך כי הרמב''ם מהחזיק כהרשב''ם קשה להבין. הנקודה העיקרית שלו היא העובדה כי הבעלים של האובייקט יכולים לבקש בחזרה את החלקים. הנקודה היא שאם הרמב''ם  מחזיק כמו רש''י והרא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כלי שלם או כסף, אז לשלם בחזרה את השברים לא מסתדר עם זה. אבל כמו שאני רואה את זה,  זה גם אינו מתאים עם הרשב''ם. אם הוא יכול להחזיר שווה כסף אז מה נותן לבעל הזכות לבקש אלה דווקא? חוץ מזה  נראה לי כי הרמב''ם קובע הלכה בגלוי כמו רש''י ואת רא''ש כי הגנב חייב להחזיר כסף [דמים] . אם הוא יכול גם להחזיר שווה כסף אני חושב שהרמב''ם יצטרך להצהיר על זה.

Rambam laws of theft. Chapter 1, law 14.

Rambam laws of theft 1:14. The Rashbam holds Bava Metzia פרק השואל the thief can pay back שווה כסף [not just money, but rather anything that is worth money.]

The proof of Rav Shach that the Rambam hold by the Rashbam is hard to understand.
His main point is the fact that the owner of the object can ask for the pieces back.
The point is that if the Rambam would be holding like Rashi and the Rosh that the thief must pay back unbroken vessels or money, then paying back the broken pieces does not fit with that. But the way I see it neither does it fit with the Rashbam. If he can pay back any שווה כסף (anything that is worth money). Then what gives the owner the right to ask for those piece specifically?

That is one way or the other we need to find some reason the owner can ask for the pieces back. But what ever that reason is can not have anything to do with the argument between the Rashbam and Rashi and the Rosh.

This was the last idea I had before I broke my leg. [I called for help and some people called an ambulance and took me to the local hospital.] ]

It would be a worth while project to defend the basic Litvak path of straight Torah based on the insights of my predecessors. That would mean making full use of  Ari and the Kant and Hegel while not drifting off into mysticism nor sterile philosophy..
This would not be all that different than the Rambam's Guide. But it would need someone of that kind of stature to do this.[I mean to say I would come out with a neo Platonic approach anyway just like the Rambam did.]

My own personal defense of Torah really began with Dr Kelley Ross's web site where he has an approach based on Kant, Schopenhauer, and Fries. It of course did not hurt that I was aware of the Ari's  interpretations of Torah based on the Talmud and his own insights.
But this has all been personal, and rarely do I ever share insights in this regard.
And any serious effort in this regard would have to take into account the important results of Hegel. So even to get the philosophical part of this project worked out could not be easy as it would have to plow a middle path between the Kant School of Dr. Ross and Hegel.--no easy task.

Or one could  just simply depend on the Rambam's Guide which is a perfectly valid approach. But it seems that after the Ari and Kant and Hegel there is considerable work to be done.