I have vision about the importance of learning Torah as the central focus. But it is like a star in the center of a constellation of related values..
Some people have related values but lack the central focus.

The basic way this works is in the context of an authentic Litvak yeshiva. In such a place the areas of focus become clear. 

What this weary world needs most is clarity of vision

What this weary world needs most is clarity of vision. The problem that most people get into is they find some value they can see is clear and good. Yet they are unaware that that value is connected to other values which are far from good or decent. No value is a value unto itself but is always connected to other values and often those other values are downright evil.
I could go on with many examples but I am sure you can provide your own examples since thss phenomenon is so widespread.


Most consciousness traps work in this way. They emphasis some good and true area of value but unseen with that area are other areas of values that are negative.
For this reason there really is no other choice but to be committed to simple learning Torah and doing what it says.--especially the Ten Commandments and to learn Rav Shach's Avi Ezri and to volunteer for the IDF.

As I think about Rav Shach's treatment of the Rambam, laws of Acquisition 20:14 and 15 I realize there is something deep and subtle going on there that I have not yet grasped. What makes the case of the exchange of animals a case where we consider the owner of the cow to have not yet taken possession of the חמור  even though the owner of the חמור has taken possession of the cow? It is true that the חמור has not yet come into his domain but he still owns it.

The answer to this question is that the essential thing here is it is the domain that matters, not ownership. This is like we see in the Rambam laws of Acquisition 22:9. if one has an object that he has given to another for safekeeping, he can still give it away or sell it because it is considered to be in his domain. But if the person he gave it to for safekeeping denies the whole thing, then the owner can no longer sell it of give it away because it is no considered any longer to be in his domain.
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 רמב''ם , ה'מכירה  פרק כ' הלכה י''ד והלכה ט''ו.  What makes the case of the exchange of animals a case where we consider the owner of the cow to have not yet taken possession of the חמור  even though the בעל of the חמור has taken possession of the cow? It is true that the חמור has not yet come into his domain but he still owns it.

The answer to this question is that the essential thing here is it is the רשות that matters, not ownership. This is like we see in the רמב''ם , ה'מכירה  פרק כ''ב הלכה ט . if one has an object that he has given to another for safekeeping, he can still give it away or sell it because it is considered to be in his domain. But if the person he gave it to for safekeeping denies the whole thing, then the owner can no longer sell it of give it away because it is no considered any longer to be in his  רשות.

 רמב''ם, ה' מכירה פרק כ" הלכה י''ד והלכה ט''ו. מה שהופך את המקרה של חילופי חיות מקרה שבו אנו רואים את הבעלים של הפרה  כמו שלא לקח עדיין ברשותו את החמור אף שהבעלים של החמור קנו  את הפרה?  נכון כי החמור טרם הגיע אל התחום שלו אבל הוא עדיין החמור של בעלים של הפרה. התשובה לשאלה זו היא כי הדבר העקרי הנה הוא הרשות שחשובה, לא בעלות. זה כמו שאנו רואים רמב''ם, ה' מכירה פרק כ''ב הלכה ט'. אם לאחד יש אובייקט שהוא נתן למשנהו למשמרת, הוא עדיין יכול לתת אותו או למכור אתו כי זה נחשב בתחום שלו. אבל אם האדם  שניתן לו למשמרת מכחיש את העניין, אז הבעלים כבר לא יכולים למכור אותו או לתת אותו כי הוא לא נחשב עוד להיות ברשות שלו.

So now that I have arrived at this amazing conclusion that what matters here is רשות, not ownership, it is possible to raise a question on Rav Shach. He brings the Tosephta that says  המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשוך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו and says that can not be talking about the רשות But rather the time of the קנין. To answer  this question let me just say if this teaching would be like the sages then clearly there would be no question that the seller would have to bring a proof that the theft happened after the sale. But this is סומכוס and so we are not discussing who has to bring a proof. the only question is the time of the sale in relation to the time of the theft.


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 I am really not sure of what is going on in the רמב''ם and in רב שך. The way I understood the רמב''ם ה' מכירה כ:י''ד is when there is an exchange of animals and one is found dead that the seller of that animal has to bring the proof. That is different than in רמב''ם ה' מכירה כ:ט''ו in which an animal is found טרף  in which case the buyer has to bring a proof.  I thought and I think the reason for the difference is חזקת הגוף. The animal had חזקת כשרות until the last possible moment. In the case the גמרא brings in כתובות ע''ו י''ב the bride was found with a blemish and the father has to bring a proof it happened after the engagement. So there we do not go by חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף. Nor in the exchange of two animals do we go by חזקת הגוף that it was alive until the last possible minute. Perhaps it is possible to suggest a a reason for the רמב''ם  that is based on תוספות in נידה ב:ב that חזקת השתא cancels חזקה מעיקרא unless some other חזקה comes along to strengthen the חזקה מעיקרא? But then why would that not work for the טבח In ה' מיכרה כ:ט''ו

