Gitin 67b The Mishna says if one says to two people give a get to my wife or to three people write and give a get to my wife they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a get to his wife then according to r Meir they can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. R Jose disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. Shmuel said if one says to two people write and give get to my wife they have to do it themselves. if they tell a scribe to write and they signed, it is not valid however this subject still requires study. The Gemara ask on this statement of Shmuel. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this gemara is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is R Meir and he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give get to his wife that they must do it themselves.(And even though the case of Shmuel is different from the Mishna because in the case of Shmuel he said “write and give” while in the Mishna he said only “give” still this makes my question even stronger because adding the words "write" we see in the Mishna that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also saidto three "write" , then R Meir agrees they must write it themselves.) So even if Shmuel might hold with R Meir there still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to thsi question is that perhaps at this point the gemara is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.---------------------------------------------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''ב The משנה says, "If one says to two people 'give a גט to my wife' or to three people, 'write and give a גט to my wife' they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a גט to his wife then according to ר’ מאירthey can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. ר' יוסי disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. שמואל said, "If one says to two people write and give גט to my wife they have to do it themselves. If they tell a scribe tp write and they signed, it is not valid, however this subject still requires study." The גמרא ask on this statement of שמואל. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this גמרא is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is ר’ מאירand he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give גט to his wife that they must do it themselves. [(And even though the case ofשמואל is different from the משנה because in the case of שמואל he said “write and give” while in the משנה he said to three only “give” tstill this makes my question even stronger because adding the word "write" we see in the משנה that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also said to three "write" then ר' מאיר agrees they must write it themselves.)] So even if שמואל might hold with ר’ מאירthere still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to this question is that perhaps at this point the גמרא is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.

za89 F Minor midi file za89 F minor nwc file

There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. Essay by Michael Huemer

