I was at the sea and thinking again about פירוש של רב שך

   I was at the sea and thinking again about פירוש של רב שך  of the argument between the חכמים and  ר' שמעון in הלכות of סוטה פרק א חלכה ג. And based on that explanation he explains the רמב''ם. At first I was thinking that it seems that according to רב שך  that the רמב''ם was פוסק like  ר' שמעון against the חכמים, [and that would be a problem if it were the case.] And then it occurred to me that in fact his explanation of the רמב''ם works perfectly. 

  Perhaps I should give a bit of background so what רב שך is saying will become clear. The statement of the חכמים is a מקוה that upon it pure things were prepared. [food was prepared by someone who at first was a nida or anyone who was  impure and went to a מקוה. ] Then the מקוה was found to be lacking the proper volume, ארבעים סאה. All the pure things are unclean whether in a רשות היחיד או רשות הרבים. The גמרא asks from a חבית that is found to be sour. The wine turned to vinegar. This חבית was used for separating tithes. For the last three day all the tithes are considered invalid.  Before these three days all the tithes are in doubt. The first explanation of the גמרא is that the מקוה is the חכמים and the חבית is ר' שמעון.  AND ר' שמעון would say the מקוה is pure in  רשות הרבים and a doubt in a רשות היחיד. Then the second explanation is that ר' שעעון says we learn from the beginning of uncleanliness to the end. Just like at the beginning if one is in doubt if he touched then he is טהור. So also if there is a doubt if one went to the מקוה or not, the אוכלים are clean. The חכמים say we do not learn from the end to the beginning. רב שך  says the issue is about שתי חזקות, חזקת השתא and חזקת טומאה against חזקא מעיקרא. רב שך  says that in this second explanation of the גמרא, the גמרא is thinking that this case of two חזקות results in a doubt. [This is not like the first way of the גמרא that holds two חזקות against one is a sure thing.] Thus  ר' שמעון is clear about the חבית.  what he says that it is a doubt. The חבית we know is now vinegar and the טבל starts out as being טבל until we know its status changed. That is two חזקות against one חזקה that the חבית used to be wine so it has a חזקה מעיקרא. But ר' שמעון would not hold this way by the מקוה since there is a general principle that concerning purity and impurity we learn from סוטה. So he learns straight from סוטה. The food prepared by people that went to that מקוה and that מקוה is the רשות הרבים. So that food is pure. If the מקוה was in a רשות היחיד the food is in doubt. But the חכמים do not learn from סוטה, and the גמרא is giving the explanation of why. THEY HOLD we do not learn from the start of impurity to the end. Since we do not learn from סוטה, we put things into the regular category of two חזקות against one. So now we understand that when the חכמים say the food is טמא, that means it is in a state of doubtful purity. And that is exactly like the case of החבית. And that is how the רמב''ם can פוסק like the statement of the חכמים about the מקוה and the statement about the חבית. He is not going like ר' שמעון. Rather by the חבית there is no argument. ALL agree it is a doubt because of two חזקות. The argument is the מקוה and ר שמעון would agree with the חכמים if we would apply the principles of two חזקות here. But he does not. He applies the law of the סוטה. The רשות הרבים in pure and רשות היחיד is a doubt.

 I was at the sea and thinking again about Rav Shach's explanation of the argument between the sages and R Shimon in laws of Sota chapter 1 halacha 3. And based on that explanation he explains the Rambam. At first I was thinking that it seems that according to Rav Shach that the Rambam was posek like R Shimon against the sages, [and that would be a problem if it were the case.] And then it occurred to me that in fact his explanation of the Rambam works perfectly.

Perhaps I should give a bit of background so what Rav Shach is saying will become clear.

The statement of the sages is a mikve that upon it pure things were prepared. [food was prepared by someone who at first was a nida or anyone who was  impure and went to a mikve. ] Then the mikve was found to be lacking the proper volume. All the pure things are unclean whether in a private or public domain.

The gemara asks from a barrel that is found to be sour. The wine turned to vinegar. This barrel was used for separating tithes. For the last three day all the tithes are considered invalid.  Before these three days all the tithes are in doubt.

The first explanation of the Gemara is that the mikve is the sages and the barrel is R Shimon. R shimon would say the mikve is pure in  public domain and a doubt in a private domain.

Then the second explanation is that R Shimon says we learn from the beginning of uncleanliness to the end. Just like at the beginning if one is in doubt if he touched then he is clean. So also if there is a doubt if one went to the mikve or not they are clean. The sages say we do not learn from the end to the beginning.

Rav Shach says the issue is about two hazakot. Hezkat hashta and hezkat tuma against hazaka meikara. Rav Shach says that in this second explanation of the gemara, the gemara is thinking that this case of two hazakot results in a doubt. [This is not like the first way of the gemara that holds two hazakot against one is a sure thing.]

