trust in God

I know I have not been clear about trust in God. I am sorry about that but the ambiguity comes from experience. That is,-- the ambiguity of experience creates ambiguity in my thoughts. I am not even sure is there is any lesson that can be learned.
The major events were that I decided to go and learn Torah in NY somehow trusting that God would take care of "parnasa" [making a living]. And that attitude basically paid off with dividends until at some point it stopped (or more accurately I stopped trusting).  One way or the other the whole thing collapsed. So, while I agree in principle, I can also see it is a delicate principle. But it is a terrible mistake to associate trust in God with the religious world which puts on a facade of righteousness to bilk naive secular Jews out of their money. 
While trust in God is  a great thing, it is an error to think it has anything to do with kollel. Most kollel people are enemies of Torah and of Israel. They use Torah as a disguise. I have therefore tried to be very picky about which yeshivas to recommend which I believe learn Torah for its own sake

To get to Torah requires getting through the major obstacle--the pseudo religious world. As soon as one can get over the illusion that thy have anything to do with Torah at all, that is when one can begin to come to true Torah.
In terms of funding, I think it is the best approach to not punish the innocent with the guilty. Thus the vast majority of religious organizations which are scams should be cut off from all funding. Especially those in Israel. And the clearly honest places like Ponovitch  and the great NY yeshivas should continue to get even more funding. But with proper care taken to insure the good institutions, the rest of the 99% of the religiosity parasites and institutions should be cut off from all funding, private and government.
[Even though the pure Litvak Yeshivas that keep out all nonsense are pretty good, there are enough there also that are just playing games. As a rule the religious world has pitted itself against the State of Israel and thus should be thrown out. Getting the massive amounts of funding they get from the state is ridiculous. I never saw such insane hypocrisy in my life as this. And then they go to the USA to beg for charity from rich American Jews that they stab in the back if they dare to come to Israel.
[The good places are not just Ponovitch but also branches of Ponovitch. Same with the great NY yeshivas Mir, Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat. Rav Montag's yeshiva in Netivot I think is also very good/

The major issue is to direct funding to the proper places that are doing good work and to cut off all funding to the cults that pretend to be learning Torah. That type of knowledge is hard to come by except by experience. The main guidelines should be whatever comes under the category of the חרם of the Gra should be eliminated. Nowadays appearance counts for ore than substance.  So these cults make a lot of effort to appear Torah'dik [of the Torah] while in fact being agents of the Devil.

You fun these cults in Israel or in the USA, you give them power to seduce ore and more innocent Jews into their insanity.
I should mention also the Merkaz HaRav of Rav Kook at teh general Mizrachi yeshivas which are very good. 

the decline in the Armed forces in the USA.

I have heard about the decline in the Armed forces in the USA. A lot of the trouble seems to be in the kind of people enlisting. But I have seen plenty of cause for optimism. One is the election of Trump. Another is the fact that there still are good people in the armed forces. Not everyone has been affected.

In Israel, also I see good reason to support the armed forces. 

Mainly the idea comes from Hegel-that not every state deserves support. But some do. Those that maximize human freedom.
This is roughly based on Howard Bloom and his book on the super-organism and the social meme.[The Lucifer Principle]
That is Hegel saw the importance of the State, but not every state. Only the ones that are committed towards what he considered to be true justice. And justice in Hegel is not ill defined. It means a maximum of freedom within the limits of responsibility and moral law.

This is more or less of what Richard Epstein (in law at NYU) means with his limited kind of government. [Though he would not put it in terms of Hegel. And he is in any case not looking for philosophical justification for his limited government approach anyway. But that ignoring of the philosophical issue seems to  me to be  a weakness in his thought rather than a strength

Beginning of Bava Metzia

Someone sent to  two volumes of Rav Shach's Avi Ezri. One is gone. But in the one I still can read, he brings an amazing idea that the Rambam's idea of  דררא דממונא is when each one is saying a טענת ספק. He brings this from a book called אבן האזל.

Rav Shach himself uses this idea to answer some questions in laws of פקדון. but without actually seeing the arguments in  אבן האזל I can already see what the Rambam must have been thinking.

He must have seen that there are two opposing approaches to דררא דממונא in the Gemara. One is is Bava Batra that סומכוס Sumchos said his law {ממון  המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע, money in doubt is divided with no oath} only in a case of דררא דממונא. The other is in the beginning  of Bava Metzia, that if Sumchos said his law in a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so in a case that is not דררא דממונא. And I already mentioned in my little booklet on Bava Metzia that some of the Mishnas that the Gemara says are Sumchos do not seem to conform to the definition of Tosphot ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם.