3. Inclinations to Believe 3.1. Types of Inclination There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. You might be inclined to believe X because X just seems to be true. Or you might be inclined to believe X because X is emotionally comforting. Or because you think good people believe X. Or because your social group believes X. Notice how the last three are quite different from believing something because it seems correct. So here’s a theory: Unjustified beliefs result when non-appearance-based inclinations influence our credences or outright beliefs. Only appearances are (epistemically) justification-conferring. 3.2. Can We Control our Beliefs? Some philosophers would question whether we can control our beliefs and whether we can believe something on the basis of ordinary (non-epistemic) desires, such as the desire for emotional comfort, or to fit in, or to be a good person. Examples: If I offered you a million dollars to sincerely believe that you are a giraffe, I bet you still couldn’t do it. But maybe this only shows that you can’t believe for practical reasons when you have conclusive evidence that the proposition is false. So consider … If I offered you a million dollars to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is even, I bet you couldn’t do it. In #2, the evidence is evenly balanced; thus, if non-epistemic desires can ever influence belief, they should be able to do so in that example, right? It looks like they can’t, so desires can’t influence beliefs. 3.3. Doxastic Semi-voluntarism Consider two extreme positions: Doxastic Involuntarism: Desires can never have any influence on any beliefs. (Strong) Doxastic Voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs just as easily as they influence ordinary actions. Neither of these is the case. What is correct is Doxastic Semi-voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs sometimes, but their influence is limited. One cannot believe a thing that is too obviously false, or too obviously unjustified. There is a limit to how epistemically irrational a person can be, even if they want to (this limit varies across people). Thus, you can’t believe you are a giraffe, no matter the reward, because that’s obviously false. Nor can you believe the number of atoms is even, because that is obviously unjustified. But suppose that your child is accused of a heinous crime (say, deadnaming Caitlin Jenner). If the evidence is complex and hard to evaluate, so that it is not too obvious what the right judgment is, then it becomes much easier for your love for your child and desire to believe that she is good to influence your judgment, causing you to believe the child innocent even when the evidence does not justify this. There will be some degree of evidence that would induce you to admit that your child had committed the heinous act, but the evidentiary threshold will just be much higher than it would be for an impartial observer. Everyone knows that things like this can happen; that is why defendants’ family members are not allowed to sit on juries. If you try talking to a political ideologue some time and giving them evidence against their beliefs, you’ll probably become convinced that the same thing is happening to them. So the first thing that enables people to adopt unjustified beliefs is evidential ambiguity. There should be mixed evidence, evidence pointing in different directions, and it should be unclear how to weigh the evidence, perhaps because the evidence for and against X is of different kinds. 3.4. Confusing Feelings with Appearances In some cases, people may confuse their emotions with appearances. When you hear a claim that you don’t like, you may have an aversive reaction, which includes a sense of the clash between that claim and others of your current attitudes. E.g., you hear a negative claim about someone you like, or a positive one about someone you dislike. You might confuse that feeling with an appearance that the claim is factually wrong. Likewise, it is possible to confuse a positive feeling, a feeling of fit with your other current attitudes, with an appearance that a claim is correct. This, in turn, partially disguises the fact that your desired belief is unjustified; it makes this sufficiently unobvious that it becomes possible to adopt the belief. 4. Corruption of Belief-Forming Practices You’re obligated, before forming a belief on a controversial issue, to conduct a responsible inquiry. This typically requires things like: listening to both sides (or multiple sides), looking for counter-evidence, and trying to find objections to arguments that you are initially attracted to. Most people are terrible at this. They only listen to news sources who they already know agree with their political orientation; they accept evidence supporting their favored view at face value, while carefully scrutinizing only the evidence that undermines their favored view (if they happen to accidentally run into some); they don’t think about objections to their views but focus their attention on reasons for their views. This violation of epistemic norms stops many beliefs from being justified (the 3rd kind of irrationality mentioned in sec. 2). Why do people do these things? Again, doxastic semi-voluntarism is important. If involuntarism were true (so that only epistemic reasons could influence beliefs and not desires), then these measures would be impotent. E.g., you could still deliberately select news sources that already agree with you, but then your credences would automatically update on the fact that you did that, and that there were many other news sources that would very likely have given you evidence against your favored view, and that would prevent you from adopting a high credence in your favored view. On the other hand, if strong voluntarism were true (so that we could form beliefs based on our desires just as easily as we take actions based on our desires), then there would be no need for these measures. You would just directly believe X based on your desire to believe it, with no need to select evidence sources, direct your attention away from objections, etc. We do these things because our desires have some power to affect our beliefs, but only when it’s not too clear what epistemic rationality demands. 5. Conclusion Actually, it’s not hard to be irrational. Everybody has non-epistemic belief preferences—desires to believe something for reasons unrelated to truth or evidential justification. These have a limited, direct influence on our beliefs, which is most important when the evidence is ambiguous and when our feelings about a proposition can be confused with appearances. Desires can also directly influence how we conduct inquiry, enabling us to take advantage of our predictable cognitive shortcomings, such as the tendency to under-adjust for biases in our evidence sources. The beliefs that we form after such an inquiry are unjustified due to failure to satisfy obligations of responsible inquiry. This is bad because unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false, and false beliefs can wreak havoc. E.g., false political beliefs prevent us from solving social problems, and often make the problems worse. The mechanisms for generating unjustified beliefs will operate more or less automatically unless you make specific, positive efforts to stop them—which you should do to be a good person. That is why the points developed above are important to know. [After the above essay I might mention here that Michael Huemer is with the school of thought of the intuitionists which is different from the Kant Fries school and also different from Hegel. As for me I see value in all three schools and see each as relating to a different stratum of level of reality phenomenal world, the rational world and the world beyond reason the dinge an sich. All this along the lines of Plotinus the philosopher who was mainly with Plato but used modifications from Aristotle]

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות בראש הדף

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות ראשון. עלה בדעתי בזמן שהייתי על שפת הים שתוספות מסתמכת על אחת משתי הדעות בגמרא לגבי מה שאדם יכול להתכוון כשאומר לכתוב גט (מסמך גירושין) ולתת אותו לאשתו. האם הוא מתכוון רק שעליהם לחתום, או שעליהם לכתוב אותו ולחתום עליו? בלי ההנחה ש"לכתוב אותו" פירושו רק שעליהם לחתום עליו, תוספות לא תהיה הגיונית. כדי להסביר למה אני מתכוון, הרשו לי להביא את התוספות. הוא שואל זאת. ר' מאיר סבור שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. מילי ממסרן לשליח. לכן הוא יכול לומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני אנשים אחרים לכתוב ולתת גט לאשתו. אבל אנחנו יודעים מר' ירמיה שאם זה החוק, אז הסופר לא יכול לחתום על הגט. אבל אם כן, יש שאלה. המשנה אומרת בגלוי שר' מאיר מסכים שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי", הם כותבים ונותנים אותו. מכיוון שיש רק שני אנשים במצב הזה, לכן, אחד מהם שכותב את זה גם חותם. התשובה של תוספת היא שהמשנה בעצם אומרת שהם חותמים על זה, וסופר כותב את זה. הבעיה עם תשובה זו היא שאנחנו מתחילים עם הגישה ש"אומר אמרו" אינה תקפה כלל. הסיבה היא שאם זה יהיה תקף, אז לא יכול להיות שחתימת הסופר על הגט (מסמך הגירושין) תהיה בסדר. כלומר, "הוא אומר לומר לאחרים" ("אומר אמרו") אינה תקפה מהתורה דאורייתא. לאחר מכן אנו עונים על סמך שינוי המשמעות הפשוטה של ​​המשנה בגלל גזירה שלא מוזכרת בשום מקום במשנה, ואנו משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלנו ש"הוא אומר, 'אמור'" מלהיות לא תקפה מהתורה לתקפה על סמך ראיות קלושות. ההסבר של תוספת צריך להיות כמו הגישה הזו בדף גמרא ס''ו ע''ב, שלכתוב את הגט פירושו רק לחתום עליו. אבל עם הדעה השנייה שזה מכווין לכתוב ולחתום, אז לתוספת לא תהיה תשובה לשאלתו

