There is a sort of question on the whole principle of democracy. It is this Stalin was mourned by the entire USSR at his passing.  If almost in every home there had been one person arrested and sent off into the darkness of the night by the NKVD, then why did people mourn at his passing? You would imagine they would have rejoiced. The reason is that people opinions have no relationship with truth.

Whom so ever controls the press and popular media controls people's opinions. And who controls the newspapers and TV do not have any particular dibs on truth--that is knowledge of the way things really are.

 Learning in depth is the major idea of Litvak yeshivot. The three great Litvak yeshivot in NY were known for this. Chaim Berlin, Mir, Torah VeDaat. Also in Israel there is Ponovitch. But I heard today someone had claimed that in depth learning is not possible without broad learning--bekiut. I can not agree. I think in depth learning depends on one's mind, or on having a learning partner with that kind of mind. I saw this when I was learning with my learning partner in Uman, David Bronson. He would almost effortlessly see the depths in Tosphot without blinking an eyelash. This had nothing to do with bekiut -- since, in fact, he had not gone through most of Shas by that point. It was all simply being able to see the depths of the Gemara and Tosphot. 

So what does that mean for someone like me? Well, it means if seeing this sort of depth in Gemara and Tosphot does not come so naturally, we must spend much more time on review. 

I admit, I was never able get to this sort of depth while in Shar Yashuv, nor in the Mir. This is the case even though I was exposed to this sort of very depth learning in both places. [I was in the classes of Rav Shmuel Berenbaum and the other roshei yeshiva], I simply never got the idea. [For myself I simply learned the Tosphot, Maharsha, Pnei Yehoshua and other achronim.] Only later, when I was learning with David Bronson (and saw this sort of depth come naturally to him) did I begin to see the idea. You can see this sort of thing in my little booklet on Shas [which has some accounts of David's approach but also after learning with him and sort of getting the idea --my own expansion of that kind of depth.] Here:    Or better yet look at Rav Chaim of Brisk's Chidushei HaRambam or Rav Shach's Avi Ezri.

[The point is in Torah : to get it right is the main thing.  

 The whole situation with the Bolsheviks is hard to judge. But after being in Iskara Lenina Street in Uman for some time the owner revealed to me the source of the long underground tunnel that stretched  from the river [where the house was] to the main street. That was about a mile of digging through the ground in Uman.   That tunnel  had been dug by the Jewish family that had owned that home during the time of Nicholas II. In other words--those pogroms were no joke. That Jewish family was terrified for their lives. They needed an escape route in case [or rather "when"] they were attacked at night. [I actually know exactly what that means. So while communism in the West seems like a terrible mistake, --I can see how it was important in the USSR. I can not really explain this except to say that a proper form of government seems to depend a lot on the DNA of the people. No one is equal to any other person. All men were created unequal. Some are bandits. Some are liars. Some are saints. To create some sort of safety and stability in those areas around Russia, it is clear that only the Bolsheviks were capable of doing so. Nicholas II while having certainly good intensions, still was sending millions to die in WWI for  some reason that no one can figure out until this very day. Was there some military objective? If so what was it? No one knows.

Southern States

 For a thought experiment: let's say the Southern States had decided the day after they signed the Constitution to secede from the Union? That is the very next day? Would that have been a rebellion? Would that have required Federal troops to come in and enforce them to return to the Union? It seems not. After all it was a voluntary agreement. There was no clause in it that it was perpetual.  So forget the next day. Maybe ten years down the road? Or twenty? Could there have been a  grace period? Or maybe the best idea was not to be stubborn about it and let the South find its own way and perhaps return to the Union in a few years. After all the terms of union had already changed. The Articles of Confederation of 1781 were the first set of agreements. 

The articles of Confederation actually said that that document was perpetual. Articles 13. Not the Constitution. So should the Second Congress have been thought to be traitors to the first agreement?

Should perhaps all the states have invaded and wiped out each other for being traitors to the first agreement? That seems unlikely.

And from the standpoint of objective morality : it is hard to see the preservation of the Union has a greater prima facie value than: "Thou Shalt Not Kill."

