Issues of the best type of government are not the same kinds of issues that come up in the Gemara.

Issues of government were not even relevant during the events of ancient Israel. For  along time there were no kings at all and when Israel asked for a king the prophet Samuel made a point to show that God's anger was kindled against Israel.

During the rule of kings government also was not relevant since the kings rule was directly towards protection from outside enemies, not internal issues. 

During the second Temple period Israel was under Persian rule for the first part. Then later, there was the Syrians [part of the empire of Alexander] and then the  descendents of the Maccabees and later the rule of Rome.
[The kings of the Maccabees were not so great. See Kidushin in chapter 3. Yanai [One king of the Maccabees] came back from a battle and wanted to celebrate. There were there wise men of Israel. One person there [the joker] told him the heart of the wise is not with you. How can I tell he asked? Put on the Urim and Tumim and test them. He did so and decided in fact they were against him. The joker said, "Murder them." The king asked תורה מה תהא עליה? What will happen with Torah? The joker said it is available for anyone who want to learn it. [He forgot about the Oral Law] So the king killed all the wise men of Israel



Gemara does not deal with issue of how to make a just government anywhere.

In the world of the religious it is assumed with no evidence that they ought to be in charge of everyone.--Yet there is no indication that that would be  a just or fair kind of rule.

It simply foes with unfounded assumption that the religious are examples of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue. --All the available evidence seems to indicate the exact opposite.

The reason this is relevant is that there are great paces that learn and try to keep Torah on the highest possible level like the Mir in NY or Ponovitch or Brisk in Israel. (Litvak yeshivas--i.e. Lithuanian types that are based on the Gra and Rav Israel Salanter to some degree) But these kinds of places are in general not interested in political power.

Just to be clear..I feel questions about how to create the most just kind of society are mainly answered in the Federalist papers by Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.


Another aspect of this issue is that it is natural for people to look for a just group to be a part of. This is why people join the religious world in the first place. That sadly is not that much different than people joining Scientology of some eastern ashram for the same reasons. The trouble is that usually the expectations are not fulfilled and there is a great deal of exploitation --plus the groups are dishonest in terms of representing a false picture of what the essential core beliefs are.

Best type of government is not at all dealt with in the Gemara and this leaves me in doubt why the religious in Israel believe they ought to be in charge of government. From what I can see the Federalist papers are right that certain principles of government have been found over the ages to be effective and workable and bring about as much as possible a fair and decent society.  Republican government [not Democracy], separation of powers, protection of private property etc. None of which the religious care about.
 

I might mention that in UMAN most people regretted the  fall of the USSR because as they told me, things were better then.  i can not explain this but at least as far as uman goes that was the consensus of about 99 %  of the population. 

New Idea. Gemara in Kidushin 64 Bava Batra 134b This is what I believe to be a very good new idea. I have not had a lot of these recently but this one looks good.

I had a chance [thank God] to take a look at the Gemara in Kidushin 64 yesterday and gained a bit of clarity about the issue. In short I would like to suggest an answer to the question of R Akiva Eiger on Bava Batra 134b--but I also want to add that this answer only goes according to one answer of Tosphot on Kidushin 64b.
The Mishna in Bava Batra says one says I have a son is believed. I have a brother is not. [So his wife is permitted to the whole world when he dies and is not obligated to marry his brother--if he dies without children.]

במשנה בבא בתרא קלד: מובא את הדין האומר יש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה כזו. היא עונה המשנה כאן היא כשיש חזקה שיש אח. רע''א שואל לא רק חזקה אלא גם אם יש עדות שיש אח היא צריכה להיות מותרת לשוק בגלל הדין כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן. נראה לי לתרץ שאם הייתה עדות שיש אח היא לא הייתה מותרת לשוק לפי דעת ר' נתן  והגמרא רוצה שהמשנה כאן תהיה גם לפי דעת ר' נתן. אבל התירוץ הזה עובד רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד:. הגמרא שם מביאה את הדין כמו כאן ושואלת שכנראה  המשנה אינו כמו ר' נתן שמובא עוד לימוד הואמר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן  ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר  אין לו בן או בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר יש לו אח ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר הוא נאמן להתיר  ולא לאסור  ור' נתן אומר גם לאסור הוא נאמן. אביי עונה המשנה היא כשאין חזקה של אח או בן  והלימוד האחר הוא כשיש חזקה של אח אבל לא ידוע שום מידע על בן. הסיבה של ר' יהודה הנשיא היא שדבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן דין של עדות שמבטל את החזקה. לכן היא מותרת. לדעת ר' נתן דבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן את הדין של חזקה. לכן החזקה הזאת אינה יותר מועילה  מן חזקת אח.
ונראה שהגמרא בבא בתרא גם מחזיקה שהדין של המשנה שם גם היא לפי דעת ר' נתן ולכן המצב הוא שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן ולכן היא מותרת. אבל התירוץ הזה הולך רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד" שבמצב שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן הוא נאמן. ולפי הדעת האחרת שם בתוספות אין לי תירוץ על הקושיא של רע''א.







