10.3.17
The Sitra Achra, the Dark Side
The problem with the Sitra Achra is the more you try to avoid it the more it runs after you.
Some people think there is not such concept as demons in the Torah even though they are quite well documented in the Ari and Zohar and the Talmud itself.
The trouble is people in the religious world tend to think they are immune by the very fact of their being religious.
The dark side, evil, teachers of Torah are in fact devils in disguise. This is a serious problem in the religious world much more than in the secular world.
The reason is to a large degree is that there is a close connection between good character and holiness. Since the Jewish secular world, with all its flaws, tends to stress good character above all, therefore they tend to be more protected from the Dark Side than the religious who stress rituals at the expense of human decency.
[I am no expert on this subject and in fact I have no idea how to avoid the Dark Side at all. All I can say is all the supposed solutions seems to be in fact traps.]
Teshuva repentance in a practical sense seems impossible. For when one tries to undo something he has done wrong the general result is to make things worse-as we see in the Torah by the people that tried to go to Israel after the events of the spies when it was decreed the generation of the desert should not enter the Land of Israel.
Some people think there is not such concept as demons in the Torah even though they are quite well documented in the Ari and Zohar and the Talmud itself.
The trouble is people in the religious world tend to think they are immune by the very fact of their being religious.
The dark side, evil, teachers of Torah are in fact devils in disguise. This is a serious problem in the religious world much more than in the secular world.
The reason is to a large degree is that there is a close connection between good character and holiness. Since the Jewish secular world, with all its flaws, tends to stress good character above all, therefore they tend to be more protected from the Dark Side than the religious who stress rituals at the expense of human decency.
[I am no expert on this subject and in fact I have no idea how to avoid the Dark Side at all. All I can say is all the supposed solutions seems to be in fact traps.]
Teshuva repentance in a practical sense seems impossible. For when one tries to undo something he has done wrong the general result is to make things worse-as we see in the Torah by the people that tried to go to Israel after the events of the spies when it was decreed the generation of the desert should not enter the Land of Israel.
[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement
I do not have an essay about this in mind. But just for my own sake I wanted to jot down some quicke ideas about how Reb Israel Salanter and the Musar Movement [{Learning the Ethics of the Medieval Sages}, ]come to answer a problem that most people have not heard of but still is very much a part of the modern world. Enlightenment versus Counter Enlightenment.
If I would have energy to expand on this I would try to show briefly the two streams of enlightenment thought. It all started with Hobbes, but Enlightenment thought branched out into John Locke versus Rousseau. [And Kant and Hegel tried to bridge the gap between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment.] But Counter Enlightenment also branched out into two streams, the secular counter enlightenment (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pagan) and religious counter enlightenment Meistre, Hamann. Pentecostal.
My basic approach is to say that the Musar (Litvak) yeshiva movement which more or less was based on the Rambam and Saadia Gaon's approaches combine the best of both approaches.[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]
It would be hard to go into this in detail, but the basic idea is that in learning Musar one internalizes the ethics of the Law of Moses, that is the Oral and Written Law.
If I would have energy to expand on this I would try to show briefly the two streams of enlightenment thought. It all started with Hobbes, but Enlightenment thought branched out into John Locke versus Rousseau. [And Kant and Hegel tried to bridge the gap between Enlightenment and Counter Enlightenment.] But Counter Enlightenment also branched out into two streams, the secular counter enlightenment (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, pagan) and religious counter enlightenment Meistre, Hamann. Pentecostal.
My basic approach is to say that the Musar (Litvak) yeshiva movement which more or less was based on the Rambam and Saadia Gaon's approaches combine the best of both approaches.[To synthesize Reason and Faith.]
It would be hard to go into this in detail, but the basic idea is that in learning Musar one internalizes the ethics of the Law of Moses, that is the Oral and Written Law.
Rambam הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הלכה ד'
You buy 50 crates of wine from Joe. [and you did משיכה and or הגבהה-you lifted them if that was possible and if not then you pulled them.] You owe him 50 dollars. Then you are taking with him and he finds out you have 50 sheep you want to sell. The surprising thing is he can tell you I absolve you of your debt if you sell to me the 50 sheep, and if you agree then he acquires the sheep without doing any action.
So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.
In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.
Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.
I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.
[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind, And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.
Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.
(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])
The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.
It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.
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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה. הלוקח lifted them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them. The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell. נמוכר can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין
So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.
The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.
רב שך says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.
I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.
I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at.
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.
The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.
It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from loan, not a different kind of משכון
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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה. (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק. עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas
I hope the above is clear. We can see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.
