Jane Goodall showed about about our close relatives in the primates are vicious. "During the first ten years of the study I had believed […] that the Gombe chimpanzees were, for the most part, rather nicer than human beings. […] Then suddenly we found that chimpanzees could be brutal—that they, like us, had a darker side to their nature." Goodall also observed the tendency for aggression and violence within chimpanzee troops. Goodall observed dominant females deliberately killing the young of other females in the troop to maintain their dominance, sometimes going as far as cannibalism. And this is in us. [People are evil.] The difference Dr Huemer wrote that we can use reason to see objective morality.

And this certainly goes along with Hegel. However Huemer is coming more from the direction of GE Moore.

But to Leonard Nelson we know good from evil by a third sense--non intuitive immediate knowledge. And I am not at all able to see who among these greats was more correct. But one thing all agree with, we can know the difference between right and wrong--if we try hard enough. But without that effort we are naturally evil.  [See In Praise of Folly by Erasmus, and or Candide.]

When Husserl was arguing against Leonard Nelson, he was on one hand making a false accusation of psychologism..But in general he was arguing against psychologim in his book anyway. And the argument is always based on the idea that the laws of Logic have nothing to do with empirical things. The laws are forever true. So my question is that after that we have logic that is fractional. Does that change the argument? 

I might make clear that to Nelson, the categories, a priori knowledge is not because that is how our minds work, but rather it is knowledge that we know not by the usual mays of pure reason or pure observation. 

 It is best not to try to extend reasoning into realms of things in themselves--things that can not be checked by observation

The problem of evil is well known problem since ancient times. To give you an idea of the scope of the issue let me say there are more than 2 billion entries on this issue when you search google. Happy reading. And among these authors have been the deepest and most profound. So what I think is this: We would do well not to try to reason about spiritual things at all. We should mind our own plot of land and be happy with what we have and not be in the category of those that Do not  look at "what is above, what is beneath, what is within, what is outside." מה למעלה מה למטה מה לפנים מה לאחור/ The Gemara says harsh words about those that look at these. Now the problem of evil is hard to understand, but when it comes to the idea that everything that God does is for the good, we ought to accept the fact and just move on.

[What are "things in themselves"? When you look at a piece of wood it has a shape and a color and a feel to it. These are characteristics that describe how you interact with that  piece of wood. But what is it without your interaction with it? What is it without the adjectives that you add to it?"

So we might know about God, and morality, and souls and angels. But not by reason. Rather by Faith. And faith is important. However one should not confuse faith with knowledge. And when one does confuse these two things, that is where religious insanity begins.

 In Torah the mention to honor and obey one's teachers never appears. Rather it is to honor and fear one's parents. So from where does the modern emphasis on listening to religious authorities come from? not from the Torah. Rather from the Tora of the Dark Side. 

 z56 music file I have not been writing much recently, but I hope that this brings a bit of joy to those that listen.

בבא בתרא דף כ''ו

 I was thinking about the Gemara on the way to the sea and back, Bava Batra 26 and 81. There is an argument between Tosfot and Rabbainu Hananel about the reason for Ula. Ula said if one has a tree within 16 cubits of the field of his neighbor he can not bring first fruits to the Temple. [The law about first fruits is he brings them to the Temple and gives them to the priest.]

Tosphot says that the reason is it is not enough to have a legal right to use the ground but rather because he needs to own the ground. It must be I think that Ula holds like Reish Lakish that קניין פירות לאו כקניין הגוף דמי (ownership of the fruits is not like ownership of the ground).On and that is why R. Yohanan says even if he has a tree right next to the very border, he still brings first fruits because על מנת כן הנחיל יהושוע את הארץ. But that alone would not be enough to be thought to own the ground. All that Joshua did was to say that people have a right to plant anywhere on their property even up until the very border with their neighbor. But that would not be enough to be considered as if they own the ground unless you have this other law of R Yohanan: קניין פירות כקניין הגוף דמי

In terms of how Rav Shach explains the sugia/subject according to R. Chananel I would like to say a few points. So what I am going to talk about will be in a different mode that Tosphot.  R. Yohanan holds when one buys a tree with its ground , he will own only four amot around it. That is the reason R. Chananel says the law is not like Ula. For Ula says nothing about ownership and nor does R. Yohanan here in perek 2 of Bava Batra. But the whole point of R Hananel the ground must belong to the owner of the tree in order to bring first fruits  and if this tree is still within 16 amot of the boundary, it still is not all his ground. So we must say that R Yohanan holds he owns only four amot around it. This is like he says on page 81 when he buys three trees he owns everything under and  the length of  plowing around them which is 4 amot. So now it only matters that four amot around the tree belong to him and that is enough to bring first fruits. [Of course within 4 amot of the boundary will still be a problem and that is why I have to add that to R Yohanan קניין פירות כקניין הגוף גמי] This is all to explain that Ula means he is a thief on the fruits. But then Rav Shach changes his mind and notes that the explanation of Ula can in fact hold that the fruit really is owned by the owner of the tree but he is still a thief because he owns  the roots of the tree all around the tree up until 16 amot. and that 16 amot is now sticking into the field of his neighbor. So he is still a thief because of the roots of his tree are bring nourishment to the fruits 

