Bava Batra 134b. Kidushin 64b.

You have to say the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking there is a hazaka for a brother and still she is permitted to marry (without yibum or halitza) because he is also saying he has a son. This is because in Kidushin the whole difference between the Mishna and the Braita over there is when there is a hazaka that there is a brother. The Gemara over in Kidushin clearly say that is the only difference and that is the reason R Nathan forbids her. So then what do you do with the Mishna in Bava Batara that is the exact same law? You have to say in Bava Batra he is also saying he has a son.

[I did not get a chance to do any learning today but it occurs to me that this might be the very reason the Ramban (Nahmanides) is disagreeing with the approach of the Baal Hameor and Rashi.

Besides one other reason he gives that כיוון שהגיד שוב אינו מגיד. [Once he says something and believed he is no longer believed to change his mind. But besides that I can imagine the Ramban (Nahmanides) also is thinking that it makes no sense to  put in an extra condition in the Mishna in Bava Batra--especially when over there it is clearly divided into two case. One when he says he has  a son and the other when he claim to have  a brother.

Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [

I had a few minutes to look at the Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [One of the major poskim (people that wrote on the Talmud from the standpoint of determining the law--as different from people that wrote on it with a view to explain the difficulties) of the Middle Ages.] And I see that I need to do a lot more work on that subject there because there seems to be a debate among the rishonim how to understand that subject. You have Rashi and the Baal Hameor [Rav Zarahia HaLevi] on one side. On the other you have the Rosh and the Ramban.

Still from what I could see my answer for R. Akiva Eiger still looks valid -- at least if you look at the subject from the viewpoint of Rashi. [I might mention here that I have heard this before when I was at the Mir in NY--that often the questions of R Akiva Eiger are only to one opinion. Just switching to the other opinions will often  answer the question. So you have to assume he was asking his question according to the viewpoint of the alternative opinion. I actually had that experience once while at the Mir. In those days it was the custom for young married men to give a kind of informal class that was separate from the regular scheduled classes. I was giving such a class there and in fact discovered that a question of R Akiva Eiger in Shabat could be answered based on a Tur in the laws of festivals.]

So just to make this short: The Gemara in Bava Batra [if memory serves me correctly] asks why do you need an extra mishna to tell us if the husband says before he dies "I have a son" he is believed. If he says "I have a brother" he is not. Answer: the Mishna is telling us even when there is a Hazaka  (prior status) that there is a brother. [What this seems to mean (at least the way Rashi and the Baal HaMeor understand it) is that he says also I have a son. So when he says "I have brother" and there is also a Hazaka (prior status) that there is a brother she is still permitted to marry someone without Yibum. [Yibum is when a woman is married and her husband dies without seed, she has to marry his brother. --or do Haliza (taking off the sandal) as mentioned in the Torah.]

R Akiva Eiger asks right there why does the gemara say a hazaka. Even with witnesses she also should be allowed to marry without Yibum.[It seems to me clear in any case that R Akiva Eiger is asking only according to the opinion of the baal Hameor since to the other opinion his question would not make sense.]
My answer is based on Kidushin 64 that wants the Mishna to be like R. Nathan not just R Yehuda Hanasi.
The point is over there in Kidushin R Nathan goes  with Hazaka (prior status) if he says "I have a brother" to believe him to make her forbidden to remarry without yibum. But if he also says I have a son she is permitted. But my point is that if there would be more than a Hazaka but also witnesses, then R Nathan would say no.--and forbid her unless there was some evidence that there is a son.

And just by taking a quick look at Rashi and the Rosh today I saw that this answer is very clear in Rashi since Rashi says that if a brother would come later and say that he is the brother then he would not be believed. But from that Rashi you can see that if there would be witnesses at the time she wants to be permitted to remarry then we would need evidence that there is a son.

I also had another proof for this answer but I forgot it.

Philosophy queen of the sciences? or bankrupt?

Philosophy used to be the queen of the sciences. It has fallen to irrelevance. [As Steven Weinberg (NoblePrize Physics--for combining electromagnetism with the weak force that causes neutron decay) wrote about the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy.] [This as compared to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics]]  This is similar to large corporations that at one time hold first place and then sink into bankruptcy. [Same with England. Once the prime world power. Now an afterthought.] The situation is not so different when it comes to religion which once was thought to contain all truth. Now is simply a matter of personal preference on where to hang out.

What does this mean in a practical sense?

I mean this question also in terms of the discredited ideologies that swept through Europe and Russia in the later 1800's.


Faith and Reason was the formula that worked for the Middle Ages. And still is a working combination. Not just one or the other. But the very meaning of faith and reason can not be the same as in the Middle Ages.
[Like the Renaissance that looked towards ancient Attica [Greece] for inspiration, but went beyond that.]

Not that philosophy itself is irrelevant. It is still necessary to get an accurate idea of what is everything all about. Just philosophy as a study has undergone a systematic decay.