So what is the difference between this and marriage? If you have given a woman 50 dollars as a loan and then tell her then loan is forgiven if you marry me and she says "Yes", the marriage is not existent.
In the Shulchan Aruch there is a commentary called the Netivot. This is one of the early commentaries that yeshivas started learning before Reb Chaim Soloveitchik arrived on the scene.
His answer to this it is is like הכרזה of the Beit Din in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.
Rav Shach [from Ponovitch] says the difference is one is נתינה (giving over something) and the other is מחילה (forgiving a debt). And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a guarantee and you give her the object back.
I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.
[Sometimes I say I have trouble understanding something as a euphemism, but not here. I believe Rav Shach has a good explanation for this but I just have not merited to understand it yet. I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods--by means of an act of acquisition, i can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action.. Clearly this is what Rav Shach must be getting at but still it is fuzzy in my mind, And I only read his essay on this yesterday for the first time so it makes sense to say I simply have not had time to absorb what he is saying.
Rav Shach brings from the Rashba a proof.
(This Rashba was a friend of the Ramban[from Spain, not the Rashba mentioned in Tosphot who is Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham])
The idea is this he says to her you are married to me by a hundred dollars and then gives her an object as guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד Obligation.
It occurred to me that we can understand Rav Shach's answer here based on R. Isaac in Shavuot 43.
To put t simply R. Isaac says a משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. [And the Rif and Rambam both decided like R Isaac.] This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her you are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt and he gives back the משכון she is married because in fact he owned the משכון and so in giving it back he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says You are married to me by the 100 dollars I will give to you and give her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan but a debt that he owes for marriage. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that Rav Shach is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from.
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יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים from a seller and he did משיכה and or הגבהה. הלוקח lifted them if that was possible, and if not then he pulled them. The לוקח owes to the seller חמישים זוז. Then המוכר finds out ללוקח יש חמישים crates of wine he wants to sell. נמוכר can tell him, "I absolve you of your debt, if you sell to me the חמישים crates of wine. If הלוקח agrees, then המוכר acquires the crates of wine without doing any action של קניין
So what is the difference between this and קידושין? If you have given a woman חמישים זוז as a loan and then tell her, "The loan is forgiven if you be married to me," and she says "Yes", the קידושין is not existent.
The answer of the נתיבות to this it is is like הכרזה וגביה of the בית דין in which the lender acquires the property of the borrower without doing any action.
רב שך says the difference is one is נתינהת giving over something, and the other is מחילה, forgiving a debt. And one of his proofs is that marrying by means of forgiving a loan is valid if there is an object that is a משכון and you give her the object back.
I still have trouble understanding this. In the case of the buyer and seller, a transaction is made and is valid without any action being done. Simply forgiving the debt makes the transaction valid.
I can see the two kinds of debt are different. One comes from a loan and the other from a buying selling arrangement. So from the fact that the original debt came from a transaction in which there was a real transfer of goods, by means of an act of acquisition, I can see how the later transaction can stem and be dependent on that and thus not need any further action. Clearly this is what רב שך must be getting at.
רב שך brings from the רשב''א a proof.
The idea is this he says to her "You are married to me by a מנה" and then gives her an object as guarantee she is not married. This is different from the case where he forgives her debt and returns her guarantee. In the later case there is a קנין acquisition, in the first case merely a שיעבוד obligation.
It occurred to me that we can understand the answer of רב שך here based on ר. יצחק in שבועות מ''ג.
To put it simply ר. יצחק says a משכון guarantee for a loan is owed by the lender. And the רי''ף and רמב''ם both decided like ר. יצחק. This one simple fact makes this who subject crystal clear. So a משכון for a loan is owned, but a משכון for getting married is not.
