הרמב''ן אומר שיש הוכחה קלה שתחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב אינו חל על מקרה שבו ההתחלה היא בשמירה פחותה, ואחר כך בא אונס. ההוכחה שהוא מביא בדף צ''ג בבא מציעא היא הברייתא בדף מ''ה בבא קמא ארבע באים במקום הבעלים: שואל, שוכר, שומר בתשלום ושומר ללא תשלום. אם הוזהר שור שלוש פעמים, והולך והורג מישהו, נהרג השור, ושלושת מיני השומרים משלמים כופר ומחזירים ערך השור לבעלים חוץ מהשומר ללא תשלום (שלא מחזיר כלום לבעלים של השור). הגמרא החליטה שהברייתא מתייחסת למקרה שבו כל הארבעה שמרו על השור עם שמירה מינימלית. וכן, הגמרא אומר שלפי ר' אלעזר יש לשחוט בהמה שכבר הוכחה כמסוכנת והמשנה שלנו מתייחסת למקרה כזה. מצד אחד, אני יכול להבין את הרמב''ן כי השומר שכר עשה כמות מינימלית של שמירה אבל כל השומרים היו צריכים לעשות את השמירה הראויה. כך שרק השומר ללא תשלום אינו מחויב לשלם. עם זאת, נראה שקשה להבין. הסיבה שאני אומר את זה היא שחוק ההתחלה בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב הכוונה לשומר בתשלום (שומר שכר). זה לא יכול להיות השומר חינם כי בכל מקרה הוא לא חייב במקום שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז זה חייב להתייחס לשומר בתשלום. אבל הוא חייב בברייתא אף על פי שעשה שמירה מינימלית. אז איך אתה יכול להחליט ממקרה שהוא חייב בתשלום, למרות שעשה שמירה מינימלית, למקרה שגם עשה שמירה מינימלית ובכל זאת להחליט שהוא לא חייב

The Ramban says that there is a light proof that the beginning with neglect and the end by force which is obligated in damage does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with minimal guarding, and then later cames force. The proof he brings on page 93 of Bava Metzia is the teaching on page 45 in Bava Kama, "Four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed and 3 kinds of guard pay the fixed penalty and pay back to value of the ox to the owner except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. The Gemara decided the braita is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding. Also, the gemara says that according to R. Elazar, that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered, and our mishna is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the Ramban because the paid guard did a minimal amount of guarding, but all should have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. However, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the entire law of the "beginning by by neglect and the end with force is obligated to pay" is referring to the paid guard. It cannot be the unpaid one because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the braita even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay even though he did minimal guarding to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.______________________________________________ The רמב''ן says that there is a slight proof that תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב does not apply to a case in which the beginning is with שמירה פחותה, and then later came force. The proof he brings on page צ''ג of בבא מציעא is the ברייתא on page מ''ה in בבא קמא four come in place of the owner: a borrower, renter, paid guard and an unpaid guard. If an ox has been warned three times, and goes and kills someone, the ox is killed, and the four kinds of guard pay the כופר and pay back to value of the ox to the owner. That is all three except for the unpaid guard who does not pay back. Theגמרא decided הברייתא is taking about a case where all four guarded the animal with minimal guarding שמירה פחותה . Also, theגמרא says that according to ר' אלעזר that an animal that has already proven dangerous must be slaughtered and our משנה is referring to such a case. On one hand, I can see the point of the רמב''ן because the שומר שכר did a minimal amount of guarding but all שומריםshould have done the proper amount of guarding. so only the unpaid guard is not obligated to pay. however, it seems hard to understand. The reason I say this is the law of the תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב is referring to the paid guard שומר שכר. It cannot be the שומר חינם because in any case he is not obligated where he did minimal guarding. so, it must refer to the paid guard. But he is obligated in the ברייתא even though he did minimal guarding. so how can you decide from a case where he is obligated to pay, even though he did minimal guarding, to a case where he also did minimal guarding and yet say he is not obligated.

בבא קמא דף י''ח וכ''ב עם הכלב, הכיכר והפחם.

יש כמה שאלות שאני רוצה להעלות בנושא בבא קמא דף י''ח וכ''ב עם הכלב, הכיכר והפחם. דבר אחד הוא שאותה גמרא הולכת הלוך ושוב מדוע חובת שריפת הערימה היא חצי נזק לתנא של המשנה ותשלום מלא לפי ר' אלעזר. זה מתחיל שזה בגלל צרורות, ואז הולך לקרן של שור תם (שמתפרע) (קרן התם) ברשות הניזק, וחוזר לצרורות. אבל אז בגלל שרבא יש שאלה לגבי אזהרה על צרורות (אבנים קטנות), הגמרא צריכה להסיק שהמקרה הוא של קרן התם ברשות הניזק. אז למה בהמשך דף כ''ב, מניח הגמרא שהחיוב הוא בגלל אש? אולי תרצה לענות שהחובה לא צריכה להיות בגלל אש כי הכלב הוא שעושה את זה, לא אדם. אבל אז למה אחר כך להגיד שזה בגלל אש? אולי אתה יכול להגיד שזה בגלל ריש לקיש שמחזיק בחובת האש היא על האדם שבבעלותו האש. אז אולי הפתרון לבעיה שלנו כאן הוא שבעל הכלב חייב על שביל הפחם על הערימה בגלל קרן (שור תם) (כשהכלב גרר את הפחם על הערימה), ועל שריפת הערימה שתשלם בעל הפחם? לדעת תוספות חובה משותפת לבעל הכלב ולבעל הפחם

There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject in Bava Kama page 18 and 22 with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the tana of the Mishna and full payment according to R. Elazar. It starts out that it is because of pebbles, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild), and goes back to pebbles. But then because of Rava having a question about warning on pebbles, the Gemara has to conclude that the case is in fact that of a tame ox. So then why later on page 22, the Gemara assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of Reish Lakish who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a tame ox on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal, . This I think is close to Tosphot that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal. ______________________________________________________________________________________ There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject inבבא קמא page י''ח and כ''ב with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the תנא of the משנה and full payment according to ר’ אלעזר. It starts out that it is because of צרורות, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild) קרן התם ברשות הניזק, and goes back to צרורות. But then because of רבא having a question about warning on צרורות (אבנים קטנות), the גמרא has to conclude that the case is that of a קרן התם ברשות הניזק. So then why later on page כ''ב, the גמרא assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of ריש לקיש who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a שור תם on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal. This I think is close to תוספות that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal.

My father-in-law (when he got to America) was totally penniless after being in the Russian Gulag system for years

The father of Trump gave to my father-in-law a job and a place to live when he got to America totally penniless after being in the Russian Gulag system for years. My father-in-law might have bee accepted into the Red Army (he was Jewish), but he was born into an area at the time was registered as German, so they sent him to the Gulag, while his brother (the borders had shifted) was registered a being born in Poland). In fact he was in the Red Army (and killed in the war). My father-in-law, Bill Finn [he had changed his name when he got to America. He wa finkelstein] was talented. He rose to the head worker of the work camp because of his ability to fix just about anything thtr got broke. When the war ended, he finally got to the USA, and met his future wife Rita Finn, my mother-in-law. she was born in Germany proper -Berlin, but had escaped by the Kinder-Transport to England where he received lodging with a family that was kind to take her in, but also that abused her in ways I would rather not explain. That put in her a deep hatred of men for the rest of her life, but did not stop her from marrying my father-in-law, and bearing three fine daughters. (she inserted that hatred into her daughter who became my wife. My wife was okay,-- until she was not ). I might say that my own family history is a lot less colorful. My grandparents escaped to America when they saw have things were going under the Russian czar Alexander with the pogroms and etc.…. So, my parents grew up as honest, loyal, hard-working Americans. My dad went to Cal Tech to get his degree in Mechanical Engineering, and from then on worked mostly in Aero-space, the U-2, the InfraRed Telescope for the Army,(note article in Lifw Magazine August 1954, pg 25) and in satellite communication for SDI. He made an extra fine camera for the U-2 which was much more accurate that the regular one, but had the disadvantage of being bulky so was not used regularly.

This is one of the amazing essays that Dr. Kelley Ross has on his web site, and I think that I ought to highly recommend it even though I never got a chance to get through this theory as thoroughly as I would have liked. This approach of Dr. Ross has never taken hold is because it has a terrible pedigree. First, it starts with Jacob Fries who was an anti semitic. But he had one important insight that corrected a lot in Kant’s Philosophy. That is you need to start from somewhere. Logical forms alone cannot provide a starting basis for a a-prior knowledge. Then, it gets up to Leonard Nelson who improved this approach a lot Finally this gets up to Kelley Ross who has the insight that you have to add the insight of Karl Poper that any theory to be true, needs to be able to be refuted by evidence. That means, that even though knowledge start with immediate non-intuitive knowledge, it can be refuted by further investigation. Just like Newton’ Gravity and Maxwell’ Electrodynamics conflicted, until Einstein decided that Maxwell was right and Newton was an approximation. I am not anywhere near the great depth of thinking of any of these philosophers and yet I still have my own two cents to add here. I feel the conflict between Hegel and Fries is sad. Each one had some very great insights- and some shockingly stupid ideas—just like all of us. (I have been astoundingly and amazingly wrong and stupid. somehow, I imagine that is not an inaccurate description of a lot of us) Hegel thought the idiotic idea of Gothe about color d superior to obvious evidence of Newton’ theory. He was ignored by all empirical scient of his time for being really stubbornly wrong. Yet Frie had hi own hare of dumb idea. A pamphlet recommending the extermination of the Jews? I guess he would not have been a convivial dinner companion. On the other hand, Hegel realized that Kant was on to something when he came up with this triad scheme (that nowadays is thought of a thesis antithesis and aufhaben] (German nationalism Hegel thought was a dumb joke and even coined a phrase for it) but Fries was also right that reason ha to tart with some any kind of axion. You have to put your foot down somewhere in order to be proven right or wrong. But if you change, then you can never be proven wrong-even to yourself. You will just convince yourself, you never meant what you meant to say. It shock me until today that I have never hear of anyone who realized that Hegel simply using Plotinus’s: Good, Logos, Being in reverse order