So it is amazingly clear what the Rambam thought. He looked at the Gemara on page 100 and saw that there is an argument between two Amoraim about when Sumchos said his law. One said only when both say טענת שמא and the other opinion is even when both say טענת ברי. So the Rambam simply decided that that is the definition of דררא דממונא and that accounts for the difference between the two Gemaras in Bava Metzia and Bava Batra. That is the Gemara in the beginning of Bava Metzia is like the opinion Sumchos said his law in both cases (certainty and certainty) and the Gemara in Bava Batra is like the opinion Sumchos said his law only in the case of doubt and doubt.


The place to begin work on this would be to look at the those Mishnas that the Gemara says are Sumchos and to see how they fit with Tosphot and/or the Rambam. But I will have to leave that work for others since I have no Gemara.

I mentioned in my notes about the Maharam from Lublin conserning the fact that Tosphot's version of the Gemara in th beginning of Bava Metzia does not have דררא דממונא לזה ודררא דממונא לזה. That fact I used to help explain Tosphot on page 100b but it might help us here also to understand why Tosphot was not able to use the pshat/explanation that the Rambam uses. 



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  בספר של רב שך האבי עזרי he brings an amazing idea that the  idea of the רמב''ם that דררא דממונא is when each one is saying a טענת ספק. He brings this from a book called אבן האזל.

רב שך himself uses this idea to answer some questions in laws of פקדון. but without actually seeing the arguments in  אבן האזל I can already see what the רמב''ם must have been thinking.

He must have seen the there are two opposing approaches to דררא דממונא in the גמרא. One is is בבא בתרא that סומכוס  said his law ממון  המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע only in a case of דררא דממונא. The other is in the beginning  of  בבא מציעא that is סומכוס  said his law in a case of דררא דממונא then all the more so in a case that is not דררא דממונא. And I already mentioned that some of the משניות that the גמרא says are סומכוס  do not seem to conform to the definition of תוספות ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם.

So it is amazingly clear what the רמב''ם thought. He looked at the גמרא on page דף ק' ע''א and saw that there is an argument between two אמוראים about when סומכוס  said his law. One said only when both say טענת שמא and the other opinion is even when both say טענת ברי. So the רמב''ם simply decided that that is the definition of דררא דממונא and that accounts for the difference between the two גמרות in  בבא מציעא and בבא בתרא. That is the גמרא in the beginning of  בבא מציעא is like the opinion סומכוס  said his law in both cases (certainty and certainty) and the גמרא in בבא בתרא is like the opinion סומכוס  said his law only in the case of doubt and doubt. 

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 ב''מ ק. בספר של רב שך האבי עזרי הוא מביא רעיון מדהים שהרעיון של הרמב''ם כי דררא דממונא היא כאשר כל אחד אומר טענת ספק. הוא מביא את זה מתוך ספר אבן האזל. רב שך עצמו משתמש ברעיון זה לענות על כמה שאלות בדיני פקדון. אבל מבלי לראות טיעוני האבן האזל אני כבר רואה מה רמב''ם חשב ודאי. הוא בוודאי ראה  שישנן שתי גישות מנוגדות בדררא דממונא בגמרא. אחת היא היא בבבא בתרא כי סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו ממון המוטל בספק חולקים בלי שבוע רק במקרה של דררא דממונא. השניה היא בתחילת בבא מציעא כי אם סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו במקרה של דררא דממונא, אז על אחת כמה וכמה במקרה שאינו דררא דממונא. וכבר הזכרתי שחלק של המשניות שהגמרא אומרת הן של סומכוס לא נראות עונות להגדרה של תוספות, ספק לבית דין בלא טענותיהם. אז זה ברור מה הרמב''ם חשב. הוא ראה בגמרא בעמוד דף ק' ע''א שיש ויכוח בין שני אמוראים לגבי מתי סומכוס אמר את החוק שלו. אחד אמר רק כאשר שניהם (הבעלי דין) אומרים טענת שמא ואת חוות הדעת האחרת היא גם כאשר שניהם אומרים טענת ברי. אז הרמב''ם פשוט החליט כי זו ההגדרה של דררא דממונא, וזה מסביר את ההבדלים בין שתי גמרות בבבא מציעא ובבא בתרא. זוהי הגמרא בתחילת בבא מציעא היא כדעת שסומכוס אמר את החוק שלו בשני המקרים (ודאות ודאות, ושמא ושמא) ואת הגמרא בבבא בתרא הוא כדעת שסומכוס אמר את החוק שלו רק במקרה של ספק וספק כשיטת רבא בבבא מציעא.

To me it seems that the left has lost the intellectual and moral high ground.

I see the problem was simply that the left had the power because it had what seemed to be true. Socialism seemed to be the wave of the future. To me it seems that the left has lost the intellectual and moral high ground. It will just take time until people see this. Sure in universities  Left wing drivel is still taught, but that is changing. And even the philosophy departments are changing for the better.
John Searle, Kelley Ross, Richard Epstein, Michael Huemer, etc. 


