In Bava Kama page 111 we ee that if a robber gives and object that he stole to someone else and the owner gave up retrieving the object then tat third person own the object and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this both Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovki suggest an explanation in a law in the Rambam law of marriage 5 law 7. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on Tosfot in Bava Kama page 67a first words “at first it was secular”. The law in the Rambam is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was giving up and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that rav Rozovski and Rav Shach find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need abandonment and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of Tosphot on page 67. There the Gemara says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The Gemara say the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. Tosphot asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. Tosphot answers the Gemara needs the answer of change name for case in which there is no change of domain for example he sanctified an animal to be his sin offering or his guilt offering. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in Tosphot that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. Tosphot holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously.However, I admit that my approach to this Rambam does not fit exactly because the Rambam wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by abandonment.” It seems he should have written, “by abandonment and change of domain.” {For abandonment does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that Rambam difficult under any interpretation I would also like to suggest that Padam Aram mean the state of Aram, not a city by the name Padan Aram. The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to Aram Naharaim to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of Nachor, not Charan . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to Charan. Charan was the city that Terach settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of Canaan. so Charan in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in Padan Aram as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in Padan Aram. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from Padan Aram that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York. _______________________________________________________ In בבא קמא page קי''א we see that if a robber gives an object that he stole to someone else, and the owner gave up retrieving the object then that third person owns the object, and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this, both רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי suggest an explanation in a law in the ר''ם laws of marriage. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on תוספות in בבא קמא page ס''ז ע''א. The law in ר''ם is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was ייאוש and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need ייאוש and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of תוספות on page ס''ז. There the גמרא says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The גמראsay the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. תוספות asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. תוספות answers the גמרא needs the answer of שינוי השם for case in which there is no change of domain, for example he sanctified an animal to be his חטאת or his אשם. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in תוספות that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. תוספות holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously. However, I admit that my approach to this רמב''ם does not fit exactly because the רמב''ם wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by ייאוש.” It seems he should have written, “by ייאוש and change of רשות.” {For ייאוש does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that רמב''ם difficult under any interpretation ---------------------------------I would also like to suggest that פדן ארם mean the state of ארם, not a city by the name פדן ארם The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to ארם נהריים to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of נחור, not חרן . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to חרן . NOW חרן was the city that תרח settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of כנען. so חרן in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in פדן ארם as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in פדן ארם. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from פדן ארם that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York.

