I am a little unhappy with "tzadik worship."

I am a little unhappy with "tzadik worship." While I can see that following  a true tzadik  has benefits,-- still this tends to change from worship of God to worship of the tzadik.  There is a separate problem also of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. That is something the Gra said was the problem with the whole  movement that he put into excommunication. That is it is a mixture of good and negative energies.  You can actually see when people get absorbed into the negative energies. Still, it seems clear that I myself and others need an example of human perfection to follow. If we don't follow a true tzadik, we often tend to follow some phony tzadik.

I sometimes open up the Chayai Moharan and find things that indicate that Reb Natan really meant to turn the whole thing into a kind of tzadik centered thing. This does not seem to be to be along the lines of the world view of the Torah [Old Testament and the Talmud] which to me seem to be more centered on worship of God. It may seem to some people to be a subtle shift in focus,- but to me it seems to be  a major change in world view.

But I admit, worship of  almost any true tzadik does not bother me as much as when people worship a false tzadik. A false tzadik is someone with great powers and what seems like Ruach HaKodesh [רוח הקודש] but it come from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil [the kelipa that is an  admixture of good and evil]. Or from the Dark Side itself. We can find examples of that easily. Just check the history of the Shatz movement. Professor Gershom Sholem wrote a few very important books about that movement that contain valuable information. For example people think when someone does something that is  miracle  that automatically qualifies them as a true tzadik. However we find that people did miracles in the name of Shabati Tzvi that surpassed anything reported about  Israel Baal Shem.
People that had never even seen Shabatai Tzvi revived the dead just by saying, "In the name of Shabatai Zvi, I command you to get up". So miracles mean a lot. They mean someone is getting powers from the side of Good -or from the Dark Side,- or from the kelipa that is a mixture--the Intermediate Zone.

[Because of the above mentioned considerations, I think the best thing is to learn and keep straight Torah--as you can find being done in Lithuanian kinds of yeshivas.]

There is really a lot to discuss here.  Israel Baal Shem was a great tzadik. However in every town in Ukraine was a group of Shatzniks and there were the people that he tried to bring back in teshuva. So there is no great thing in being a "disciple of the Baal Shem Tov". These were the people that went on Friday night to where the action was--to the Shatz group, --not to the local rosh yeshiva. The result is easy to see. Go to HU and xerox the three books of Natan, the false prophet of the Shatz, and you will see what you are being taught as something kosher is really from the Dark Side.

All the above shows you why Litvaks stick with Gemara.

sin

I am pretty sure about some sins. I did things based on what I thought at the time were good reasons, but turned out to have disastrous consequences for myself and family. Those were about 4 major sins. All of them involved leaving some area of value. But besides that I figured that I had not just left some area of value but as a result I ended up joining some area of negative value.
But besides all this I also figure that when I suffer from some evil person, that there must be something of that same kind of evil in me,-- I mean as a kind of mirror effect.

All this is based on אין יסוריים בלי עוון there are no suffering that does not have a sin. But also on a statement of Rabbi Ishmael: One who has transgresses a positive command and repents does not move unless he has been forgiven.
If a negative  command then repentance covers and Yom Kippur cleanses.
If a negative command that has Karet or the death penalty then repentance covers but suffering cleanses. If it is חילול השם then only death brings forgiveness.

The things however that I think I need to repent on are not exactly in these categories. Leaving Israel is one thing. That was based on my thinking of Israel as a bad thing as is common among strictly religious people. The other sins are like that. They would not normally be considered things that there is a specific command against. They were just more subtle kinds of mistakes but with large repercussions.

Of course there are lots of things I have been accused of by very wicked people which are all lies. But though people do lie about me often, still they are only accusing me of things they can understand. My real sins are not things anyone can understand. They are more subtle. But also infinitely more serious.

In any case that leaves me with the rest of humanity in a dilemma.  How to pick ourselves up from the pit we have fallen into? It is in answer to this kind of question that I write on my blog about the importance of learning Torah in a Lithuanian kind of Yeshiva. It may not be a perfect solution but from what I can tell it is the best thing out there. At least in this way I can find out what I have done wrong and maybe even begin to correct things. But without learning straight, unadulterated Torah how can I or anyone find out what we have done wrong? Without that we are as likely as not to find some evil path that appeals to us and to claim it is good. With straight Torah, that possibility is less likely.

Bava Metzia 104

Ideas in Talmud
Ideas in Bava Metzia



I should admit that my previous ideas on Bava Metzia 104 I think were mistaken based on the fact I was going with the approach of the Maharshal and I think now that approach is impossible to defend.

