trust in God and learning Torah

There was something really great about the whole idea of trust in God and learning Torah that really worked. This was the way that Navardok spread. The idea was that if one takes on himself to learn Torah, then all his other needs are taken care off. This was actually mentioned by Reb Israel Salanter in the magazine he published in Vilnius. But he was careful not to emphasis any particular aspect of Musar, because he thought every person will find what they need in it. But Joseph Jozel Horwitz went with this idea to the limits. And it worked. The idea in a nutshell is God helps those who depend totally on him, not those that depend on their own actions.
This I found really works mainly, if you do not put it to a test. And at a certain point in my life I did not want to go too far with trust {Bitachon} because I did not want a situation in which I thought I needed something and not get it and that might reflect baldly on faith itself.
This approach I still feel is  a viable option.
To get a good idea of this approach it is best to get the actual book of Navardok which is one of the classical Musar books to come out of the Musar movement.

Bitul Chametz (nullifying leaven bread)

It is a true point that Tosphot holds Bitul Chametz (nullifying leaven bread) is from hefker הפקר (abandoning) as he says in Pesachim page 4.
That is he holds that when we say on the day before Passover. "All the leaved bread or leaven itself that I own is הפקר (abandoned) like the dirt of the earth," we mean it is הפקר (abandoned). I do not have any Gemaras to be able to look up anything, but off hand I think we can see plenty of questions that just jump out at you even without thinking. First of all the dirt of the earth is not הפקר abandoned. Almost all wars in human history are fought over the dirt of the earth--land.
But that is not all. Neither Rashi nor the Rambam hold from this idea of "hefker." And from what I recall there is some kind of argument in Nedarim if Hefker needs to be in front of a witness.
And  a further question comes up is what about יאוש [letting go] which comes up about lost objects? Is this hefker here in Passover the same kind of thing as "giving up" on a lost object?
That is,-- with lost object we do not need the guy to be מפקיר. Just the fact that he gives up, that makes picking it up not longer in the category of stealing.
And what about that long Tosphot in Ketuboth about when we say דברים שבלב אינם דברים? {"Things in the heart are not things".} While here we say מבטלו בלבו ודיו he is nullifies it {the leaven} in his heart and that is enough.
The questions just keep piling up. What about that whole Sugia in Pesachim circa 93-94 where the Gemara says one does not get מכות (lashes)  because it is a לאו ניתק לעשה?

Incidentally, that whole thing about דברים שבלב אינם דברים comes up about a fellow that wanted to go to Israel and sold his property with that in mind and then changed his mind. The question there comes up in terms of when do we say things in the heart are not things--and  if there was some condition on the sale then he needed to say it and when do we say one needs a תנאי כפול כבני גד וראובן
[Sorry, I do not remember where that Tosphot is. Last time I saw it I was in Israel in Netivot and I wanted to look it up concerning אין אדם מקנה דבר שלא בא לעולם]
I seem to recall that Tosphot said we only say דברים שבלב אינן דברים only when his heart and his words or actions contradict each other-so that would at least take care of one of the above mentioned questions.



 I mean to ask if  ביטול חמץ is from הפקר and is a fulfillment of  אך ביום הראשון תשביתו שאור מבתיכם then how is this an מצוות עשה?
In any case the opinions of Rashi and the Rambam here also need some work.

Ari, Issac Luria

I have a great deal of respect for the Ari, Issac Luria but  I also am aware that almost all people that claim to follow him and his path are demons. Reb Nachman hinted to this often in his Lekutai Moharan. This is in itself a good reason to avoid the religious world in its entirety.

Reb Nachman's statements in this regard are not well known because they are hinted at in his published books but explicit in the השמטות on the חיי מוהר''ן which was only printed once a long time ago by the Na Nach group.. However I have heard that that actual השמטות were collected [by Rav Shmuel Horvitz] and are available in print in the bookstore on Rechov Salant in Mea Shearim.