I had one or two more points to make today in reference to the ideas I rote own yesterday on Rav Shach's question on the Tosephta.
First of all I am really not sure of what is going on in the Rambam and in Rav Shach. The way I understood the Rambam [Laws of Acquisition 20:14] is when there is an exchange of animals and one is found dead that the seller of that animal has to bring the proof. That is different than in ch 20 law 15 in which an animal is found Treif [it had a puncture in its lung] in which case the buyer has to bring a proof.  I thought and I think the reason for the difference is חזקת הגוף. The animal had חזקת כשרות until the last possible moment. In the case the gemara brings in Ketuboth 76B the bride was found with a blemish and the father has to bring a proof it happened after the engagement. So there we do not go by חזקת כשרות and חזקת הגוף. Nor in the exchange of two animals do we go by חזקת הגוף that it was alive until the last possible minute. Perhaps it is possible to suggest a a reason for the Rambam that is based on Tosphot in Nida page 2b that חזקת השתא cancels חזקה מעיקרא unless some other חזקה comes along to strengthen the חזקה מעיקרא? But then why would that not work for the טבח In ה' מיכרה כ:ט''ו








On a side issue The Ketzot says in a case an object was stolen and it is not know if it was before or after the קנין the proof is upon the buyer. Rav Shach simply points out this is in contradiction to both the Rambam and Rav Joseph Karo-but like almost all other Rishonim like the Rosh and the Ran.

The final idea today is the Ari, Isaac Luria. To intend the intentions can be a long and difficult process. Therefore it is  a good idea to get either the small Sidur of the Reshash or the large one.

The small one seems good to me but I have heard that Rav Mordedchai Sharabi said there were some mistakes in it. I myself used the large one [which has the intentions of the Ari in expanded form by the Grandson of the Reshash.] If one is lacking the background for that I think the best idea is to learn  the Eitz Chaim of the Ari and Reb Chaim Vital.  When to do this? I think after having finished Shas twice. {That is what Reb Shmuel Berenbaum told me.} To do this learning however for me at this point seems to be pointless but I still can see its great value for people that are sensitive to that area of value.

[The Ashlag edition of  the writings of the Arizal are the best.] In any case when it comes to Kabalah, the Ashkenazim world is way too filled with the teachings of the Sitra Achra in disguise.

The תוספתא ב''מ פרק ג'  says המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו This is clearly like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים.  In the רמב''ם laws of מכירה כ:י''ד רב שך says clearly the argument is when the theft occurred before or after the קנין. This can not be they are arguing  in whose domain the animal was when it was stolen, because that would not be דררא דממונא. We need they should themselves be in doubt for there to be דררא דממונא
But then it should be a simple case of מי שנולד הספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה. That is the question of Rav Shach
I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question based on the version of the גמרא in ב''מ page ק' that says אלא הא מני סומכוס. That is the גמרא there says that סומכוס says ממון המוטל בספק חולקים even when the animal there gave birth in the domain of the seller. Thus even when there is חזקת רשות we find that סומכוס still says his law.

התוספתא ב''מ פרק ג' אומרת המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו. זהו בבירור כסומכוס, - ממון המוטל בספק חולקים. ברמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ:י''ד רב שך אומר בבירור הטענות הן בזמן הגניבה התרחשה לפני או אחרי קנין. זה לא יכול להיות שהם מתווכחים על התחום אשר החיה הייתה כשנגנבה משום שזה לא יהיה דררא דממונא. אנחנו צריכים שטוענים יהיו  בספק כדי שיהיה דררא דממונא. אבל אז רב שך שאול שזה צריך להיות שאלה פשוטה של מי שנולד ספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה גם לבסומכוס. ברצוני להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו מבוססת על הגרסה של הגמרא בב''מ דף ק. שאומרת "אלא הא מני סומכוס". זוהי שגמרא שם אומרת כי סומכוס אומר ממון מוטל בספק חולקים גם כאשר החיה הולידה בתחום המוכר. לכן גם כאשר קיימת חזקת רשות אנו מוצאים כי סומכוס עדיין אומר החוק שלו.

I still am puzzled about some things here like the fact that the Tosephta seems to need to be explained as the question is when did the theft occur before or after the acquisition while in the Rambam Laws of Acquisition 20:14 and 20:15 the question is in whose domain did the problem occur.

The Tosephta (BM ch 3) says המוכר פרה לחבירו ונגנבה זה אומר ברשותך נגנבה וזה אומר ברשותך יחלוקו This is clearly like Sumchos ממון המוטל בספק חולקים.  Rav Shach says clearly the argument is when the theft occurred before or after the קנין. This can not be they are arguing  in whose domain the animal as when it was stolen because that would not be דררא דממונא. we need they should themselves be in doubt for there to be דררא דממונא
But then it should be a simple case of מי שנולד הספק ברשותו עליו להביא את הראיה
I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question based on the version of the Gemara in BM page 100 that says אלא הא מני סומכוס. That is the gemara there says that סומכוס says ממון המוטל בספק חולקים even when the animal there gave birth in the domain of the seller. Thus even when there is חזקת רשות we find that סומכוס still says his law.