However I can see the greatness of the USA and I feel like Allan Bloom wrote that the USA is one of the wonders of the world. I am glad that there is the Union.

רמב''ם in הלכות סוטה פרק א' הלכה ג

Introduction. The Gemara in Nida page2 brings one law that a mikve that is lacking the right volume all pure things made on it are unclean. It asks from a different statement that a barrel that is used as tithe and was found to be vinegar--all the tevel [un-tithed wine] before three days is all in doubt. The Gemara answer The first statement is the sages. The second is R Shimon. So how can the Rambam decide the law like both when there is  a clear contradiction?

  The way רב שך explains a difficult רמב''ם in הלכות סוטה פרק א' הלכה ג' is this. There is the case of מקוה lacking ארבעים סאה. All unclean. And a barrel for מעשר found to be vinegar. That is a doubt. So רב שך says both come from the same law of two חזקות against one תרתי לריעותא. . The point being that twoחזקות against one is thought to be a doubt. This idea would explain the רמב''ם perfectly. But as for the גמרא it does not seem to fit very well. Look at רב שך explanation of the first answer of the גמרא נידה דף ב' ע''ב and the secondמ= תירוץ. This answer of רב שך says that that רמב''ם borrowed part of the first explanation with part of the second to come up with a third explanation to explain the רמב''ם. Look there at רב שך on הלכות סוטה פרק א' הלכה ג' and you will see that  idea of רב שך certainly fits the רמב''ם perfectly, but the question is how does that for with the גמרא? There is the fact that the רמב''ם is פוסק like the מקוה and the חבית. One very good idea to explain this is that both come from the idea that two חזקות are thought to be  a doubt תרתי לריעותא. But when the גמרא itself wants to answer this contradiction it comes up with two totally different explanations. נידה דף ב' ע''ב. 

הדרך בה רב שך מסביר רמב''ם קשה בהלכות סוטה פרק א 'הלכה ג' היא זו. יש מקרה של מקוה חסר ארבעים סאה. כולם טמאים. חבית למעשר שנמצא כחומץ. זהו ספק. אז רב שך אומר ששניהם באים מאותו חוק של שני חזקות כנגד אחת [תרתי לריעותא] . הנקודה היא שתי חזקות כנגד אחת נחשבות לספק. רעיון זה יסביר את הרמב''ם בצורה מושלמת. אבל לגבי הגמרא זה לא נראה מתאים מאוד. עיין בהסבר של רב שך על התשובה הראשונה של גמרא נידה דף ב 'ע''ב   ותירוץ השני. תשובה זו של רב שך אומרת כי רמב''ם לווה חלק מההסבר הראשון עם חלק מהשני כדי להגיע להסבר שלישי כדי להסביר את הרמב''ם. תסתכל שם על רב שך על הלכות סוטה פרק א' הלכה ג' ותראה שהרעיון של רב שך בהחלט מתאים לרמב''ם בצורה מושלמת, אבל השאלה היא איך זה מתאים לגמרא? יש את העובדה שהרמב''ם הוא פוסק שווה במקוה והחבית. רעיון טוב מאוד להסביר זאת הוא ששניהם נובעים מהרעיון ששני חזקות נחשבות ספק (תרתי לריעותא). אך כאשר הגמרא עצמה רוצה לענות על סתירה זו היא מגיעה עם שני הסברים שונים לחלוטין. נידה דף ב 'ע''ב

To answer this let me say that first of all if the Gemara had been thinking like the Rambam it would have had a simple and easy answer for the contradiction between the mikve and the barrel. It could have said when it says a mikve that was measured and found lacking, all the pure things made on it are unclean" means they are in doubt. Just like the barrel. and there would not have been any contradiction in the first place. So what I think is that when the Rambam brings that idea of the mikve that all the pure things made on it are unclean he mean when there is a hazaka purity from the beginning. Therefore it is a case of doubt. There is a hezkat hashta -that the mikve does not have the right volume against a hazaka of pure things. But the Gemara was explaining that statement about the mikve to mean there is  no doubt for example in such a case where there is no original hazaka of purity on the mikve or the pure things. it is not an argument between the gemara and the rambam. rather the gemara understands the statement about mikve to refer to one case and the rambam is quoting the same statement but he means it to refer to a different case. But there is no argument in law. If you have two hazakot against one that would be a doubt. But if you have one hazaka against nothing or two against nothing that is a case of no doubt._______________________________________________________________________