Gitin 67 side a Tosphot. it occurred to me while at the sea shore that Tosphot is relying on one of the two opinions in the Gemara about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it Tosphot would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the Tosphot. he asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger. thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. but we know from R. Jeremiah that if that is the law then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The Mishna says openly that "R Meir holds if one says to two people 'write and give a get to my wife' they write and give it." Since there are only two people in this case. Therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of Tosphot is the Mishna really means they sign it, and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say he says say is not valid from the Torah. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the Mishna because of a gezera (decree) that is nowhere mentioned in and Mishna, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of Tosphot has to be like that one approach in the Gemara page 66b that to write the get only means to sign it. but with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then Tosphot would not have an answer for his question.--------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות. It occurred to me while at the sea shore that תוספות is relying on one of the two opinions in the גמרא about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it תוספות would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the תוספות. He asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger.מילי מימסרן לשליח Thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. But we know from ר ' ירמיה that if that is the law, then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The משנה says openly that ר' מאיר מסכיםנ if one says to two people write and give a get to my wife, they write and give it. Since there are only two people in this case, therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of תוספות is the משנה really means they sign it and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say "he says, 'say'" is not valid from the תורה דאורייתא. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the משנה because of a גזירה that is nowhere mentioned in the משנה, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of תוספות has to be like that one approach in the גמרא page ס''ו ע''ב that to write the get only means to sign it. But with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then תוספות would not have an answer for his question.

Gitin page 66 side b. Rambam laws of divorce chapter 2 laws 5 and 6.