[Perhaps if we could all go back to basics would be best. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson. If we could just get through that material maybe we would be doing a lot better.]- See robert hanna about the vacuous twentieth century analytic philosophy. 

Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב

But on last Friday after looking at the Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger there, I had an idea of how to answer his question.

גמרא בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב. המשנה האומר יש לי בן נאמן. יש לי אח אינו נאמן. זה אומר יש לו בן ולכן אשתו אינה חייבת ביבום. יש לי אח ולכן אשתו חייבת ביבום. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה בזה בקידושין  דף ס''ד ע''א. הגמרא .עונה פה יש חזקה על שיש אח. רע''א שואל אפילו אם יש עדים שיש לו אחים הוא צריך להיות נאמן כשהוא אומר שאין לו
בגלל הדין המובא להלן כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן וזה אפילו כנגד עדים. התירוץ נראה בא מן הגמרא בקידושין סד ע''ב. שם מובא את הדין שיש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שאול שכנראה שזה אינו כר' נתן. שכך מובא  האומר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן ובשעת מיתה אין לי בן או האומר בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה יש לי אח. ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר נאמן להתיר ואינו נאמן לאסור. ר' נתו אומר גם נאמן לאסור. אביי אומר לא קושיא. המשנה היא כשאין חזקה והברייתא היא כשיש חשזה שיש אח ואין חזקה על בן. ולכן שם ר' נתן אומר שהיא אסורה וחייבת ביבום בגלל החזקה.
לי נראה שהגמרא בבבא בתרא גם מחזיקה בשיטת הגמרא בקידושין שהמשנה שם גם כמו ר' נתן. ור'נתן מאמין בו בגלל החזקה אבל לא היה מאמין לו אם הייתה עדות בגלל שהנאמנות של הבעל בשעת מיתה הוא רק בגלל שהוא מפספס ומשנה את הטיעון שלו אבל עדות ר' נתן היה מאמין


From what I recall the Gemara there goes like this. The Mishna says one who says he has a son is believed but one who says he has a brother is not. The Gemara asks that this seems to be extra since we already learn this same rule in Kidushin 64 side A. It answers, here in Bava Batra there is a prior status that he has a brother [Hazaka.]  Rav Akiva Eiger asks that even more that a Hazaka but even with witnesses that he has a brother and he says he does not he should be believed like the case when he is married and he says he gave a get [divorce ] to his wife.
The answer I think is this. The Gemara in Kidushin brings the same rule [He says he has a son he is believed. he says he has brother he is not believed.] and asks that it seems to not be like R. Nathan.]
For we have a teaching: He says at the time of marriage I have a son and later before he dies he says I do not have a son. Or at the time of marriage he says I have no brother and later before he dies he says I have brother. R Yehuda the Prince says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also he is believed to forbid. [That is R Natan is going by what he says at the end. R Yehuda goes by what he says at the beginning.]






Abyee answers the mishna [is where] there is no hazaka (prior status). The teaching is where there is a hazaka that he has a brother but no hazaka (prior status) about a son.

The answer to the question of R.A. Eiger is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is also thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that wants the Mishna to be like R Nathan, not just like R Yehuda. And R Nathan in the teaching is going with Hazaka.  But that is because the husband himself flip flops.But in a case where there would be witnesses R Nathan would disagree with the Mishna.

The problem I see in the religious world is that of con. Getting people to believe that what is not authentic Torah really is. This I see is the ultimate reason for the fact that the Gra signed on the letter o excommunication. But it also explains why so many people ignore it. Because we are all more liable to being fooled that we believe. For this reason it is a good idea to have an idea of what authentic Torah is. And also to read a few books about the widespread practice of con and scam--to show how easy it is to be fooled.

The great thing about Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY [two very great Litvak yeshivas] is authenticity.

This is very much different from the majority of what goes on in the religious world where deception and scamming secular Jews is the rule--not the exception.

And this I think one of the major reasons for the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication.

The problem he saw was not just falsifying what the Torah says but scamming and conning people about it.

"Authentic" means that certain places are into learning Torah--nothing more or less. They are not claiming anything else. This is the major characteristic of Litvak yeshivas in Israel also. There is no aspect of scam that is so common place in the rest of the religious world. 

R Yohanan had a disciple R. Zeiri. R Yohanan wanted R Zeiri to marry his daughter. [The daughter of R Yohanan.] R Zeiri did not want her. One day they were crossing a river. R Zeiri carried R Yohanan over teh river on his shoulders. [All this is in the last chapter of Kidushin.] R Yohana asked him, "My Torah is good enough for you but my daughter is not?" [R yohanan was born in Israel. R. Zeiri came to Israel from Babylon]

[The point was that the people in Babylon were considered to be more myuhas [pure lineage] than people born in Israel.

I have trouble understanding this story because if I would have had a chance to marry the daughter of a true Torah scholar [not the modern phonies] I would have jumped at the opportunity.[If I would have I probably would still be learning Torah until this very day]