Perhaps the question should be just the opposite. Why does the ר''ש say what he says? Maybe the most simple explanation is like רב שך?
 To answer for רב שך you might say here that the ר''ש was forced into his position because of  the משנה תרומה פרק ד is where he intended to separate more and he did not see any difference between this and the case of separating 1/61 instead of 1/60? [In the difference between 1/60 and 1/61 he is intending to separate the right amount right then and there--not a little now and a little later.] But the רמב''ם held there is a simple difference, and so Rav Shach's explanation is the most simple.


אולי השאלה צריכה להיות בדיוק ההפך. מדוע הר''ש אומר מה שהוא אומר? אולי ההסבר הפשוט ביותר הוא כמו רב שך? כדי לענות בשביל רב שך אפשר לומר כאן כי הר''ש נאלץ לתוך עמדתו בגלל משנת תרומה פרק ד' היא מצב שהוא נועד להפריד יותר, והר''ש לא רואה הבדל כלשהו בין זה לבין המקרה של הפרדת אחת מששים ואחת במקום אחת מששים? אבל רמב''ם מעריך שיש הבדל פשוט, ולכן ההסבר שלו הוא פשוט ביותר

The Rambam for all I know might have looked at the Yerushalmi that says that mishna in Trumot ch 4 is when he intends to separate more  and thought then it makes sense why it is not truma or maaser.

The Mishna משנה in Truma (ch 4)

The general way of taking תרומה, the part of the crop that goes to the כהן, is by physically removing that percentage of the crop. The same goes for מעשר the עשירית that is given to the Levi.  This is what I think made the רמב''ם explains the  משנה in מסכת תרומה in a kind of forced way that does not seem to be in accord with its simple explanation. The  משנה in תרומה (ch 4) says simply, המפריש מקצת תו''ם מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום  אחר ר''מ אומר אף מוציא ממנו תרומה על מקום אחר
ר''ת תו''ם היינו תרומות ומעשרות  "When one separates a part of תרומה and מעשר from a stack of grain, one can not take from it ,"it" masculine gender, תרומה and מעשר to another place but only to itself.  ר. מאיר says: Also to another place.
The simple explanation is like the ראב''ד  that since the part he separated is not the full amount percentage, thus the entire stack is still mixed with טבל .  The reason is the general rule held by the sages "אין ברירה".  That means he can not take from this stack of grain one סאה, and then say, "This סאה is מעשר for nine סאה in this other stack." The reason? We can not say that in reverse there is choice to say what he now holds is טבל. This is certainly what the משנה sounds like and it goes well with the fact that ר. מאיר says he can do so because ר. מאיר  holds יש ברירה. But then the obvious question is then the same problem exists for that very same stack of grain. Why can he take a סאה and say "This סאה is מעשר for nine סאה in the stack?" If אין ברירה then אין ברירה. If there is no choice then there is no choice. So the רמב''ם in  תרומה says when one separates a partial amount of תרומה, he has to take תרומה from it, --from the grain he separated.  It does not have the category of תרומה at all. The question then the אחרונים  ask is: then what about the previous law in the רמב''ם תרומה פרק ג:ו  where it says if he separates 1/61 what he has separated is תרומה and he then goes and take the remaining amount that is needed to complete the right percentage? The ר''ש רבינו שמשון  brings the ירושלמי  that  says the משנה in תרונה  פרק רביעי case he intends to separate more. This the ר''ש says means when he does not intend to separate more, the part he has separated is straight טבל and does not have the category of תרומה at all. My question here is this. Is it possible the רמב''ם holds with ר''ש? 
I mean הלכה ז would be when he does not intend to separate any more; and הלכה ו   is when he intended to separate a complete percentage, but missed by a drop?
I saw that רב שך explains the רמב''ם exactly the opposite from the ר'ש and I am wondering why this is necessary?  רב שך says the רמב''ם holds when he does not intend to separate any more it has the full category of תרומה and מעשר; and when he does intend to separate more, it does not because תרומה and מעשר do not work in reverse. Then הלכה ו is simply not a case of working in reverse, but of simply then and there not separating enough at one time.

 Perhaps the question should be just the opposite. Why does the ר''ש say what he says? Maybe the most simple explanation is like רב שך?
 To answer for רב שך you might say here that the ר''ש was forced into his position because of  the משנה תרומה פרק ד is where he intended to separate more, and he did not see any difference between this and the case of separating 1/61 instead of 1/60? But the רמב''ם held there is a simple difference, and so his explanation is the most simple.