But at any rate, we now have to figure out Tosphot and the Rif.

I already dealt with the Rif in a previous note. But the Rif could also say the Gemara in Bava Metzia is simply like R Yehoshua Ben Karcha and that is not the law. Or like I said before he could say the cases are different.

But what about Tosphot? To Tosphot the law is like Shmuel and the Gemara in Shavuot says that is only when he explained the pledge is against the whole loan. This does not look like the Gemara in BM. There here gets the whole pledge whether he said it is for the whole loan or not. The only difference is the amount the pledge went down in value.  Changing to Rashi's version in BM would help except for the continuation of the Gemara that says "טעמא דכתב ליה."


Tosphot might say that Rabbi Yochanan meant to lender can get the pledge from the orphans but only according to the amount of the loan if it was not said openly that the pledge is for the whole loan. Or that he meant he gets it from the orphans until the loan is paid. But no matter what Tosphot would do with R Yochanan it would not be how the gemara understands R Yochanan. So it could be I will have to revert to the same answers I gave for the Rif. [The two places  don't agree. Or maybe we could say the Gemara in Bava Metzia is just going according to R Yehoshu Ben Karcha. The reason I did not want to answer this is they ask from Rabbi Yochanan. But maybe that is not a problem. The Gemara might want to get R Yehoshua as close to the halacha as possible but that does not mean they think that he is the Halacha.]

The two places  don't agree. Or maybe we could say the גמרא in בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א is just going according to רבי יהושע בן קרחה. The reason I did not want to answer this is גמרא ask from רבי יוחנן. But maybe that is not a problem. The גמרא might want to get רבי יהושע בן קרחה as close to the הלכה as possible but that does not mean they think that he is the הלכה.



שני מקומות לא מסכימים. או שאולי נוכל לומר הגמרא בבבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א היא רק הולכת לפי רבי יהושע בן קרחה. הסיבה שאני לא רציתי לענות את זה מקודם היא שהגמרא שואלת מרבי יוחנן. אבל אולי זה לא בעיה. הגמרא ייתכן שהיא תרצה לקרב רבי יהושע בן קרחה  להלכה ככל האפשר אבל זה לא אומר שהם חושבים שהוא כן לפי הלכה





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I already dealt with the רי''ף in a previous note. But the רי''ף could also say the גמרא in ב''מ is simply like רבי יהושע בן קרחה and that is not the law. Or like I said before he could say the cases are different.

But what about תוספות? To תוספות the law is like שמואל and the גמרא in שבועות says that is only when he explained the משכון is against the whole הלוואה. This does not look like the גמרא in ב''מ. There here gets the whole משכון whether he said it is for the whole הלוואה or not. The only difference is the amount the משכון went down in value.  Changing to רש''י version in ב''מ would help except for the continuation of the גמרא that says "טעמא דכתב ליה."


תוספות might say that רבי יוחנן meant to lender can get the משכון from the orphans but only according to the monetary amount of the משכון if it was not said openly that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה. Or that he meant he gets it from the orphans until the הלוואה is paid. But no matter what תוספות would do with רבי יוחנן it would not be how the גמרא understands רבי יוחנן. So it could be I will have to revert to the same answers i gave for the רי''ף.

אני כבר עסקתי ברי''ף בהערה קודמת. אבל רי''ף יכול גם לומר הגמרא בב''מ היא פשוט כמו רבי יהושע בן קרחה וזה לא החוק. או כמו שאמרתי לפני כן שהן מדברות על מקרים שונים. אבל מה עם תוספות? לתוספות החוק היא כמו שמואל והגמרא בשבועות אומרת שרק כאשר הוא הסביר המשכון הוא נגד כל ההלוואה. זה לא נראה כמו הגמרא בב''מ.  כאן בב''מ המלווה מקבל את כל המשכון בין אם הוא אמר  שהוא עבור כל ההלוואה או לא. ההבדל היחיד הוא אם המשכון ירד בערך. ולענות לפי גרסת רש''י בשבועות לא יעזור בגלל המשך הגמרא בב''מ שאומרת "טעמא דכתב ליה." לתוספות אפשר לומר שרבי יוחנן התכוון שהמלווה יכול לקבל המשכון מהיתומים  רק בהתאם לסכום כספי של החוב אם זה לא נאמר בגלוי שהמשכון הוא לכל ההלוואה. או שהוא התכוון שהוא מקבל אותו מהיתומים עד ההלוואה משולמת. אבל לא משנה איך  שתוספות יפרשו רבי יוחנן, שזה לא יהיה איך שהגמרא מבינה רבי יוחנן. אז יכול להיות שאני אצטרך לחזור לאותן תשובות שנתתי לרי''ף ולומר שגם הן לתוספות