I should mention that the חרם signed by the Gra --if you actually take the time to read it, did not apply to Reb Nachman which is why I feel free to read his books. But in terms of what the Gra did actually forbid I believe is forbidden and remains forbidden because of the same problems that Reb Nachman saw. To ignore the signature of the Gra is to invite insanity. And every time one ignores it, he or she invites another drop of insanity into his or her soul.

[The Ari is quite an amazing thinker and I think it was in part by learning his books that when i got to Israel the Divine Presence started shining on me and my family.  Eventually I pushed that away since I did not feel the ability to remain attached to God on that level. It was just a bit too much for my poor soul.]



[In terms of learning the Ari I feel besides his basic works there are a few schools of thought later on which are fine commentaries of the Ari like the books of Rav Yaakov Abuchatzeira, and the Rashash (Shalom Sharabi) and the Ramchal.]

Music T30

t30 D major

Purim]

Xerxes is as far as I know is אחשורוש [from Purim] because that is how the name is pronounced in Persian. [Achash-vei-rosh]
He had two dreams telling him to attack Athens and all of the Hellenes. That was after he had thought to do so anyway. His chief adviser told him not to do so. At night he saw a handsome man standing over him telling him if he does not attack Greece he would lose everything just as fast as he gained everything. Then he had a second dream along the same lines. And then his put his chief adviser in his royal robes, and sat him down on his throne at night to sleep. The same man came to his adviser and said "Are you the one who has been telling Xerxes not to attack Athens? You are jerk." Or something along those lines.[I forget the exact words.]
When he attacked his allies were numerous. Everyone thought he would win and joined him. No one joined the Hellenes. Even those that had agreed to ally themselves with Athens stayed away from the battle to see which side would prevail.
300 Spartans and about 4000 other men from other parts of Greece stopped about 1/2 a million men.
And the Spartans would have won if not for one betrayer who showed the Persians and alternative route to get behind the Greek lines.



Xerxes was the last great king of Persia and from then on its glory and might fell.

He was murdered by the chief of his armed guards.

Bava Metzia page 97B

I wanted to mention that in a previous essay I suggested that what Tosphot meant in Bava Metzia page 97B is that the law of Rav Yehuda even without Abyee would have to come from Shmuel means the statement of Shmuel in Ketubot.
This was based on the idea of Rav Shach that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from Tosphot in Nida page 2b.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that Shmuel does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that Tosphot is saying that in Bava Kama when Shmuel says the Mishna there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain even with a weak certainty that would overthrow even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in Ketubot. This mean Tosphot is throwing out his previous answer to the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does Tosphot do with the first Mishna in the chapter 10 הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak ברי which is a contradiction to the first answer of Tosphot. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that Tosphot is holding that we go by a weak ברי even in a case of חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what Tosphot is saying over there about the law in Ketubot that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in Bava Kama the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in Ketubot we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is weak because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.

Now Tosphot in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So Tosphot does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak Bari and we do go by a strong bari. Still I think we can see this is a argument in Tosphot itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between Rav Yehuda and Shmuel.
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 בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב תוספות said  that the law of רב יהודה would have to come from שמואל even without אביי means the statement of שמואל in כתובות.This was based on the idea of רב שך that חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא cancel each other which he brings from תוספות in נדה דף ב' ע''ב.
But now I would like to go into the astounding ramifications of this idea. It means that שמואל does go by a ברי גרוע  a weak certainty. That implies lots of things. It means that תוספות is saying that in בבא קמא when שמואל says the משנה there is like סומכוס but the חכמים say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה that is not because of a weak certainty. Rather the reason is that both parties are saying the same kind of certainty. But if there would be a case where one is certain, even with a weak certainty, that would defeat even חזקת ממון as is in fact the case in כתובות. This means תוספות is rejecting  his previous answer to the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל, and giving a totally new answer. And this new answer also answer the question that I asked a few years ago about what does תוספות do with the first משנה  in the tenth chapter של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. There I noticed that we say ברי עדיף  even though there it is a weak certainty  which is a contradiction to the first answer of תוספות. But now with this new answer everything is good. And we also learn a new דין. That is that תוספות is holding by the opinion  that we go by a weak certainty  even against  חזקת ממון. This is because that is exactly what תוספות is saying over there about the law in כתובות that we believe her because she has a weak ברי even to be מוציא ממון. Now I just wanted to explain what I mean that in בבא קמא the reason we say המוציא מחבירו עליו הריאה is not because we we ignore a weak ברי. Not at all. The reason is rather because both certainties are equal. Neither person was there. So it makes no difference how certain each one is. Both certainties are equal. So in כתובות we believe her because she has a certainty even though it is a weak certainty because she knows her husband was not there in order to be able to give  a different version of the events.Now תוספות in the end does suggest that we do not have to say this. So תוספות does revert to his previous answer that we do not go by a weak certainty and we do go by a strong certainty. Still I think we can see this is a argument in תוספות itself between two different possible answers for the contradiction between רב יהודה and שמואל.


 בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב תוספות אמר כי החוק של רב יהודה יצטרך לבא משמואל אפילו בלי אביי. רציתי לומר זה  מכוון שמואל בכתובות. זו התבססה על הרעיון של רב שך כי חזקה דהשתא וחזקה מעיקרא מבטלות זו את זו שהוא מביא מן תוספות בנדה דף ב' ע''ב. אבל עכשיו אני רוצה להיכנס להשלכות של הרעיון הזה. זה אומר שמואל אכן מחזיק מברי גרוע, ודאות חלשה. זה אומר  כי בבבא קמא כאשר שמואל אומר המשנה שם כמו סומכוס אבל חכמים אומרים המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה, כי הוא לא בשל ודאות חלשה. במקום זאת הסיבה היא ששני הצדדים אומרים את אותו סוג של ודאות. אבל אם  יהיה מקרה שבו אחד בטוח, אפילו עם ודאות חלשה, כי זה יביס גם חזקת ממון כפי שקורה הלכה למעשה במקרה בכתובות. משמעות הדבר תוספות דוחה התשובה הקודמת שלו לסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל, ונותן תשובה חדשה לגמרי. והתשובה החדשה הזאת גם עונה על השאלה ששאלתי לפני כמה שנים על מה עושה תוספות  עם המשנה הראשונה בפרק העשירי של בבא מציעא הבית והעלייה. שם אנחנו אומרים ברי עדיף למרות שיש בו ודאות חלשה וזו סתירה לתשובה הראשונה של תוספות. אבל עכשיו עם התשובה החדשה הזו הכל טוב. ואנחנו גם לומדים דין חדש. זה הוא כי תוספות מחזיק  בסברה כי נלך לפי ודאות חלשה אפילו נגד חזקת ממון. הסיבה לכך היא כי זה בדיוק מה שתוספות אומר שם על החוק הכתוב שאנחנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות חלשה אפילו להיות מוציא ממון. עכשיו אני רק רציתי להסביר למה אני מתכוון כי בבא קמא הסיבה שאנחנו אומרים מוציא מחבירו עליו ריאה היא לא בגלל שאנחנו מתעלמים מברי גרוע (חלש). בכלל לא. הסיבה היא דווקא בגלל הוודאויות הם שווות. אדם לא היה שם. אז זה לא משנה איך  כל אחד הוא בטוח בטענתו. ודאויות שניהם שווות. אז בכתובות אנו מאמינים לה כי יש לה ודאות למרות שזה ודאות חלשה כי היא יודעת שבעלה לא היה שם כדי להיות מסוגל לתת גירסה שונה של האירועים. עכשיו תוספות בסופו של הדבר אכן מרמז כי אין לנו להגיד את זה. אז תוספות אינו חוזר מן התשובה הקודמת שלו שאנחנו לא הולכים לפי ודאות חלשה וכן אנחנו הולכים לפי ודאות חזקה. ובכל זאת אני חושב שאנחנו יכולים לראות את זה הוא כטיעון בתוספות עצמו בין שתי תשובות אפשריות שונות עבור הסתירה בין רב יהודה ואת שמואל


There is a lot to think about how this applies to our Mishna in Bava Metzia 97a and later on page 100 but this is as far as I got today. I mean it seems there is a lot to think about in terms of why Rav Yehuda says what he says about our Mishna. I do not have the Gemara but from what I remember he is deriving his law from the part of our Mishna in which there is certainty and doubt in which case certainty wins. But what about the סומכוס part where there are two doubts and so they divide. Still this seems about as far as I can figure this all out for today.

