בבא מציעא ל''ה

Ideas in Shas

Ideas in Bava Metzia
In terms of   רב שך idea in laws of ה' שכירות א' הלכה ו. The idea is in short that in בבא מציעא לה: רב אידי בר אבין and אביי disagree about the sages of the משנה.  Then רב שך brings an idea not look that it fits well with אביי and רב אידי בר אבין. The basic idea is this. Two people come to the court of law and one claims payment for a loan.  The other says "You forgave the loan." If it is during the period before the loan is due to be paid the לווה is not believed, but if after that period, he is believed because he could say "I already paid you back".  Then why not during the time of the loan also? He answers it is a "טענה גרועה" since no loan is standing to be forgiven, It is standing to be paid,
Now רב שך applies this idea to when a work animal dies during the time it is being hired out. The Torah does believe the one that hired the animal with an oath but the actual plea itself seems weak. The animal is not standing in order to die. And רב שך in fact says that was the argument between אביי and רב אידי בר אבין. What bothers me here is that neither אביי nor רב אידי בר אבין say that that is what they are arguing about. They say they are arguing about when does possession pass to the one that hired the animal, the time of the oath or the time the animal died? That to me sounds like the whole argument between them is this: They agree that קניין פירות לאו כקניין הגוף of the object, And that שכירות אינה קניין הגוף. But in a case when the animal dies then that changes. Then the קניין פירות כקניין הגוף in the object itself. And there is a simple proof of this idea. A thief that damages the object he stole, he has to give back double the price or whole objects, and he keeps the vessel he broke. See what I wrote about אין שמין לגנב. So damage can confer possession in the case of hiring also.

בבא מציעא ל''ה ע''ב. רב שך בה' שכירות א' הלכה ו. הרעיון הוא בקיצור כי בבא מציעא לה: רב אידי בר אבין ואביי חולקים בדעת החכמים של המשנה.  רב שך מביא רעיון שקשה להבין בעניין אביי ואת רב אידי בר אבין. הרעיון הבסיסי הוא זה. שני אנשים מגיעים לבית המשפט  ואחד טוען תשלום עבור הלוואה. השני אומר "אתה סלחת את ההלוואה." אם זה בתקופה שלפני ההלוואה צריכה להיות משולמת הלווה לא נאמן, אבל אם אחרי תקופה זו, הוא נאמן כי הוא יכול לומר "כבר שילמתי לך בחזרה". אז למה לא בזמן של ההלוואה גם? הוא עונה זו  "טענה גרועה" מאז הלוואה אינה עומדת להיות נסלחת, זו עומדת להיות משולמת. עכשיו רב שך מביא את הרעיון הזה כאשר חי עבודה מת במהלך הזמן שהעבודה מתבצעת, התורה  מאמינה  השוכר עם שבועה, אך הטיעון בפועל עצמו נראה חלש. החיה אינה עומדת למות. וזה רב שך למעשה אומר כי היה ויכוח בין אביי ואת רב אידי בר אבין. מה קשה לי כאן הוא שלא אביי ולא רב אידי בר אבין מזכירים כי זה הם מתווכחים. הם מתווכחים בעניין הזמן שקניין עובר לשוכר את החיה, הזמן של השבועה או הזמן שהחיה מתה? זה נשמע לי כמו כל הטיעון ביניהם הוא זה: הם מסכימים כי קניין פירות לאו כקניין הגוף [של האובייקט], ושכירות אינה קניין הגוף. אבל במקרה כאשר החי מת אז יש שינוי. ואז קניין פירות כקניין הגוף בתוך האובייקט עצמו. ויש הוכחה פשוטה של ​​הרעיון הזה. גנב שהזיק את האובייקט שהוא גנב, הוא צריך להחזיר כפל המחיר או אובייקטים שלמים, והוא קונה  כלי שהוא שיבר. ראה מה שכתבתי על אין שמין לגנב. אז נזק יכול להעניק קניין במקרה של שכירות גם.

Bava Metzia page 35 - Rav Shach's idea.

In terms of  Rav Shach's idea in laws of hiring I:6 I do not have a lot to add to what God granted to me to write yesterday. The only thing is that I am not so sure if the actual approach really works.

The idea is in short that in Bava Metzia page 35b Rav Aidi bar Abin and Abyee disagree about the sages of the Mishna. Rav Shach brings a good idea from Rav Aaron Kotler that fits well in the place his brings it. But to me it does not look that it fits well with Abyee and Rav Aidi.
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The basic idea of Rav Aaron Kotler makes a lot of sense. It is this. Two people come to the court of law and one claims payment for a loan and the other says you forgave the loan.If it is during the period before the loan is due to be paid the borrower is not believed but if after that period he is believed because he could say I already paid you back. Rav Aaron asks then why not during the time of the loan also? He answers it is a "weak plea." since no loan is standing to be forgiven, It is standing to be paid,
Now Rav Shach applies this idea to when a work animal dies during the time it is being hired out. The Torah does believe the one that hired the animal with an oath but the actual plea itself seems weak. The animal is not standing in order to die. And Rav Shach in fact says that was the argument between Abyee and Rav Aidi.