הדרך הכללית של לקיחת תרומה, (החלק של היבול שהולך כהן), היא על ידי הסרה פיזית של אחוז מהיבול. כן לגבי מעשר  שניתן ללוי. זה מה שאני חושב גרם לרמב''ם להסביר את המשנה במסכת תרומה בדרך שלא נראית להיות בקנה אחד עם ההסבר הפשוט שלה. המשנה בתרומה אומרת בפשטות,המפריש מקצת תו''ם מוציא ממנו תרומה עליו אבל לא למקום איר אחר. ר''מ אומר אף מוציא ממנו תרומה על מקום אחר. ר''ת תו''ם היינו תרומות ומעשרות.  (כאשר אחד מפריד חלק התרומה ומעשר מתוך ערימה של תבואה, הוא לא יכול לקחת ממנו תרומה והמעשר למקום אחר אבל רק לעצמו. ר מאיר אומר: גם למקום אחר. ההסבר הפשוט הוא כמו ראב''ד כי מאז החלק שנפרד אינו אחוז מלוא הסכום ולכן הערימה כולה עדיין מעורבב עם טבל. הסיבה לכך היא הכלל שבידי החכמים אין ברירה. כלומר, הוא לא יכול לקחת מהערימה של תבואה  סאה אחת ואז לומר סאה זה מעשר לתשע סאה בערימה אחרת. הסיבה? אנחנו לא יכולים לומר כי בכיוון ההפוך למפרע יש בחירה להגיד מה שהוא מחזיק כעת הוא טבל. זהו בהחלט איך המשנה נשמעת וזה הולך טוב עם העובדה שר. מאיר אומר שהוא יכול לעשות זאת משום שר. מאיר מחזיק יש ברירה. אבל אז השאלה המתבקשת היא אז אותה הבעיה קיימת באותה ערימה של תבואה. למה הוא יכול לקחת סאה ולומר "סאה זו מעשר  לתשע סאה בערימה?" אם אין ברירה, אז אין ברירה. אז רמב''ם בתרומות פרק ג' הלכה ז' אומר כאשר אחד מפריד כמות חלקית של התרומה הוא צריך לקחת תרומה ממנה, מן התבואה שהיא מופרדת. (זו לא  בקטגוריה של תרומה בכלל.) השאלה אז האחרונים לשאול אז מה לגבי החוק הקודם רמב''ם תרומות פרק ג'  ה''ו שבה כתוב אם הוא מפריד 1/61 מה שהוא הפריד הוא תרומה, ואז הוא הולך לקחת את הסכום הנותר כי הוא צריך להשלים את האחוז הנכון. ר''ש (רבינו שמשון) מביא את הירושלמי שאומר משנה בתרומה הפרק הרביעי  היא מקרה שבכוונתו להפריד יותר. ר''ש אומר כשהוא אינו מתכוון להפריד יותר, החלק שהוא הפריד הוא  טבל ואינו משויך לקטגוריה של תרומה בכלל. השאלה שלי כאן היא זו. האם זה אפשרי שרמב''ם מחזיק עם ר"ש? אני מתכוון הלכה ז' תהיה כאשר אין בכוונתו להפריד עוד, והלכה ו' היא כשאר הוא מתכוון להפריד אחוז שלם אבל חיסר מקצת? ראיתי כי רב שך מסביר את רמב''ם בדיוק ההיפך מן ר'ש ואני שואל למה זה הכרחי? רב שך אומר רמב''ם מחזיק כאשר אין בכוונתו להפריד עוד יש לו את הקטגוריה מלאה של תרומה, ומתי שהוא מתכוון להפריד יותר זה לא תרומה ומעשר בגלל שתרומה ומעשר לא חלים למפרע. ואז הלכה ו' הוא פשוט לא מקרה של למפרע אלא שבו במקום הוא לא מפריד מספיק בבת אחת. 

Music for the glory of God.

t78 B flat major

To me Northern and Southern heroes all were great men. I am not against the North, but certainly not against the South. So in my opinion, if the South does not want them,  R. E. Lee statues ought to be placed in Washington DC, preferably next to the Lincoln and the Washington Monument. Both sides were fighting for the preservation of the Constitution as they understood it.

You can ask from a Torah point of view if the war was justified at all? A possible argument could be made from Herodotus and Thucydides about the need to preserve the State.  Cyrus and Darius could walk over just about anyone they wanted to because of the sheer vastness of their state. The Magi or anyone else simply and to give up and join in. The alternative was annihilation.The only thing that could and did stand in the way of the Persian empire was the combined power  of Hellenas, Athens and 300 Spartans. Since  שלום המדינה peace n prosperity of the State is one of the major goals of Torah as the Rambam makes abundantly clear in the Guide, the preservation of the Union does become a valid Torah Principle.