I am still being short here because i am very tired after being at the sea. But not so cold. Still, the best idea is to see inside the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach in Laws of First Fruits 2:10 and 2:13 

I might mention also that Rabbainu Chananel might be thinking in terms of damages. That thus he would say that when Ula said, "He can not bring first fruits because he is a thief," that means the prohibition of damages comes from the prohibition of theft. For after all R. Yose never said anything about ownership but rather that one can plant next to the boundary of his neighbor.

___________________________________________________________

 I was thinking about the גמרא on the way to the sea and back, בבא בתרא דף כ''ו ודף פ''א 26 and 81. There is an argument between תוספות and ר' חננאל about the reason for עולא. There עולא said if one has a tree within שש עשרה אמות of the field of his neighbor he can not bring ביכורים to the מקדש. [The law about ביכורים is he brings them to the מקדש and gives them to the priest.]

תוספות says that the reason is it is not enough to have a legal right שיעבוד to use the ground, but rather because he needs to own the ground. It must be I think that עולא holds like ריש לקיש that קניין פירות לאו כקניין הגוף דמי (ownership of the fruits is not like ownership of the ground). and that is why ר' יוחנן says even if he has a tree right next to the very border, he still brings ביכורים because על מנת כן הנחיל יהושוע את הארץ. But that alone would not be enough to be thought to own the ground. All that יהושוע did was to say that people have a right to plant anywhere on their property, even up until the very border with their neighbor. But that would not be enough to be considered as if they own the ground unless you have this other law of ר' יוחנן: קניין פירות כקניין הגוף דמי

There is a long piece by Rav Shach about this subject that explains R Hananel. That Ula means that if the nourishment comes from the ground of his neighbor, then the fruit belongs to his neighbor (even though he himself owns the tree. With this insight he explains the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch that when one buys a tree, he owns only 4 cubits around it, not 16 like Ula.]

In terms of how רב שך explains the סוגיא subject according to רבינו חננאל I would like to say a few points. So what I am going to talk about will be in a different mode than תוספות.  Now ר' יוחנן holds when one buys a tree with its ground , he will own only ארבע אמות around it. That is the reason רבינו חננאל says the law is not like עולא. For עולא says nothing about ownership and nor does ר' יוחנן here in פרק ב'  of בבא בתרא. But the whole point of רבינו חננאל the ground must belong to the owner of the tree in order to bring ביכורים  and if this tree is still within שש עשרה אמות of the boundary, it still is not all his ground. So we must say that ר' יוחנן holds he owns only ארבע אמות around it. This is like ר' יוחנן says on page 81 when he buys three trees he owns תחתיהם וביניהם וחוצה להם כמלוא אורה וסלו everything under and  the length of  plowing around them which is ארבע אמות. So now it only matters that ארבע אמות around the tree belong to him and that is enough to bring first fruits. [Of course within ארבע אמות of the boundary will still be a problem, and that is why I have to add that to ר' יוחנן קניין פירות כקניין הגוף גמי] This is all to explain that עולא means he is a thief on the fruits. But then רב שך changes his mind and notes that the explanation of עולא can in fact hold that the fruit really is owned by the owner of the tree, but he is still a thief because he owns  the roots of the tree all around the tree up until שש עשרה אמות. And that שש עשרה אמות is now sticking into the field of his neighbor. So he is still a thief because of the roots of his tree are bring nourishment to the fruits 

I might mention also that רבינו חננאל might be thinking in terms of damages.  Thus he would say that when עולא said, "He can not bring first fruits because he is a thief," that means the prohibition of damages comes from the prohibition of theft. For after all ר' יוסי  never said anything about ownership, but rather that one can plant next to the boundary of his neighbor.

