There was once a  student of Rav Isaac Hutner in Israel.
Rav Isaac Hutner had already started  Chaim Berlin in N.Y.

  This student got involved in Breslov.
Rav Hutner called him into his office and told him it is one or the other,  "If you are going to be Breslov, you can't learn here."
When he was called in Rav Hutner had a Guide For The Perplexed on his desk. In Breslov that is equivalent to having the most offensive book possible in front of your face.

  I have a reason for bringing this story here. It is not what one would think. This student was showing up for the regular two sessions of the --morning and afternoon but he would go to Breslov [Rechov Salant] to pray at night. Rav Hutner did not have a problem with that.
Nor did he have a problem with Nachman from Breslov and Uman. He said if it would happen that someone would find  a book of  Nachman that had been hidden, he would not sleep until he got a copy of it. And for a whole year his main learning besides Gemara was the Lekutai Moharan of  Nachman of Breslov. (In Chaim Berlin it was on his learning shtender [desk] a entire year.)
  The point is rather that Brelsov is a cult. They use the greatness of  Nachman and his advice to draw people into their cult.  And the cult of Breslov has nothing to do with Torah or with  Nachman.
The advice and ideas of  Nachman are used as conscious  traps to lure people in.

   A few months went by a the student was a wandering American student  in Israel in a time when there was no such entity. Lost and forlorn. Eventually Rav Freifeld called Rav Hunter and begged him to let him back in.
  The thing to understand here that you do not see on the surface level of this story is that Rav Hutner was building a kind of Noah's Ark. Not before the flood (the world outside of Torah), but after the flood is already here. And this student was part of the inner circle. He was being groomed for greatness you might say. I can relate to this because I had a similar type of relationship with Rav Freifeld until I too upset the boat.


  There is a lot to discuss here and I have made this essay to short. I hope to fill in some gaps for people but I have had  along day and I had plenty of other things I wanted to discuss on the Internet like the offering the high priest has to bring in he does idolatry by accident. Also the subject of Israel Salanter. Also the Aristotelian approach of the Rambam and the Neo-Platonic of the Ramban (Nachmanides, רמב''ן).The way to differentiate when you are talking is to say "Ramban" with the accent on the last syllable, and Rambam with emphasis on the first.

Belief in a Tzadik

In terms of the status of a tzadik [saint] and how important it is to be close to him or her in order to achieve the Garden of Eden (or be saved from eternal damnation) seems to be an argument among different people. That is not only do they argue about whom is the tzadik that one should believe in, but even if you get a whole group of people that believe in one particular tzadik, it is difficult to get them to agree on how much one should believe in that tzadik. 

Some would suggest a strong position. That believing in chasidut is everything and one who does not believe is damned. Others might take weak position. That it is good to believe, but not so essential as the more radical opinion.

Then,  is the question: "What exactly is it one is supposed to believe about the tzadik?" Or who could be considered a valid line of tradition coming from him? Or who is a valid disciple, and who is a bad disciple?

But if we look at the Torah itself, we do not find that believing in any tzadik is essential.

The Torah itself looks like a very radical kind of Monotheism.

If we look in the Rambam/Maimonides it seems clear that the Torah was willing to make concessions for people in order to bring them to radical monotheism. (E.g, service in the Temple was so people don't go and offer sacrifices to idols instead.) It looks like the opinion of the Torah is pure unadulterated Monotheism and yet she is willing to make allowances for human frailty.
There is a debate in fact about this. Some people hold that the Torah is already radical monotheism. Others hold the Torah is intending to lead people to radical monotheism  but  that she is willing to make allowances for people that need help to get there. You can probably think of plenty of examples on your own but let me just mention one that comes to mind right now. Elimelech was the king of the Philishtim (Phoenicians) and he was visited by God in a dream and told to go to Avraham [Abraham] to ask Avraham to pray for him. You could say that it would have been better for him to pray to God directly but God knew he was not going to do so, so he told him to ask Avraham. Jacob said "The angel that has saved me from all my troubles should bless the children." Who was this angel? And would not this count as praying to a Mediator? [And the Rambam considered praying to a mediator is the very essence of idolatry]

 

When the Sanhedrin makes a mistake and allows idolatry [or any other of the 42 types of sin for which one brings a sin offering] and there is a person תלמיד שהגיע להוראה that knows they made  a mistake and depends on their decision, then he has to bring his own sacrifice.  [That is the first teaching (Mishna משנה) in tractate Horayot הוריות] But if he actually knows it is forbidden is not he doing it on purpose? (You can't bring a sacrifice for doing a sin on  purpose). The Gemara says it means he thought mistakenly that there is mitzvah to listen to the Sanhedrin even when you know they are wrong. But since there is no such mitzvah, he must bring a sin offering. This is not what you hear in Shabat table Judaism.