"To be involved in words of Torah" is not the same thing as to say lots of words of Torah.

I think the mitzvah of learning Torah is a time thing, not a verbal thing. The reason I say this is that we already know from the Yerushalmi (One of two Talmuds. That is the Jerusalem Talmud) that learning Torah has no שיעור למטה (no minimum size.)  So it is like making a scratch on one's skin because of sorrow on losing a loved one. That is a prohibition from the Torah. And it also has no minimum size. So if two witnesses tell a person, "Do not make a scratch from sorrow, because if you do, you will transgress the prohibition of שריטה and get 39 lashes,"  and he does so anyway and does it a lot, he still gets only one set of 39 lashes. The reason? Because there is no minimum size.
This is directly opposite to the prohibition of קרחה pulling out one's hair from sorrow and/or not from sorrow. The reason is that the five places of the beard have a minimum size in five different places. (I.e. 40 hairs that have a minimum length of being able to be held between two fingers.) So if warning is given--that is only one warning- and the person goes on to pull out the hair of his beard, then he gets 5 sets of 39 lashes. The reason is קרחה (puling out the beard) has a minimum size.
So clearly since  learning Torah has no minimum size, there is nothing to separate one word of Torah from another except the time factor, not how many words of Torah he says.

Practically speaking-when I was learning with David Bronson, he was usually the learning partner that did the saying of the words, for the simple reason that he was the one that had done the homework--the pre shiur (pre session) preparation. I just sat and listened. But listening is also being involved in words of Torah.

To some great degree I feel vindicated in not learning much as much Torah as  I would like to because of being in any yeshiva I think is not good nowadays since they have all been taken over by the Sitra Achra.. Since I have to do it on my own I figure I have a good excuse for not learning as much as I would be doing in a yeshiva situation. {There are only a few places left that are still learning authentic Torah like Ponovitch an the NY Litvak yeshivas. But the genuine Torah places are so rare you can count them on one hand.}

(1) There are a few concepts I picked up in yeshiva which are valuable and even though I have fallen away from them, they are still important to explain to those that might benefit.
One is the idea of Bitul Torah. [Not learning Torah when you can be learning.]] In other words you might be a working guy. That is great. But if you do not actually need the money then you are in fact not allowed to work because that is time that could be spent learning Torah.

The does not mean one is required to be learning Torah all the time. Rather it means when time is available then one is in fact required to be learning Torah.

You see this in all the obvious places in the Yerushalmi and the Rambam but somehow or other the idea rarely gets across to people--including me.
(The Rambam considers Physics to be in the category of learning the Oral Law as you can see in his discussion of dividing the day into three parts.))




(2) הכרת הטוב gratitude was another concept I was introduced to right away. The most clear expression of this is the Musar book חובות לבבות Obligations of the Hearts. This you also see in Rashi when aaron struck the Nile River and it became blood.  Rashi says there that Moses refused to strike the river because it had once done  a favor for him.

(3) דיני ממונות [laws about money] was obviously learned well at the Mir, but this also translated into deed as well as learning.

(4) Speaking the truth-the absolute truth at all times with utter total disregard for one's own advantage was another concept I picked up. I could tell lots of personal stories how that concept helped me in miraculous ways during the years.

t77 music files

 T-77 D major  {I am assuming this  still needs a good deal of editing.}

t77 midi file

I thought that it might be a good idea to mention the events surrounding R. Yohanan and Ilfa. There is a lot to learn from that event but it seems to me that I was more in the shoes of Ilfa than R. Yohanan.
Nowadays the kind of test that Ilfa faced seems to have morphed . Certainly "parnasa" [livelihood] is a test and always has been, but today there are more kinds of things which draw one away from Torah. Mainly they are along the lines of, "Sure learning Torah is a good thing, but come and do this more important mitzvah that is even greater than learning Torah." Or "Come do this mitzvah so that your Torah will be more real and authentic and even better." There are countless of ways for the evil inclination to seduce one away from Torah. After all all the Satan has to do all day is think up new ways to draw people from Torah and make up deep sounding teachings that seem to imply how other things are better than Torah and then inspire his agents with these deep lessons.

The basic events were as follows. R Yohanan and Ilfa were sitting and learning Torah. דחק להם שעתא. The hour pressed upon them. (That is: they were starving yeshiva students.) They discussed going out for סחורה (to work). They were sitting near a stone wall. R. Yohanan heard two angels discussing whether to topple and push down the wall on top of them. One angel said "Let's push this wall down on them since they are thinking of leaving learning Torah to do business." The other angel answered "No. Let's leave them alone because for one of them עומדת שעתא the hour stands. (i.e. one of them will still continue to sit and learn)." Ilfa went out and became a business man. In the meantime R Yohanan continued to learn Torah and eventually became the Rosh Yeshiva (head of the yeshiva).
When Ilfa returned from one business trip he encountered R Yohanan and tried to show that he was still learning Torah even while doing business. He said, "Show me anything in the Tosephta  and  I will show you were it is hinted at in the Mishna."  Then the Gemara brings that legal discussion.