There is something odd going on with the international date line. I saw that the Radvaz deals with this question. He first was asked if it is one period in time everywhere, - and he says no. Because the first shabat was in the Sinai desert. Therefore, it is to each individual according to his place. And then he brings the question of where the day starts, and he brings the same sources as the Chazon Ish, the Kuzari and the seder Olam who say it starts in the far east ( after the end of the continent, not in the middle). so everything is clear. It does not start in the exact opposite of Jerusalem, but rather somewhere in the middle of the Pacific Ocean . To me this means everything is clear. But the Chazon Ish held a different day that what is set by the international date line. He starts the day exactly opposite Jerusalem and he says he based this on the Kuzari and seder Olam. To me it seems that if the middle of longitude is in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), then the date line is in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, and that the day starts at the very far end of the far east (Just like the Goyim say). But take a look at a map. If you assume Jerusalem is in the middle, and the day starts on the exact opposite side, then the date line is in the middle of Asia and then yom kipur comes out a different day. Then, Rav Isar Zalman Metlzar said, “The Chazon Ish was wrong.” The complaint that the Chazon Ish said about this was that Rav Izar Meltzar did not write this in his book on the Rambam. But if you look at the introduction to his book, the Even HaAzael, you will see that Rav Meltzar said openly that he did not include in his book the ideas that he said the yeshiva. The book is focused only on the Rambam. The fact that an important decision was left out means nothing. i also saw in the radvaz an issue that occurred to me --the problem of having the ketubah written and signed before the actual wedding-that is a document that is able to be collected on before the date of it time when it is valid in fact. Thet ketubah not valid. I did not read and learn the whole answer of the radvaz in depth, but years ago I decided that since my own ketutbah was written and signed in such a way it was not valid and wrote another one for my wife

My sex is XY.

My sex is XY. I have no gender. Gender is what nouns have. some are masculine and some are feminine and some are neutral. But I am not a noun. I do not know why some people think they have a gender unless they think that they are a noun? In Hebrew all nouns are masculine or feminine. But English is different. You can tell by the word itelf, not by its ending. An example: "Man" is a maculine word. Woman is a feminine word. But there are many examples. [Father, son, uncle, boy, waiter, rooster... and wife, daughter, sister, hen... ]

When your own free will can (and probably will lead you astray), that is the time when you need strong principles that you will not break

We dream on, as destiny take us in directions we could never have imagined. But destiny take us onward, but it does so only half way. At some point, free will kicks in, and then (as can you might expect), things go terribly wrong. However, during the period in one’s life that destiny is in control, even if you sin and do dumb things, generally destiny ignores it. After all, “There is a purpose to everything under the sun” (Ecclesiastes) even you. But when destiny stops, and has done what it set out to do, that is when you need to watch out. That is when your own free will can (and probably will lead you astray). That is the time when you need strong principles that you will not break. I have thought long and hard about these principles and I would like to share some of them. First of all is to speak the truth at all cost. Lying has to be as hard as pulling teeth. Not to speak lashon hara (i.e., not to speak negatively about anyone). There is however an argument about lashon hara between Rabbainu Yona and the Rambam. To the approach of Rabbainu Yona there are times and circumstance outside of the court of law that allows one to speak negativity about someone for the need of some benefit. To the Rambam, no such circumstances exist. If you have to critique someone, it has to be in a court of law or not at all. (Otherwise it is straight forward lashon hara.) I tend to see the point of Rabbainu Yona when it comes to warning someone. I have thought long and hard about these principles and I would like to share some of them. First of all is to speak the truth at all cost. Lying has to be as hard as pulling teeth. Not to speak lashon hara (i.e., not to speak negatively about anyone). There is however an argument about lashon hara between Rabbainu Yona and the Rambam. To the approach of Rabbainu Yona there are times and circumstance outside of the court of law that allows one to speak negativity about someone for the need of some benefit. To the Rambam, no such circumstances exist. If you have to critique someone, it has to be in a court of law or not at all. (Otherwise it is straight forward lashon hara.) I tend to see the point of Rabbainu Yona when it comes to warning someone. There are other principles that I think are important but not to the degree of thee first two. Some are to stick with the basic path of the Gra as much as possible in terms of learning Torah, both by bekiut (fast) and beiyun (in depth) [however, I think that using Torah to make money is not exactly along the line of the Gra. people nowadays assume it is ok to use Torah to make a living but to me it seems that this is improbable]

Beverly Hills High School was different than Soviet Education. At Beverly Hills High School, you had to take all kinds of requirements that had no relation to your future goals. In the Soviet Union, things were almost the complete reverse. You had to choose a direction when you just started out, [and it showed]. I recall walking by a music school over there, and was astounded at the quality of some violinist that I heard as I was walking by the open windows. Someone over there told me that Jasha Heifetz [by all accounts, the greatest violinist in the world during his time] came from that area [and maybe that same school],-- and I totally believe it. I forget the tracks for students in the USSR that they had. There was music and math and physics, and I imagine a biology track. But for me, having to divide my attention between chemistry, language, world history, English lit.,etc.. wore me out. I certainly did not like it at all. To my mind, it was taking away time and effort from things I wanted to pursue. At the beginning, I wanted the physics route, but physics (I discovered) needs a lot of time and effort unless you are among the blessed few that have 150 I.Q. and higher. [I am by the way - way, way, way…. below. English literature etc. and etc. was not my cup of tea. Over the yearS, I have begun to appreciate the balanced approach of my high school,] but I think I might have made it in physics if I had the time. Being forced to learn some foreign language and a mediocre existentialist novel in English literature and not even getting home until 6:15 every day drained all my energy. [I could have walked home but have gotten there anyway tired until 7 PM.] (However, I think it I also had a tremendous love for the orchestra and music. {Mr. Smart was a tremendous conductor, and also my teacher in violin, Mr. Chassman was a great violinist. He taught in the Valley, at that univerity there. I forget the name.} I think I must had inherited this from father who obviously had a tremendous love and respect for the great classical composers. Clearly, he would have become a professional violinist if not for his other love-- invention. He got a bachelor’s degree at Michigan university [somewhat close to home where his parents lived in N.J., not walking distance but at least closer than California where he eventually went to.] then he got a master’s degree in mechanical engineering at Caltech. at that point, I have no idea what he might have done, but WWII began and he joined the Airforce and never returned to university. still the USA government was hungry for his kind of talent. he created the first infrared telescope and camera and a second camera for the U-2 and then laser communication between satellite [] now that tuff has become the basis for fiber optics an and the Elon Musk satellite e array and that use that technology of laser communication. [the idea I really similar to telephone. You modulate the signal in order to end a message. But the time my dad developed this it had one goal alone. To keep the soviets from being able to monitor our communications. {radio signals spread out and can be intercepted. Not lasers.}}]. But, I still believe that all that was simply for the sake of making a living and supporting his wife and children. I believe his real love was the great classical composers. maybe Mozart. but it is hard to tell. but my best guess is Mozart. [As for me, I think the emphasis of my mom of marrying a “nice Jewish girl” and to be a mensch got me interested in gemara. (“Nice Jewish girl” were synonyms to the mind of my mom. However, I believe these are two separate requirements) I still have a tremendous love and thrill for Gemara, Tosphot and Maharsha]-- Eventually I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU for Physics.

The religious world has found a way to make Torah into a tremendous source of profit. I doubt if Moses would be happy about that

The approach of the Gra is important from many angles. But much of it the Litvak world has missed a few of the most important points. The main thing is learning Torah for its own sake not for money. Nowadays Torah is big business. Why not serve in Zahal, The Army of Defense of Israel? The reason is that that would dig into the status of the religious fanatics. It has nothing to do with what the Torah requires.("You will sit here, while your brothers go up to war?" That is from the book of Numbers.) It is a major characteristic of the religious world to make big deal about minor details while ignoring direct un-mistakeable commandments of the Torah .[the law about charity is brought at the end of the first chapter of bava kama in the rosh. it is derived from the general law about presents to the poor in the torah, the forgotten sheaves, etc. The rule is one who has 200 zuz is not allowed to receive charity. So then for people that are getting paid to learn torah, is it charity or is it payment for services rendered? If charity if one has the amount of a ketubah then it is forbidden to receive charity. if it is payment for, that also is forbidden because of the prohibition of using torah as a shovel to dig with]

You cannot eat an egg, or drink a glass of water without Faith.Religious fanaticism and secular fanaticism just do not work. But to find the middle ground is just as hard.