Thus R Shimon is clear about the barrel. that is what he says that it is a doubt. The barrel we know is now vinegar and the tevel starts out as being tevel until we know its status changed. That is two hazakot against one that the barrel used to be wine so it has a hazaka meikara.

But R Shimon would not hold this way by the mikve since there is a general principle that concerning purity and impurity we learn from sota. So he learns straight from sota. The food prepared by people that went to that mikve  and that mikve is the public domain. So that food is pure. If the mikve was in a private domain the food is in doubt.

But the sages do not learn from sota. and the gemara is giving the explanation of why. That is we do not learn from the start of impurity to the end. Since we do not learn from sota we puts things into the regular category of two hazakot against one.

So now we understand that when the sages says the food is impure that means it is in a state of doubtful purity. And that is exactly like the case of teh barrel. and that is how the Rambam can posek like the statement of the sages about the mikve and the statement about the barrel. He is not going like R Shimon. Rather by the barrel there is no argument. al agree it is a doubt because of two hazakot. The argument is the mikve and R Shimon would agree with the sages if we would apply the principles of two hazakot here. But he does not. He applies the law of the sota. The public domain in pure and private is a doubt.

in the religious world that most of the leaders are stupid though they pretend to be Torah geniuses.

 It takes a kind of understanding of Torah to see that many Torah scholars are in fact just playing a game of pretending to be Torah scholars--and people believe them. Thus it is not unusual to find in the religious world that most of the leaders are stupid though they pretend to be Torah  geniuses. It is all an act. On the other hand there are the great Litvak yeshivot like the Mir in NY where in fact the roshei yeshiva were very smart. However the religious world has leaders that are basically stupid but play act with the right gestures.

The sages themselves mention this problem in GemaraShabat and Rav Nahman mentions this issue in his LeM concerning Torah scholars that are demons. Lem vol 1. chapters 12 and 28

 I noticed in the writings of Dr. Kelley Ross [Friesian ] that he believes that Hegel held from a sort of phenomenalism-  the view that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist in themselves, but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli]. I can see that  even strong supports of Hegel like McTaggart held this way. But I have never been able to see Hegel in that way and in support of my view I would like to say that this is exactly how Cunningham explains Hegel in his PhD thesis. [Thought and Reality in Hegel's System. GUSTAVUS Cunningham.]\Rather I think that Hegel is thinking of Being as emanating from Logos. Not being identical. This would be like Plotinus. And this aspect of Hegel I have thought to be so for  long time-and also this aspect of Plotinus in that he holds like Aristotle in some particular ways. And in this very discussion I think Hegel holds like Aristotle that universals [the categories of thought] can not exist without  particulars. And visa versa. See chapter III in Cunningham to see many examples of Hegel's saying so openly. Not that particulars have no existence outside of thought. 

Flour and sugar and oil are all necessary for a cake to exist. But they are not a cake. Only a cake is a cake.

רב שך עונה מדוע איננו לומדים מסוטה [הלכות סוטה פרק א']

 רב שך עונה מדוע איננו לומדים מסוטה [הלכות סוטה פרק א'] לומר אפילו ספק טומאה ברשות הרבים טהור אפילו כנגד חזקת טומאה. שאלתי את התשובה שלו לפני כמה ימים וחשבתי היום ששאלתי מבוססת על אי הבנה של מה שאמר רב שך. מה שהוא אומר זה. אם היינו לומדים מסוטה לרשות הרבים, אז למעשה אפילו דברים שיש להם חזקת טומאה יהיו טהורים. זה יהיה בגלל גזירת הכתוב. אבל למעשה אנו לומדים רק מסוטה לספק טומאה ברשות היחיד כי ספק נחשב למוחלט.] וזה מסביר את הגמרא שאחרת קשה להבין. הגמרא אומר שחכמים לומדים מסוטה לומר ספק של טומאה ברשות היחיד הוא בהחלט טמא. ואז הוא שואל, אז למה לא ללמוד מסוטה ברשות הרבים. תשובה: המקוה אינו דומה לסוטה. המקוה הוא ספק בגלל חוסר נפח. השאלה אינה קשורה לרשות היחיד או לרשות הרבים. הספק לגבי הסוטה הוא בגלל היותה לבד עם גבר ברשות היחיד. אין סתירה ברשות הרבים. ואז הגמרא שואלת, אבל למרות זאת לא כך שכל ספק לגבי טומאה ברשות הרבים הוא טהור? תשובה: מדובר במקרה של שני דברים שדוחפים לעבר טומאה. חזקת טמא של אובייקט עד שהוא נעשה טהור, או האדם המטפל בחפץ. בנוסף חזקת השתא של המקוה שנמדד ונמצא כי הוא חסר ארבעים סאה. קשה מאוד להבין את הגמרא הזו. בהתחלה הוא אומר שהסיבה שמקוה שנמדד ונמצא חסר כל הטהרות שנעשו על גביו טמאות  היא מכיוון שאנו לומדים מסוטה. ואז נראה שהוא משנה את דעתו ואומר שהסיבה היא כי שני חזקות נגד אחת. אולם כעת אנו מבינים את הגמרא בצורה מושלמת מכיוון שהיא לא לומדת מסוטה על שום דבר ברשות הרבים. רק רשות היחיד. באשר לרשות הרבים אנו לא לומדים דבר מהסוטה כלל. הדברים ברשות הרבים וזה יכלול את סוטה אם אין להם בכלל חזקה קודמת לא טהור או לא טמא יהיו כמו שהם. אבל אם למשהו יהיה חזקה של להיותו טמא זה יהיה טמא.

