Bava Batra page 3a. Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 10

I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of Rav Isar Meltzer about the Rosh [rav ]. The Rosh holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners) they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the Rosh entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the Rosh. The question then what is the reason for the Rambam? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both Rav shach and Rav Isar meltzer explain the reason is that to the Rambam this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of Rav Isar Meltzer that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of רב איסר מלצר about the רא''ש. The רא''ש holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners), they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the רא''ש entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the רא''ש. The question then what is the reason for the רמב''ם? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both רב שך and רב איסר מלצר explain the reason is that to the רמב''ם this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” הטעם הוא Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of רב איסר מלצר that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” הברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול לגבי גישתו של רב איסר מלצר לגבי הרא''ש. הרא''ש מחזיק בחצר זו (שאין בה ארבע אמות לכל אחד מהשותפים), הם מסכימים לחלוקה לפי החלפה (קנין חליפין). זה כשלעצמו מסביר את הרא''ש לגמרי. עם החלפה, אף אחד לא צריך להגיד "לך ותרכוש" (לך חזק וקני) ואתה צריך רק אחד שילך ויאחז בחצי שלו. כך שאין אי בהירות לגבי הרא''ש. השאלה אם כן מה הסיבה לרמב''ם? למה שניהם צריכים להשתלט, אבל אף אחד לא צריך להגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש?" לשם כך מסבירים גם רב שך וגם רב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שלרמב''ם זו לא רכישה על ידי החלפה, אלא חלוקה של מה שכבר יש לשניהם. לכן, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש", אולם שניהם צריכים להשתלט על המחצית שלהם. עכשיו אתה יכול לשאול מדוע הם לא צריכים לומר, "לך לרכוש?" הטעם הוא כי אתה צריך את זה רק כאשר אחד מוכר נכס לשני, והשני משתלט לא מול המוכר. זה הולך לפי הרעיון של רב איסר מלצר שלומר "לך ורכש" פירושו פקודה ישירה שנצטרך במקרה של רכישה. אבל גם בלי הפקודה הזו, עדיין יש הסכמה מרומזת לרכישה. אבל אם במילים האלה יש רק משמעות של הסכם לרכוש, אז גם עם חלוקת רכוש נצטרך שאחד יגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש

page 3a of Bava Batra

There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page 3a of Bava Batra. Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief, or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the Rosh, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the Rosh this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the Rambam both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “Go and make an acquisition.” To Rav Isar Meltzer, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “Go and acquire”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “Go and acquire” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to Rav Shach the reason of the Rosh is that the Rosh considers this a case of acquisition by exchange where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “Go and acquire.” But Rav Shach and Rav Isar Meltzer agree that the reason for the Rambam is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “go and acquire,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what Rav Isar Meltzer holds here about the opinion of the Rosh, it is from exchange or from agreement?" Rav Shach mentions that the law is that even in dividing, you only need one to take his share. He however does mention that that might be only in a case when the courtyard is big enough for four cubits to come to each one. But from this we can understand the Rosh, who says even if just one divides that is enough. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________]_________________________ There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page דף ג' ע''א of בבא בתרא Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief (סודר), or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the רא''ש, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the רא''ש this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the רמב''ם both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “לך חזק וקני.” To רב איסר מלצר, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “לך חזק וקני.”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “לך חזק וקני” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to רב שך the reason of the רא''ש is that the רא''ש considers this a case of acquisition חליפין where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “לך חזק וקני.” But רב שך and רב איסק מלצר agree that the reason for the רמב''ם is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “לך חזק וקני,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what רב איסר מלצר holds here about the opinion of the רא''ש, it is from exchange or from agreemenT? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ יש נושא שארצה להציג בדף דף ג' ע''א בבא בתרא. שני אנשים מחזיקים יחד חצר ורוצים לחלק אותה, למרות שהיא קטנה. למעשה, הוא כל כך קטן שארבע אמות לא ילכו לשניהם. ולמעשה, במקרה זה, הם לא יכולים להכריח זה את זה להתחלק. אבל הם רוצים להתחלק בכל זאת. הם יכולים לעשות רכישה על ידי מטפחת (סודר), או אפילו בלי רכישה במטפחת על ידי שכל אחד יכניס לחלק שהוא רוצה ולעשות שם רכישה על ידי עשיית גדר או נעילה או פירוק גדר. לרא''ש רק אחד צריך לעשות רכישה. הסיבה היא שמכיוון ששניהם מחזיקים בו במשותף, לאחר שאחד לוקח חלק אחד, השני מקבל את החלק השני באופן אוטומטי. לרא''ש זה דומה או אולי זהה לרכישה בהחלפה (חליפין). לרמב''ם שניהם צריכים לעשות רכישה. אבל לשניהם אין צורך לומר לשני "לך חזק וקני". לרב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שבמקרים כלליים של רכישת קרקע צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כאן אין מדובר ברכישה רגילה, אלא בחלוקת מה שכבר מחזיקים במשותף. ובביטוי "לך חזק וקני" יש במרומז את המשמעות של נתינת חזקה ישירות, לא רק הסכמה לתת לאחר לרכוש. (ובענייננו, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש" כיון ששניהם מחזיקים בו, אבל צריך להיות הסכם לתת לשני לרכוש.) אולם לרב שך טעם הרא''ש הוא שהרא''ש רואה בזה מקרה של רכישה על ידי חליפין כאשר וכאשר שותף אחד רוכש, השני רוכש אוטומטית מבלי לומר "לך חזק וקני". אבל רב שך ורב איסר מלצר מסכימים שהסיבה לרמב''ם היא שזה חלוקת מה שכבר יש להם, ולכן לא צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כל אחד צריך להחזיק בחציו כפי שאתה יכול לדעת, אני לא בטוח מה רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כאן לגבי דעת הרא"ש, זה מחילופין או מהסכמה רב שך מזכיר שהדין הוא שגם בחלוקה צריך רק אחד שייקח את חלקו. עם זאת, הוא מזכיר שזה יכול להיות רק במקרה שבו החצר גדולה מספיק כדי שארבע אמות יגיעו לכל שותף. אבל מכאן אפשר להבין את הרא''ש, שאומר גם אם רק אחד מחלק די בכך.

