za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format Music has been numbered from 1 to 100 in each series A to Z. Then started again from "za". However many files are missing or lost. Most were never put on line. There are however older files with names like black hole or anything I could think of at the time. There is a file by the name of mathematics and another by name "orchetra"--for that it was written for

misuse of a philosophy. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs

If every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory, but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed. Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular, the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently, and held that one need to learn the Organum of Aristotle (known by the name of the seven wisdoms). It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam are ignored. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs. To be clear, I prefer the distilled approach of Kelley Ross who combines Kant with Leonard Nelson and Schopenhauer. But, I still see great value in Hegel and a more modern great thinker, Michael Huemer of the Intuitionist approach. still I think the Kelley Ross approach is the best.{friesian.com.} Reichenbach had more sense than the Friesian school when it came to Relativity, so to be able to create a consistent system, the Friesian school did not have much to work with until Kelley Ross who managed to put together the various strands of thought into a consistent system. [However he is ignored in Germany, which is sad. For that approach needs modification.] Rav Nachman of Breslov dismissed learning philosophy completely, and there is a good point to that as we can see nowadays how crazy it can get. But still, I see great values in a few of them, e.g. the minor dialogoes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fries, Hegel,Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross.

the first mishna in Bava Batra המשנה הראשונה בבבא בתרא

Tosphot holds in first mishna in Bava Batra the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of derara demomona. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “We both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the gemara says openly that that is not a case of derara demomona. Now the case of derara demomona, Tosphot often says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their pleas, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the gemara in Bava Batra (page 35 side B) holds` derara demomona is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the gemara in Bava Metzia (page 3) says derara demomona is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in Bava Batra where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of derara demomona to be when they object could belong to both. later note: Rav shach brings Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 97b and the beginning of perek 10 that derara demomona is that each is considered to be holding the object. The Rabbainu Yona (bava batra page four and page 35) (who is brought by Rav Isar Meltzer) holds derara demomona is that the object is tied or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the rashbam and Tur as brought by Rav Nachum of the Mir ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of derara demomona in Bava Batra 35a that it means both might own the object. But if you hold derara demomona is like the gemara in Bava Mezia page 3a that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the ketzot HaChoshen that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two gemaras differ about derara demomona is possible to see in the language in Bava Batra 35 "it [the field that each claim that it belong to him] cannot be derara demomona because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so derara demomona means it can belong to both. In Bava Metzia page 3a it says "THE garment that both are holding cannot be derara demomona because it might belong to both" Thus if it can belong to both together then it cannot be derara demomona I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________ תוספות holds in first משנה in בבבא בתרא the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of דררא דממונא. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “we both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the גמרא says openly that that is not a case of דררא דממונא.. Now, the case of דררא דממונא, often תוספות says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their טענות, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the גמרא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) holds דררא דממונא is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the גמרא in בבא מציעא (page ג') says דררא דממונא is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in בבא בתרא where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of דררא דממונא to be when the object could belong to both. note: רב שך brings תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב and the beginning of פרק י' הבית והעליה that דררא דממונא is that each is considered