What bothers me here is that neither Abyee nor Rav Aidi say that that is what they are arguing about. They say they are arguing about when does possession pass to the one that hired the animal--the time of the oath of the time the animal died? That to me sounds like the whole argument between them is this: They agree that possession of the fruits in not like possession of the object, And that hiring does not give possession of the object. But in a case when the animal dies then that changes. Then the possession or hiring does mean there is a possession in the object itself. And there is a simple proof of this idea. A thief that damages the object he stole, he has to give back double the price or whole objects, and he keeps the vessel he broke. [See what I wrote about אין שמין לגנב] So damage can confer possession in the case of hiring also. Maybe this counts as a new idea?


I ought to mention that when I was learning with my learning partner David Bronson-we found ways of answering difficult issues in Rav Shach and if I would be learning with him now perhaps I also could find an answer. However right now I think that my approach here makes more sense.

Why do the righteous suffer? Is a question asked in the prophets Havakook, not just in the book of Job. But in the book of Job you get what to me looks like the answer. The three friends of Job were all rebuked by God himself there.

Why do the righteous suffer? Is a question asked in the prophets Havakook, not just in the book of Job. But in the book of Job you get what to me looks like the answer. The three friends of Job were all rebuked by God himself there. Job himself is not exactly rebuked, but God "tells him off". He asks "Who are you to judge?" But one person in the whole book gets off the hook,-- Elyihu. So what did Elyihu say different from the other three?
That one good deed outweighs a thousand sins.  Add to that sincere repentance and that seems to be enough to get a person into the Divine Light.[ Job 33]



Schopenhauer seems to have an approach in terms of the Will. Though he generally delights in the fact that we do not understand the workings of the Will, still in a late letter he indicates that there is a dimension of the Will's workings in the world that it all goes towards the good. That seems to be the approach of King David in psalms around #73


[Schopenhauer provides the metaphysics for Kelley Ross's  Kant Fries School of thought. That is largely based on Leonard Nelson for the part that is meant to answer how do we know stuff? It is known as the Friesian School or Critical school but Dr Ross really has made it into a larger structure. He uses the bricks to build his own structure.]

בבא מציעא ל''ה ע''ב

בבא מציעא ל''ה ע''ב. The רמב''ם הלכות שכירות א' ה''ו in that case of the שוכר animal and then משאיל it goes like ר' יוסי that the שואל pays the owner. So that goes well with the general rule of ריש לקיש possession of the fruit is not like possession of the object itself. קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף And that goes well with what רב שך writes in laws of hire ו' ה''ה. So then why does  רב שך not say that that in itself is the debate with the sages and ר' יוסי? Because of a few good reasons. The most obvious one is this. When רב אידי בר אבין asks on the sages and אביי answers him they do not say the reason for the sages is because the possession of the fruit is like possession of the object. Neither do they say that the fact that שוכר the animal gets possession by the fact of hiring. Instead רב אידי  asks when does possession start? From the oath. He then asks why does the owner not say he does not need the oath of the שוכר and instead wants to talk with the שואל. And אביי answers him possession does not start from the oath. Rather it starts from the time the animal dies. But both are talking only according to the sages, and they are both agreeing that possession did not start from the time of hiring. Also we do not want a debate among sages of the משנה to depend on a debate among sages of the Talmud. So now  רב שך is crystal clear. He knows the reason for the רמב''ם is that the possession of the fruit is not like possession of the object. But then he is wondering then what is the reason for the sages that hold the שואל pays the שוכר? And then he comes with this idea the argument between אביי and רב אידי depends on whether a plea of accident is a strong plea. [I still think that Rav Shach should have mentioned this aspect of things openly, even though it is clear that he was thinking along these lines.]