This coming piece is to give an approach to the Rambam. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people to two witnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone --or to two people tell two witnesses write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''get''(doc of divorce) the Rambam brings that it is not valid derabanan or maybe from the Torah. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the Rambam and the Ramban about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of divorce to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of Divorce chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a get and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the Ramban the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a get to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. therefore, the get in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The Rambam however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a get to his wife is not valid from the words of the Scribes and perhaps from the Torah. So he definitely does not agree with the Ramban about the problem being the need for lishma--for her sake. I think the reason for the Rambam is this. There is an argument in the gemara Gitin page 66. We know the law is like R. Jose, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a get “is not valid or not. The Rambam holds we see in the Gemara Gitin page 67 that even if he says, “Tell to others” is valid from Torah law, still there is a decree from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However there is also an opinion in the Gemara that R. Jose holds he says, “tell others” is in fact not valid from the Torah. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the Rambam. Now to go on in this subject a little. The Ramban holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a present to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “He says ‘tell others’” is valid. But the Rambam holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the Rambam decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in Gitin page 66.][this is a involved subject, but here i just wanted to give my take on the reason for the rambam. The reason for the Ramban is alredy pretty clear in the Ramban himself as quoted by the Ran and more openly said in the Drisha and Rav Naftali Trouphf and Rav Shach. I think my take on the Rambam here is original]------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This coming piece is to give an approach to the רמב''ם. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the אבי עזרי of רב שך. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people tell two witnnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone ; or write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''גט''(document of divorce) the רמב''ם brings that it is not valid דרבנן or maybe from the תורה דאורייתא. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the רמב’’ם and the רמב’’ן about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of גירושין to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of גירושין chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a גט and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the רמב’’ן the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a גט to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. Therefore, the גט in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The רמב’’ם however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a גט to his wife is not valid from the words of the סופרים and perhaps from the תורה. So, he definitely does not agree with the רמב’’ן about the problem being the need for לשמה for her sake. I think the reason for the רמב’’ם is this. There is an argument in the גמרא גיטיןpage ס''ו ע''ב. We know the law is like ר' יוסי, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” מילי לא מימסרו לשליח But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a גט “is not valid or not. The רמב’’ם holds we see in גיטין ס''ז that even if he says, “אומר אמרו” is valid דאורייתא, still there is a גזרה from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However, there is also an opinion in the Gemara that ר' יוסי holds אומר אמרו is in fact not valid דאורייתא. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the רמב’’ם. Now to go on in this subject a little. The רמב’’ן holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a מתנה to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “אומר אמרו’” is valid. But the רמב’’ם holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the רמב’’ם decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in גיטין ס''ו ע''ב. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ הקטע הבא נועד לתת גישה לרמב"ם. אבל גישה נוספת שאני זוכר היא שצריך לקבל מתנה [דעת המקבל]. זו עשויה להיות תשובה לרמב"ם. תשובה נוספת נמצאת באבי עזרי של רב שך. השאלה העיקרית היא מדוע, "הוא אומר 'תגידו'" (הוא אומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך מתנה ולתת אותו למישהו; או לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך גירושין ולתת אותו לאשתי) אינו תקף למסמך מתנה, אבל עבור "גט" (מסמך גירושין) הרמב"ם מביא שהוא אינו תקף דרבנן או אולי מהתורה דאורייתא אין ויכוח בין הרמב"ם לרמב"ן לגבי המקרה שבו אדם אומר לשני אנשים, "כתבו וחתמו על מסמך גירושין ותן אותו לאשתי", שהם יכולים לעשות כן, אך אינם יכולים לומר לאף אחד אחר לעשות כן. [הלכות גירושין פרק ב', חוק ה']. והם גם מסכימים אם הוא אומר להם לומר לסופר לכתוב גט ולחתום עליו ולמסור אותו לאשתו, שהם אינם יכולים לעשות כן. [פרק ב', חוק ו']. אולם בנימוק לכך, הם חולקים. לרמב"ן, הסיבה לחוק האחרון היא שאנחנו צריכים שהוא (הגט) ייכתב למענה. במילים אחרות, זהו מקרה רגיל של יצירת שליח. ואדם יכול למנות שליחים לומר לאחרים למנות אחרים לכתוב, לחתום ולתת גט לאשתו. אולם, הבעיה היא שהסופר צריך לשמוע את הפקודה מהבעל ישירות. לכן, הגט במקרה זה אינו תקף מדין התורה. לכן, במקרים אחרים של, "אמרו לאחרים לעשות דבר מה" זה תקף. הרמב"ם, לעומת זאת, סבור שהמקרה האחרון של אמירת אמרו לאחרים לכתוב ולחתום ולתת גט לאשתו אינו תקף מדברי הסופרים, ואולי גם מהתורה. לכן, הוא בהחלט לא מסכים עם הרמב"ן לגבי הבעיה שהיא הצורך של לשמה (למענה). אני חושב שהסיבה לרמב"ם היא זו. יש ויכוח בגמרא גיטין דף ס"ו ע"ב. אנו יודעים שההלכה היא כמו ר' יוסי, "דברים לא יימסרו לשליח". מילי לא מימסרן לשליח. אבל השאלה היא האם זה אומר גם שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים, "תאמר לאחרים לכתוב גט" זה לא תקף או לא.[אומק אמרו] הרמב"ם קובע שאנו רואים בגיטין ס''ז שגם אם הוא אומר "אמרו" תקף דאורייתא, עדיין יש גזרה מדברי הסופרים שאסור לו לעשות זאת מכיוון שהם עלולים לבקש מהסופר לחתום במקרה שבו הבעל אמר בגלוי שהסופר חייב לכתוב, ושני האחרים חייבים לחתום. (כלומר, הוא אמר שהם צריכים לחתום, לא הסופר). עם זאת, יש גם דעה בגמרא שר' יוסי סבור ש"אומר אמרו" למעשה אינו תקף דאורייתא. זו הסיבה לכך ששתי דעות אלו מובאות ברמב"ם. ועכשיו נמשיך קצת בנושא הזה. הרמב"ן סבור שאם הוא אומר לאחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה כמתנה למישהו, זה תקף. הסיבה לכך היא שהוא סבור ש"אומר אמרו" תקף. אבל הרמב"ם סבור שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים "אמרו לשני אחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה ותתנו אותו למישהו" זה בכלל לא תקף. הסיבה היא שבנקודה זו הרמב"ם החליט ש"אמר לומר לאחרים", זה לא תקף מדין התורה, כמו אותה דעה חלופית בגיטין ס"ו ע"ב

za88 midi file E Flat major za88 nwc file