The implications of these events are vast and few people are willing to heed the lessons. There is not question that what Ilfa did was perfectly justified. Still we see there is some level of appreciation of Torah that R Yohanan must had had. That is sometimes the real test is not whether you are sitting and learning. It is rather, "Do you appreciate the Torah enough? Or are you willing to give it up for a few bucks?"

My own appreciation of Torah was reinforced by a small book בניין עולם  which brings the Gra on the Mishna in Peah who brings the Yerushalmi. A very important aspect of that discussion is the question "What is the minimum amount of a mitzvah or a sin?" This comes up concerning  לא ירבה לו סוס and שריטה and קרחה.(note 1)




There is a lot to go into about this but the basic idea is that the Yerushalmi says even one word of learning Torah is worth more than all the other mitzvot.

But the Mishna not not say that learning Torah has an infinitesimal measure. Rather "No measure." Thus it is like שריטה that one would get one set lashes for lots of שריטות because it has no שיעור. This is different from things that have  a שיעור  like קרחה. Thus for קרחה one gets five sets of lashes even though there was only one התראה issued--because it has a שיעור.
There is much to think about here but in short it is not as if every word of Torah is a separate mitzvah. Rather is one sits an learns for example a whole day in the Mir Yeshiva in NY or Chaim Berlin, then he gets a  big mitzvah. That is the same as if he did lots of שריטות. He gets one big sin. It is not as if he did lots of little sins. So with Torah that has no minimum measure, sitting and learning a whole day is a big mitzvah, not lots of small mitzvot.

I should mention that people that use Torah to make money are generally enemies of those that learn Torah for its own sake. So the fact that people are sitting and learning does not make them friends to Authentic Torah. For all we know they might be doing it for the money and ease of life style and to get out of the IDF  and the prestige. In fact to get out of the IDF was the one main motivating factor is the formation of 99% of all Israel yeshivas.
This is the trouble with the religious system. It is a breeding ground for anti Torah and anti Israel zealots. The fact that people learn Torah all day says nothing about their integrity or true purpose. if fact 99% are in it for the ease and comfort of lifestyle of sitting and chatting all day and getting paid to do so.

With the exception of Ponovitch and its off shoots most yeshivas there have no interest in Torah at all.

No lower measure  also means as it does for peah--that one fulfills it with an infinitesimal amount.that one fulfills the mitzvah by saying one word of Torah.

(note 1) If one does many scratches  שריטות there is one set of lashes. But for קרחה even with just one warning there are five sets. The reason שריטה has no שיעור.

the idea of minimum measure comes up in truma and maaser. if one gives less than 10% it has not the legal category of maaser. the rambam writes the same about truma in laws of truma ch 3 halach 6 and 7. the trouble is halacha 6 where it is truma and it is unclear what the difference is--unless you go to the Yerushalmi. there it is clear the difference is if one intend to take more truma or not. Rav Shach explains the Rambam thus: If his intention is to take more then it does not have the category of truma at all. If not it is truma. That is the opposite of how the Rash [rabainu Shimshon explains the yerushalmi.]

הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א

To understand the רמב''ם it is necessary to make a distinction between איסור הנאה and איסור למזבח.
In that way the רמב''ם is clear. He says in הלכות איסורי מזבח that any object that is נעבד is אסור למזבח. It makes no difference if the object belongs to him or not.  But in terms of אסורי הנאה he says in הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' that most surprising of laws. He says even on one's own animal, if he is עובד  it, it does not become forbidden in הנאה unless he does at least a small  מעשה. Clearly he is saying that if he bowed down to his own animal, the animal does not become forbidden in הנאה  and it is even מותר באכילה. It is possible to miss this point of first reading because of the order the רמב''ם  places the subject. At first he says one does not make forbidden in הנאה  anything that  אין בו תפיסת אדם even an animal unless he does a small act like שוחט סימן אחד. When do we say this. On his own objects. But objects that belong to another, even if he does a complete שחיטה  he does not forbid the animal or whatever object it might be. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו.