So we he says to her, "You are married to me by the fact that I forgive your debt," and he gives back the משכון, she is מקודשת because in fact he owned the משכוןת and so in giving it back, he is giving something to her, not just forgiving a debt. But when he says "You are married to me by the מנה I will give to you," and gives her a משכון, she is not married because the משכון there is for a different kind of debt, not debt from a loan, but a debt that he owes for קידושין. So we definitely see this kind of distinction that רב שך is making between forgiving a debt and giving something that depends on from where the debt comes from. We also learn something new about R. Isaac that he meant his law to apply only to a משכון that come from loan, not a different kind of משכון
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קידושין מ''ז. רמב''ם ה' מכירה ה:ד יש לוקח שקונה מטלטלים ממוכר והוא עשה משיכה או הגבהה. הלוקח הרים אותם אם זה היה אפשרי, ואם לא אז הוא משך אותם. הלוקח חייב למוכר חמישים זוז. ואז למוכר מתגלה שללוקח יש חמישים ארגזי יין שהוא רוצה למכור. המוכר יכול להגיד לו, "אני פוטר אותך מן החוב שלך, אם אתה מוכר לי חמישים ארגזי היין." אם הלוקח מסכים, אז המוכר רוכש את ארגזי היין מבלי לעשות שום פעולה של קניין. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין קידושין? אם אדם נותן לאישה חמישים זוז כהלוואה, ואז אומר לה, "ההלוואה נסלחת, אם את מסכימה להיות נשוי לי," והיא אומרת "כן", הקידושין אינן קיימים. התשובה של הנתיבות לכך היא שזה כמו הכרזה וגבייה של בית הדין שבו המלווה רוכש הנכס של הלווה בלי לעשות שום פעולה. רב שך אומר שההבדל הוא אחת נתינת משהו, והשנייה היא מחילה, סליחת חוב. ואחת ההוכחות שלו היא שאם אדם מתחתן באמצעות סליחת הלוואה, זו תקפה אם יש אובייקט (הוא משכון) והוא נותן לה את האובייקט בחזרה. עדיין אני מתקשה להבין את זה. במקרה של הקונה ומוכר, העסקה היא בתוקף מבלי לעשות שום פעולה. כל שעל המוכר לעשות הוא סליחת החוב שהופך את העסקה תקפה. אני יכול לראות ששני סוגי החוב שונים. אחד מגיע מהלוואה והשני מסדר מכירה וקנייה. אז מן העובדה כי החוב המקורי הגיע מעסקה בה חלה העברה אמיתית של מוצרים, באמצעות מעשה של רכישה, אני יכול לראות איך העסקה המאוחרת יותר יכולה לנבוע מעסקה הראשונה ובכך לא צריכה יותר לזו פעולה. ברור שלזה מה שרב שך חייב לחתור להגיע. רב שך מביא מן רשב''א הוכחה. הרעיון הוא כזה, אדם אומר לה "את נשוי לי על ידי מנה" ואז נותן לה אובייקט כערובה, היא לא נשואה. זה שונה מהמקרה שבו הוא סולח החוב שלה ומחזיר הערבות שלה. (במקרה אחר יש רכישת המשכון על ידי האישה, במקרה השני יש רק חובת שיעבוד.) עלה בדעתי כי אנו יכולים להבין שהתשובה של רב שך כאן מבוססת על ר. יצחק בשבועות מ''ג. במילים פשוטות ר. יצחק אומר ערבות משכון עבור הלוואה הוא רכוש המלווה. ואת הרי''ף ורמב''ם החליטו כמו ר. יצחק. עובדה פשוטה זו עושה את הנושא הזה ברור. אז משכון עבור הלוואה בבעלות, אלא משכון עבור קידושין הוא לא. אז אם אדם אומר לה, "את מקודשת לי על ידי העובדה כי אני סולח את החוב שלך," והוא נותן בחזרה את המשכון, היא מקודשת כי למעשה הוא בעלים של משכון וכך כשהוא נותן אותו בחזרה, הוא נותן לה משהו, לא רק סליחת חוב. אבל כשהוא אומר "את מקודשת לי על ידי המנה שאני אתן לך," ונותן לה משכון, היא לא נשואה, כי משכון זה בגלל סוג אחר של חוב, לא חוב הלוואה, אלא חוב שהוא חייב עבור קידושין. אז אנחנו בהחלט רואים את זה סוג של הבחנה כי רב שך עושה בין סולח חוב ולתת משהו תלוי מאיפה מקורו של החוב. כמו כן, אנו לומדים משהו חדש על ר' יצחק שהוא התכוון שהחוק שלו חל רק על משכון שמגיע להלוואה, לא סוג אחר של משכון.
added to
Ideas in Shas
I hope the above is clear. We can see that what is going on in Kidushin is very much dependent on R Isaac and also from Rav Shach we can see something new about R. Isaac statement in itself.
You must say that what Rav Shach means is everything depends on what kind of arrangement caused the debt and we see that R.Isaac in the Gemara must have meant his law for a guarantee for loan only.
9.3.17
Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters
Reb Nachman thought most teachers of Torah are monsters שדין יהודאיים, the so called teachers of Torah, scourges sent by the Lord to punish a nation that had departed from the true faith, drunk with lunacy and insanity. They are best described as half men, half beasts, monstrous centaurs. [Reb Nachman was a great tzadik, but he was not infallible, and he definitely opened to door to the kind of tzadik worship that is pure idolatry that infects his supposed followers. His emphasis of Shmirat Habrit mainly leads to more sin that it helps. Still if a tzadik should be judged by the misuse he is put to, then no tzadik would come out OK.]