Georg Hamann quoted Hume that one cannot eat an egg, or drink a glass of water without faith. [You have to believe it is of benefit before actually trying it. Maybe it was tampered with?] {He tried to wean Kant away from the Enlightenment. ) This failed to convince Kant, but it does show that all experience starts with faith. Kant was not convinced. Hegel tried to reconcile faith and reasoning in the Phenomenology {and later in all subsequent writings which are a reformulation of Plotinus ‘approach to Plato with Aristotle integrated in the system.}. Hegel in the meantime struggling even for a loaf of bread eventually rose up to super stardom, until that was cancelled by Schelling. In the meantime, the importance of faith and reason has never been diminished and still remains a vital point in any balanced and sane human being.However, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross developed an idea of non-intuitive immediate knowledge. All reason has to start with unproven faith, axioms that cannot be proven (but can be refuted if enough evidence shows them to be flawed. Religious fanaticism and secular fanaticism just do not work. But to find the middle ground is just as hard. Just to take a middle approach without reason is just as ridiculous as the extremes. You need a valid criterion for the middle

It seems the higher the IQ, the more that one can deceive himself

There are a lot of mistakes about what is going on in physics and in particular philosophers seem to get everything wrong about it. It seems the higher the IQ, the more that one can deceive himself about what reason actually says. Like Rav Nachman said reason reason fools to those that possesses it[. In fact, Einstein never showed that absolute space ether does not exist bur t rather that it is undetectable. And in and an odd way photons and matter are really harmonic oscillators vibrating violin string. Just like Pythagoras held that about the Music of the spheres. What else could that be except vibrating musical instrument. And in fact, the uncertainly principle of Heisenberg really fit in perfectly into the harmonic oscillator equations of some kind of oscillating medium The uncertainty of momentum and position of any particle fits in the standard variation, the average value of a harmonic oscillator. The average value of momentum is equal to the mass times the angular velocity times h bar over 2. The

Debunking Skepticism, At some point, rational people should just disregard everything we have to say about our radical skeptical theories.

Debunking Skepticism Michael Huemer Mar 23 Here, I debunk the debunkers — the moral skeptics.* [ *Based on: “Debunking Skepticism,” in Higher-Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology, ed. Michael Klenk (Routledge, 2020). ] 1. Introduction Moral skeptics argue that either there aren’t any moral facts, or there are but we don’t know them. Why? Because our mechanisms for forming moral beliefs are not reliably truth-directed. Two sub-arguments: a) Our moral intuitions are produced by something that is insensitive to moral truth, like natural selection, or the cultural traditions we happened to be born under. b) There is so much disagreement among moral judgments that we have to conclude that humans can’t reliably judge morality. I suggest that there are similar arguments debunking skepticism itself: skeptical beliefs are produced by unreliable processes that produce lots of disagreement. 2. Skeptics Are Unreliable 2.1. Philosophers’ General Skeptical Leaning Philosophers as a group have an extreme skeptical leaning, compared to people from other disciplines. For virtually anything that philosophers talk about (not just morality), one of the leading philosophical theories will be an extreme form of skepticism. This is not true of any other field of study that I know of. E.g., among chemists, a leading theory is not that there are no chemicals or that we know nothing about them. Among geologists, there is no theory that anyone takes seriously that says there are no rocks. Among art historians, a major view isn’t that there is no art or that it has no history. But among epistemologists, a leading theory is that there is no knowledge. Among ethicists, a major theory is that there is no right or wrong. When philosophers theorize about free will, someone is going to say that there is no such thing; when we talk about beauty, someone will say there is no beauty; when we talk about time, someone will say it isn’t real; etc. Basically, for anything that philosophers talk about, some of us are going to pipe up and propose that that thing “isn’t real”, or that we know literally nothing about it. Of course, these radical skeptical positions are usually small minority views. Nevertheless, the profession takes them seriously and spends a lot of time discussing them, as no one in any other discipline would do. 2.2. When Beliefs Are Open to Bias What kinds of beliefs are most susceptible to being influenced by bias? Here are some: Beliefs based on abstract reflection, rather than observation, scientific study, etc. Beliefs stated in vague terms rather than precise terms. Beliefs that rely on empirical speculation. Beliefs that are ideologically significant. Beliefs that require high-level judgment calls, e.g., weighing up complex bodies of evidence. I assume it’s obvious why each of those types of belief would be relatively easily influenced by bias. Notice that moral skepticism, or the premises of the arguments for it, have all five of these traits. (Examples of 3: the claim that moral beliefs are adaptations; specific evolutionary explanations for specific moral beliefs.) So moral skepticism and the arguments for it are exactly the type of belief and argument that we would expect to be easily influenced by bias, should someone have a pro-skeptic bias. 2.3. Sources of Pro-Skeptical Bias Why might philosophers have a skeptical bias? There are many reasons. I can’t list them all; here are a few: Some people have an abnormal fear of being duped, which they express by taking extreme skeptical philosophical stances. Some people get a sense of superiority and cleverness, or a pleasurable feeling of rebelliousness, from “debunking” the beliefs of others. Skeptical stances make intellectual life simple and easy. It’s a lot easier to just reject or pretend to doubt X than it is to figure out the actual nature of X. Arguing with others is easier too; just reject every premise that the other person puts forward, or claim to not see why it’s plausible. The profession (academic philosophy) rewards people who give clever defenses of “interesting” positions — which often means surprising and radical positions. Skepticism is perhaps the easiest such position to think of. Those are all about skepticism in general. Now a few about moral skepticism in particular: Many people think that it’s bad to be “judgmental”. The ultimate in not being judgmental is being a skeptic. Many people have succumbed to the ideology of scientism. Since ethics doesn’t sound like “science” (i.e., natural science), the science-worshippers have to reject it. Morality is often inconvenient for us. 2.4. Bias or Virtue? Ok, philosophers are way more skeptical than researchers in any other field. There are two salient explanations: (a) Maybe it stems from philosophers’ intellectual virtues; e.g., perhaps we are more rational, open-minded, and intelligent than other researchers, and maybe these things lead to skepticism because skepticism is correct. (b) Maybe it is a bias, as I’ve been suggesting. Theory (b) is obviously more plausible than (a), for at least 3 reasons. Again, philosophers develop and take seriously radical skeptic theories about virtually everything they look at. If we did it for just one thing (say, morality), it might be plausible to say that that one thing isn’t real or isn’t knowable. But the prior probability that multiple different things that everyone else thinks we obviously know about are all unreal — morality, time, consciousness, free will, numbers, matter, meaning, truth, beauty, causation, epistemic reasons, theoretical entities in science — is near zero. All of those are things that philosophers have rejected, and been taken seriously by other philosophers. The prior that skepticism is a reasonable position for multiple of those things is much lower than the prior that philosophers have a general bias toward skepticism. Philosophers have taken up forms of skepticism that would impugn the work of all other researchers in all other fields. E.g., inductive skepticism would impugn all work in all the sciences. Therefore, either the skeptical philosophers are being overly skeptical, or everyone else in every other field is insufficiently skeptical. The former is obviously more likely. Skeptics are always telling us that disagreement about X supports skepticism about X. But there is huge disagreement among philosophers about the merits of skeptical theses and argument. This shows that the belief-forming methods that philosophers are using are unreliable. 3. Unreliability Undercuts Skepticism 3.1. The Import of Higher-Order Evidence You might wonder: Why not just directly evaluate the arguments given by moral skeptics? Once we do that, there will be no need to speculate about the psychological infirmities of their authors. The answer is that if there is a pro-skeptical bias among philosophers, then the people evaluating the skeptical arguments are likely to share that bias, and thus our direct evaluation of the skeptical arguments will be unreliable. We need to look at the second-order evidence, which suggests the unreliability of the belief-forming mechanisms leading to skepticism. This, by the way, is perfectly parallel to what the skeptics themselves say about why you shouldn’t just directly evaluate moral propositions and see whether any of them are true. 3.2. Third-Order Evidence Restores Belief What’s the result of becoming skeptical of skepticism itself? Do we just become completely skeptical about everything? Or do we return to our normal beliefs? The answer is the latter. This is the process: a. First, we have prima facie justification for believing certain first-order moral propositions, like “you shouldn’t torture babies”, because these things seem obviously correct and we have no reason (yet) for doubting them. b. Skeptics present second-order evidence that our moral intuitions are unreliable. This undercuts our justification for the 1st-order moral claims. c. Anti-skeptics present third-order evidence that the (alleged) 2nd-order evidence given by the skeptics is unreliable. This undercuts our justification for believing that our moral intuitions are unreliable. With no justification for believing that anymore, we no longer have an undercutting defeater for the 1st-order moral claims. So the 1st-order moral claims are justified again. 4. Objections 4.1. “Philosophers are superior thinkers.” More about the theory mentioned in 2.4 that perhaps philosophers’ tendency to skepticism is due to our being better thinkers: There is at least some reason to think this. E.g., philosophers appear to be on average more open-minded, more rational, clearer-thinking, and more disposed to ask fundamental questions than people in other fields. If philosophers were overall more reliable than other researchers, what would we expect to see? Two things: (a) We’d expect to see philosophers making faster progress than others. (b) We’d expect to see more agreement in philosophy than in other fields. Needless to say, these predictions are the opposite of the truth. So while philosophers may be better thinkers than others in some respects, there is no reason to think we are better at getting to the truth. 4.2. Is Meta-skepticism self-defeating? Some of my arguments suggest that philosophical reasoning in general is unreliable. But that would mean my own reasoning for that conclusion is unreliable, so we should disregard it. But then, we should also disregard the reasoning for disregarding that reasoning, etc. This paradox would confront the view that no philosophical argument provides any justification at all for anything. But that’s a silly view. The paradox doesn’t really confront the moderate view that we should lower our confidence in philosophical arguments, upon learning that philosophers are really unreliable. Moreover, not all philosophical arguments are equally unreliable. We should be especially suspicious of arguments that contradict extremely widely-shared beliefs that we initially would have ascribed very high credence to; follow a more general pattern of arguments that contradict other widely-shared, high-credence beliefs; turn on subjective, speculative, vague, or otherwise unreliable abstract judgments. These are all true of arguments for moral skepticism. They are much less true of the argument, here, for disregarding moral skepticism. 5. Conclusion Appearances can be revealing. A fundamental rule of rationality is to start from the assumption that things are pretty much the way they seem, unless and until you have specific reasons to doubt that. Sometimes, something surprising is the case. If you have a friend who has a conspiracy theory, perhaps you should listen to him — after all, sometimes there are conspiracies! But if your friend repeatedly comes up with conspiracy theories, for virtually everything he thinks about, then at some point, you should just disregard everything he says about these theories. You shouldn’t listen to all the details and try to rebut each specific argument. You should just disregard them wholesale. Philosophy is the friend with a million conspiracy theories. Kant called philosophy “the queen of the sciences,” but perhaps it were better named “the Alex Jones of the sciences.” It’s not one time that philosophers came up with the idea that maybe we’re being radically deceived. It’s every goddamned time we talk about anything. At some point, rational people should just disregard everything we have to say about our radical skeptical theories.