What this means is vast. It means that he is looking at the statement of רב הונא as referring to only his own animal and he is deciding the law as  רב הונא. But it also means that he looked at the statement of Rav Amram אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו  and decided the law like that also. He decided both statements are true and do not contradict.
Thus he must have had a different version of the statement of רב הונא.
רב הונא said in חולין page מ' ע''ב when a person bows down to the animal of his friend he does not make it forbidden but if he is שוחט סימן אחר he does make it forbidden. The version of  the רמב''ם  must have said: "When a person bows down to his own animal he does not make it forbidden בהנאה but if he is cuts one סימן he does make it forbidden."

This is as many things in the Rambam very easy to miss. Or perhaps I should say I missed this entire thing until today. To me it seems amazing and phenomenal. In one second the whole approach of the Rambam became clear to me and how he deals with the different gemaras that are part of this sugia. Maybe I should write down the Gemaras as background information, but at any rate, the basic point of what the Rambam holds and how he looks at the Gemara in Hulin is clear.



רמב''ם הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' כדי להבין את הרמב''ם יש צורך לעשות הבחנה בין איסור הנאה ואיסור למזבח. בדרך זו  הרמב''ם ברור. הוא אומר בה' איסורי מזבח כי חפץ שהוא נעבד הוא אסור למזבח. זה לא משנה אם החפץ שייך לו או לא. אבל במונחים של אסורי הנאה הוא אומר בהלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' גם על בעל חי של עצמו, אם הוא עובד את זה, זה לא גורם לו להיות אסור בהנאה אלא אם כן הוא עושה לפחות מעשה קטן. ברור שהוא מכוון שאם הוא השתחווה לבהמה שלו, הבהמה אינה הופכת להיות אסורה בהנאה וזו אפילו מותרת באכילה. אפשר לפספס את הנקודה הזו בקריאה הראשונה בגלל הסדר שהרמב''ם מציב את הנושא. בהתחלה הוא אומר אחד לא עושה איסור הנאה בדבר שאין בו תפיסת אדם אפילו חיה אלא אם הוא עושה מעשה קטן כמו שוחט סימן אחד. אבל זה באובייקטים שלו. אבל חפצים ששייכים לאחר, גם אם הוא עושה שחיטה גמורה הוא אינו אוסר את החיה (או כל אובייקט אחר). אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו. פירוש הדבר הוא שהוא מסתכל במשפט של רב הונא כמתייחס רק הבהמה שלו, והוא מחליט החוק כפי רב הונא. אבל זה גם אומר שהוא הביט בחוק של רב עמרם אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו והחליט החוק ככה גם. הוא החליט  שהטענות נכונות ואינן סותרות. לכן הוא בטח קיבל גרסה שונה של ההצהרה של רב הונא. בגרסה שלנו רב הונא אמר בחולין דף מ' ע''ב כאשר אדם משתחווה אל חיה של חברו הוא לא עושה את זו אסורה אבל אם הוא שוחט סימן אחד הוא עושה את זו אסורה. הגרסה של רמב''ם בוודאי אמר: "כשאדם משתחווה אל בהמה שלו הוא לא עושה את זה אסורה בהנאה, אבל אם הוא חותך  סימן אחד שהוא עושה את זו אסורה.

Rambam עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א'

To understand the Rambam it is necessary to make a distinction between איסור הנאה and איסור למזבח.
In that way the Rambam is clear. He says in הלכות איסורי מזבח that any object that is נעבד is אסור למזבח. It makes no difference if the object belongs to him or not.  But in terms of אסורי הנאה he says in הלכות עבודה זרה פרק ח' הלכה א' that most surprising of laws. He says even on one's own animal, if he is עובד  it, it does not become forbidden in הנאה unless he does at least a small  מעשה. Clearly he is saying that if he bowed down to his own animal, the animal does not become forbidden in הנאה  and it is even מותר באכילה. [It is possible to miss this point of first reading because of the order the Rambam places the subject. At first he says one does not make forbidden in הנאה  anything that  אין בו תפיסת אדם even an animal unless he does a small act like שוחט סימן אחד. When do we say this. On his own objects. But objects that belong to another, even if he does a complete שחיטה  he does not forbid the animal or whatever object it might be. אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו.

What this means is vast. It means that he is looking at the statement of רב הונא as referring to only his own animal and he is deciding the halacah as  Rav Huna. But it also means that he looked at the statement of Rav Amram אין אדם אוסר דבר שאינו שלו  and decided the halacah like that also. He decided both statements are true and do not contradict.
Thus he must have had a different version of the statement of Rav Huna.
Rav Huna said in Hulin page מ' ע''ב when a person bows down to the animal of his friend he does not make it forbidden but if he is שוחט סימן אחר he does make it forbidden. The Rambam's version must have said  when a person bows down to his own animal he does not make it forbidden בהנאה but if he is cuts one סימן he does make it forbidden.