But that is not to imply the religious world is very good. Anyone who has ever been in a religious neighborhood knows  one immutable fact about the religious world שכן רע. They are evil neighbors.  Not just that they do not mind their own business but insist on poking their noses into everyone else's business and then go looking for even the slightest fault and then exploiting that to make some crusade against anyone they do not like.  Living anywhere near a religious person is an experience like no other of Hell on Earth.  

Some people seem to equate being religious with being righteous, moral and decent but from long experience I can say that is not true. In fact as a rule, the relationship is inverse. Righteous=1/ religious.
Clearly Reb Israel Salanter was aware of this and tried to correct it to by means of the emphasis on Musar thinking that people would see the main emphasis of Torah is on בין אדם לחבירו [human decency]- but the only people to have gotten that message are Reform and Conservative Jews.

Without the actual Talmud in front of me, it is hard to speculate. But I think that you have to say that Rav Shach has some way of understanding R. Yehuda (of the Mishna) in a different way than he is usually understood. R. Yehuda says ביעור חמץ the destruction of leaven is by fire. The way this is usually understood is based on a statement במה דברים אמורים קודם זמן איסורו אבל אחר זמן איסורו השבתתו בכל דבר. [When do we say this? Before the time it is forbidden. But after that time one can get rid of the leaven in any shape or form.]  Now based on a later on sugia [treatment of this subject] around page 93-95 in Pesachim it says leaven shall not be found is a prohibition that is transferred to a positive command. {לאו הניתק לעשה/a negative command that even if one transgress it he does not get lashes because it can be rectified by a positive command }That can only work if ביעור חמץ is only at the time of the prohibition. So to whom is that Gemara referring to? Apparently R. Yehuda.
This would at least help to understand the Rambam who does hold that ביעור is only at the time of the prohibition  and yet he gets lashes [because obviously he is going like the sages against R Yehuda] But the thing you see in the Rambam is the way he understood the argument between the sages and R. Yehuda--is what is the destruction of leaven? Anyway possible or only by fire? But both hold it is at the time of the prohibition. So this is how Rav Shach understands the Rambam and I think he must be basing it on that later Gemara.
Of course, none of this is like Rashi or Tosphot. And that leaves us with the obvious question what do Rashi and Tosphot do with that Gemara on page 93-95?

In any case there is clearly a lot of work that needs to be done here. Reb Chaim Soloveitchik also deals with this same question but I do not have his book nor the Gemara. At any rate his answer, is that לא יראה ולא ימצא is a positive and negative command--so that is how he answers for the Rambam which does not help us about the Gemara on 95.

In case it is unclear what I am saying here it is this. You can not have  לאו הניתק לעשה when the עשה starts before the לאו. They have to start and end at the same time for this law to apply.

Religious Zionism seems right to me to a large degree. Rav Kook defended this based on ideas he got from Hegel

Religious Zionism seems right to me to a large degree. Rav Kook defended this based on ideas he got from Hegel

 It seems to me that Hegel gives a good defense of nationalism. But as you can see Hegel and John Locke were not so far apart in terms of what kind of nation they were defending–that is one the insures the freedoms of the citizens. That you can see in Hegel in many places here he talks about what kind of essence a human being has–for example: Hegel’s Idea of Philosophy, by Quentin Lauer, S.J. with a new translation of Hegel’s Introduction to the History of Philosophy.


In John Locke there are a few problems like empiricism, blank slate, property rights based on a labor theory of value. [The last was noted by Dr Richard Epstein.] 

Brett Stevens has an interview with a follower of Rav Kahana  on his site.

I do not see how a person's whole sense of worth should be based on group identity. To me that does not seem at all like what the Torah says. But in fact in all religious groups the sense of worth is based on group identity. That is why I say all religious groups are cults and have nothing to do with authentic Torah. [Unless we would be talking about the few authentic Litvak yeshivas] 

I was asked by Israel Rosen in Israel about Jewish Nationalism because he was in a kollel in which this was a debate. I said Jewish Nationalism has support from the Zohar (as is obvious to anyone who has read even one page.)

The main mitzvah of the religious world is to be against Israel and to get the money of Reform and Conservative Jews (real Jews). That is one reason I say the religious world is diametrically opposed to the Torah.  You can pretty much know what the Torah really says to do by looking at the religious and do everything the exact opposite of what they do. They are filled with the Sitra Achra sadlly enough.


The was a pamphlet at the Western Wall that was tracing the chaos and Reign of Terror in France to Rousseau and the totally different kind of Democracy in the USA to John Locke, which is a true point. But on the same hand the problems in the USA with the total emptiness of society can also be traced to John Locke. To me the approach of the Rambam makes a lot more sense.

I did not want to go into it here but in fact Reb Aaron Kotler has a Musar book and in that book he wrote that for the State of Israel דינא דמלכותא דינא the law of the country is the law.

t32 a minor [t32 in midi]

 t31 F major  [t31 in midi]