למרות שזה די מובן מאליו, אני חושב שאוכל להזכיר איך הרמב''ם מבין את הגמרא בעמוד י''ט בבא קמא. הרמב''ם לדעתי הכי פשוט. הגמרא אומרת, "אם יש שאלה לגבי אזהרה, זה אומר אוטומטית שאין שינוי". ואז הגמרא הופכת את זה, ואומרת שהשינוי בעצם מוטל בספק. אולם, בצד שאין ספק, חייבת להיות שאלה לגבי אזהרה. הרמב''ם מבין שזה פשוט כדי לשנות את כיוון הסיבתיות. עם זאת, הנחת היסוד עומדת. כלומר לפי הרמב''ם, שאם יש התראה, אין שינוי. לתוספות ההבנה של הגמרא היא כך. אם יש ספק לגבי שינוי, לא יכולה להיות אזהרה. כלומר, שאזהרה ושינוי הם משתנים התלויים זה בזה. אם יש אזהרה על צרורות לפי דרכן הרגילה, חייבת להיות אזהרה גם על שינוי. אם אין שינוי, לא יכולה להיות אזהרה על אזהרה כאשר צרורות מגיעות בדרכן הרגילה------כדאי להזכיר שלרב שך, יש פירוש אחר על הרמב''ם שהוא יותר מתאים לתוספות, אבל לא בדיוק. לפי רב שך, הרמב''ם מבין ששאלות האזהרה או השינוי הן בדיוק אותה שאלה. כלומר, אם אזהרה שייכת, אז יש שינוי. כלומר, נזק ברגל של שור השתנה לנזק על ידי קרן של שור, ולכן אזהרה אוטומטית חלה. אבל אם אזהרה לא חלה, זה אומר שהצרורות נשארות נגזרות של נזק על ידי רגל, ולכן שינוי לא יכול לחול. השינוי חל רק על נזק באמצעות קרן

Even though it is kind of obvious I think I might mention how the רמב’’ם understands the גמרא on page י''ט (that is brought here in my previous blog entry). The רמב’’ם I think is the simplest. The גמרא says, “If there is a question about warning, that automatically implies there is no change.” Then the גמרא turns that around, and says that change is, in fact, in doubt. However, on the side that there is no doubt, there must be a question about warning. The רמב’’ם understands that that is simply in order to change the direction of causation. However, the basic premise stands. That means according to the רמב’’ם, that if there is warning, there can be no change. There can only be doubt about one, or the other. They are variables that are exclusive. To תוספות the understanding of the גמרא is thus. If there is doubt about change, there can be no warning. That is, that warning and change are mutually dependent variables. If there is warning about צרורות according to their regular way, there must be warning about change also. If there is no change., there cannot be warning about warning when צרורות come their normal way.

bava kama page 19. The difference how tosphot and ramban understand the gemara.

Even though it is kind of obvious I think I might mention how the Rambam understands the Gemara on page 19 (that is brought here in my previous blog entry). The Rambam I think is the simplest. The Gemara says, “If there is a question about warning, that automatically implies there is no change.” Then the Gemara turns that around, and says that change is, in fact, in doubt. However, on the side that there is no doubt, there must be a question about warning. The Rambam understands that that is simply in order to change the direction of causation. However, the basic premise stands. That means according to the Rambam, that if there is warning, there can be no change. There can only be doubt about one, or the other. They are variables that are exclusive. To Tosphot the understanding of the Gemara is thus. If there is doubt about change, there can be no warning. That is, that warning and change are mutually dependent variables. If there is warning about pebbles according to their regular way, there must be warning about change also. If there is no change., there cannot be warning about warning when pebbles come their normal way. I might mention thar רב שך has a different interpretation of the רמב''ם that is more in line with תוספות, but not exactly. According to רב שך, the רמב''ם understands the questions of warning or change are exactly the same question. That means, if warning applicable, then there is change. That means damage by foot of an ox has changed to damage by horn of an ox, and so automatically warning is applicable. But if warning does not apply, that means that צרורות remain a derivative of damage by foot, and therefore change can not apply. Change is only applicable to damage by horn.]

אני חושב שה רמב''ם (ניזקי ממון פרק ב' הלכות ה' ו') סובר שלא יכולים להיות שלושה מיני תשלום עבור צרורות לתנא אחד, וכך הוא מבין את הגמרא על דפים י''ח וי''ט בבא קמא. זאת אומרת שיכול להיות חצי נזק ורביעי; או חצי ושלם, אבל לא שלושתם. כדי להסביר למה אני מתכוון אביא את הגמרא בדף י''ט. שם רב אשי שאל אם יכול להיות שינוי עבור צרורות להוריד את התשלום מחצי לרביע. הגמרא מציע שנוכל לדעת זאת משאלת רבא אם יכולה להיות אזהרה לצרורות? הגמרא אומרת כיון שזו שאלה לרבא, ולכן לא יכול להיות שינוי לרביע. (זו בעיה כי לרב אשי היה ספק אם השינוי שייך. אם התשובה פשוטה לא הייתה לו שאלה). אז גמרא מציע שאולי רבא התכוון לומר שאם אין שינוי, אז חייבת להיות שאלה אם ניתן להפעיל אזהרה. (כלומר לא שאין שינוי בוודאות. אלא אולי יש שינוי, ולכן אין לנו שאלה לגבי אזהרה. או שאולי לא יש שינוי, ולכן יש שאלה לגבי אזהרה.) אפשר לסכם את הגמרא הזו כך. אם יש שאלה לגבי אזהרה, השינוי אינו שייך. כְּלוֹמַר. השאלה לגבי האזהרה גורמת לכך שאין שינוי. ואז הגמרא הופכת את זה, ואומרת אם אין שינוי, צריכה להיות שאלה לגבי אזהרה. כלומר שחץ הסיבתיות מסובב. אבל מכל מקום, הרמב''ם מוטרד תחילה מאותה שאלה שמטרידה את התוספות. איך יכולים להיות שלושה סוגי תשלום, רביע, חצי ושלם. לרמב''ם אפשר לקבל שלושה סוגי תשלום, אבל רק שני מינים לכל תנא (מורה). ר' אלעזר מחזיק שיש חצי ללא אזהרה, וזה עולה לתשלום מלא כשיש אזהרה, (ושינוי לא משנה בכלל, אם הוא קיים או לא). החכמים מחזיקים חצי תשלום לצרורות, ואם יש שינוי, זה יורד לרביע, (והאזהרה אינה חלה כלל, בין אם ניתנה אזהרה ובין אם לא). דבר אחד עדיין מפריע לי במסקנת הגמרא הזו: איך העובדה שאין שינוי תגרום לשאלת אזהרה? אני רוצה להוסיף כאן רעיון נוסף. רב שך מעלה שאלה ברמב''ם. למה הוא מביא את השאלה על שינוי, אבל לא את השאלה על אזהרה? אני רוצה להציע תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו. אני חושב שהרמב''ם גורס שבגמרא שלנו, אנחנו יכולים לראות ששינוי ואזהרה הם משתנים לא תואמים. אם יש שינוי יורד לרביע, התראה אינה שייכת (שתעלה התשלום לנזק מלא). אם יש אזהרה שעולה לתשלום מלא, לא יכול להיות שינוי יורד לרביע. לכן, הוא הביא רק את השאלה על שינוי, כי הדין אינו כמו ר' אלעזר שגורס שעם אזהרה, התשלום עולה לתשלום מלא. (ר' אלעזר מחזיק את זה בסיטואציה של המשנה על הכלב עם הכיכר והפחם הבוער. הוא מחזיק בזה שזה דורש תשלום מלא כשיש אזהרה שלוש פעמים). אבל הרמב''ם החליט שהדין הוא כמו החכמים שבמקרה זה נדרש רק חצי תשלום. אבל רב אשי שאל לפי החכמים אם אפשר ששינוי יוריד את התשלום לרביעית. לפיכך החליט הרמב"ם ששינוי לצרורות הוא בספק והשמיט אפשרות של אזהרה להעלות את התשלום לנזק מלא כי הדין אינו כמו ר' אלעזר. אולם תוספות גורס שהסבר הגמרא שלנו בדף י''ט שונה. הוא גורס שמשמעות הגמרא היא זו. אם אזהרה חלה על צרורות (כדי שהתשלום יהיה נזק מלא), אז היא תחול גם על שינוי בצרורות. כלומר יש שינוי בצרורות שמביאים אותו לרביעית, והאזהרה הזו ישימה בצורה כזו שתחזיר אותו לחצי. (זה לא יביא לנזק מלא כי זה יהיה קפיצה גדולה מדי כמו שתוספות אמרו קודם. תוספות גם גורס שהגמרא גורסת שאם אזהרה לא חלה על צרורות (להביא תשלום לנזק מלא), אזהרה לא יכולה להיות חלה גם על שינוי. כלומר, בשלב זה עשוי להיות שינוי, אבל אזהרה לא תחול על זה להביא את זה לחצי תשלום