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p129 t74 D major midi t74 mp3  [same file in nwc]

p129 in midi format p129 nwc

Musar [learning the books of Ethics written during the Middle Ages

I noticed that Rav Shach mentioned Musar twice in his introduction to the Avi Ezri. He even goes so far as to bring the idea that without good character and fear of God, all one's Torah learning is negative and poison.

Musar, after it got mixed with kabalah, takes a  different direction than the Musar of the early Middle Ages. For example, the attitude of  the Rambam and his son's and grandchildren's Musar books  have very different attitudes than later books of Musar. A lot of fanaticism gets introduced after  the Middle Ages. [Muar of the Middle Ages held of the approach of Faith with Reason, Reason with Revelation.]
Later books can mix up people.
However this is not to imply anything negative about the Ari (Heaven forbid.)
My feeling about this is that if one feels ready to learn the Ari (Isaac Luria) and has  been through Shas a least a few times, then the best thing is to learn the Ari straight. [The main thing I think is the Tree of Life though my learning partner, David Bronson, thinks that the  מבוא שערים is even more essential.]

[Though I am myself ashkenazic, I can not stress enough to avoid all the ashkenazic sitra achra [dark side] books of mysticism written after the 1600's.] The only commentary on the Ari from the ashkenzic world  is the Gra. So for good commentary on the Ari, the best thing is the Gra, Rav Shalom Sharabi (Yemen) and or Rav Yaakov Abuchazeira.

The truth be told I do not think it is possible to get the "spirit of Torah" outside of a Litvak Musar yeshiva. I have absolutely no respect for synagogues at all. If one is not in the area of a genuine Litvak yeshiva then the best thing is to learn at home. 

Not enough attention is placed on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.

Not enough attention is place on making a distinction between the Ari and occult practices.  It is almost inevitable that one gets involved in learning the Ari that he get caught up in some kind of occult activity. People find supposed proofs in his writings for all kinds of very stupid activities; or sometimes just the opposite. They attack true tzadikim thinking of themselves as having privy information about some deep secrets of the Torah revealed by the Ari.

public school is a waste of time.

My impression of education is basically that public school is a waste of time. It is best to limit oneself to the basic program of the Rambam--the Oral Law, the Written Law , Physics and Metaphysics. Even the Metaphysics thing I would limit it to what the Rambam meant by it--that is the book of Aristotle called Metaphysics. Most of secular education I think is bitul Torah [wasting time which could be spent learning Torah]. [The main thing to learn as far as the Oral and Written law is concerned in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which contains the prime essence of Torah in its pristine glory.]
Not that the religious world is any better. Most of what passes for Torah in the religious world is Torah of the Sitra Achra." [Dark Side Torah](The demons have Torah also. This is what passes for authentic Torah in the religious world.)

In terms of Torah learning my impression is to do in depth learning right away. That is what Reb Shelomo Freifeld did when he made his yeshiva Shar Yashuv. The idea there was to plunge into the depth of the Gemara right away. I was not happy with that at the time but since then I have seen that when people do not learn how to learn right away, they never get it.

[As for Physics I do not have a lot to say except it is best not to make random detours. The best thing is to go to Quantum Field Theory as soon as possible.[What is as soon as possible? That is after doing Quantum Mechanics and Calculus, and Functional Analysis.]
It is true that the Rambam wanted his Mishna Torah to be learned straight but that does not exclude the importance of going into it in depth as Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and Rav Shach did as you can see in the law of learning Torah where 1/3 is for the Oral Law and another third is for in depth learning.

Gitin page 4a

I should mention that I gained a great deal of respect for Tosphot from my learning partner David Bronson. If not for him I might have been satisfied with asking a question on Tosphot and then going on. So in answer to my question on Tosphot Gitin page 4a let me just say that Tosphot is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me 100 shekalim and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
If anyone on the blog' sphere has read my little book on Shas they would have already have seen me go into the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what Tosphot is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you ow me 100 shekalim and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then Tosphot is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that Tosphot is thinking that even to R. Elazar the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But Topshot is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. So now what looked to be an unanswerable question on Tosphot now becomes clear. Tosphot suggest that even R Elazar agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the halachic category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a halachic category that he has to pay.