link to Ideas in Shas

בבא מציעא ל''ה ע''ב. רמב''ם הלכות שכירות א' ה''ו במקרה של שוכר חיה, ואז משאיל אותה (ואז קרה אונס שהחיה מתה) הולך כמו ר' יוסי כי שואל משלם לבעלים. אז זה הולך טוב עם הכלל של ריש לקיש קנין של הפרי הוא לא כמו קנין של האובייקט עצמו. קנין פירות לאו כקנין הגוף וזה הולך טוב עם מה רב שך כותב ה' שכירות ו" ה''ה. אז מדוע רב שך לא לומר כי זה בעצמו הוויכוח של החכמים עם ר' יוסי? בגלל כמה סיבות טובות. התוצאה הברורה ביותר היא זו. כאשר רב אידי בר אבין שואל על החכמים אביי עונה לו שהם לא אומרים שסיבת החכמים משום קנין של הפרי כמו קנין של האובייקט. גם הם לא אומרים כי העובדה של השכירות של החיה גורמת קנין.  רב אידי שואל מתי הקניין מתחיל? מן השבועה. ואז הוא שואל מדוע הבעלים לא אומרים שהם לא צריכים את השבועה של השוכר ובמקום זה רוצים לדבר עם השואל. וזה אביי עונה לו קנין אינו מתחיל מן השבועה. במקום זאת הוא מתחיל מרגע החיה מתה. אבל שניהם מדברים לפי דעת החכמים, ושניהם מסכימים כי קניין לא התחיל מהרגע של השכירות. כמו כן אנחנו לא רוצים ויכוח בין חכמי המשנה תסמוך על ויכוח בין חכמי התלמוד. אז עכשיו דעת  רב שך היא ברורה כשמש. הוא יודע את הסיבת הרמב''ם היא כי קנייןו של הפרי הוא לא קניין של האובייקט. אבל אז הוא תוהה אז מהי הסיבה שחכמים שמחזיקים שהשואל משלם לשוכר? ואז הוא מגיע עם רעיון זה הטיעון בין אביי ואת רב אידי תלוי אם לא  טענת התאונה היא טיעון חזק.

Rav Shach in Laws of Hire I: 6, Bava Metzia 35:b

Bava Metzia 35:b
I am grateful to God that I found a way to explain Rav Shach and also that I can write it on the internet with the computer of a friend.[I still can not write music but still I am happy that God has grated to me to writes a new idea in Torah.]
This is in reference to what I asked yesterday about Rav Shach in laws of hire I: 6
Because I never know how much time I have I will write the idea that I had today in short.

The Rambam in that case of the one that hires the animal and then lends it goes like R. Yose that the borrower pays the owner. So that goes well with the general rule of Reish Lakish possession of the fruit is not like possession of the object itself. And that goes well with what Rav Shach writes in laws of hire VI:5

So then as I asked yesterday does Rav Shach not say that that in itself is the debate with the sages and R Yose? Because of a few good reasons. The most obvious one is this. When Rav Aidi bar Abin asks on the sages and Abyee answers him they do not say the reason for the sages is because the possession of the fruit is like possession of the object. Neither do they say that the fact that one that hired the animal gets possession by the fact of hiring. Instead Rav Aidi asks when does possession start? From the oath. He then asks why does the owner not say he does not need the oath of the one that hires and instead wants to talk with the one that borrowed. And Abyee answers him Do not think possession starts from the oath. Rather it starts from the time the animal dies. But both are talking only according to the sages and they are both agreeing that possession did not start from the time of hiring.

Also we do not want a debate among sages of the mishna to depend on a debate among sages of the Talmud.
So now Rav Shach is crystal clear. He knows the reason for the Rambam is that the possession of the fruit is not like possession of the object. But then he is wondering then what is the reason for the sages that hold the borrower pays the one that hired? And then he comes with this idea the argument between Abyee and Rav Idi depends on whether a plea of accident is a strong plea.

talks by Rav Shach.

I saw in the Litvak study hall a book that has excerpts of talks by Rav Shach. Sometimes they seem very insightful but it seems a little much on the religious side. And the religious side can be for me confusing. After all Kant said that when one tries to apply reason to the realm of the thing in itself, contradictions are inevitable,

So my approach is to try to learn Gemara and to live according to the laws of Moses, but to avoid the religious world which is contrary to that ideal--though they certainly imagine that they are in accord with it.

 Involvement with the religious world is usually disastrous. The reason is though they believe they are keeping Torah, they are in fact doing the opposite.

But to try to understand the reason for this just gets one involved in a realm where reason can not go. (But I venture to say  to the religious, their emphasis on ritual makes them superior in their own minds) The best thing to do is to be  a mensch -a decent human being.

Rav Shach in the Rambam in laws of hire

Rav Shach in the Rambam in laws of hire says an idea to answer the Rambam over there. But I think that Rav Shach himself came up with a better idea a few pages later.


To be as direct and short as I can.[Since I am tired and also worried about my problems.]
Rambam Laws of Hire I: 6 goes like R. Yose. The case is a person hired an animal to do work with and then loaned it to another person. On that person's time the animal dies.
To whom does the borrower pay?[Background: A borrower pays for everything and one that hires pays for small things but not for big accidents that he has no control over. The animal dying is considered a big accident but then he takes an oath that that is in fact what happened.