I think that the רמב’’ם in [('ניזקי ממון פרק ב' הלכות ה' ו] holds that there cannot be three kinds of payment for צרורות לתנא אחד and that that is how he understands the גמרא on דפים י''ח וי''ט בבא קמא. I mean that there can be half damage and a fourth; or a half and a whole, but not all three. To explain what I mean let me bring the גמרא on דף י''ט. THERE רב אשי asked if there can be change for צרורות to bring down the payment from חצי to רביע. The גמרא suggests that we can know this from the question of רבא if there can be warning for צרורות? The גמרא says since this is a question to רבא, therefore there cannot be change to a רביע. (This is a problem because רב אשי had a doubt if change is applicable. If the answer is simple he would not have had a question). so גמרא then suggests that perhaps רבא meant to say that if there is no change, then there must be a question if warning can be applied. (That Is to say that it is not that there is no change for sure. Rather there might be change, and therefore we have no question about warning. Or there might be no change and therefore there is a question about warning.) This גמרא can be summed up thus. If there is a question about warning, then change is not applicable. I.e. the question about warning causes there to be no change. Then the גמרא turns that around, and says if there is no change, there has to be a question about warning. That means to say that the arrow of causation is turned around. But at any rate, the רמב’’ם is first bothered by the same question that bothers תוספות. How can there be three kinds of payment, רביע, חצי and a whole. The רמב’’ם that you can have three kinds of payment, but only two kinds for every תנא (teacher). ר’ אלעזר holds there is חצי with no warning, and that goes up to full payment when there is warning, (and change does not matter at all, whether it is present or not). The חכמים hold there is חצי payment, and if there is change, that goes down to רביע, (and warning does not apply at all, whether warning was given or not). One thing still bothers me about the conclusion of this גמרא is this: how would the fact that there is no change cause there to be a question about warning? I would like to add one more idea here. רב שך brings up a question on the רמב’’ם. Why does he bring the question about change but not the question about warning? I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. I think the רמב’’ם holds that in our גמרא, we can see that change and warning are incompatible variables. If there is change going down to רביע, there cannot be warning. If there is warning going up to full payment, there cannot be change going down to a רביע. Therefore, he brought only the question about change because the law is not like ר’ אלעזר who holds that with warning the payment goes up to full payment. (ר’ אלעזר holds this in the situation in the משנה about the dog with the loaf and burning coal. He holds this requires full payment when there is warning given three times). But the רמב’’ם decided the law is like the חכמים that that case required only half payment. But רב אשי asked according to the sage if change is possible that would bring the payment down to a fourth. The רמב’’ם therefore decided that change for צרורות is a doubt and leave out the possibility of a warning bring up the payment to full damage because the law is not like ר' אלעזר. However, תוספות however holds that the explanation of our גמרא on דף י''ט is different. He holds that the meaning of the גמרא is this. If warning is applicable to צרורות (so that the payment would be full damage), then it would also be applicable to a change in צרורות. That is to say there is change in צרורות that bring it down to a fourth and that warning is applicable in such a way that would bring it back up to a half. (It would not bring to full damage because that would be too much of a jump as תוספות said before. תוספות also holds that the גמרא holds that if warning is not applicable to צרורות (to bring payment to full damage), then warning cannot be applicable to change either. That is, at this point there might be change, but warning would not apply to it to bring it to half payment. Or there might not be change at all. That is even if change happen the payment is still חצי

Gemara on page 18 and 19 of Bava Kama. A difference between Rambam and Tosphot.

I think that the Rambam holds that there can not be three kinds of payment for pebbles, and that that is how he understands the Gemara on page 18 and 19 of Bava Kama. I mean that there can be half damage and a fourth; or a half and a whole, but not all three. To explain what I mean let me bring the Gemara on page 19. Rav Ashi asked if there can be change for pebbles to bring down the payment from 1/2 to 1/4. The Gemara suggests that we can know this from the question of Rava if there can be warning for pebbles? The Gemara says since this is a question to Rava, therefore there cannot be change to a 1/4. (This is a problem because Rav ashi had a doubt if change is applicable. If the answer is simple he would not have had a question ). so Gemara then suggests that perhaps Rava meant to say that if there is no change, then there must be a question if warning can be applied. (That Is to say that it is not that there is no change for sure. Rather there might be change, and therefore we have no question about warning. Or there might be no change and therefore there is a question about warning.) This Gemara can be summed up thus. If there is a question about warning, then change is not applicable. I.e. the question about warning causes there to be no change. Then the Gemara turns that around, and says if there is no change, there has to be a question about warning. That means to say that the arrow of causation is turned around. But at any rate, the Rambam is first bothered by the same question that bothers Tosphot. How can there be three kinds of payment, 1/4, 1/2 and a whole. The Rambam that you can have three kinds of payment, but only two kinds for every tana (teacher). R Elazar holds there is 1/2 with no warning, and that goes up to full payment when there is warning, (and change does not matter at all, whether it is present or not). The sages hold there is 1/2 payment, and if there is change, that goes down to ¼, (and warning does not apply at all, whether warning was given or not). One thing still bothers me about the conclusion of this Gemara is this: how would the fact that there is no change cause there to be a question about warning? I would like to add one more idea here. Rav Shach brings up a question on the Rambam. Why does he bring the question about change but not the question about warning? I would like to suggest a possible answer to this question. I think the Rambam holds that in our Gemara, we can see that change and warning are incompatible variables. If there is change going down to 1/4, there cannot be warning. If there is warning going up to full payment, there cannot be change going down to a 1/4. Therefore, he brought only the question about change because the law is not like R Elazar who holds that with warning the payment goes up to full payment. (R Elazar holds this in the situation in the mishna about the dog with the loaf and burning coal. He holds this requires full payment when there is warning given three times). But the Rambam decided the law is like the sages that that case required only half payment. But Rav Ashi asked according to the sage if change is possible that would bring the payment down to a fourth. The Rambam therefore decided that change for pebbles is a doubt and leave out the possibility of a warning bring up the payment to full damage because the law is not like R. Elazar. Tosphot however holds that the explanation of our Gemara on page 19 is different. He holds that the meaning of thee Gemara is this. If warning is applicable to pebbles (so that the payment would be full damage), then it would also be applicable to a change in pebbles. That is to say there is change in pebbles that bring it down to a fourth and that warning is applicable in such a way that would bring it back up to a half. (It would not bring to full damage because that would be too much of a jump as Tosphot said before. Tosphot also holds that the gemara holds that if warning is not applicable to pebbles (to bring payment to full damage), then warning cannot be applicable to change either. That is at this point there might be change, but warning would not apply to it to bring it to half payment. Or there might not be change at all. That is even if change happen the payment is till 1/2

The need to combine two principles in learning that at first glance seem contradictory

It is worth mentioning that my son Izhak was aware of the need to combine two principles in learning that at first glance seem contradictory. One is the idea of saying the words and going on until the end of the book or chapter, and then the other of review. He was aware of the greatness and importance of Rav Nahman's idea of “saying the words and going on.” But on the other hand, often people often forget the importance of review as Rav Nachman said himself in Sefer Hamidot, “He who learns, but does not review etc.” some people are naturally brilliant in one field or the other but that does not exclude the importance of learning Gemara Physics and mathematics even if you are not naturally talented in this area. It is like saying you do not need to be moral even if you are not naturally moral. Positive values need to be adhered to even against one’s natural inclination, The issue is not how talented you are, but rather what are the areas that are important to concentrate on even if you are not in order to become a whole and wholesome human being.

The North violated the contract –state’s rights, and the Supreme Court's decision in the Dred Scott case

If you look at questions and answers of the Radvaz you will see what I have been saying all along. That if you have two people in a contract, and one breaks the conditions of the contract, the other has the right to leave the partnership. This happened in Egypt where three people had the king’s treasury in partnership, and one Reuven was not active at all, but simply collected a percentage. Part of the agreement was that the other two that were active would not loan out any of the money to anyone. It was simply to collect taxes. And yet even though they swore not to, they violated the contract and later money was found missing. Still Reuven was forced to pay a third of the missing money as per the agreement with the king. If money was found missing, then the partners had to pay with their own money. However, the Radvaz wrote that Reuben had the right to leave the partnership. Why should not the same idea apply to the Civil War? The North violated the contract –state’s rights, and the Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision. Why should the South not be allowed to leave the partnership? Think of a wife that wants to leave a marriage. Should the husband wage war to stop her?

I respect Rav Nahman of Breslov a lot, but his critique of science and philosophy is something I think was better to be left out.

It is hard to say that any one person has all the truth. There is a lot of emphasis on finding one person or path to follow, and to stick with that, -- no matter what. But I find that approach to lack this insight that not everything any one person said was always 100% correct. I respect Rav Nahman of Breslov a lot, but his critique of science and philosophy is something I think was better to be left out. It may have applied to people in in his area and in his time, but a blanket condemnation of science seems to me to be contrary to the general approach of Musar which started with the book the chovot levavaot which is clear about the importance of science in chapter 3 of shar habechina. But also the Gra, I think, was right about most things- in particular his emphasis on learning Torah. You see this in the results of the generations that held with his approach-strong sense of morality and decency as you can see today in the Lithuanian kind of yeshivot that follow his path. The proof is in the pudding. (The results show the validity of the recipe.)I am not saying the Litvak world yeshiva world is perfect either. But that is the only address to go to learn what is straight un-adulterated Torah

There was in Egypt during the time of the Radvaz a sort of situation in which people that owned slaves would free the slave-girl, and by that the slave would become ipso facto free and Jewish [and her child who was conceived at the time she was a slave] as can see in many of the questions brought to him {Shut Ha’Radvaz}.] This of course was nothing compared with the time of the Reish Galuta, Butenai when intermarriage was rampant. The common approach of Sephardim toward Ashkenazi is tainted with an implicit assumption (but upspoken) that the Ashkenazi is not really Jewish. That question might as well be reversed. [ Theidea here is that a slave that is dipped into a natural body of water at the time he or she is acquired becomes a gentile slave. Then, if he or she is freed later, he or she becomes Jewish. This was very common in Egypt when many people owned slave girls.]