בבא קמא דף קי''א. זהו נושא שרב שך ורב שמואל רוזובסקי עוסקים בו שניהם בפרק ה' בדיני הר''ם של גניבה, דין ז'. שאלה אחת היא שאם אדם נישא אישה בגניבה או בשוד [כלומר, גנב חפץ ונתן אותו לאישה ואומר בכך את נשואה לי] וידוע שכבר הייתה ייאוש מצד הבעלים, אז הנישואין תקפים. אולם, ראה בזכרון שמואל פרק נ''ח שם הוא מביא את המקרה של חפץ מקודש שאם המצב הוא כזה שהקדש יצטרך לשלם עבור החפץ, אז לא ניתן דבר למעשה. אז, במקרה שלנו עם גניבה, אפילו עם ייאוש ושינוי תחום, הגנב צריך להחזיר לבעלים אם הגנב היה גנב ידוע, וגם אם הוא לא היה ידוע, האדם שרכש את החפץ מהגנב היה צריך לשלם עבורו למעט תיקון השוק. אז, גם אם אנחנו עוסקים במקרה שבו האישה לא צריכה להחזיר את החפץ, עדיין היא צריכה לשלם עבורו, או לפחות מדין התורה היא הייתה צריכה לשלם עבורו אלא בגלל תיקון השוק. [איש לא היה קונה כלום אם כל קנייה ניתנת לביטול.] לכן, היא לא קיבלה כלום, והנישואין לא צריכים להיות תקפים. הבעיה השנייה היא, למה היא נשואה? לרב רוזובסקי ולרב שך, זה בגלל שהייתה ייאוש יחד עם שינוי תחום. איזה שינוי תחום? האחריות והזכויות שיש לגנב לפני שהוא מחזיר אותו. לגר''א לעומת זאת, זה אומר שהייתה שינוי תחום נוסף לפני שהחפץ ניתן לאישה. ובמונח של שוד, הגר"א בהחלט צודק, שכן ייאוש אינה חל על שוד. שינוי התחום היה צריך להתרחש לפני מתן החפץ לאישה אבל כאשר השאלה היא על גניבה מדוע היא נשואה? אני חושב שזכויות הגנב ולא הייאוש היו עובדים מכיוון שכל אחת מהן חלשה. אבל יחד הם יכולים להיחשב ככאלה שהגנב נתן לה משהו בעל ערך כספי רק כדי להבהיר. אם הייתה גניבה, והגנב מכר את החפץ, והייתה ייאוש על ידי הבעלים, אז האדם קנה אותו. עם זאת, אם הגנב היה ידוע, הקונה צריך לשלם עבורו. אם לא הגנב מפורסם, אז הלוקח לא צריך לשלם והבעלים צריך לרדוף אחר הגנב לבדו כדי לקבל פיצויים. כמו כן, אנו מתייחסים כאן לעובדה שאישה יכולה להינשא על ידי מתן חפץ בעל ערך כספי. אז, במקרה שלנו כאן, שבו גבר נתן חפץ ששדד או גנב לאישה ואומר "הנה את נשואה לי על ידי החפץ הזה", אז אם כבר הייתה ייאוש על ידי הבעלים, אז היא נשואה. אבל ייאוש על ידי הבעלים לבדה לא גורמת לבעלות. רק ייאוש עם שינוי תחום גורמת לבעלות. אבל כאן שינוי התחום התרחש בו זמנית עם מתן החפץ לאישה. אלא אם כן הולכים עם רב שך ששינוי התחום מתייחס לזכות שהייתה לגנב לפני שהחזיר אותו. מה זה אתם עשויים לשאול. אחד מהם הוא מה שאתם רואים ברשב"א בבבא קמא ל"ג דף 33 שם הוא אומר שאם במקרה שם הקונה חרש עם השור לפני שהיה צריך להחזירו, הוא לא צריך לשלם עבור השימוש בשור

Bava Kama page 111.

Bava Kama page 111. This is a subject that Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovski both deal with in the Rambam laws of theft chapter 5 law 7. [R. Rozovski was the rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch for about 35 years before Rav Shach.] One question is that if one marries a woman by theft or robbery [i.e., he stole an object and give it to a woman and say by this you are married to me] and it is known that there was already giving up abandonment by the owner, then the marriage is valid. However, see in Zichron Shmuel chapter 58 where he brings the case of sanctified object that if the situation is such that the Temple would have to pay for the object, then nothing was given in fact. So, in our case with theft even with abandonment and change of domain, the thief has to pay back the owner if the thief was a well-known thief, and even if he was not well known, the person that acquired the object from the thief would have to pay for it except for fixing of the market place. So, even if we are dealing with a case in which the woman does not have to give back the object, still she has to pay for it, or at least from the law of the torah she would have to pay for it except because of fixing of the market placve. [No one would buy anything if any buy can be cancelled.] Therefore, she received nothing, and the marriage should not be valid. The other problem is, why is she married? To Rav Rozovski and Rav Shach it is because there was abandonment along with change of domain. What change of domain? The responsibilities and privileges that the thief had before he gives it back. To the Gra however, it means that there was another change of domain before the object was given to the woman. And in terms of robbery, the Gra is certainly right for abandonment does not apply to robbery. The change of domain had to have occurred before giving the object to the woman. When the question is about theft why is she married? I think that privileges of the thief nor abandonment would work along since each Is weak. But together they can be considered a such that the thief gave her something of monetary value. just to be clear. If there was theft and the thief sold the object, and there was abandonment by the owner, then the person that bought it keep it. However, if the thief was well-known, the buyer has to pay for it. If not, then he does not have to pay and the owner must go after the thief alone to get repaid. Also, we are referring here to the fact that a woman can be married by giving her an object with monetary value. So, in our case here where a man gave an object that he robbed or stole to a woman and says behold you are married me by this object, then if there was already was abandonment by the owner, then she is married. But abandonment by the owner alone does not cause ownership. Only abandonment with change of domain causes ownership. But here the change of domain occurred simultaneously with the given of the object to the woman; that is unless you say like rav shach that the change of domain refers to privileges the thief had before giving it back. what are these? you might ask. one is what you see in the rashba [R. Shmuel ben Aderet. Not the Rashba of Tosphot who is R Shimshon ben avraham] in Bava Kama page 33 where he says in the case where a e buyer plowed with stolen ox before it had to be given back, he does not have to pay for the use of the ox.