za53 B minor in midi za53 in nwc

za52 in C minor

za52 midi za52 nwc

Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76. Also see the teaching: "All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of flesh and blood are removed from him."

I have a few approaches to learning that I would like to recommend. sometimes one approach seems best and other times another. One way I mentioned in the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov #76 to say the words and go on. Even if one does not understand immediately he will eventually understand when he goes on to the end of the book and then reviews it many times. This I found helpful not just in Gemara but also in some of the important commentaries on the Talmud, like Rav Shach' Avi Ezri and Rav Isar Meltzer; Even Haazel. I also have used this method in math and physics. another method was low methodical saying the words of every page or even every sentence forwards and backwards and in fact that method helped me get though my course at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. Another method is what is in fact practiced in the secular world of listening to lectures by experts in the subject. That one is probably the best since it really was the reason for any success at Polytechnic and also at the Mir in NY where I heard classes and lectures by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. I highly doubt if I had been able to get anywhere in these subjects without listening to the experts. Study alone at home was helpful in getting ready to absorb the message, but the real quality learning was from listening to lectures. Can you imagine if I had been able to play the violin by learning books? Obviously not. It had to be by learning from the best. on. Even though this approach to learning is effective in Torah, Math and Physics, still i would like to place a special emphasis on the Mishna: All who accept on themselves the yoke of Torah, the yoke of government and the yoke of people are removed from him. My learning partner (David Bronson mentioned to me the importance of this teaching.)

Bava Metzia page 2a, 3a, 37b. Rambam Laws of two people arguing in court ch 9, law 7. Laws of Robery ch four, law 10.