Bava Metzia

These are the two גמרות that my previous note was meant to be applied to.
Here I am taking the approach of תוספות according to the מהרש''א. I am giving up explaining these גמרות according to the מהרש''ל in בבא מציעא because even if I could get him to work in ב''מ I would still have to face the fact that is approach is absolutely contrary to the גמרא in שבועות point blank. That is because the מהרש''ל is saying we continue the approach of saying דורשיין לשון הדיוט even when it is not written.  How much more opposite to the גמרא in שבועות could you get? There the גמרא says שמואל is only when he explains openly the משכון is for the הלוואה. Or change it to רש''י if you want that שמואל is only when he did not explain it openly. One way of the other, there is a difference.




 The גמרא in שבועות מ''ד ע''א. The משנה says the משכון is against the הלוואה only according to its own monetary worth. The גמרא asks this seems not like שמואל who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole הלוואה. The גמרא answers  שמואל is when he said so explicitly and the משנה is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of שמואל is the subject of an argument between two תנאים.  The ברייתא  says רבי אליעזר says if the מלווה lost the משכון he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole הלוואה. Then רבי עקיבא says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a משכון in the first place but to be for the הלוואה? You lost the משכון, you lost the הלוואה.'"
The גמרא says that neither רבי אליעזר nor רבי עקיבא hold from שמואל and rather they disagree about the law of רבי יצחק. The גמרא says רבי יצחק said the מלווה owns the משכון. Then the גמרא pushes that off and says רבי יצחק was talking about a case when the משכון was taken not at the time of the הלוואה and in that case everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. Rather their argument is when the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה and it is parallel to the argument between רבה and רב יוסף. The argument is this. רבה said a the finder of a אבידה has the category of a שומר חינם. Then רב יוסף said a שומר שכר. The גמרא says even then if the מלווה does not need the משכון there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the מלווה needs to use the משכון.

The גמרא in בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א says רבי יהושע בן קרחה holds  דורשין לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the משכון is considered to be for the whole הלוואה even if the משכון is not worth much. The גמרא asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole משכון? But that contradicts רבי יוחנן who said the מלווה can take the whole משכון from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather רבי יהושע בן קרחה meant that if the משכון goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on, then we go after other property in order that the whole הלוואה should be paid back.

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אלה הם שתי גמרות שההערה הקודמת שלי הייתה אמורה להיות מיושמת
כאן אני לוקח את הגישה של תוספות בהתאם למהרש''א. אני לא נותן את הסבר  הגמרות על פי מהרש''ל בבבא מציעא, כי גם אם אני יכול לקבל אותו  בב''מ, אני עדיין אצטרך להתמודד עם העובדה שהגישה שלו מנוגדת לחלוטין לגמרא בשבועות, טווח אפס. זאת משום שהמהרש''ל אומר שאנו ממשיכים את גישתו של  "דורשיין לשון ההדיוט" גם כאשר זה לא כתוב. זה לההפך  לגמרא בשבועות . שם הגמרא אומרת שמואל הוא רק כאשר הוא מסביר בגלוי שהמשכון הוא להלוואה. או לשנות אותו לרש''י אם אתה רוצה ששמואל הוא רק כאשר הוא לא הסביר את זה בגלוי.  דרך אחת או האחרות, יש הבדל.

