The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b

The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b says that the original question on Rava from R. Yose holds that the bees also cause damage, and hold that Rava has to say his law also according to R. Yose. so, the gemara asks, "How can we find bees next to the border in the first place in such a way that the owner of the mustard can tell him 'since your bees are next to the border even though they cause damage, I will also put my mustard there even though they also cause damage.'" This cannot be according to Rava who says anything that causes damage has to be three handbreadths away from the border. Then Rav Papa answers, "It is a case of a buyer." That means (to Rabainu Izhak) that the mustard is next to the border and it was there when the other side of the property was sold, and now the owner of the mustard is telling the owner of the bees to go 6 handbreadths away from the border. This is now good to Rava that the mustard is next to the border because of the sale of the property on the other side, but Rava himself is talking about a case where there was no sale and there are just two people in a courtyard that has a division line and each one has to be three handbreadths away from the border. What is unclear to me is why Rabbainu Izhak changes the arrangement from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there. Why not say that it is a case of a sale, and the owner of the mustard says, "Put your bees three cubits from the border, and I will put my mustard three cubits from the border." I think the maharam from lublin explains this in his clear explanation of this tophot, however i have not yet been able to understand him. i hope to get to the litvak beit midrash where there is a Bava Batra and Reb Aaron Kotler' ''Chidushei Reb Aaron'' to help me understand this Rabbainu Izhak [who is in fact explaining the approach of his grandfather, Rashi, who is short in his explanation of this subject.] I might mention here that Reb Aaron Kotler actually says that Rashi and Ri Migash are almost, but not quite identical in this approach. That being the case, this means that this approach of Rabbanu Izhak in our Tosphot is very close to the actual halacha in the shulchan aruch of rabbainu Yosef Karo who follows the Rambam who follows his rav, the Ri Migash. I think the answer to this question might be this: the next question of the gemara is, “If it is a case of a buyer, then why do the sages disagree? Now if the bees also do damage, then it is simple that the sages would say once the bees are there already, then the mustard must be kept away (they both cause damage to each other). Only now the original assumption has changed, and the bees are not considered to cause damage according the sages, and so it makes sense that the mustard should be kept away from them 6 handbreaths On the other hand, it is perhaps possible that the sages might say to the owner of the mustard to keep the mustard away from the bees since the bees were there first and are at the border because the yard was sold at the diving line. so again, I ask, why is it so simple that the sages might not say to the owner of the mustard to keep it away even in this case? And so, I ask again why does Tosphot change the arraignment? Later I saw that Tosphot asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("hava amina'”) in its place, and just change to a case of a sale [buyer]? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If Tosphot means that R. Yose would have said that both need to be three handbreadths from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three handbreadths) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "hava amina". But if Tosphot means that R. Yose would not have said the mustard would be right next to the border, then Tosphot is going back to the Mishna that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of the Gemara came from the braita that did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. There is also a slight question on Tosphot here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the sages that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is kipping ahead. _________________________________________________________________________________________ (Later I saw that תוספות asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("הוה אמינא'”) in its place and just change to a case of a לוקח? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If תוספות means that ר' יוסי would have said that both need to be three טפחים from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three טפחים) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "הוה אמינא". But if תוספות means that ר' יוסי would not have said the mustard would be exactly next to the border, then תוספות is going back to the משנה that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of theגמרא came from the ברייתאthat did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. That can mean three .טפחים There is also a slight question on תוספות here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the תנא קמא that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is skipping ahead.) On the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Rabbainu Izhak means. The answer of Rav Papa is that R Yose is a case of a buyer and the mustard is next to the border, and even though rabbainu izhak is changing the original assumption of the sages, even so in this approach of Rav Papa, R. Yose holds that the bees do some damage and so the bees should kept away from the border three handbreadths. He is not saying that each one, both mustard and bees should be kept three handbreadths away (the distance would be six handbreadths). Rather only the bees. The reason is that in fact we are keeping with the original assumption that “first come first served.” That since the mustard was there first, it can stay there. The second question of tosphot is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that Tosphot is saying the sages are changing their original assumption, but that R. Yose keeps his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? The answer is we find it according to the sages that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then R Yose objects that they ought to be taken away. Then tosphot anwers that if this was the case then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the braita, still Tosphot holds there is no difference between the mishna and the braita, R Yose holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away (the second question of תוספות is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that תוספות is saying the חכמים are changing their original assumption but that ר' יוסי keep his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? the answer is we find it according to the חכמים that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then ר' יוסי objects that they ought to be taken away. Then תוספות answers that if this was the case then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the ברייתא, still תוספות holds there is no difference between the משנה and the ברייתא. In both, ר' יוסי holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away ) On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask about the original question and answer of Tosphot. We change the situation to that the mustard is next to the border and Tophot asks why not keep the original assumption that the bees are next to the border and that they cause damage and even so since it is a case of a sale, the mustard can be also next to the border? Tophot answers that R Yose would not have said in that case that the mustard can be also at the border. I wondered why not? If it is a case of a sale why should the mustard have to be far away? Why not say that since it is a case of a sale, then the mustard can also be next to the border? The answer I think is that the permission we get from a sale is that therefore we can find something that causes damage next to the border, but it does not imply that therefore some that causes damage can but put next to an object on the other side of the border once that object is already there.