חשבתי על הגמרא בדרך לים ובחזרה, בבא בתרא דף כ''ו ודף פ''א כ"ו. יש ויכוח בין תוספות לר' חננאל על הסיבה לעולא. שם אמר עולא שאם יש לאחד עץ בתוך שש עשרה אמות מהשדה של שכנו, הוא לא יכול להביא ביכורים למקדש. [החוק לגבי ביכורים הוא שהוא מביא אותם אל המקדש ונותן אותם לכהן.]
תוספות אומר שהסיבה היא שזה לא מספיק שיש לשיעבוד (זכות חוקית) להשתמש בקרקע, אלא בגלל שהוא צריך להחזיק בקרקע. זה חייב להיות אני חושב שעולא מחזיק כמו ריש לקיש שקניין פירות לאו כקניין הגוף דמי (הבעלות על הפירות אינה כמו בעלות על הקרקע). ולכן ר' יוחנן אומר גם אם יש לו עץ ממש ליד הגבול, הוא עדיין מביא ביכורים כי על מנת כן הנחיל יהושע את הארץ. אבל זה לבד לא יספיק כדי להיחשב לבעלות על הקרקע. כל מה שיהושע עשה היה לומר שלאנשים יש זכות לשתול בכל מקום ברכושם, אפילו עד הגבול ממש עם שכנם. אבל זה לא יספיק כדי להיחשב כאילו הם בעלי הקרקע אלא אם כן יש לך דין אחר של ר' יוחנן: קניין פירות כקניין הגוף דמי

בבא בתרא דף כ''ו. לגבי איך רב שך מסביר את הנושא לפי רבינו חננאל אני רוצה לומר כמה נקודות. אז מה שאני הולך לדבר עליו יהיה במצב שונה מתוספות. עכשיו ר' יוחנן מחזיק כשאדם קונה עץ עם האדמה שלו, הוא יחזיק רק ארבע אמות סביבו. זו הסיבה שרבינו חננאל אומר שהחוק אינו דומה לעולא. כי עולא לא אומר דבר על בעלות וגם ר' יוחנן לא אומר כאן בפרק ב' של בבא בתרא. אבל כל העניין של רבינו חננאל הוא שהקרקע חייבת להיות שייכת לבעל העץ כדי להביא ביכורים ואם העץ הזה עדיין בתוך שש עשרה אמות מהגבול, עדיין לא כל הקרקע שלו. אז אנחנו חייבים לומר שר' יוחנן מחזיק ברשותו של בעל העץ רק ארבע אמות סביבו. זה כמו שאומר ר' יוחנן בעמוד 81 כשהוא קונה שלשה עצים שבבעלותו תחתיהם וביניהם וחוצה להם כמלוא אורה וסלו [הכל מתחת ואורך החריש סביבם שהוא ארבע אמות]. אז עכשיו רק ארבע אמות מסביב לעץ שייכים לו וזה מספיק כדי להביא ביכורים. [כמובן שבתוך ארבע אמות מהגבול עדיין תהיה בעיה, ולכן אני צריך להוסיף את זה לר' יוחנן קניין פירות כקניין הגוף גמי.] זה הכל כדי להסביר שעולא אומר שהוא גנב על הפירות. אבל אז רב שך משנה את דעתו ומציין שההסבר של עולא יכול למעשה לקבוע שהפירות באמת בבעלותו של בעל העץ, אבל הוא עדיין גנב כי הוא הבעלים של שורשי העץ מסביב לעץ עד שש עשרה אמות. ושש עשרה אמות האלה נכנסות עכשיו לשדה של שכנו. אז הוא עדיין גנב בגלל שורשי העץ שלו מביאים הזנה לפירות

אציין גם שרבינו חננאל אולי חושב במונחים של נזקים. כך היה אומר שכאשר אמר עולא "אינו יכול להביא ביכורים כיון שהוא גנב", משמע איסור הנזק בא מאיסור גניבה. כי אחרי הכל ר' יוסי מעולם לא אמר דבר על בעלות, אלא שאפשר לשתול ליד גבול שכנו.

 It is an important fact that in the book of Job, we find that Job  doesn't say that God is right. Rather says that we do not understand God. It is his friends that stick  up for God . They say God does not send punishment to a righteous man,   They say everything that the religious say. And GOD at the end of the book says they are wrong.  It says in Isaiah God creates evil. Rather, God's ways are not subject to human understanding.  בורא רעה. This is changed in the first  blessing of the Shema to "He creates everything." But in the Prophet it says openly "He creates Evil."

This sounds like blasphemy. However God in the Book of Job says it was the friends of Job that were saying blasphemy by saying God does not punish the righteous. 

But the friends of Job had good intensions to stick up for God, instead of sticking up for their friend, Job. Still, God did not want or need their good intensions. Rather He said that they sinned, and that Job should pray for them to be forgiven. To Job himself he simply said that Job does not understand.

It is hard to know why God, who is totally good should create evil. But that refers back to an older problem -How do sperate events stem from God who is a Divine Simplicity, a Undifferentiated Unity. He is not made of Separate ingredients, 

We do not know. These issues are in the realm of the "dinge an sich"-things in themselves-where even te most pure Reason can not enter