Does one need intension is be liable?
"One who serves idols from love or fear, Abyee said is liable and Rava said he is not liable." (Sanhedrin 61b)
How does this fit the Mishna (page 60b), "One who serves idols or bows or sacrifices or burns or pours or who accepts it as his god and says 'you are my god is liable.'"
I asked this a few days ago one one of my blogs. Today I want to say over the question again and give a possible answer.
The question is that if accepting it as his god is not necessary, then what does Abyee do with the end of the Mishna? If it is necessary, then what does Rava do with the beginning of the Mishna?
I hope this question is clear to people. I went into more detail somewhere else on some this blog or the Wine Women and Transcendence blog.
At ant rate here is my answer. First let's look at the Gemara [Talmud]. The Gemara starts off with Abyee wanting to use this Mishna as a proof, and the Gemara pushes off the proof with a statement of Rabbi Jeremiah who says the first statement of the Mishna means service like its way (the usual way of the idol). From this we see Abyee thought the Mishna is a proof. It occurred to me that Abyee must be thinking that the juxtaposition of the first five cases against the last case means that the first cases don't need the condition of accepting as ones god. And Rava must be thinking that the Mishna is thinking that it only needs to mention this condition in the last clause because there you might think you don't need it since he is saying openly he accepts the idol as his god.
That is all I have to say about this. I had another idea about the Baal Hameor but maybe I will write about that elsewhere. (note 1) I also have an idea about Kant I have wanted to write about for a few days (mainly the fact that his "thing in itself" the "dinge an sich" is a position in epistemology, not metaphysics. (Kant says it exists but its character depends on the subject ) That has been noted before by Dr. Kelly Ross in California but he derives it from a short statement of Kant, while I wanted to show that it is a central position of Kant but I just have not been able to find time for an essay about this). [Kant is very important in order to understand the Rambam but I just can't go into this issue right now]
I also would like to go into some detail about the idea that Abyee uses for a proof about the high priest having to bring a sacrifice if he make a mistake about what is considered idolatry. The Sanhedrin also does this and I wanted to go into some detail showing how this contradicts the idea of Daat Torah. But no time today.
(note 1) That his idea that sacrifice exodus 22 would only exclude service in a way of honor to idols that one usually sacrifices to and not to other kinds of idols makes sense. You can see this by this idea: what does sacrifice tell us-not to sacrifice to idols that one usually serves in some other manner or idols that in fact one usually sacrifices to. That excludes kissing or hugging or any other type of serve to those particular idols. But it does not tell us anything about other kinds of idols.
That is, to acquit a way of honor or dishonor to idols that such is not their way we need the verse, "How do they serve?" Deuteronomy 12. This is not really a big deal but it does show how what the Meor Hagadol is saying is not just some ad hoc distinction but is required by the logic o the subject.
"One who serves idols from love or fear, Abyee said is liable and Rava said he is not liable." (Sanhedrin 61b)
How does this fit the Mishna (page 60b), "One who serves idols or bows or sacrifices or burns or pours or who accepts it as his god and says 'you are my god is liable.'"
I asked this a few days ago one one of my blogs. Today I want to say over the question again and give a possible answer.
The question is that if accepting it as his god is not necessary, then what does Abyee do with the end of the Mishna? If it is necessary, then what does Rava do with the beginning of the Mishna?
I hope this question is clear to people. I went into more detail somewhere else on some this blog or the Wine Women and Transcendence blog.
At ant rate here is my answer. First let's look at the Gemara [Talmud]. The Gemara starts off with Abyee wanting to use this Mishna as a proof, and the Gemara pushes off the proof with a statement of Rabbi Jeremiah who says the first statement of the Mishna means service like its way (the usual way of the idol). From this we see Abyee thought the Mishna is a proof. It occurred to me that Abyee must be thinking that the juxtaposition of the first five cases against the last case means that the first cases don't need the condition of accepting as ones god. And Rava must be thinking that the Mishna is thinking that it only needs to mention this condition in the last clause because there you might think you don't need it since he is saying openly he accepts the idol as his god.
That is all I have to say about this. I had another idea about the Baal Hameor but maybe I will write about that elsewhere. (note 1) I also have an idea about Kant I have wanted to write about for a few days (mainly the fact that his "thing in itself" the "dinge an sich" is a position in epistemology, not metaphysics. (Kant says it exists but its character depends on the subject ) That has been noted before by Dr. Kelly Ross in California but he derives it from a short statement of Kant, while I wanted to show that it is a central position of Kant but I just have not been able to find time for an essay about this). [Kant is very important in order to understand the Rambam but I just can't go into this issue right now]
I also would like to go into some detail about the idea that Abyee uses for a proof about the high priest having to bring a sacrifice if he make a mistake about what is considered idolatry. The Sanhedrin also does this and I wanted to go into some detail showing how this contradicts the idea of Daat Torah. But no time today.
(note 1) That his idea that sacrifice exodus 22 would only exclude service in a way of honor to idols that one usually sacrifices to and not to other kinds of idols makes sense. You can see this by this idea: what does sacrifice tell us-not to sacrifice to idols that one usually serves in some other manner or idols that in fact one usually sacrifices to. That excludes kissing or hugging or any other type of serve to those particular idols. But it does not tell us anything about other kinds of idols.
That is, to acquit a way of honor or dishonor to idols that such is not their way we need the verse, "How do they serve?" Deuteronomy 12. This is not really a big deal but it does show how what the Meor Hagadol is saying is not just some ad hoc distinction but is required by the logic o the subject.