At least Hegel saw the importance of the USA in his statement that, “America is the state of the future.”

I have been thinking about Kant and the later attempts to fix the perceived short-comings in his system, but I can not seem to get beyond two arch rivals that each one had some good points. It seems very confusing to me. Hegel and Fries had the same points that Reinhold and Fichte saw --you need to start from somewhere. Though it was Leonard Nelson that made that point rigorous. Yet, Hegel had some important points also; and ever since I encountered this debate on both sides, I have neve been able to get beyond it. I tend towards Leonard Nelson [Neo-Friesian] and the exposition of his ideas on the blog of Kelley Ross. But I still can not get beyond the point that Hegel also had some important ideas- that even Kelley Ross brings in his Ph.D. thesis. The question that is most important (on Fries and Hegel) is not the results of their ideas, but the core. And in each one of these thinkers, I find great value in the core, but I cannot get beyond the problems. Maybe just one is right, maybe two, maybe all three have some valuable ideas, or maybe all three are downright wrong? I guess, I have to admit my intellectual shortcomings (which are very great), and get back to learning Gemara (Talmud and Rav Shach). But when I get back from the sea and am totally exhausted, I have no more energy to learn Talmud or Physics or Math. I just have to wind down until I can sleep,------But then I start wondering: "Why did they all think that Rousseau was great?" Kant had the portrait of Rousseau hanging in his room?!!!, and Hegel was an early admirer until the devastation and guillotines of the French revolution got him to re-think his earlier position. At least Hegel saw the importance of the USA in his statement that, “America is the state of the future.” [Hegel saw that the subject and object are not two different things. They are two sides of the same coin.] Read Hegel with an awareness of the Greek idea of identity of opposites, and Plato’s permanent forms, and Aristotle’s, bringing the forms into the here and now -the individual substance, and Schelling's ideas of knowledge, and unite all these disparate ideas into a unity a seamless quilt. Then you can get an idea of what Hegel was getting at.

תוספות בבא קמא דף י''ח ע''א

ברצוני להסביר את גישת תוספות בבא קמא דף י''ח ע''א. רוצה הגמרא להשיב על שאלה של רבא. היא אם צרורות משלמים מגוף הבהמה או לא. תשובה מהיסית היא כן בגלל המשנה עם כיכר הפחם והכלב שגורמים לערימה לעלות בלהבות. המשנה אומרת שמשלם חצי נזק ושחשבו שזה צרורות ואנחנו למדים במקום אחר שהתשלום הוא מהגוף. אחר כך גמרא שאלה מר' אלעזר שאמר שהמקרה חייב בתשלום מלא נזק, ואין זה סביר לשלם נזק מלא מהגוף. אנו עונים שהוא מחזיק כמו ר' יהודה שחציו משולם מהגוף, והחצי השני ממזומן. רב סמא שאל אולי ר' יהודה אמר שרק במקרה שהיה שינוי, לא במקרה של צרורות שזה נורמלי. הגמרא עונה שזה מקרה של אזהרה שלוש פעמים. לקח לי הרבה זמן להבין מה המשמעות של תוספות כאן. בתחילה נראה שלתשובה אין קשר לשאלה. השאלה הייתה כזו. ר' אלעזר מחזיק במקרה של הכיכר פחם הוא נזק מלא, ובכל זאת אנחנו יודעים שהוא משולם גם מהגוף כמו במקרה של חצי נזק. ענינו שר' אלעזר סבור כמו ר' יהודה שצד תמות נשאר במקומו. כלומר, למרות שהתשלום עולה עד נזק מלא, עדיין מחצית ההתחלה נשארת במקום, ומשולם מהגוף. התשובה היא שמדובר באזהרה של שלוש פעמים. והלא זו הייתה השאלה? איך יכול להיות תשלום מהגוף אם מדובר בדרך הרגילה? הבנתי מה המשמעות של תוספות כאן. הוא אומר שהגמרא חולק על רב סמא וקובע שאפילו לא במקרה של שינוי, אלא במקרה רגיל כשיש התראה של שלוש פעמים והנזק עולה לתשלום מלא לר' אלעזר, עדיין משלמים חצי תשלום מהגוף. בהמשך הגמרא משנה זאת ואומרת שלמעשה, גם ר' אלעזר וגם החכמים מסכימים עם סומכוס שאין צורך באזהרה כדי שצרורות ידרשו תשלום מלא. אבל הם חלוקים אם היה שינוי בלי אזהרה, ולכן הפך סוג הנזק לקרן התם, ור' אלעזר מחזיק קרן התם הוא תשלום מלא והחכמים כאן של ר' אלעזר מחזיקים כמו חכמים החולקים על ר' טרפון והם מחזיקים קרן ראשונה (קרן התם) חצי תשלום

Tosphot in Bava Kama page 18. First words of Tosphot: Have you heard this in a case (of pebbles) from the start

I would like to explain the approach of Tosphot in Bava Kama page 18. The gemara wants to answer a question of Rava, if pebbles pay from the body of the animal or not. A tentative answer is yes because of the mishna with the coal loaf and dog that cause a stack to go up in flames. The mishna says that pays half damage and that it thought to be pebbles and we learn elsewhere that payment is from the body. Then we ask from R. Elazar who said that case is required to pay full damage and it is unlikely to pay full damage and also from the body. We answer that he holds like R. Judah that half is paid from the body, and the other half from cash. Rav sama asked, maybe R. Judah said that only in a case when there was change, not in a case of pebbles which is normal. The gemara answers it is a case of three times warning. It took me a long time to realize what Tosphot mean here. At firs the answer seems to have no relation to the question. The question was this. R Elazar holds the case of the loaf and burning coal is full damage and yet we know it is also paid from the body like in case of half damage. We answered that R Elazar holds like R Yehuda that the side of tameness stay in it place. Ie even though the payment goes up to full damage still the beginning half stays in it place and is paid from the body. The answer is it is a case of three times warning. Was that not the question? How could there be payment from the body if it is a case of the normal way? I realized what Tosphot means here. He is a saying that the Gemara is disagreeing with Rav Sama and holds that even not in a case of change, but in a normal case when there are three times waring and the damage goes up to full payment to R Elazar, still half payment is made from the body. The Gemara later on changes this, and says that, in fact, both R Elazar and the sages agree with Sumchos that you need no warning for pebbles to require full payment. But they are disagreeing because there was change, and therefore the type of damage became horn and R Elazar holds first time horn is full payment and the sages here of R Elazar hold like the sages that disagree with R. Tarfon and they hold first time horn is half payment ____________________________________________________________________________________________I would like to explain the approach of תוספותin בבא קמא ע''א ג''ה מועד page 18. The גמרא want to answer a question of רבא is if צרורות pay from the body of the animal or not. A tentative answer is yes because of the משנה with the coal loaf and dog that cause a stack to go up in flames. The משנה says that pays half damage and that it thought to be pebbles and we learn elsewhere that payment is from the body. Then we ask from ר' אלעזר who said that case is required to pay full damage, and it Is unlikely to pay full damage and also from the body. We answer that he holds like ר' יהודה that half is paid from the body, and the other half from cash. רב סמא asked maybe ר' יהודה said that only in a case when there was change, not in a case of צרורות which is normal. The גמרא answers it is a case of three times warning. It took me a long time to realize what תוספות mean here. At first the answer seems to have no relation to the question. The question was this. ר’ אלעזר holds the case of the loaf and burning coal is full damage, and yet we know it is also paid from the body like in case of half damage. We answered that ר’ אלעזר holds like ר' יהודה that the side of tameness stay in its place. I.e., even though the payment goes up to full damage, still the beginning half stays in it place, and is paid from the body. The answer is it is a case of three times warning. Was that not the question? How could there be payment from the body if it is a case of the normal way? I realized what תוספות means here. He is a saying that the גמרא is disagreeing with רב סמא and holds that even not in a case of change, but in a normal case when there are three times waring and the damage goes up to full payment to ר’ אלעזר, still half payment is made from the body. The גמרא later on changes this, and says that, in fact, both ר’ אלעזר and the חכמים agree with סומכוס that you need no warning for צרורות to require full payment. But they are disagreeing because there was change, and therefore the type of damage became horn and ר’ אלעזר holds first time horn is full payment and the חכמים here of ר’ אלעזר hold like the sages that disagree with ר' טרפון and they hold first time horn is half payment.

I was blessed with being in two great yeshivot, Shar Yasuv and the Mir in N.Y., and heard and received guidance in learning from Naftali Yegeer and Shmuel Berenbaum] and also learned from David Bronson.