I have been looking at the subject of the mustard and the bees in Bava Batra 18b. My learning partner David Bronson would have spent at least a month on each Tosphot there. But I see there are a few other approaches that make the subject to require at least a year. R. Akiva Eiger, Rav shach and Reb Aaron Kotler each have a whole booklet on the subject because of the difficulty in the subject. See also Rav sharira Gaon. And the RiMigash

I have been looking some interesting writing of Rav Jacob Emden. It is true that he allows a girlfriend type of relationship but not exactly in the way you might think, Rather the idea is that he comes and lives with her man in his home. It is not to be casual. [see Chronicles I chapter 2 verses from 45 46 and onward. He thinks that there is good reason for a zava to need to be tovel in a natural spring as Rashi and some geonim say. I might mention that this is not stated in Leviticus. In Leviticus a natural spring is only mentioned with a zav. However there is a hekish between zav and zava in the Gemara that would seem to mean that a zava needs a natural spring. If you count like the Rambam all women will be zavot. [No one sees blood exactly from day 19 to 25 every single month. But if you count like the Ramban, almost no women will ever be zavot. They do not usually see seven days and then again three more ] And where could you find a natural spring anyway? The sea does not count as a natural spring

Rasputin has gotten a terrible reputation for no reason. When nothing else could cure the son of the tzar, Rasputin did help. He rightly told the tzar not to get involved in WWI and not persecute the Jews. [The pogroms had started long before Nichols II.] And it was true what he told the tzar what if his death would be by him or anyone in extended family, that the tzar himself and his family would not survive after that more than one year