But also this brings up the interesting subject of what  the Mishna means by a disciple that has reaches the ability to make a decision [תלמיד שהגיע להוראה]. The Gemara explains this means he has finished Shas [Talmud] and understands it (גמיר וסביר).


At any rate to get to the one point I have been trying to get to through this essay. the two points of Reb Chaim from Voloshin. [Disciple of the Gra]. No favoritism  in decision making. And the law of the Gemara.
This came up in a letter he wrote to a famous rabbi who had made a halacha decision Reb Chaim knew was wrong. He points out in the\ letter he is only interested in the law Gemara. And also that he does not care who makes a halacha decision not like the Gemara. They are wrong period. And this relates to what I was saying at the beginning of this essay. Ordination stopped after Yehuda the prince and Ravina and Rav Ashi were the end of horah the end of the period of decision making (סוף הוראה)
The Maharshal quotes the Rambam about this idea that the period of decision making ended with the last amoraim. And this gives this idea extra weight since the Maharshal was no fan of the Mishna Torah of the Rambam. The fact that people today can claim halachic authority going back to Sinai and are not laughed out of town shows how far we have fallen.

Now here is where this essay should have started-on the question of how to determine a  particular law based on the Talmud and poskim. But I have had a long day. In short what responsible people do is  learn the Gemara with the Rosh and then the Tur with the Beit Yoseph. And that seems in fact to the best way in a practical sense. But to go into the whole topic right now is difficult.

 Basically the Gemara gives the rules for how the decision is reached when you are in a Mishna. Also there are a few rules in the Gemara itself to decide between Amoraim. The commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch  almost always disagree with the decision of the Shulchan Aruch ( שלחן ערוך) based on the Gemara itself or what they call the "poskim" which in their terminology means Rishonim [medieval authorities]. The term was misappropriated for Achronim and is now used as a weasel word.

Doing idolatry by accident

Doing idolatry or any of 42 types of sin by accident means one has to bring a sin offering

There are 43 types of sin for which one brings a sin offering. Six of them one brings a offering that goes up and down.[קרבן עולה ויורד] A rich person brings a goat. A poor person brings two turtle doves. a dirt poor person brings a flour offering. The others not so. The others for people like you and me we would have to bring either  a female from goats or  sheep. But idolatry is different. Everyone has to bring a she goat.Even the high priest. and even the king. but there is a difference between a high priest and the average person. The high priest has to have both a mistaken decision about the law and also be accidental.  העלם דבר עם שגגת מעשה
Abyee uses this fact to show that there can be such a thing an accidental idolatry.
 For if idolatry needs intention then how could there ever be such a thing as doing it by accident.? If you do it by accident without intention you did nothing at all!
[To see this in the Torah [the Old Testament] you have to go to the beginning of Leviticus where it talks about sin offerings and divides the subject into the congregation and the high priest and the individual. And then you have to go to the Book of Numbers [ch. 15] where it discuss the sacrifices for transgressing the sin of idolatry for the individual and the entire congregation, and it leaves out the high priest]





I want to go into all these issues. But I also want to go into  a side issue about the idea of a mistaken decision.  No everyone agrees that the high priest has to make a mistaken decision in order to bring a sin offering for idolatry. Yehuda the Prince says all he needs is to do it by accident. But the Sanhedrin definitely needs to make a mistaken decision in order to bring a sacrifice.
That is: for the Sanhedrin to bring a sin offering they have to rule about some aspect of one of the 43 types of sin that it is allowed and the majority of the Jewish people living in Israel have to follow that decision and act on it. Then they bring twelve oxen and twelve goats.
But if there is an individual who knows that the Sanhedrin made  a mistake and he acts on their decision thinking mistakenly that it is a mitzvah to listen to the sages, then he has to bring his own sacrifice.

The first thing you will ask is the Rashi "Even if they tell you left is right and right is left." That Rashi is brought in the subject of Zaken Mamre. There a person goes publicly against the Sanhedrin.
So now everything is clear. When you know the Sanhedrin made  a mistake you are not allowed to listen to them. But also you are not allowed to make a public statement against them.

I admit Musar (Classical ethics from the Middle Ages) is only a first order theory in ethics

I admit Musar מוסר (Classical Ethics from the Middle Ages) is only a first order theory in ethics, and that this fact is what makes it uninteresting, and perhaps even not effective. The very first Musar book,The Duties of the Heart [חובות לבבות] did however put a second order theory in the beginning of his book. It is a modification of neo-Platonism. But Musar was not meant to be second order (Meta-Musar). But there were people that went through the trouble to give a second order theory, e.g, Saadia Geon, Maimonides (the Rambam). . [ But his basic focus is to find justification for the commandments of God.] A kind of preliminary approach can be found for the commandments based on a mystic approach can be found in the writings of Isaac Luria, but he is dealing with connections in higher worlds and has not brought his ideas down to the human level. But to accept any part of the mystic approach you have to get over the hurdle that Kant made.(note 1) Or you could dispense with the mystic approach completely and settle for the Metaphysical Aristotelian approach of the Rambam/Maimonides or the metaphysical Neo Platonic approach of Saadia Geon and the Duties of the Heart.