My impression about learning is that of the medieval authorities like the first Musar book, the Obligations of the Hearts and the Rambam that learning Torah (the Old Testament and the two Talmuds), Physics and Metaphysics are the things to concentrate on. However, it can be objected that these are hard. But being hard to understand is not a valid objection. These are things that one is supposed to study even with an I.Q. of room temperature. Like it says in the paragraph of the Shema, “Thou shalt teach them to your children, and speak of them when you sit in your house, and when you walketh on the way.” So the question is not whether to do this study or not? Rather, what is the best way to go about it? In tractate Avoda Zara page 19 it suggests to say the words in order, and to go on. That means, to finishing the whole book, and then to review that same book many times. [It is even said up to 400 times.] [Also to listen to lectures from people that know their subject. I was blessed with being in two great yeshivot, Shar Yasuv and the Mir in NY, and heard and received guidance in learning from Naftali Yegeer and Shmuel Berenbaum] and also learned from David Bronson. Even though, he was considered as nothing by all, I realized his ability -astounding ability- to go into the depths of the Talmud with Tosphot. From that period, began my writing on Ideas in the Talmud and Subjects in Bava Mezia in my two small booklets that have have links to in this blog Nowadays, I do not have the privilege to learn with David Bronson, but Izhak Rosten sent to me a copy of the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which I find very helpful in finding and searching out the depths of the Talmud

Uman, Ukraine

People in Uman were very kind to me for many years. I made it my business to be there for Rosh Hashana every year, and all the Ukrainians there were extremely hospitable to me. I was (for 7 years) the adult supervisor in a student dorm for the local university students. Thus, it has always pained me greatly to think that these same kind people might even today be on the front lines, and perhaps some may not even be among the living anymore. You might say that would make me an adamant defender of winning the war. But no. Rather, I would much rather there would be peace. And even though I can not say anything about people's feelings in Kiev or anywhere else in Ukraine. But in Uman itself, I did not see or hear of any resentment against the USSR. On the contrary, when ever I asked people if things were better now or better during the time of the USSR people consistently told me things were better during the period of the USSR. (лучше, чем сейчас. Тогда все работали) So, my view of the whole matter is that I want there to be a stop to the war, and I do not care whose flag is flying above any particular territory. (Even Neil Armstrong paid respect to his fallen comrades that together had tried to get to the moon, both from the USA and the USSR. He left medallions from the soviet cosmonauts that came before him and from Apollo 1 who had died tragically.) \ That period was when I was learning Gemara with my learning partner at the ziun of Rav Nahman of Breslov for about an hour every day. I had a slight understanding what it means to learn in depth from my years in Shar Yashuv and the Mir yeshiva in NY. However, I had forgotten a lot until it was reawakened in me by my learning partner in Uman David Bronson who also had learning in Litvak yeshivot like the Aderet Eliyahu in Jerusalem which goes strictly by the path of the Gra. [If I had stuck with the straight path of the Litvak world, I would probably be married today with my x wife, and still be learning Torah every day all-day. I imagine that I did not appreciate the straight path of the Gra enough, and got sidetracked.] Even though Rav Nahman had great and important ideas,-if one loses the straight path of the Gra of learning Torah for its own sake, then all bets are off. To lose the Gra is to lose everything אנשים באומן היו מאוד אדיבים אליי במשך שנים רבות. עשיתי את העסק שלי להיות שם בראש השנה כל שנה וכל האוקראינים שם היו מאוד מסבירי פנים אליי. במשך כ-7 שנים הייתי המפקח למבוגרים במעונות סטודנטים עבור סטודנטים באוניברסיטה המקומית. לפיכך, תמיד כאב לי מאוד לחשוב שאותם אנשים אדיבים עשויים להיות אפילו היום בחזית, ואולי חלקם אפילו לא בין החיים יותר. אפשר לומר שזה יהפוך אותי למגן נחוש של הניצחון במלחמה. אבל לא. במקום זאת הייתי מעדיף שיהיה שלום. ולמרות שאני לא יכול להגיד שום דבר על אנשים מה שמרגישים בקייב או בכל מקום אחר באוקראינה, אבל באומן עצמה מעולם לא שמעתי או שמעתי על טינה כלשהי נגד ברית המועצות. להיפך, בכל פעם ששאלתי אנשים אם המצב טוב יותר עכשיו או טוב יותר בתקופת ברית המועצות, אנשים אמרו לי באופן עקבי שהדברים היו טובים יותר בתקופת ברית המועצות. לכן, ההשקפה שלי לגבי כל העניין היא שאני רוצה שתהיה עצירה למלחמה, ולא אכפת לי של מי דגלו מתנוסס מעל איזה טריטוריה מסוימת התקופה ההיא הייתה לומד גמרא עם שותפי ללמידה בציון של הרב נחמן מברסלב במשך כשעה בכל יום. הייתה לי הבנה קלה מה זה אומר "ללמוד לעומק" מהשנים שלי בשאר ישוב ובישיבת מיר בניו יורק. אולם שכחתי הרבה עד שהתעורר בי מחדש על ידי שותפי ללימוד באומן, דוד ברונסון, שגם הוא למד בישיבות של ליטה כמו אדרת אליהו בירושלים שהולכת למהדרין בדרכו של הגר"א

za 70 d minor

za70 d minor midiza70 nwc format

ברצוני לשאול שאלה על תוספות בבא קמא דף י''ח ע''ב. הוא נותן מספר סיבות מדוע רבא לא רצה להציע שהמשנה עם הכלב והלחם הולך כמו החכמים שלא מסכימים עם סומכוס, ומחזיקים שצרורות זה חצי נזק. זה אומר שהם לא שואלים אם המשנה צריך להיקרא כמתייחס למקרה רגיל של צרורות כי כבר ענינו על זה. אמרנו שאם זה יהיה כך, אז איך יכול ר' אלעזר להחזיק בזה נזק מלא, אבל גם את זה שיש לשלם מגוף החיה? במקום זאת, השאלה היא שעלינו לקרוא את המשנה כעל שינוי בצרורות. החכמים היו אומרים שזה חצי נזק כחוק הרגיל, והשינוי לא משנה לר' אלעזר שמחזיק בזה שהוא נזק מלא. שאלה שלי: אין סיכוי שר' אלעזר יחזיק במקרה רגיל של צרורות זה חצי נזק, אבל אם יהיה שינוי, זה יעלה לנזק מלא. כלומר, אני שואל מדוע תוספות לא ענה על הסיבה הכי ברורה מדוע רבא לא יכול היה לומר שמשנה זה מקרה של צרורות עם שינוי, ובכל זאת ר' אלעזר מחזיק שזה נזק מלא, למרות שבאופן כללי הוא מחזיק עם החכמים שזה חצי נזק. כל מה שאני יכול לחשוב עליו כדי לענות על זה הוא אולי תוספות זה מציע שרבא אולי אמר את החכמים של המשנה הזה, כמו החכמים של סומכוס שזה חצי נזק, ור' אלעזר מחזיק את זה כמו סומכוס שזה נזק מלא. מכל מקום, אנו יכולים לראות מדוע רבא כן אמר שגם ר' אלעזר וגם סומכוס מחזיקים זה מקרה של שינוי, ושניהם מחזיקים כסומכוס שבדרך כלל מדובר בנזק מלא, אבל לחכמים זה ירד לחצי נזק בגלל השינוי. לסומכוס שינוי זה אינו מוריד את התשלום, אבל הוא גורם לכך שהדין שהנזק משולם מגוף הבהמה, לא תשלום מלא במזומן. הטעם הוא כי השינוי עושה את זה כמו שור תם ששינה וגורף וגנח והנזק משולם מהגוף.-------רק כדי לעזור להבהיר את דברי כאן, הרשו לי להביא את הנושא הבסיסי. רבא אם צרורות משלמים מהגוף או כסף מלא במזומן. תשובה: אנו רואים מהמשנה של הכלב עם הכיכר ששולם חצי נזק, ואנחנו מניחים שזה כמו צרורות ובכל זאת משולם מהגוף. תשובה: לא. זה לא יכול להיות כך כי ר' אלעזר אמר שהמקרה הזה משלם את מלוא הנזק, ולא ניתן לשלם את מלוא הנזק מהגוף. תשובה: הוא קובע שכל נזק משלמים כמו סומכוס אבל מהגוף כמו ר' יהודה שאמר תם נשאר במקומו. רב סמא שאל, "אנחנו יודעים רק שר' יהודה אמר את זה במקרה של שינוי, לא במקרה כמו שלנו שבו נזק עם צרורות הוא נורמלי. תשובה (לפי תוספות) המקרה הזה של המשנה הוא לא כשהיה רק מעשה אחד של הכלב עם הכיכר. אלא זה קרה שלוש פעמים, והייתה אזהרה בכל פעם. אז לר' אלעזר זה נזק מלא, אבל לחכמים זה נשאר בחצי נזק כי לא היה שינוי. [בשלב זה, אנחנו לא עונים למה זה יהיה נזק מלא לר' אלעזר ובכל זאת ישולם מהגוף.] אז אנחנו שואלים: אבל אז לרבא תהיה תשובה ברורה לשאלתו אם אזהרה חלה על צרורות? יהיה ברור שזה לא לפי החכמים, אבל אזהרה כן חלה לפי ר' אלעזר. אבל רבא ענה. לא. השאלה שלי הייתה רק לגבי אם אזהרה חלה על מקרה רגיל של צרורות לפי החכמים שמחזיקים בו חצי נזק. אבל המשנה של הכלב עם הכיכר הולך לפי סומכוס שמחזיק בכל מקרה של צרורות הוא נזק מלא. אבל המשנה הזו מתייחסת למקרה שבו היה שינוי, אבל ללא אזהרה. לפיכך לר' אלעזר יש נזק מלא, אבל הוא משולם מהגוף, וחכמים גורסים שזה חצי נזק. זה בגלל השינוי זה ירד לחצי נזק