to be holding the object. The רבינו יומה (who is brought by רב איסר מלצר) holds דררא דממונא is that the object is שייך or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the רשב''ם and טור as brought by רב נחום of the מיר ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of דררא דממונא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) that it means both might own the object. But if you hold דררא דממונא like the גמרא in בבא מציעא page ג' ע''א that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the קצות החושן that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two גמרות differ about דררא דממונא is possible to see in the language in בבא בתרא ל''ה "it cannot be דררא דממונא because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so דררא דממונא mean it can belong to both. In בבא מציעא ג' ע''א it says it cannot be דררא דממונא because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be דררא דממונא I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תוספות אוחז במשנה ראשונה בבבא בתרא דין חומה בחצר בין שני שותפים מתחלק שווה בשווה כיון שהוא דין דררא דממונא. אבל אם היו מחלקים כי שניהם נחשבים כמחזיקים בחומה, אז אם אחד אומר "בניתי את כל החומה", והשני אומר "שנינו בנינו", אז יצטרכו לחלק אותו שלושה רבעים, ורביעית, כמו במקרה של שניים אוחזים בבגד ששם מחלקים שלוש רביעיות ורביעית (כשאחד אומר "הכל שייך לי" והשני אומר "שנינו הבעלים שלו"). (ושם עם שניים אוחזים בבגד, הגמרא אומר בגלוי שזה לא דין דררא דממונא.) עכשיו, במקרה של דררא דממונא, פעמים רבות תוספות אומרים שזה מקרה שלבית הדין יש ספק גם בלי ההסבר שלהם, ולכן שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה בלי בהתייחס לטענות שלהם. כעת הגמרא בבבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''ב מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא כאשר החפץ שהם מתווכחים עליו יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, ואילו הגמרא בבא מציעא (דף ג') אומר דררא דממונא הוא רק כאשר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אלא צריך להיות שייך רק לאחד או לשני, לא לשניהם. לכן, אני חושב שהחוק בבא בתרא שבו הם מחלקים את הקיר באופן שווה חייב לקבוע שההבנה של דררא דממונא היא כשהחפץ יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. הערה: רב שך מביא תוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב ותחילת פרק י' הבית והעליה שדררא דממונא הוא שכל אחד נחשב מחזיק את החפץ. רבינו יונה (בבא בתרא דף ד' ול''ה) (שהביאו רב איסר מלצר) מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא שהחפץ הוא שייך או קשור לכל אדם.(זו גם גישתם של הרשב''ם וטור כפי שהביאו רב נחום מהמיר) אבל, בכל אופן, אני חושב שדין חלוקת החומה הולך בבירור עם הרעיון של דררא דממונא בבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''א) שפירושו של שניהם יכולים להיות בעל החפץ. אבל אם תחזיק דררא דממונא כמו הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ג' ע''א שזה אומר שהחפץ לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אז דין חלוקת הכותל צריך להיות כמו קצות החושן כלומר משום שכל אחד מהם נחשב כמחזיק את הקיר אציין כאן שזה ששני הגמרות נבדלים לגבי דררא דממונא אפשר לראות בלשון בבא בתרא ל''ה "לא יכול להיות זה דררא דממונא כי אם זה שייך לאחד זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשני ואם זה שייך להאחר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לראשון". אז דררא דממונא מתכוון שזה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. בבבא מציעא ג' ע''א כתוב "שזה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא כי זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם" לכן אם זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם יחד אז זה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא אני רוצה להוסיף כאן נקודה שהיא כנראה פשוטה, אבל אני עדיין לא יודע את התשובה. מה אם בחצר אין מספיק מקום שיש חוק שבו אחד יכול להכריח את השני לחלק? {כלומר, אין לו ארבע אמות לכל אחד.} אז אם בכל זאת ישים חומה, האם אתה מחלק את האבנים אם החומה נופלת ולמי שהעמיד את החומה אין הוכחה שהוא עשה את העבודה לבד

za57 E minor midiza57 E minor nwc format

za56 E Flat Major midi za56 nwc

Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot. I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam

There was a great scholar in the Mir who I have just discovered, a Rav Nachum. I  can see great importance in learning his ideas and I might mention here that while Rav shach and Rav Isar Zalman Meltzer generally concentrated their efforts in understanding the Rambam, Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot as was my learning partner, David Bronson in Uman, and also Rav Naftali Yegger in the yeshiva shar Yashuv in New York.  I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David bronson took a definite I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David Bronson took a definite stand that, "Tosfot is always right." Period. But I think that I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam. I think that both Rambam and Tosphot are important. I would like to take use this internet platform to suggest to learn Rav shach and Rav Nachum in each subject, and I also believe that there is a connection between their approaches. however i recommend the approach of balance with a combination of learning in depth along with quike learning--doing the review many time.

za555 midi in A Minor za55 in nwc