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So in answer to my question on תוספות  let me just say that תוספות is thinking along these lines. Let's say one person comes to court and says to the other you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says yes! Then what is the law? He must pay, even though there might never have been any loan at all. That is there is a חלות דין even if there was never a חלות קניין. And it is not the same as a person writing a שטר by which he obligates himself to pay some mount of money.
This is like  the difference in laws of שגגות between טעות במציאות וטעות בדין
So that is what תוספות is thinking. Lets say a person comes to court and says you owe me מאה שקלים and the other says לא היו דברים מעולם and two witnesses come and say לווה ופרע he must pay because כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. So it is true that we believe there was a loan. But there is also a חלות דין. That is there is now a law that he must pay even if there never was a loan. The דין is חל.
Then תוספות is also thinking what is it that makes a שטר into a שטר? Well we know already that תוספות is thinking that even to ר. אלעזר the signature of two witnesses makes it into a שטר. But תוספות is thinking further. He is thinking there are two aspects of a שטר. One is that is is evidence for what it says happened. but there is also the דין of  a שטר. What תוספות suggests that even ר. אלעזר agrees that for שטרי מכר עדי חתימה כרתי  that is they give the document the דין category of  שטר in the same was that הודאת פיו creates a הלכה category that he has to pay.


 התשובה לשאלה שלי על תוספות. תוספות הוא חושב בכיוונים האלה. נניח שאדם אחד מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר לשני אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים והשני אומר כן! אז מה הדין? הוא חייב לשלם, למרות שאולי מעולם לא היה כל הלוואה בכלל. כלומר יש חלות הדין גם אם לא היה אף פעם חלות קניין. וזה לא אותו דבר כאדם שכותב שטר שבאמצעותו הוא מחייב את עצמו לשלם כסף. זה כמו ההבדל החוקי בשגגות בין טעות במציאות וטעות בדין. אז זה מה תוספות חושב. נניח שאדם מגיע לבית המשפט ואומר "אתה חייב לי מאה שקלים", והשני אומר "לא היו דברים מעולם", ושני עדים באים ואומרים "לווה ופרע", הוא חייב לשלם כי כל האומר לא לווה כאומר לא פרע, והודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אז נכון שאנחנו מאמינים שיש הלוואה. אבל יש גם חלות דין. כלומר יש עכשיו חוק שהוא חייב לשלם גם אם מעולם לא היה הלוואה. הדין הוא חל. ותוספות  גם חושבים מה זה עושה שטר להיות שטר?  אנו יודעים כבר כי שתוספות חושבים שגם לר' אלעזר החתימה של שני עדים עושה את השטר להיות שטר. אבל תוספות חושבות בנוסף. הוא חושב שיש שני היבטים של שטר. האחת היא כי היא מעידה על מה שכתוב שקרה. אבל יש גם את הדין של שטר. מה שתוספות מרמזים הוא שגם ר' אלעזר מסכים כי עבור שטרי מכר, עדי חתימה כרתי, כי הם נותנים את המסמך דין והקטגוריה של שטר. באותה מדה  הודאת פיו יוצרת קטגוריה בהלכה כי הוא צריך לשלם. זה חלות דין

representative democracy

I first ran into the idea of feedback  in electricity and it seems like a good analogy. [I was learning that as part of the idea of the Rambam of learning Physics.]

The idea of feedback seems to be central to Calvin in his establishment of representative democracy in Geneva and in its outskirts.

[It has been noted before me that representative government did not originate with Athens , nor Rome, nor John Locke but rather Calvin. Athens was not a representative government but rather a democracy.]
The thing which is interesting to me is the complain  of Shmuel the prophet about the sin of setting up a king. You can not say that Shmuel was saying bad kings are bad, but even good kings. After all Shmuel only anointed two kings, Saul and David. And he was saying to Israel that their desire to have a king was a terrible sin in the sight of God. Unless we understand him to be ignorant he must have been referring even to the two kings that he set up.

That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.

I thought today that at least once I ought to jot down a basic idea that I heard from Reb Shelomo Freifeld about learning. And it was also emphasized by his son Motti. That is the idea to review a certain subject ten times.  Rav Freifeld might have said this in reference to each chapter of the Gemara but this idea I usually applied to much smaller sections of Gemara. For example  Tosphot and the Maharsha and the Pnei Yehoshua I would in general try to just say over ten times. I had a pencil that I would jot down a small dot for every time I had repeated a Pnei Yehoshua or a Tosphot.
This was usually done as part of the in depth sessions.

It is true I have mentioned on many blogs the idea of learning fast without review which I saw originally in Musar books, but that I never really applied in my yeshiva years--even in terms of fast learning. Even fast learning to me meant to review the Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot a few times and then go on.
It was only later that I started doing Physics, that learning fast made a lot more sense to me in order to get the big picture.

