ketuboth page 18 and 19. Rambam laws of loans

I think the Rambam explains a doc of confidence or conscience that it is simply a lie, and therefore the witnesses that say'' this is our signature but it was fictious' are not believed. that is the Rambam understands that they are not believed because they are now testifying that they testified to a lie and therefore nothing they say can be believed. the doc itself is not validated, nor invalidated. The Gemara itself mentions the court might find another document with their signature and validate it by that. This approach suits the Rambam well. Reb Aaron Kotler brings Tosphot that holds a different reason they are not believed when they say the doc was fictious there was an oral understanding about it and that there was in fact no loan. Tosphot holds the reason they are not believed is that they admit the document was written according to law. Reb Aaron brings some explanations about Tosphot, but he decided the intension of Tosfot is based on Tosfot (pg. 18) that it is a migo in place of witnesses. That is the witnesses on the doc are considered separately from the two witnesses that now testify about that signature. Reb Aaron also shows that the ''I might have thought'' is a migo., not a case of the same witnesses that affirm also deny.----------------------------------------I think the רמב’’ם explains a שטר of אמנה or מודעא that it is simply a lie, and therefore the witnesses that say, "This is our signature, but it was fictious" are not believed. That is, the רמב’’ם understands that they are not believed because they are now testifying that they testified to a lie, and therefore nothing they say can be believed. The שטר itself is not validated, nor invalidated. The גמרא itself mentions the court might find another document with their signature, and validate it by that. This approach suits the רמב’’ם well. ר' אהרון קוטלר brings תוספות that holds a different reason they are not believed when they say the שטר was fictious )there was an oral understanding about it, and that there was in fact no loan(. תוספות holds the reason they are not believed is that they admit the שטר was written according to כהלכתא. NOW ,רב אהרן brings some explanations about תוספות, but he decided the intension of תוספות is based on תוספות (דף י''ח) that it is a מיגו in place of witnesses. That is the witnesses on the שטר are considered separately from the two witnesses that now testify about that signature. ר' אהרן also shows that the הווא אמינא is a מיגו, not a case of the הפה שהיתר הוא הפה שאוסר.

zb14 E minor midi file zb14 nwc file

יש חוק בגמרא כתובות בדף י''ט ע''ב. חוק זה הוא מרב נחמן שאמר שעדים שאומרים על שטר בחתימתם שזה היה שטר של אמנה או של מודעה (כלומר, בדיוני) אינם נאמנים, והשטר נחשב תקף למרות דבריהם המאוחרים יותר. עם זאת, אנו יודעים מהמשנה שאם הם אומרים שהם היו ילדים או שהם חתמו באונס, הם נאמנים. אבל, בחוק אחר, אנו מוצאים שאפשר לכתוב שטר עבור לווה למרות שהמלווה אינו עמו אם באותו שטר כתובה רכישה באמצעות מטפחת (קניין סודר, היינו קניין חליפין). כתבתי פעם אחת ברעיונותיי בבבא מציעא שלא היה לי ברור אם אותו שטר אומר שיש הלוואה, (הווה), או שתהיה הלוואה, (עתיד). רב שך מציין באבי עזרי של הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק כ''ד הלכה א' ששני החוקים הנ"ל סותרים זה את זה. [במקרה אחד, אתה אומר שהם יכולים לכתוב שטר בדיוני. במקרה השני, אתה אומר שלא מאמינים להם כשהם אומרים שהם חתמו על אחד כזה.] מבחינתי, העובדה שהרמב"ם מביא את שני הדינים מראה בבירור שהרמב"ם מחזיק בחוק שאפשר לכתוב שטר עבור לווה למרות שהמלווה אינו איתו, פירושו שהשטר אומר שתהיה הלוואה בזמן עתיד, או שזה אומר שלמעשה כבר הייתה הלוואה בפועל (בעבר) ושבמציאות הייתה הלוואה