גמרא בשבועות מ''ד ע''א. המשנה אומרת המשכון הוא נגד ההלוואה רק על פי השווי הכספי שלו. הגמרא שואלת זה לא נראה כמו שמואל שאומר המשכון נחשב שווה לכל ההלוואה. הגמרא עונה שמואל הוא כשאמר זאת במפורש והמשנה היא כאשר הוא לא עשה זאת. הגמרא שאולת אולי דעתו של שמואל היא הנושא לוויכוח בין שני תנאים.  רבי אליעזר אומר, אם מלווה איבד משכון הוא לוקח שבועה שזה היה באונס והוא אוסף את כל ההלוואה. אז רבי עקיבא אומר: "הלווה יכול לומר, 'מדוע אני נתתי משכון, אבל כדי להיות להלוואה? איבדת המשכון, איבדת את ההלוואה." הגמרא אומרת לא רבי אליעזר ולא רבי עקיבא מחזיקים משמואל. אבל אולי הם מתווכחים על החוק הרב יצחק.  רבי יצחק אמר משכון בבעלות המלווה. אז הגמרא דוחפת את זה ואומרת שאם נלקח המשכון לא בזמן ההלוואה  כולם מסכימים עם רבי יצחק. במקום זאת הטענה שלהם היא כאשר המשכון נלקח בעת ההלוואה וזה במקביל לוויכוח בין רבה ורב יוסף. הטיעון זה. רבה אמר למאתר של אבדה יש הקטגוריה של שומר חינם. אז רב יוסף אמר שומר שכר. הגמרא אומרת גם אז אם מלווה לא צריך את המשכון אין מחלוקת, אלא המקרה הוא כאשר המלווה צריך להשתמש במשכון.
הגמרא בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א אומרת רבי יהושע בן קרחה מחזיק דורשין לשון הדיוט. זה אומר שאנחנו מסתכלים על השפה של המסמך המדויקת. אז כשהוא כותב, "כל תשלומתא דאית לך כל קבל דיכי" זה אומר המשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה גם אם המשכון הוא לא שווה הרבה. הגמרא שואלת אבל מה אם הוא לא כתב את זה? ואז הוא לא היה בבעלות השלמה של המלווה? אבל זה סותר את רבי יוחנן שאמר מלווה יכול לקחת את כל המשכון מהיתומים. אז הוא מחזיק אותו גם כשהוא לא כתב שום דבר. אלא רבי יהושע בן קרחה מחזיק בשיטה שאם המשכון ירד בערך ואינו שווה לחוב, אז אנחנו הולכים אחרי רכוש אחר של הלווה כדי שכל ההלוואה תהיה משולמת בחזרה.

Shavuot and Bava Metzia

That whole essay on the difficulties between Shavuot 43b 44a and Bava Metzia 104a I think I need to rethink. The whole thing is only valid if we go by the Maharshal. The Maharshal assumes that Tosphot continues in his normal way of explaining דורשין לשון הדיוט that even if it is not written it is considered as if it is written.
But if we go by the Maharsha that Tosphot changed his explanation then the two sugiot seem to fit.
That is it needs to be spelled out that the pledge is for the whole loan and if not then it is against only the monetary value of the pledge.

So the sugia in BM comes out just like it sounds. The lender gets the whole pledge if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the Gemara that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the Gemara in Shavuot.

And still the main problem remains. The Gemara in Shavuot is clear that the pledge is only for its monetary worth, and that is how the Rif says also. And that means if it is lost the rest of the loan must be paid. The Gemara in BM is clear if the loan is not paid he the lender gets the whole pledge even if it is more than the amount of the loan, even if it is not written as such. And the only reason it is written is if the pledge goes down in value that the lender can collect more property of the borrower. Perhaps one could answer in one case the pledge was lost and in the other the loan is not paid. But why would that make  a difference?
So what we seem to have here is that with the Rif these two gemaras do not argue. Rather in the case of the pledge being lost then it is only against its monetary worth. But if the loan is not paid the lender gets the whole pledge. But to Tosphot the law is like Shmuel that in both cases the pledge is against the whole loan.







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I need to rethink  the difficulties between שבועות  מ''ד ע''אand בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א. The whole thing is only problematic if we go by the מהרש''ל. The מהרש''ל assumes that תוספות continues in his normal way of explaining דורשין לשון הדיוט that even if it is not written it is considered as if it is written.
But if we go by the מהרש''א that תוספות changed his explanation, then the two סוגיות seem to fit.
That is it needs to be spelled out that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה, and if not then it is against only the monetary value of the משכון.

So the סוגיא in בבא מציעא comes out just like it sounds. The מלווה gets the whole משכון if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the גמרא that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the גמרא in שבועות.


So the סוגיא in ב''מ comes out just like it sounds. The מלווה gets the whole משכון if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the גמרא that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the גמרא in שבועות.

And still the main problem remains. The גמרא in שבועות is clear that the משכון is only for its monetary worth, and that is how the רי''ף says also. And that means if it is lost the rest of the חוב must be paid. The גמרא in ב''מ is clear if the חוב is not paid  the מלווה gets the whole משכון even if it is more than the amount of the חוב, even if it is not written as such. And the only reason it is written is if the pledge goes down in value that the lender can collect more property of the borrower. Perhaps one could answer in one case the pledge was lost and in the other the loan is not paid.