The Gemara [Talmud] there asks why do we need this mishna when we learn the same thing in Kidushin? Answer. This mishna is when there is a Hazaka [prior status] that there is a brother.

R Akiva Eiger asks even if there would be witnesses that there is a brother he ought to be believed that he has a son as the very next section of the Gemara makes clear that if he says I divorced my wife he also is believed to make her permitted.[Not require Yibum--to marry his brother.]

The answer I think is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that the mishna can also go according to R Nathan--who would hold with Hazaka but not if there were witnesses.

The Gemara in Kidushin  brings the same idea of the mishna and then asks that it does not seem to be like R Nathan. For we learn in another teaching: One says I have a son when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. Or he says I have no brother when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. R Yehuda HaNasi says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also to forbid he is believed.

Abyee says our mishna can also be like R Nathan because the mishna here in kidushin is when there is no hazaka of a brother or a son. In the other teaching there is a hazaka that there is a brother but we know nothing about a son. So in case of the other teaching the reason R Yehuda permits is that the words he says at the time he gets married have a category of  witnesses which is stronger that hazaka that he has a brother.] R Nathan hold what he says at the time he gets married has only the category of another hazaka.

So what one can answer to R Akiva Eiger is the case in Bava Batra is there is a hazaka of a brother but he also says he has a son and those words also have the category of a hazaka. But if there were witnesses that he has a brother it would be a hazaka against witnesses and that would not be enough.

But in Kidushin in the end of Tosphot there is a debate about this exact issue. To one opinion there in such a case he would be believed that he has a son and in the other opinion he would not be believed. So to that second opinion my answer here would not work.

problem of Change, Faith and Reason, -the Mind Body problem.

Philosophy started with the problem of Change. (How is change possible? What is, is. What is not, is not. Parmenides) That led up to Plato and Aristotle. Then that puttered down until Plotinus made his synthesis between Plato and Aristotle [Neo Platonism]. Then the Middles Ages were about the possibility and way to combine faith with reason. Then a new thing started with Descartes --the Mind Body problem. That led up until Kant and Hegel. Now we are in a post Kant era. What comes next is any one's guess. [But my feeling is that these questions are all connected. The development is not random]

There were some great thinkers after Kant and Hegel, but great in terms of commentary.

The people after Kant that seems to me to have great value are, Kelley Ross {Friesian School}, McTaggart, Huemer, Steven Dutch, Habermas. and Maverick Philosopher

Sometimes it seems to me the best thing about some thinkers like Kelley Ross or Habermas is when they evaluate other philosophers. Like Habermas' critique on Rawls' Theory of Justice. Or Huemer's Why I am not an Objectivist


I want to add that the issue of faith and reason started early with Philo but really picked up with the debate between Christians and Muslims. The whole issue really reached its climax with Aquinas. Then also puttered out until Descartes.

country of Jewish Law and insane religious fanatics

In Israel at present it looks that the issue of a country of Jewish Law is becoming a big issue in the coming elections. From practical experience I can say confidently that such a state of affairs would be  a disaster. This is in fact in spite of the greatness of personal keeping of the laws of the Torah. But to give power to the insane religious fanatics that control the interpretation of Jewish law would be a horrible nightmare.


[The issue seem to be that the middle and slightly left wing think that Prime Minister Netanyahu is on course to give power to the insane religious parties. That is my impression]

The issue on one hand would be freedom. And that is an issue.But the more important issue is that idea of Rav Nahman of Torah Scholars that are demons in his LeM vol I ch 12 and chapter 28.

[But the issue is brought up many other times in the books of Rav Nahman. For example in the very last Torah lesson of his life in LeM vol II ch. 8 the same issue is brought in terms of religious leaders that are liars. מנהיג של שקר


It is hard to put this into a larger context because you do find in Eastern Religions cults like Adi Da and even secular cults. But the problem in the Jewish world with the religious seems to be a bit different. It is a certain kind of kelipa [evil force] that has some kind of similarity with other kinds of evil forces, but still has it own unique characteristics.

Even more there is great doubt about how much good yeshivas do. After the fact that the Gra's signature on the letter of excommunication is ignored, the Sitra Achra [Realm of Evil] basically has a foothold in every yeshiva. Even the best. [My feeling is that the excommunication did not apply to Rav Nahman and that is why I quote him.This is based on my reading of the original documents that were printed up in a book I saw a few years ago.]

My own experience with even the best of the yeshivas has proved to me that the whole enterprise has limited benefit.

[Of curse the issue of freedom is a big issue. Wanting the means is the same as wanting the goal. If the religious want to impose their world view that would be to murder and enslave everyone that does anything they do not like, And they do not like a lot of stuff. And wanting to give them power means to wanting their goals. Their goals are not innocent]


Torah is important but something went way off in the religious world.

Bava Batra 134b. Kidushin 64b.