I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of rav shach in the rambam. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). [The case of theft is one wants to give back an object that he stole, but does not know from which one of two people he stole it. The case of buying is one sold an object to two people and does not remember to which one of them. The case of holding is two people are holding an object, and each one says, "It belongs to me." In each case you divide the value of the object.] These are the three cases the Rambam says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding an object for two people, and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The Rambam does not make the sort of difference of the Ri Migash. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] The difference according to Rav Shach is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the Gemara and brought in Tosphot that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that certainly can not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when he says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the Rambam and the Gemara. The Rambam says they divide and the Gemara on page 37b says “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer is the case of holding an object for two people. There each is certain, and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that Rav Shmuel Rozovski says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt, and that there comes the laws money that is in doubt stays in its place as the R’’an suggests. But what would be the difference between theft and a deposit if both are certain and neither is holding it and yet the case of theft you divide and the deposit stays put? I can answer somewhat like the gemara says how ca you compare theft with a deposit? the case of theft is such that there is no reason to leave the object in the hands of he who stole it. Even if there is no proof for either side and even if one is lying and even if the division can’t be correct, still you give it to them both a and they divide it between themselves. (That is not the same as when the court itself divides the value in half and gives a half to both parties.) But in the case of a deposit both gave their object to him by their own volition. Now there is no way of knowing to whom belong the part that is argued over, therefore it stays in its place. That is because it is where the actual owner put it. Until proof is brought, that is where it stays. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I was at the sea and on the way back it occurred to me a kind of clarity in the approach of רב שך in the רמב''ם. The sign I use to remember this is GMT [Greenwich Meridian Time] Gezela (theft), mechira (stealing) and tofsim (holding). These are the three caseS the רמב''ם says one divides. The case where you do not say this is in the case of holding aפקדון for two people and it is not known which one owns it. There you say the part that is argued about should stay in its place. The רמב''ם does not make the sort of difference of the ר''י מיגש. [If both are holding it, they divide it, but if not, it stays in its place.] Even though the רמב''ם does not mention the idea of the גמרא of where there is definitely a liar, nor the idea of the division might be correct it, still he might hold with these ideas as I will mention soon. But the main difference according to רב שך is that when they are certain, they divide the object. And you can see that goes according to the idea of the גמרא and brought in תוספות that what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him. But that can certainly not be the case if he himself is in doubt. Rather, it is assumed to belong to him when it says, ‘’ It belongs to me for sure.’’ And, in fact, in the cases where each is holding it and in the case of a sale, they are certain. Only the case of theft you have to say they divide when they are certain, and it stays in its place when they are in doubt. [This would answer the contradiction between the רמב''ם and the גמרא. The רמב''ם says they divide and the גמרא on page ל''ז ע''בsays “It stays in its place.”] The question that this idea would not answer the case of holding an object for two people. there each is certain and you say its stays in its place. I imagine this is the reason that רב שמואל רוזובסקי says the opposite i.e., the case where you divide is because of a doubt and that there comes the law המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיהas the ר''ן suggests. But רב שך can answer that you divide when they are certain and also because the law what is in the hands of a person is assumed to belong to him and like the גמרא says the division might be true and there is not a liar for a certainty. But in the case of holding an object for two people, even though each one is certain, but neither is holding it and there is a liar for sure and the division can not be correct. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ בבא מציעא ב' ע''א ג' ע''א ל''ז ע''ב רמב''ם טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', גזילה פרק ד' חלכה י יש שלושת המקרים שהרמב''ם אומרכל אחד מחלק.[[המקרה של גזלה הוא שרוצה להחזיר חפץ שגנב, אבל לא יודע מאיזה אחד משני אנשים הוא גנב אותו. במקרה של קנייה הוא מכר חפץ לשני אנשים ואינו זוכר למי מהם. המקרה של תופסים הוא שני אנשים מחזיקים חפץ וכל אחד אומר "זה שייך לי". בכל מקרה אתה מחלק את הערך של האובייקט]] המקרה שבו אתה לא אומר זאת הוא במקרה של החזקת פיקדון לשני אנשים ולא ידוע למי שייך. שם אתה אומר שהחלק שמתווכחים עליו צריך להישאר במקומו. הרמב''ם אינו עושה את סוג ההבדל של הר''י מיגש. [אם שניהם מחזיקים בו, מחלקים אותו, אבל אם לא, הוא נשאר במקומו.] אף על פי שהרמב''ם לא מזכיר את רעיון הגמרא איפה בהחלט יש שקרן, וגם לא את רעיון שהחלוקה עשויה להיות נכונה, ובכל זאת הוא עשוי להחזיק ברעיונות האלה כפי שאציין בקרוב. אבל עיקר ההבדל לפי רב שך הוא שכשהם בטוחים מחלקים את החפץ. ותוכל לראות שזה הולך כרעיון הגמרא והביא בתוספות שמה שיש ביד אדם שייך לו. אבל זה בהחלט לא יכול להיות המקרה אם הוא עצמו בספק. אדרבא, מניחים שזה שייך לו כשאומר ''זה שייך לי בוודאות'' ולמעשה, במקרים שכל אחד מחזיק בו ובמקרה של מכירה, הם בטוחים. רק במקרה של גניבה יש לומר שהם מחלקים כשהם בטוחים, וזה נשאר במקומו כשהם בספק. [זה יענה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם לגמרא. הרמב''ם אומר שהם מחלקים והגמרא בדף ל''ז ע''ב אומר "נשאר במקומו".] השאלה שרעיון זה לא יענה במקרה של החזקת חפץ לשני אנשים. שם כל אחד בטוח ואתה אומר שהוא נשאר במקומו. אני מתאר לעצמי שזאת הסיבה שרב שמואל רוזובסקי אומר את ההיפך כלומר, המקרה שבו אתה מחלק הוא בגלל ספק וששם מגיע החוק המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה כמו שהר''ן מציע אני מבין שזה לא בדיוק מה שרב שך אומר, (הוא משווה הרמב''ם עם הר''י מיגש שהעיקר תלוי באוחזים) אבל אני עדיין סומך מ על הרעיון הבסיסי שלו שאתה מחלק כששניהם בטוחים. אבל אני יכול לראות מה קבע הרב שמואל רוזובסקי [שמחלקים כששניהם בספק] כי הוא סומך על הרעיון של רב חיים מבריסק שצריכים לקיים ''החזרת החפץ'', מה שיכול להיות אם שני הצדדים מוטלים בספק, אך לא היכן שאחד משקר

A complaint about Hegel is that he idolizes the state and detracts from the importance and significance of the individual. But this critique seems to me to be unfair because his general approach across the board is that nothing has reality except in so far as it corresponds to its true concept. And so one might ask ''what is the true idea of a state? Hegel sensed this and said that “the USA is the state of the future,” meaning that its principles corresponded most closely with the ideal state. See the essay of Kaufman about Hegel. On the other hand the approach of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross is also important as to answering the problem of how knowledge is possible as different and my point here is that Hegel is better understood as a philosopher, not a political activist. And if he was advocating anything it certainly was not the Prussian state as historical evidence shows but rather the English and later the American model. [see the cambridge book on hegel where different authors explain different aspects of hegel.]