I should add that the thoughts I have on this subject are mainly concerned with the types of חזקות in each case and how that question affects what Tosphot is saying. Further the fact that the Mishna is like Sumchos might make some important differences, but no one on the page seems concerned with that. They do bring it up on page 100 but what I would like to think about is how the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot there might affects things over here in page 97.

If you are wondering what I mean, it is this: In Bava Kama there is חזקת ממון-and that seems to be the only kind of חזקה over there with the events there. Later there are different kinds of חזקה that the Geara brings up. חזקת מרא קמא וחזקת רשות. I guess you might say that I am wondering how far Tosphot wants to take this idea of a certainty that can defeat a חזקה. We do see he is thinking of חזקת ממון but what about the later type in the mishna in page 100?--[It is for these reasons that people learn a learning partner. To be able to go through the details. But when that i not possible like with me, I guess I just have to try to figure out what Tosphot is thinking here  by myself.]
In any case you can see what the Musar book אורחות צדיקים meant that originally the Tosphot were a lot larger and later they were edited down. Clearly here Tosphot was dealing with a completely different answer than his first answer but apparently  a lot was edited out by the editors.

That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public, and there is no further prohibition to repeat it.

There is a famous law about באפי תלתא "in front of three." That is once slander [or the dust of slander אבק לשון הרע] has been said in front of three, then it is considered to already be known in public,  and there is no further prohibition to repeat it. The question on this is simple. Who is asking?  One of the three. He is asking "Can I repeat it, since it was said in front of three?"  Then just tell him, "No," and then there will no longer be three people making it known.

A similar situation arises in Gitin also in הלכות מכירה.

הרי זה גיטך על מנת שלא תנשאי לפלוני "This is your divorce, if you do not get married to Smith." If she gets married to Smith, there is no divorce-- and so she can't get married to Smith. That is--the marriage is not valid. So only if it is a valid divorce, can it be invalid.

Secular readers already know this as the "Liar's Paradox." It comes up in mathematics. The set of all sets. The Liar' Paradox was answered well by Dr. Kelley Ross based on the Kantian idea of the ground of validity.  The math thing I forget.

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On a side note: In my mind the best Halacha book is the Tur with the Beit Joseph (טור בית יוסף). Also the Hayee Adam (חיי אדם) by a disciple of the Gra. The Aruch Hashulchan (ערוך השלחן) is  a great halacah book also.
In the long run the only real halacha book is the Gemara itself because, that is in the final analysis the only thing that determines halacha. This is obvious to anyone who has ever learned even one word of the Shach, Taz, or Beit Joseph.The approach of all baali halacha is to find out what the Gemara holds. As Reb Chaim from Voloshin puts it "אין לנו אלא דינא דגמרא" ''We only are concerned about the Law of the Gemara.'' Nothing else matters. {That was in a letter he wrote about why he disagreed with some decision of some famous person. He said as I mentioned, that it does not matter how great or smart someone is. All that matters is what the Gemara says.  And he also said over what the Gra said "לא לישא פנים בהלכה" ''not recognize faces in halacah.'' That is a phrase used for a judge to decide a case on its own merits, not on who is being represented.}
[But of course, it matters what Rishonim thought. Obviously they were better at Gemara than we are. But we respect what they say  only because we believe they understood the Gemara better than we do.- which is perfectly true.]
The Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo is a short version of his Beit Yoseph and I think the Tur Beit Yoseph is better. Still there is one way to do the Shulchan Aruch itself which makes a lot of sense that is to do it with the Beer Heteiv and Shaari Teshuva. I did not learn the whole Shulchan Aruch of Rav Yoseph Karo in that way, but I did do a lot of Choshen Mishpat in that way --with the Beer Heteiv and Pischei Teshuva right on the page and  I found that a really great way of doing it.--Short and sweet and to the point.