za79 A minor midiza79 nwc format

תוספות בבא קמא קי''א ע''ב. אם יש מצב שנגזל חפץ והבעלים ייאשו אבל החפץ עדיין בשליטתו זה נחשב להיות חסרון בבעלות. זו קשה להבין. להיות ברור אני רוצה להביא תוספות. אם יש שני תנאים, יש ייאוש ושנוי רשות, וחפץ של אדם השלישי. אם אין ייאוש ולא שינוי רשות אז זה של הבעלים והם יכולים לתבוע הגזלן או אדם השלישי. אבל יכול להיות מצב ביניים. יש ייאוש בלי שינוי רשות או שינוי רשות בלי ייאוש. [המצב ביניים שיש חיסרון בבעלות גורם שאם החפץ קיים, יש להחזירו, ואם החפץ אינו קיים, אז אדם השלישי פטור לגמרי]. זה המצב האחרון ברור. החפץ שלו ואינו בשליטתו, ולכן אם הקדיש אותו אינו מוקדש. אבל אם יש ייאוש בלי שינוי רשות זה נראה להיות שלו לגמרי. אז למה אינו נחשב להיות שלו לגמרי-------יתר על כן, ברצוני לשאול זאת. תוספות גורסת שכאשר יש נטישה אך אין שינוי תחום, או שינוי תחום ללא נטישה, שאם החפץ בסביבה, עליו להחזירו. אך אם החפץ אינו בסביבה, אז הבעלים יכול לרדוף רק אחר הגזל המקורי כדי לקבל פיצויים. אך תוספות שואלות על כך שאם כאשר החפץ בסביבה, האדם השלישי חייב להחזירו, אז גם אם הוא אינו בסביבה, הוא צריך להיות אחראי. מדוע הוא אינו אחראי? תוספות משיבה שזה פסוק. אם החפץ שנגנב נמצא בצורתו המקורית (כעין שגנב), יש להחזירו. אך אם הוא השתנה, אז הבעלים יכול לרדוף אחר הגזל לבדו. ברצוני לשאול על כך שאותו נימוק צריך לחול כאשר לא הייתה נטישה ולא שינוי תחום. אך שם אנו אומרים שהבעלים יכול לרדוף אחר הגזל המקורי או אחר זה שתפס אותו מאותו גזל ואכל אותו. גם הוא לא צריך להיות אחראי על פי פסוק זה