To answer this let me say that first of all if the גמרא had been thinking like the רמב''ם it would have had a simple and easy answer for the contradiction between the מקוה and the הבית. It could have said when it says a מקוה שנמדד ונמצא חסר כל טהרות שעשו על גביו טמאות means הטהרות are in doubt. Just like the חבית. And there would not have been any contradiction in the first place. So what I think is that when the רמב''ם brings that idea of the מקוה that all the pure things made on it are unclean מקווה שנמדד ונמצא חסר כל טהרות שעשו על גביו טמאות he מכוון when there is a חזקה purity from the beginning. Therefore it is a case of doubt. There is a חזקת השתא that the מקוה does not have the right volume against a חזקה of pure things. But the גמרא was explaining that statement about the מקוה to mean there is  no doubt for example in such a case where there is no original חזקה of טהרה on the מקוה or the pure things. It is not an argument between the גמרא and the רמב''ם. rather the גמרא understands the statement about מקוה to refer to one case and the רמב''ם is quoting the same statement, but he means it to refer to a different case. But there is no argument in law. If you have two חזקות against one that would be a doubt. But if you have one חזקה against nothing, or two against nothing, that is a case of no doubt. חזקה כנגד כלום היא וודאי. שתי חזקות כגד אחת  גורמת ספק

יש כאן קשר ל חידושי הש''ס

Robert E Lee was about to be indicted for treason. Yet he refused to accept an offer to go to a stronghold with men that would have provided a safe haven.

 After the Civil War, Robert E. Lee was about to be indicted for treason. Yet he refused to accept an offer to go to a stronghold with men that would have provided a safe haven. Besides that, there was an offer from the president of Mexico to accept anyone who needed sanctuary. [Plus offers to go to England to live in a palace and all expenses paid for life.--] Robert E. Lee also did not accept that, nor recommend it to anyone. His idea was, "We are now all American citizens." How does one explain this? It must be he thought there was something unique about the Constitution of the USA, and its system that was an aspect of objective morality. That is some example for all mankind how to live in a just and equitable system. 

He also wanted to provide an example to all people of the South to submit to Federal authority, -even at the cost of his life. He really ought to be considered up here with  Socrates with  the greats of world history. Socrates also would not rebel against Athenian authority even at the cost of his life. And even if you hold that he was on the wrong side of the fence politically speaking--well Socrates also was a Karl Popper shows at great length in his The Open Society and its Enemies 

Rambam in Laws of Sota perek I. Law 3

 The way Rav Shach explains a difficult Rambam in Laws of Sota perek I. Law 3 is this. There is the case of  mikve lacking 40 seah. All unclean. And a barrel for maasar found to be vinegar. That is a doubt. So Rav Shach says both come from the same law of two hazakot against one. The point being that two hazakot against one is thought to be a doubt. This idea would explain the Rambam perfectly. But as for the gemara it does not seem to fit very well. Look at Rav Shach explanation of the first answer of the Gemara in Nida page 3 and the second. This answer of Rav Shach says that that Rambam borrowed part of the first explanation with part of the second to come up with a third explanation to explain the Rambam.

I do not have energy to write out the whole subject. Just look there at Rav Shach on Sota I:3 and you will see what I mean that the end of that idea of Rav Shach certainly fits the Rambam perfectly but the question is how does that for with the Gemara? There is the fact that the Rambam is posek like the mikve and the barrel. One very good idea to explain this is that both come from the idea that two hazakot are thought to be  a doubt. But when the Gemara itself wants to answer this contradiction it comes up with two totally different explanations. Nida page 2 side b. This has bothered me for weeks. I  van not see any answer when I look at Rav Shach. But on the way to the sea and back I ponder this question and hope that someday I may understand what Rav Shach is saying.