There is a law in the Gemara Ketuboth on page 19B and brought in the Rambam from Rav Nachman who said is that witnesses that say about a document with their signature that it was a document of “faith” or of “knowledge” (i.e., fictious) that they are not believed, and the doc is considered valid in spite of their later statement. However, we know from the Mishna that if they say they were children or that they signed by force, they are believed. But in a different law, we find that one can write a document for a borrower even though the lender is not with him if that document has a acquisition by handkerchief written in it. I already wrote once in my ideas in Bava Metzia that it was unclear to me if that document says there is a loan, (present tense), or there will be a loan, (future tense). Rav Shach points out in the Avi Ezri laws of loans 24 law one that the above two laws contradict each other and not cannot both coexist. [in one case you say they can write a fictious doc. In the other case you say they are not believed when they say they signed on one.] To me the fact that the Rambam brings both laws shows clearly that the Rambam holds the law that one can write a document for a borrower even though the lender is not with him means the doc says there will be a loan future tense, or that it means that in fact there already was a loan in fact (past tense) and that in reality there was a loan.-------------------There is a law in גמרא כתובותon page י''ט ע''ב from רב נחמן who said is that witnesses that say about a שטר with their signature that it was a שטר of אמנה or of מודעא (i.e., fictious) that they are not believed, and the שטר is considered valid in spite of their later statement. However, we know from the משנה that if they say they were children or that they signed by force, they are believed. But, in a different law, we find that one can write a שטר for a borrower even though the lender is not with him if that שטר has an acquisition by handkerchief written in it. I already wrote once in my ideas in בבא מציעא that it was unclear to me if that שטר says there is a loan, (present tense), or there will be a loan, (future tense). רב שך points out in the אבי עזרי laws of loans כ''ד law א' that the above two laws contradict each other, and not cannot both coexist. [In one case, you say they can write a fictious שטר. In the other case, you say they are not believed when they say they signed on one.] To me the fact that the רמב’’ם brings both laws shows clearly that the רמב’’ם holds the law that one can write a שטר for a borrower even though the lender is not with him means the שטר says there will be a loan future tense, or that it means that in fact there already was a loan in fact (past tense) and that in reality there was a loan.

בבא מציעא ט''ו ע''א. רמב"ם הלכות הלוואות כ''א, חוק י'

המקרה הוא שיש הלוואה והלווה מכר את אדמתו לקונה לאחר ההלוואה. במקרה של חדלות פירעון בהלוואה, המלווה יכול לקחת את הנכס. אבל האם הוא משלם את הוצאות הקונה, את הזמן, המאמץ והכסף שהשקיע כדי לשפר את הנכס? עבור הרי"ף התשובה היא לא. עבור רבינו חננאל התשובה היא "כן". רב נחום מהמיר סבור שהמקרה ברמב"ם הלכות הלוואות כ''א, חוק י' דומה לרי"ף מכיוון שהמקרה הוא של אפותיקי (נכס שהוקצה לתשלום ההלוואה) והרווחים קטנים מההוצאות, והמלווה משלם רק את סכום הרווחים לקונה, אבל אני לא רואה את זה ככה. אני חושב שהמלווה עדיין משלם את ההוצאות, אבל רק פחות מהסכום המלא, ולכן זה לא כמו הרי"ף. חוץ מזה, רב שך גורס שהרמב''ם גורס כמו רבינו חננאל שהמלווה אכן משלם את הוצאות הקונה

The case is there is a loan and the borrower sold his land to a buyer after the loan. In case of default on the loan, the lender can take that property. But does he pay the expenses of the buyer, the time effort and money he spent to improve that property? To the Rif the answer is no. To R Chananel the answer is yes. Rav Nachum of the Mir thinks that the case in Rambam laws of loans 21, law 10 is like the Rif because the case is that of an apotiki (property set aside to pay for the loan) and the profits are less than the expenses, and the lender only pays the amount of the profits to the buyer, but I do not see it this way. I think the lender is still paying the expenses, but just less than the full amount, and so it is not like the Rif. Besides that, Rav Shach also holds that the Rambam holds like R. Chananel that the lender does pay the expenses of the buyer.-------------------------------The case is there is a loan and the borrower sold his land to a buyer after the loan. In case of default on the loan, the lender can take that property. But does he pay the expenses of the buyer, the time effort and money he spent to improve that property? To the רי''ף the answer is no. To רבינו חננאל the answer is "yes." רב נחום of the מיר thinks that the case in רמב''ם laws of loans 21, law 10 is like the Rif because the case is that of an אפותיקי(property set aside to pay for the loan) and the profits are less than the expenses, and the lender only pays the amount of the profits to the buyer, but I do not see it this way. I think the lender is still paying the expenses, but just less than the full amount, and so it is not like the רי''ף. Besides that, רב שך also holds that the רמב''ם holds like רבינו חננאל that the lender does pay the expenses of the buyer.

I think the Schrodinger equation has a certain insight in it about the nature of time. after all the first part of the equation is change in time. the second part is the total energy. and the equation says they are equal. so, if we look at the wave function psi of the universe, we see change in time can only happen because of the energy of the universe. --and visa versa. I mean to say that when we see an object moving, we say it has moment of inertia. Something is keeping it moving, and that is is momentum. And we know from relativity that space itself (though not matter) is a thing that can flow and move. The Einstein equation says the curvature of space equals its energy. Well the Schrodinger equation tells us the same thing about time. [The partial of the wave funtion with respect to time equals the energy]-For clarification let me mention that I am thinking of the wave function to be the wave function of the whole universe. thus, the partial derivative of the psi of the universe with respect to time equals the kinetic and potential energy of the universe. So, time changes only because the universe has energy. [I know this sounds deterministic, but after all that is what the Schrodinger equation says. I am not asking how it relates to Heisenberg.]