The Gemara itself brings this:
However the sages of the mishna say the borrower pays the one that hired the animal-if the one that hired the animal takes the required oath.

Rav Adi bar Abin says the owner ought to tell the one that  hired: can talk to the borrower directly. Abyee answered to Rav Adi: the obligation starts when the animal dies, not at the time of the oath.

To me the issue seems clearly based on the argument between R Yochanan and Reish Lakish about אם קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי-- if possession of the fruits is like possession of the object itself.
See Rav Shach himself later on in laws of hire where him goes into this in detail and I am thinking that later section must have been written long after this one because I think Rav Shach would have seen that he himself had a better answer than the one he gives, The explanation he gives  to the debate between Abyee and Rav Abin is if a plea of "accident" is a strong plea,

But from my point of view it seems simple that the question is does renting or hiring something give one possession in the physical object or not? If yes, the it is clear why the borrower would have to pay the one that hired. The reason is that for that period of time of the renting, he is in the place of the owner and so when an accident occurred in the possession of the borrower, the money would have to be paid to him, not the owner. And that is how Rav Shach himself explains the debate between R Yochanan and Riesh Lakish.

Sorry if this is not so clear but it is the best I can do right now.

I just added this to my little book on Shas

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רב שך in the רמב''ם הלכות שכירות  says an idea to answer the רמב''ם  over there. But I think that רב שך himself came up with a better idea a few pages later. 'רמב''ם  הלכות שכירות א הלכה ו goes like ר' יוסי. The case is a person hired an animal to do work with and then loaned it to another person. On that person's time the animal dies. To whom does the borrower pay? Background. A שואל pays for everything and שוכר pays for  גניבה ואבידה  ואונסים קטנים but not for אונסים גדולים כגון שוד מזוין או מיתת הבהמה that he has no control over. The animal dying is considered a big accident, but then השוכר takes an oath that that is in fact what happened. The גמרא itself brings this. However the חכמים of the משנה say the borrower pays to the שוכר, if the שוכר takes the required oath. רב אידי בר אבין  says the בעל הבית ought to tell the שוכר I can talk to the borrower directly. אביי answered to רב אידי בר אבין, the obligation starts when the animal dies, not at the time of the oath. I think the debate is based on the argument between ר' יוחנן and ריש לקיש about אם קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי. The explanation רב שך gives  to the debate between אביי and רב אידי בר אבין  is if a plea of "accident" is a strong plea. But from my point of view it seems simple that the question is this. Does hiring something give one possession in the physical object or not? If yes, then it is clear why the borrower would have to pay the שוכר. The reason is that for that period of time of the renting, he is in the place of the owner and so when an accident occurred in the possession of the borrower, the money would have to be paid to השוכר, not the owner.



רב שך ברמב''ם הלכות שכירות אומר רעיון לענות על רמב''ם שם. אבל אני חושב כי רב שך עצמו בא עם רעיון טוב יותר לאחר כמה דפים. רמב''ם הלכות שכירות א הלכה ו' הולך כמו ר' יוסי. המקרה הוא אדם שוכר חיה לעשות עבודה ולאחר מכן משאיל אותה לאדם אחר. על הזמן של השואל הבעל חי מת. למי השואל משלם? (רקע כללי. שואל משלם על הכל ועל שוכר לשלם עבור גניבה ואבידה ואונסים קטנים אך לא עבור אונסים גדולים כגון שוד מזוין או מיתת הבהמה שאין לו שליטה עליו). מיתת החיה נחשבת תאונה גדולה, אבל אז השוכר לוקח שבועה כי זה למעשה מה שקרה. הגמרא עצמה מביאה את זה.  לפי דעת החכמים של משנה השואל משלם לשוכר, אם השוכר לוקח את השבועה הנדרשת. רב אידי בר אבין אומר בעל הבית יכוללהגיד לשוכר אני יכול לדבר עם השואל ישירות. אביי ענה לרב אידי בר אבין, החובה מתחיל כאשר החיה מתה, לא בעת השבועה. אני חושב הדיון מתבסס על הטיעון בין ר' יוחנן לבין ריש לקיש על אם קנין פירות כקנין הגוף דמי. ההסבר רב שך נותן לדיון בין אביי ואת רב אידי בר אבין היא אם טענת "תאונה" הוא טיעון חזק. אבל מנקודת המבט שלי זה נראה פשוט כי השאלה היא זו. האם שכירת משהו נותנת בידי אחד האובייקט הפיזי או לא? אם כן, אז ברור מדוע השואל יצטרך לשלם את השוכר. הסיבה היא שבמשך פרק זמן של השכרה, הוא נמצא במקום של הבעלים ולכן כאשר תאונה התרחשה ברשותו של השוכר.