So what we seem to have here is that with the רי''ף these two גמרות do not argue. Rather in the case of the משכון being lost then it is only against its monetary worth. But if the loan is not paid the lender gets the whole pledge. But to תוספות the law is like שמואל that in both cases the משכון is against the whole הלוואה.

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 יש קשיים בין השבועות מ''ד ע''א ובבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א. כל העניין הוא רק בעייתי אם נלך לפי המהרש''ל. המהרש''ל מניח שתוספות ממשיך בדרך הרגילה שלו להסביר "דורשין לשון ההדיוט" שגם אם זה לא כתוב שזה נחשב כאילו הוא נכתב. אבל אם נלך לפי המהרש''א שתוספות שינו את ההסבר שלו, אז שתי הסוגיות שתתאמנה. כלומר זה צריך להיות מפורט שהמשכון הוא לכל ההלוואה, ואם לא אז הוא נגד רק את הערך הכספי של המשכון. אז סוגיא בבא מציעא יוצאת בדיוק כמו זה נשמע. מלווה מקבל כל המשכון אם הוא פירט את זה במסמך. הבעיה היחידה תהיה אז החלק הבא של הגמרא שנראית  שהמלווה עדיין מקבל את כל המשכון, גם אם הוא לא כתב את זה וזה נגד הגמרא בשבועות. אז סוגיא ב''מ יוצאת בדיוק כמו שזה נשמע. מלווה מקבל כל המשכון אם הוא פירט את זה במסמך.
 ועדיין הבעיה העיקרית נותרה. הגמרא בשבועות ברורה שהמשכון הוא רק לשווי הכספי שלו, וכך גם רי''ף אומר. וזה אומר שאם הוא איבד את המשכון, שארית החוב חייבת להיות משולמת. הגמרא ב''מ ברורה אם החוב לא ישולם המלווה מקבל כל המשכון גם אם הוא יותר מהסכום של החוב, גם אם לא כתוב כזה. והסיבה היחידה שכתוב היא אם המשכון יורד בערך אז המלווה יכול לאסוף יותר רכוש של הלווה. אולי אפשר לענות שמקרה אחד הוא שהמשכון אבד, והשני הוא שההלוואה לא שולמה. אז מה נראה הוא  שעם הרי''ף שתי גמרות אלה לא מתווכחות. במקרה שהמשכון הלך לאיבוד אז הוא רק נגד השוויות מוניטרית. אבל אם ההלוואה לא שולמה, המלווה מקבל את כל המשכון. אבל לתוספות החוק הוא כמו שמואל כי בשני המקרים המשכון הוא נגד כל ההלוואה.

here is a link to the book on bava metzia

Ideas in Bava Metzia

Isaac Luria

The legitimate mystics after the  Ari  האריז''ל does expand the Ari. We have the Reshash שלום שערבי having the שבירת הכלים in all the עולמות. That is fine because that is just going along with the regular expansion that the Ari himself does in the second part of the עץ חיים.

 The צמצום [contraction] refers to all ten sepherot.

The reason I bring this up is because this corresponds to something that Kant was doing.  Kant also limited reason. He said that when pure reason {not just human reason} ventures into areas where it does not belong it produces self contradictions.

The movement that the Gra put into Cherem. This would be a problem from the standpoint of Halachah even if we did not understand the motivations of the Gra. All the more so when we do understand. The trouble is certainly because of idolatry. But that would not be as bad as idolatry coupled with real evil. There is after all is said and done very good reasons that Gra signed the Cherem and it is a real failure of judgement for people to ignore it.  And recently we have Rav Shach saying the same thing as the Gra and predictably he too was ignored.

what motivates Muslims

I wanted to say that people that have  a secular orientation have no basis to comprehend what motivates Muslims. If they are economists they try to frame the problem in terms of economic relationships. If they are politicians they try to frame the problem in terms of political elements. The only people that can comprehend what motivates Muslims are religious people. And in a secular society religious people are ignored--even though they are the only ones that actually realize what is going on.
Muslims are motivated by Islam.  And Islam is big problem. Not that I like to knock other people, but I think the Rambam was wrong in this case. He saw the Islam of Ibn Rushd and the people that rationalized it.  I suggest starting with a thesis that Islam is evil and working back from that. That is we might very well find good people that are good in spite of being Muslim. That is they simply do not take their religion seriously.