My suggestion is to learn Musar with its underlying set of justifications. It is the difference between a doctor telling a person, "Don't eat  such and such" and a doctor telling the same person "Don't eat such and such a thing because you will die in three months if you do, and the reason is that you are allergic to it and it has a cumulative effect." The only problem with this idea is that it is time consuming.
(note 1) You could get over this hurdle with Schopenhauer. But if one tries to ignore it I think one will trip and fall. Just imagine you are running a four laps around the field and there are hurdles in front of you. And you decide to think positive :"there is no hurdle".
Hegal  also is a highly metaphysical system

  I tend to think of Hegel as a kind of intuitionist along the lines of Prichard. The reason I tend to trust Kelly Ross is on philosophical issues I have spend some time learning I have found him to be remarkably insightful. So I tend to trust him also on issue like Hegel in which I know little. It is the same reason that when I learn Talmud with my learning partner and we disagree that I tend to think that he is probably right --since after arguing with him I usually find out that in fact he did understand the material better than me. It is called "faith in the wise."
I think everyone can agree that Hegel has some important points. But he falls flat on his face when he discuss social issues. His best work is analysis of other philosophers and also in making his own metaphysical system.

But the world has fallen into ignorance. Many people claim to be experts in Torah without having done the work.

Torah does not mean Jewish history. It means a basic understanding of the Oral and written Law. That means two things. (1) General knowledge of Shas and Poskim (The 60 tractates of the Talmud and Rif Rambam, Rosh, Tur, Beit Yoseph and Shulchan Aruch. and it is desirable also to have knowledge of the writings of the Remak and Isaac Luria and the books of Jewish philosophy by Maimonides and Saadia Geon in order to understand the basic world view of the Torah

Idolatry.

Does one need intension is be liable?

"One who serves idols from love or fear, Abyee said is liable and Rava said he is not liable." (Sanhedrin 61b)

How does this fit the Mishna (page 60b), "One who serves idols or bows or sacrifices or burns or pours or who accepts it as his god and says 'you are my god is liable.'"

I asked this a few days ago one one of my blogs. Today I want to say over the question again and give a possible answer.
 The question is that if accepting it as his god is not necessary, then what does Abyee do with the end of the Mishna? If it is necessary, then what does Rava do with the beginning of the Mishna?

I hope this question is clear to people. I went into more detail somewhere else on some this blog or the Wine  Women and Transcendence blog.
At ant rate here is my answer. First let's look at the Gemara [Talmud]. The Gemara starts off with Abyee wanting to use this Mishna as a proof, and the Gemara pushes off the proof with a statement of Rabbi Jeremiah who says the first statement of the Mishna means service like its way (the usual way of the idol). From this we see Abyee thought the Mishna is a proof. It occurred to me that Abyee must be thinking that the juxtaposition of the first five cases against the last case means that the first cases don't need the condition of accepting as ones god. And Rava must be thinking that the Mishna is thinking that it only needs to mention this condition in the last clause because there you might think you don't need it since he is saying openly he accepts the idol as his god.

That is all I have to say about this. I had another idea about the Baal Hameor but maybe I will write about that elsewhere. (note 1) I also have an idea about Kant I have wanted to write about for a  few days (mainly the fact that his "thing in itself" the "dinge an sich" is a position in epistemology, not metaphysics. (Kant says it exists but its character depends on the subject ) That has been noted before by Dr. Kelly Ross in California but he derives it from a short statement of Kant, while I wanted to show that it is a central position of Kant but I just have not been able to find time for an essay about this). [Kant is very important in order to understand the Rambam but I just can't go into this issue right now]

I also would like to go into some detail about the idea that Abyee uses for a proof about the high priest having to bring a sacrifice if he make a mistake about what is considered idolatry. The Sanhedrin also does this and I wanted to go into some detail showing how this contradicts the idea of Daat Torah. But no time today.

(note 1) That his idea that sacrifice exodus 22 would only exclude service in  a way of honor to idols that one usually sacrifices to and not to other kinds of idols makes sense. You can see this by this idea: what does sacrifice tell us-not to sacrifice to idols that one usually serves in some other manner or idols that in fact one usually sacrifices to. That excludes kissing or hugging or any other type of serve to those particular idols. But it does not tell us anything about other kinds of idols.  
  That is, to acquit a way of honor or dishonor to idols that such is not their way we need the verse, "How do they serve?" Deuteronomy 12. This is not really a big deal but it does show how what the Meor Hagadol is saying is not just some ad hoc distinction but is required by the logic o the subject.