The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.
As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform, and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.
The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.
Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.
The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.
They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.
In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.
The way many Jews dealt with this was simple to leave them, and create havens of safety away from them: (1) Reform Judaism, (2) Conservative Judaism, (3) the State of Israel.
As you can tell these solutions never appealed to me much because Reform, and Conservative seemed to leave out the hallowed, sacred aspects of Torah.
The best solution in my mind is the Litvak yeshiva which keeps to the Torah without the insanity that fills the religious nightmare world.
Still the Litvak yeshivas are too close to the religious monsters for comfort.
The Gra tried to deal with this problem with obviously no success as he was ignored in total.
They often resort to the problem of Lashon HaRa (slander) which is always a one way street. They can speak slander about anyone they want to, but no one can speak bad about them.
In any case there is a mizvah to warn people about traps they can fall into.
{Rambam laws of buying chapter 5 halacah 4 }
If a person buys some goods, and then owes money. Then the buyer wants to sell stuff of his own {Rambam, Laws of Buying, chapter 5, halacah 4.} and then seller tells him, "Sell it to me, and your debt will be paid." At that point, the original seller does not have to do any act of acquisition. The Raavad as you can imagine disagrees with this (twice). The Gemara in Kidushin says if this were so, then it would have to work for kidushin (marriage) also. And we know it does not. The Netivot has an answer for the Rambam and Rav Shach also. But for now I just wanted to state what the problem is just for the sake of information. The problem is that in marrying a woman, one can not do so by a loan. This is a famous halacha. That is to say: you loaned her money. Then you want to marry her. So instead of giving her a ring you say, "The debt you owes to me is forgiven." That does not work, and the reason is as the Gemara says הלוואה להוצאה נתנה a loan is given to be spent. [That is the money of the loan already belongs to her.]
So what is the difference between this case and the above case of the buyer and seller? The buyer owes money. The seller then forgives the debt and the property of the buyer goes automatically to the seller.
I confess I did not understand Rav Shach's answer to this problem but I did see how he blew all the other proposed solutions out of the water. His seems to revolve on the money owed by the woman is forgiven as opposed to the money owed by the buyer which creates an act of purchase. I can see that the origins of the money owed in the two cases are different.One is in fact a loan. The other is money owed because of goods bought. Still I have a hard time understanding why that would make any difference
So what is the difference between this case and the above case of the buyer and seller? The buyer owes money. The seller then forgives the debt and the property of the buyer goes automatically to the seller.
I confess I did not understand Rav Shach's answer to this problem but I did see how he blew all the other proposed solutions out of the water. His seems to revolve on the money owed by the woman is forgiven as opposed to the money owed by the buyer which creates an act of purchase. I can see that the origins of the money owed in the two cases are different.One is in fact a loan. The other is money owed because of goods bought. Still I have a hard time understanding why that would make any difference
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
This goes to an argument between Richard Epstein and Dr. Michael Huemer. There is a legitimate argument for limited government. You have to see that debate. But the basic idea is the need for government is not the same as need for private institutions.
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
My notes on
http://www.breitbart.com/ have mainly been along the lines of Reb Nachman who said to avoid doctors.
There is a lot to go into about this, but the main idea I wanted to say today was simply without any elaboration, that government is not a social contract. That is, there is something different about the need for a government that is not the same as an extension of social contract theory either of the Rashbam in Bava Metzia, nor John Locke nor Rousseau.
I have to say that Richard Epstein wins the debate here. But that means that since government is a ding an sich a thing in itself its rights of contract are not unlimited. That is more or less what Epstein would say and does say I think. But he is looking at Roman Law and the Constitution of the USA. I am looking into the very essence of government in itself that I think is limited.
Can a government force people to provide health care for others?
My notes on
http://www.breitbart.com/ have mainly been along the lines of Reb Nachman who said to avoid doctors.
There is a lot to go into about this, but the main idea I wanted to say today was simply without any elaboration, that government is not a social contract. That is, there is something different about the need for a government that is not the same as an extension of social contract theory either of the Rashbam in Bava Metzia, nor John Locke nor Rousseau.
I have to say that Richard Epstein wins the debate here. But that means that since government is a ding an sich a thing in itself its rights of contract are not unlimited. That is more or less what Epstein would say and does say I think. But he is looking at Roman Law and the Constitution of the USA. I am looking into the very essence of government in itself that I think is limited.
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