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I would like to suggest that the first mishna in Bava Batra is like sumchos and that this is in fact what the Gemara itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? And the Gemara answers "It is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them." That means: I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof, so now the mishna comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a stam mishna like sumchos is not unusual like the mishna in bava kama about an ox that gores a cow and the mishna in Bava Mezia page 100, and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the tosphot understands the question of the gemara to be like sumchos, but say that the sages would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "he grabbed it after the doubt had arisen" in which case the sages would agree with sumchos". But then I think tosphot must mean that obviously the answer of the gemara is going like sumchos. Then Tosphot finds a way that the answer of the gemara would go also with the sages. and thus, they explain that when the gemara says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. and thus, the one in whose domain it is has a migo, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain and therefore both sumchos and the sages would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the migo disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. Tosphot also mentions that Rashi holds a similar view that the question of the Gemara is like sumchos. However, Rashi is still different from Tosphot. Tosphot holds sumchus would say to divide because it is a case of deraraa demomona. But Rashi says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of Rashi explains the Rambam who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. () And this is like the Gemara in Bava Batra page 3 that says the case of the Mishna Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this Rashi it Is clear that even though they built the wall but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to Rashi and the Rambam. To Tosphot, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard Now that we see the mishna is like sumchos , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The mishna says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be derara demomona and sumhos says to divide only in a case of derara demomona _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to suggest that the first משנה in בבא בתרא is like סומכוס and that this is in fact what the גמרא itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? and the גמרא answers it is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them. That means I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof. so now the משנה comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a סתם משנה like סומכוס is not unusual like the משנה in בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א about an ox that gores a cow and the משנה in בבא מציעא page ק', and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the תוספותunderstands the question of the גמרא to be like סומכוס, but say that the חכמים would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק" in which case the חכמים would agree with סומכוס ". But then I think תוספות must mean that obviously the answer of the גמרא is going like סומכוס. Then תוספות finds a way that the answer of the גמרא would go also with the חכמים. and thus, they explain that when the גמרא says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. And thus, the one in whose domain it is has a מיגו, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain. And therefore both סומכוס and the חכמים would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the מיגו disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. ד תוספות also mentions that רש''י holds a similar view that the question of the גמרא is like סומכוס. However, רש''י is still different from תוספות. The reason is תוספות holds סומכוס would say to divide because it is a case of דררא דממונא. But רש''י says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of בבא מציעא where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of רש''י explains the רמב''ם who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. And this is like the גמרא in בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א that says the case of the משנה Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this רש''י it Is clear that even though they built the wall, but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly, and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to רש''י and theרמב''ם . To תוספות, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard.Now that we see the משנה is like סומכוס , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The משנה says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be דררא דממונא and סומכוס says to divide only in a case of דררא דממונא ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ אני רוצה להציע שהמשנה הראשונה בבא בתרא היא כמו סומכוס וזה בעצם מה שהגמרא עצמה מציעה כשהיא שואלת אם החומה נופלת, מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. זה לא ברור מאליו? והגמרא עונה זה בא לומר לנו שזה הדין גם כשהאבנים נופלות לצד החצר של רק אחד מהם. כלומר אולי חשבת שהדין הוא כמו החכמים שמי שמוציא מתחום חברו צריך להביא הוכחה. אז עכשיו המשנה באה להגיד לנו כסף שיש בו ספק מחלקים. אני יכול להזכיר שיש סתם משניות כמו סומכוס. זה לא יוצא דופן כמו המשנה בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א על שור שנגח פרה והמשנה בבא מציעא עמוד ק'. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהתוספות מבינים את שאלת הגמרא כמו סומכוס, אבל אומרים שהחכמים יסכימו לגישתו כאן במקום שאין לאף אחד טענה יותר מהשני ושמדובר ב"תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק". "במקרה זה החכמים יסכימו עם סומכוס". התשובה של הגמרא הייתה הולכת גם עם החכמים וכך, הם מסבירים שכאשר הגמרא אומר שהקיר נפל לחצר של רק אחד מהם, זה אומר שהוא נשאר שם זמן רב בתחום שלו הוא בעל מיגו, הוא היה יכול לומר שקניתי אותו והוא יאמין כי זה היה כל כך ארוך בתחום שלו ולכן גם סומכוס וגם החכמים היו אומרים שזה יהיה שייך לזה חוץ מהעובדה שנדרשים שניהם לבנות את החומה ולכן המיגו נעלם והקיר מתחלק שווה בשווה ביניהם. תוספות מזכירה גם שרש''י מחזיק בדעה דומה ששאלת הגמרא היא כמו סומכוס. אולם רש''י עדיין שונה מתוספות. הטעם שתוספות מחזיק הוא שסומכוס היה אומר לחלק כי מדובר בדרא דממונא. אבל רש''י אומר שהם מחלקים כי החצר שייכת לשניהם, וכך דומה הדבר בתחילת בבא מציעא ששניהם אוחזים בחפץ. וגישה זו של רש''י מסבירה את הרמב''ם שאומר במקרה שהכותל נופל מחלקים בשווה "הויאל שמקום הכותל משל שניהם". הסיבה היא בגלל שהמקום שייך לשניהם, ולכן הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. וזהו כגמרא בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א שאומר המשנה היא בחצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה. ברש''י זה מכוון שאף שבנו את החומה, אבל אין זה אומר שחילקו בעלות בחצר. שניהם עדיין מחזיקים בו במשותף, ולכן אם החומה נופלת, הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. אולם זה רק לרש''י ותרמב''ם. לתוספות מחלקים שווה גם אם חילקו בעלות החצר עכשיו כשאנחנו רואים שהמשנה הוא כמו סומכוס, אפשר לשאול "אז למה הם מתחלקים רק בגלל 'לכן'?" (המשנה אומר שהם בונים את החומה אם בגלל שהם חייבים או בגלל שהם מסכימים לעשות את זה) לכן אם החומה נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. אפשר לענות על זה כך. אם לא יצטרכו לבנות את החומה במשותף, לא היה ספק לבית המשפט של מי החומה? בית המשפט יכול היה להניח שרק אחד בנה אותו בעצמו. ולכן לא יהיה דררא דממונא, וסומכוס אומר לחלק רק במקרה של דררא דממונא