(eio. No U (universal) is S (substance). Some F (form) is S. Some F are U, but some are not.)
(i) Substance is form. (ii) Form is universal. (iii) No universal is a substance.
That is F is not a subset of U. But F and S intersect. There are some forms that are substances.
This seems important because the Maimonides is considered to be going with Aristotle. It does not seem that he would have missed these problems. Is there perhaps ways to answer these things? Or Perhaps Maimonides was aware of these problems and therefore took a kind of Middle Path between Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists. Sincerely Avraham Rosenblum
I would agree that Aristotle affirms (i) and (ii), but I don’t really see (iii). Universals are forms, and forms are substance. I think that Maimonides is actually a Neoplatonist, where the chain of Being is grades of form, and universality, from the four elements up to the One.
So I am curious why you, or anyone, would say that “No universal is a substance” in Aristotle.Best wishes,KR
Dear Dr Ross. I thank you for your detailed reply. My basic idea that Aristotle hold no universal is a form comes from Marc Cohen in the entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia Aristotle's Metaphysics. where he traces this idea to book Z chapter 13 of the Metaphysics.Sincerely Avraham Rosenblum
|(i)||Substance is form.|
|(ii)||Form is universal.|
|(iii)||No universal is a substance.|
"Substance" is the major term. "Form" is the middle term. "Universal" is the minor term.
(iii) seems to mean: "There is no intersection between the set of universals and the set of all substance." [E]
So we have a lot of possibilities to go through. Let's start with AAE. The middle is distributed. But there is the illicit process of the minor term..
Perhaps it is rather IIE. Then that would be the fallacy of the undistributed middle. Neither premise refers to every member of the middle term.
Perhaps it is AIE. Same problem. The middle term is not distributed.
Perhaps it is IAE. Form is distributed in the second premise but not universal. That seems to be a fallacy of the minor term. You say something in the conclusion about every member of the minor term but not in the second premise.
So that is what Marc Cohen means. That there is no way to make sense of all three propositions.
(EIO-4. No U (universal) is S (substance). Some F (form) is S. Some F are not U but some might be?)