There was almost never a time in yeshiva that my struggle to make progress was looked kindly upon. Both Shar Yahuv and the Mir stressed learning in depth. I once made a siyum [finishing] of Shabat and the basic reaction of even my closest friend [Shelomo Berger ] was "How many times did you review it?"
That is to say learning in depth was embedded in the culture to the degree that fast learning was looked upon as superficial. My own feeling was that the in depth thing is great but I also wanted to get the "big picture." Not the big picture in the way of Reb Chaim or Rav Shach which is to go through Shas through one sugia. Rather I simply wanted  a clear idea of each tractate as a whole.
Years later I have begun to see how right they were. I have noticed that people that do not know how to  get into the essence of a sugia when they are young never get it.

Gitin page 4a

The problem is this. תוספות at first suggests that to ר. אלעזר one needs עדי מסירה for both money and גיטין to make a חלות קניין. Then he suggests maybe not for money since הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. But that rule does not suggest there can be a חלות קניין by means of words, nor does it suggest any kind of קניין for money at all. It only says that we believe there was  a חלות קניין because of his words.



הבעיה היא זו. תוספות בהתחלה מעלה כי לר. אלעזר  צריכים עדי המסירה  לחלות קניין כסף ולגיטין. אחר כך הוא מציע שאולי לא לכסף בגלל שהודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. אבל הכלל הזה אינו מציע שיכולה להיות חלות קניין באמצעות מילים, ואינו מציע שום סוג של קניין  כסף בכלל. הוא רק אומר שאנחנו מאמינים שהייתה  חלות קניין בגלל דבריו


I believe that תוספות meant to answer this question. That is why he brings up the issue of חב לאחרים.  That is he is saying I know the law of הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי  does not mean that הודאת פיו makes a חלות קניין. But it might because, after all, we would not believe  הודאת פיו if it was a case of חב לאחרים.

אני מאמין כי תוספות נועד לענות על שאלה זו. זו הסיבה שהוא מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. כלומר הוא אומר אני מכיר את החוק של הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי אין זה אומר כי הודאת פיו עושה חלות קניין. אבל זה יכול להיות ראיה, שאחרי הכל, לא היינו מאמינים הודאת פיו אם זה היה מקרה של חב לאחרים.

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 תוספות suggests  that  ר. אלעזר should hold that both חלות גיטין and a חלות כסף should happen only by עדי מסירה. He is not thinking of שטרי ראיה but rather שטרי קניין. Then he wants to backtrack, and to say this: to ר. אלעזר all שטרות even to make a חלות are valid with just עדי חתימה. But we would still need עדי מסירה For גיטין because אין דבר שבערווה פחות משיים.
Then he wants to bring a proof from הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי. On this I asked that הודאת  פיו  does not accomplish a חלות. Then I suggested that תוספות must be thinking of this objection and thus brings up the subject of חב לאחרים. The basic idea is in גיטין and קידושין one creates an obligation for others, but money might be different.  I do not understand why that is relevant. It is true that one can obligate himself money without any transaction just by a document. But it still has to be a valid document. But a more serious question is that the answer of תוספות  goes against the very same premise that תוספות is trying to prove. תוספות is trying to prove the validity of a שטר can be brought about by עדי חתימה. That means the validity of a document of גיטין קידושין or שטר מכר. But the brings a proof that גיטין וקידושין are different than קנייני כסף

 תוספות מעלה כי יכול להיות שר. אלעזר מחזיק ששני חלות גיטין וכן חלות שטרי מכר צריכות לקרות רק על ידי עדי המסירה. הוא לא חושב על שטרי ראיה אלא שטרי קניין. אז הוא רוצה לחזור בו, ולהגיד את זה:  לר. אלעזר כל שטרות אפילו לעשות חלות תקפות גם על ידי עדי חתימה. אבל אנחנו עדיין צריכים עדי המסירה עבור גיטין וקידושין כי אין דבר שבערווה פחות משניים. ואז הוא רוצה להביא ראיה מן הודאת פיו כמאה עדים דמי.  שאלתי כי הודאת פיו אינה משיגה חלות. ואז הצעתי שתוספות חושב על זה ובכך מעלה את הנושא של חב לאחרים. הרעיון הבסיסי הוא שגיטין וקידושין  יוצרים מחויבות לאחרים, אבל קניין כסף יכול להיות שונה. אני לא מבין למה זה רלוונטי. זה נכון שאדם יכול לחייב את עצמו בכסף בלי שום עסקה רק על ידי מסמך. אבל זה עדיין צריך להיות מסמך תקף. אבל שאלה רצינית יותר היא כי התשובה של תוספות נוגדת את ההנחה שאותה תוספות מנסה להוכיח. תוספות מנסה להוכיח את תוקפו של שטר יכול להיות על ידי עדי חתימה. כלומר, את תוקפו של מסמך של גיטין קידושין או שטר מכר. אך מביא הוכחה לכך גיטין וקידושין הם שונים מאשר קנייני כסף.