You have to say the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking there is a hazaka for a brother and still she is permitted to marry (without yibum or halitza) because he is also saying he has a son. This is because in Kidushin the whole difference between the Mishna and the Braita over there is when there is a hazaka that there is a brother. The Gemara over in Kidushin clearly say that is the only difference and that is the reason R Nathan forbids her. So then what do you do with the Mishna in Bava Batara that is the exact same law? You have to say in Bava Batra he is also saying he has a son.

[I did not get a chance to do any learning today but it occurs to me that this might be the very reason the Ramban (Nahmanides) is disagreeing with the approach of the Baal Hameor and Rashi.

Besides one other reason he gives that כיוון שהגיד שוב אינו מגיד. [Once he says something and believed he is no longer believed to change his mind. But besides that I can imagine the Ramban (Nahmanides) also is thinking that it makes no sense to  put in an extra condition in the Mishna in Bava Batra--especially when over there it is clearly divided into two case. One when he says he has  a son and the other when he claim to have  a brother.

Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [

I had a few minutes to look at the Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [One of the major poskim (people that wrote on the Talmud from the standpoint of determining the law--as different from people that wrote on it with a view to explain the difficulties) of the Middle Ages.] And I see that I need to do a lot more work on that subject there because there seems to be a debate among the rishonim how to understand that subject. You have Rashi and the Baal Hameor [Rav Zarahia HaLevi] on one side. On the other you have the Rosh and the Ramban.

Still from what I could see my answer for R. Akiva Eiger still looks valid -- at least if you look at the subject from the viewpoint of Rashi. [I might mention here that I have heard this before when I was at the Mir in NY--that often the questions of R Akiva Eiger are only to one opinion. Just switching to the other opinions will often  answer the question. So you have to assume he was asking his question according to the viewpoint of the alternative opinion. I actually had that experience once while at the Mir. In those days it was the custom for young married men to give a kind of informal class that was separate from the regular scheduled classes. I was giving such a class there and in fact discovered that a question of R Akiva Eiger in Shabat could be answered based on a Tur in the laws of festivals.]

So just to make this short: The Gemara in Bava Batra [if memory serves me correctly] asks why do you need an extra mishna to tell us if the husband says before he dies "I have a son" he is believed. If he says "I have a brother" he is not. Answer: the Mishna is telling us even when there is a Hazaka  (prior status) that there is a brother. [What this seems to mean (at least the way Rashi and the Baal HaMeor understand it) is that he says also I have a son. So when he says "I have brother" and there is also a Hazaka (prior status) that there is a brother she is still permitted to marry someone without Yibum. [Yibum is when a woman is married and her husband dies without seed, she has to marry his brother. --or do Haliza (taking off the sandal) as mentioned in the Torah.]

R Akiva Eiger asks right there why does the gemara say a hazaka. Even with witnesses she also should be allowed to marry without Yibum.[It seems to me clear in any case that R Akiva Eiger is asking only according to the opinion of the baal Hameor since to the other opinion his question would not make sense.]
My answer is based on Kidushin 64 that wants the Mishna to be like R. Nathan not just R Yehuda Hanasi.
The point is over there in Kidushin R Nathan goes  with Hazaka (prior status) if he says "I have a brother" to believe him to make her forbidden to remarry without yibum. But if he also says I have a son she is permitted. But my point is that if there would be more than a Hazaka but also witnesses, then R Nathan would say no.--and forbid her unless there was some evidence that there is a son.

And just by taking a quick look at Rashi and the Rosh today I saw that this answer is very clear in Rashi since Rashi says that if a brother would come later and say that he is the brother then he would not be believed. But from that Rashi you can see that if there would be witnesses at the time she wants to be permitted to remarry then we would need evidence that there is a son.

I also had another proof for this answer but I forgot it.

Philosophy queen of the sciences? or bankrupt?

Philosophy used to be the queen of the sciences. It has fallen to irrelevance. [As Steven Weinberg (NoblePrize Physics--for combining electromagnetism with the weak force that causes neutron decay) wrote about the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy.] [This as compared to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics]]  This is similar to large corporations that at one time hold first place and then sink into bankruptcy. [Same with England. Once the prime world power. Now an afterthought.] The situation is not so different when it comes to religion which once was thought to contain all truth. Now is simply a matter of personal preference on where to hang out.

What does this mean in a practical sense?

I mean this question also in terms of the discredited ideologies that swept through Europe and Russia in the later 1800's.


Faith and Reason was the formula that worked for the Middle Ages. And still is a working combination. Not just one or the other. But the very meaning of faith and reason can not be the same as in the Middle Ages.
[Like the Renaissance that looked towards ancient Attica [Greece] for inspiration, but went beyond that.]

Not that philosophy itself is irrelevant. It is still necessary to get an accurate idea of what is everything all about. Just philosophy as a study has undergone a systematic decay.


[Perhaps if we could all go back to basics would be best. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson. If we could just get through that material maybe we would be doing a lot better.]- See robert hanna about the vacuous twentieth century analytic philosophy.