 רב שך means to answer why we do not learn from סוטה [laws of סוטה פרק א ] to say even ספק טומאה  ברשות הרבים טהור אפילו כנגד חזקת טומאה. I asked on his answer a few days ago and it occurred to me today that my question was based on a misunderstanding of what רב שך was saying. What he is saying is this. If we would learn from a סוטה to a רשות הרבים then in fact even ספק טומאה בשביל things that have a חזקת טומאה would be טהור. It would be because of גזירת הכתוב. But in fact we don't. We only learn from סוטה in a  רשות היחיד that a doubt is considered to  be definite.] And THIS explains the גמרא that otherwise is hard to understand. The גמרא says the חכמים learn from סוטה to say a doubt of טומאה in a רשות היחיד is definitely טמא. Then it asks, then why not learn from סוטה in a רשות הרבים. Answer: the מקוה is not like a סוטה. The מקוה is a doubt because of the volume. The question about volume is not connected with a private or רשות הרבים. The doubt about the סוטה is because of being alone with a man in a  רשות היחיד. There is no סתירה in a רשות הרבים. Then the גמרא asks but even so is it not so that every doubt about טומאה  a רשות הרבים is pure? Answer: it is a case of two things pushing towards uncleanliness. The חזקת טמא of an object עד it has been made clean, or the person that is handling  the object. Plus the חזקת השתא of the מקוה which was measured and found to be lacking ארבעים סאה. This גמרא is very hard to understand. At first it says the reason the doubt for the מקוה is unclean is because we learn from סוטה. Then it seems to change its mind and says  the reason is because two חזקות against one. Now however we understand the גמרא perfectly because it is not learning from סוטה about anything in a רשות הרבים. Only the  רשות היחיד. As for the רשות הרבים we learn nothing from סוטה at all. Things are clean in a רשות הרבים and that would include סוטה if they have no prior חזקה at all. Not טהור or unclean. But if anything would have a חזקה of being unclean it would be טמא.

 Rav Shach means to answer why we do not learn from Sota [laws of Sota perek I ] to say even a doubt about things [if they are clean or not] are clean in a public domain. I asked on his answer a few days ago, and it occurred to me today that my question was based on a misunderstanding of what Rav Shach was saying. What he is saying is this. If we would learn from a sota to a public domain, then in fact even things that have a prior status of being unclean would be clean. It would be because of gezerat hakatuv. But in fact we don't. We only learn from sota in a  private domain that a doubt is considered to  be definite.] And this explains the Gemara that otherwise is hard to understand. The Gemara says the sages learn from Sota to say a doubt of uncleanliness in a private domain is definitely unclean. Then it asks then why not learn from Sota in a public domain. [i.e.the sages hold a mikve that was measure and found lacking the right volume, all things made on it whether in a public or private domain are unclean.-So the question is why not say in a public domain they are clean?] Answer: the mikve is not like a sota. The mikve is a doubt because of the volume. The question about volume is not connected with a private or public domain. The doubt about the sota is because of being alone with a man in a private domain. There is no privacy in a public domain. Then the gemara asks but even so is it not so that every doubt about cleanliness  a public domain is pure/ Answer it is a case of two things pushing towards uncleanliness. The status of uncleanliness of an object because it has been made clean--or or the person that is handling  the object. Plus the present status of the mikve which was measured and found to be lacking the proper volume. This gemara is very hard to understand. At first it says the reason the doubt for the mikve is unclean is because we learn from Sota. Then it seems to change its mind and says  the reason is because two hazakot against one. Now however we understand the gemara perfectly because it is not learning from sota about anything in a public domain. Only the private domain. As for the public domain we learn nothing from sota at all. Things are clean in a public domain and that would include sota if they have no prior hazaka at all. Not one clean or unclean. But if anything would have a hazaka of being unclean it would be unclean.

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