I was coming back from the sea and it occurred to me something that is hard to understand in the second Tosphot on page 111 in Bava Kama. it is this. If you have a case where the owner has given up, but it is still in his domain, that is considered to be not his completely. But that is what is difficult to understand. The stolen object is considered to be totally in his domain, and yet the abandonment creates a lack or deficiency in his ownership. To be a bit clearer about what I am asking, let me bring Tosphpot. To Tosphot if the owner has given up and it has changed domain from the robber to another person, then that third person own the object completely and the owner can go after the robber alone to get repaid, not to that third person. but if there was no abandonment nor change of domain from the robber to a third person, then there is no question that the owner can go after the robber or the third person to get repaid. it is the middle case that Tosphot is saying creates in-between rate in which there can be a difference. if the object is still around, then it mut be given back to the owner. but if the stolen object is not around e.g. it was eaten, then the third party is not obligated in anything. the owner can go after the robber alone. But there are two ways, a middle state can be created. One way is there was abandonment, but no change in domain. Another is there was change in domain, but no abandonment. This last case is clear. If there was change in domain, then the owner owns the object, but it is not under his control, so if he would sanctify it, it would not be sanctified. It is that other case that I find difficult to understand. he gave up but it is still in his domain in ownership and under his control. why should that be considered a lack in ownership? Furthermore, I would like to ask this. Tosphot holds that when there is abandonment but no change of domain, or change domain with no abandonment, that if the object is around then he must give it back. But if the object is not around, then the owner can go only after the original robber to get repaid. But Tosphot then ask on this that if when the object Is around the third person must give it back, then even if it is not around, he ought to be liable. Why is he not liable? Tosphot answers it is a verse. If the object that was stolen is in its original form, it must be given back. But if it has changed, then the owner can go after the robber alone. I would like to ask on this that this same reasoning ought to appply when there was neither abandonment nor change in domain. But there we say the owner can go after the original robber or the one that grabbed it from that robber and ate it. He should also be not liable according to that verse. ]\-----------THERE Is something that is hard to understand in the second תוספות on page קי'א in בבא קמא. it is this. If you have a case where the owner has given up, but it is still in his domain, that is considered to be not his completely. But that is what is difficult to understand. The stolen object is considered to be totally in his domain, and yet the יאוש creates a lack or deficiency in his ownership. To be a bit clearer about what I am asking, let me bring תוספות. To תוספות if the owner has given up, and it has changed domain from the robber to another person, then that third person owns the object completely, and the owner can go after the robber alone to get repaid, not to that third person. But if there was no יאוש, nor change of domain from the robber to a third person, then there is no question that the owner can go after the robber or the third person to get repaid. it is the middle case that תוספות is saying creates in between מצבin which there can be a difference. If the object is still around, then it must be given back to the owner. But if the גזול object is not around )it was eaten(, then the third party is not obligated in anything. The owner can go after the גזלן alone. There are two ways a middle state can be created. One way is there was ייאוש, but no שינוי רשות. Another is there was שינוי רשות, but no ייאוש. This last case is clear. If there was שינוי רשות, then the owner owns the object, but it is not under his control. If he would sanctify it, it would not be sanctified. It is that other case that I find difficult to understand. יש ייאוש but it is still in his בבעלות של הבעלים המקוריים and under his control. why should that be considered a lack in ownership?

Bava Kama 111 A'B I want to explain what I think the Tosfot intends in Bava Kama 111. But first, let me bring the Mishnah and the Gemara. The Mishna says that if a thief gives what he stole to his children, they are not responsible, only the thief is responsible. Rav Chisda said that if someone stole and the owner did not give up and someone else takes the object and eats it, the owner can collect from each of them because the object was still in the owner's possession. The Gemara asks about this from the Mishna, which says that he can collect only from the thief, not from the children. Rav Chisda answers that the Mishna is talking about a case in which the owner gave up. The Tosfot holds that abandonment after a change of ownership does not confer ownership, and according to this assumption they are correct that Rav Chisda ruled and granted that if there is despair, one can only collect from the thief, not from the other. It does not matter whether the despair preceded the change of ownership or not. Even if there was a no change of ownership and the object was still in the owner's possession, it is still the same as the law of “his and not in his control”, which he cannot dedicate because he lacks ownership. Therefore, the owner can only collect from the thief. If it was owned totally by the owner, then the owner can collect from the robber or the second one that ate it