Tosphot Bava Kama page 18 b

[I would like to make clear that Tosphot gives good reaons to anwer his question. My question is simply why not give the most stricking and obvious reason?] I would like to ask a question on Tosphot Bava Kama page 18 b. He gives several reasons why Rava did not want to suggest that the Mishna with the dog and the loaf goes like the sages that disagree with Sumchos, and hold that pebbles is half damage. That means that they are not asking if the Mishna should be read as referring to a regular case of pebbles because we already answered that. We said that if that would be so, then how could R. Elazar hold it is full damage and also that must be paid from the body of the animal. Rather, the question is that we should read the Mishna as being about a change in pebbles. the sages would say it is half damage because that is the regular law, and the change would make no difference, but R. Elazar would hold it is full damage. My question: There is no way that R Elazar would hold a regular case of pebbles is half damage, but if there is a change it would go up to full damage. That is, I am asking why Tosphot did not answer the most obvious reason why Rava could not have said that Mishna is a case of pebbles with change, and yet R. Elazar holds it is full damage though in general he holds with the sages that it is half damage. All I can think of to answer this is perhaps Tophot is suggesting that Rava might have said the sages of this Mishna hold like the sages of sumchos that it is half damage and that R. Elazar holds it like Sumchos that it is full damage. At any rate, we can see why rava did say that both R. Elazar and Sumchos hold it is a case of change and both hold with Sumchos that it is normally full damage, but to the sages that is brought down to half damage because of the change. To Sumchos that change does not bring the payment down, but it does cause that the law that the damage is paid from the body of the animal, not full payment in cash because the change make its like a docile ox who changed and gored and that damage is paid from the body. ____________________________ Just to help clarify my remarks here let me bring the basic subject. Rava asked,"do pebbles pay from the body or full cash?" Answer: we see from the mishna of the dog with the loaf that is paid half damage and we assume that is pebbles, and yet is paid from the body. No. That cannot be so because r elazar said that case pays full damage and we know full damage cannot be paid from the body. Answer: he holds that full damage is paid like sumchos, but from the body like R. Yehuda who said docile stays in its place. Rav sama asked; “We only know that R Judah said this in a case of change, not in our case where damage with pebbles is normal. Answer: (according to Tosphot) this case of the mishna is not when there was just one act of the dog with the loaf. Rather, it happened three-times and there was a warning each time. so, to R Elazar it is full damage, but to the sages it remains at half damage because there was no change. [At this point, we are not answering why it would be full damage R. Elazar and yet paid from the body.] We ask, "but then Rava would have an obvious answer to his question, "If warning applies to pebbles?" It would be clear that it does not according to the sages, but warning does apply according to R. Elazar. Rava answered. No. My question was only about if warning applies to a regular case of pebbles according to the sages who hold it is half damage. But the Mishna of the dog with the loaf is going according to sumchos who holds all case of pebbles is full damage. But this mishna is referring to a case where there was change but no warning. Thus to R. Elazar there is full damage, but it is paid from the body, and the sages hold it is half damage. That is because of the change it went down to half damage. _____________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to ask a question on תוספות בבא קמא page י''ח ע''ב. He gives several reasons why רבא did not want to suggest that the משנה with the dog and the loaf goes like the חכמים that disagree with סומכוס ,and hold that צרורות is half damage. That means, that they are not asking the משנה should be read as referring to a regular case of צרורות because we already answered that. We said that if that would be so, then how could ר' אלעזר hold it is full damage, but also that must be paid from the body of the animal? Rather, the question is that we should read the משנה as being about a change in צרורות. the חכמים would say it is half damage because that the regular law, and the change make no difference to ר' אלעזר who would hold it is full damage. שאלה שלי There is no way that ר' אלעזר would hold a regular case of צרורות is half damage, but if there is a change, it would go up to full damage. That is, I am asking why תוספות did not answer the most obvious reason why רבא could not have said that משנה is a case of צרורות with change and yet ר' אלעזר hold it is full damage, though in general he holds with the חכמים that it is half damage. All I can think of to answer this is perhaps תוספות is suggesting that רבא might have said the חכמים of this משנה hold like the חכמים of סומכוס that it is half damage and that ר' אלעזר holds it like סומכוס that it is full damage. At any rate, we can see why רבא did say that both ר' אלעזר and סומכוס hold it is a case of change, and both hold with סומכוס that it is normally full damage, but to the חכמים that is brought down to half damage because of the change. To סומכוס that change does not bring the payment down, but it does cause that the law that the damage is paid from the body of the animal, not full payment in cash הטעם הוא.because the change make its like a שור תם who changed and gored and that damage is paid from the body. Just to help clarify my remarks here let me bring the basic subject. רבא asked do צרורות pay from the body or full cash. Answer we see from the משנה of the dog with the loaf that is paid half damage and we assume that is צרורות like and yet is paid from the body. No. That cannot be so because ר' אלעזר said that case pays full damage and full damage cannot be paid from the body. Answer: he holds that full damage is paid like סומכוס but from the body like ר' יהודה who said תם stays in its place. רב סמא asked “we only know that ר' יהודה said this in a case of שינוי , not in our case where damage with צרורות is normal. Answer (according to תוספות) this case of the משנה Is not when there was just one act of the dog with the loaf. Rather, it happened three-times and there was a warning each time. so, to ר' אלעזר it Is full damageת but to the חכמים it remains at half damage because there was no change. [At this point, we are not answering why it would be full damage ר' אלעזר and yet paid from the body.] THEN we askת but then רבא would have an obvious answer to his question if warning applies to pebbles? It would be clear that it does not according to the חכמים but warning does apply according to ר' אלעזר. BUT רבא answered. No. My question was only about if warning applies to a regular case of צרורות according to the חכמים who hold it half damage. But the משנה of the dog with the loaf is going according to סומכוס who holds all case of צרורות is full damage. But this משנה is referring to a case where there was change but no warning. Thus to ר' אלעזר there is full damage but it is paid from the body, and the sages hold it is half damage. That is because of the שינוי it went down to half damage.

בבא קמא עמוד י''ח

בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי מהי הבעיה העיקרית בבבא קמא עמוד י''ח שגם רש''י וגם תוספות נאבקים בה. זה שההתחלה והסוף של הדיון לא תואמים. רב סמא שאל רבינא אולי ר' יהודה אמר דינו שתם נשאר במקומו רק כשהחיה התחילה תם ואז הפכה למועד. היה שינוי בבהמה. אז יש הבדל בנוסח רש''י ותוספות לגבי התשובה. לרש''י התשובה היא "זה מקרה שהחיה השתנתה והוזהרה. זה התחיל תם והפך למועד”. גרסה זו עונה על השאלה של רב סמא, אבל אז השאלה הבאה היא, "אם כן, יש לנו תשובה ברורה לשאלה של רבא, "אם אזהרה יכולה לחול על צרורות?" ברור שזה לא עונה על השאלה הזו. השאלה הייתה אם אזהרה חלה על צרורות, לא אם אזהרה ושינוי חלים על צרורות. אבל אז בואו נסתכל על הגרסה של תוספות. ואז רב סמא אמר, "אולי ר' יהודה אמר דינו רק במקרה שהבהמה הייתה תם, ונעשתה מועד? תשובה: המקרה שלנו של הכלב עם הכיכר והפחם הבוער הוא מקרה של שהייתה אזהרה. ובכן, איך זה עונה על השאלה של רב סמא? השאלה לא הייתה אם הייתה אזהרה או לא. השאלה הייתה אם היה שינוי או לא? אני מניח שהמשמעות של תוספות היא שזו תשובה אחרת שהתשובה למעלה שבה אמרנו שר' אלעזר מחזיק עם סומכוס שצרורות נדרשות לשלם נזק שלם. על דעה זו שאל רב סמא את שאלתו. אבל עכשיו אנחנו אומרים שר' אלעזר מחזיק בדעה אחרת שהשאלה לא תחול עליה. הוא מחזיק שלש פעמים אזהרה על חלוקי נחל גורמות לכך שנדרש לשלם נזק שלם ,וזה המקרה של המשנה עם הכלב עם הכיכר לחם. אני מניח שאולי תוספות אומר שהתשלום המלא הזה יהיה מגוף החיה כמו במקרה של חצי תשלום. או שמא הוא מתכוון שהתנא שהציע נזק לכלב ישולם מגופו של הכלב רק במקום שלא הייתה אזהרה, ועדיין זו הייתה הפעם הראשונה או השנייה שזה קרה. כך אני חושב שזה מה שתוספות מתכוון כאן ----להבהיר שאלתי,תן לי להביא את כל הסוגיא. הגמרא מתחילה עם רבא ששואל אם צרורות משלמים מגופה של החיה או מזומן. תשובה: אנו למדים מהמשנה של הכלב עם הפחם ששורף את הערימה שחייב בחצי נזק לערימה. ותוספתא אומרת לנו שהתשלום הוא מגוף הבהמה. אנחנו שואלים על זה מר' אלעזר שאמר שמשלם תשלום מלא עבור הערימה. איך יכול להיות נזק שלם שמגיע מהגוף? תשלום מלא הוא תמיד מקרה של תשלום במזומן. לאחר דיון עונה הגמרא שאולי ר' אלעזר מחזיק כמו ר' יהודה שהצד של תם נשאר במקומו. משמע שאף על פי שהוא משלם נזק שלם, עדיין מחציתו נובע ממכירת הבהמה [מה שיכול להיות הרבה פחות מזה שאם כל הנזק היה מוערך ומשולם ללא התחשבות בערך הבהמה]. בנקודה זו רב סמא שאל את שאלתו אולי ר' יהודה אמר את החוק שלו רק במקרה של שינוי מצייתן למסוכן, לא משהו כמו אבנים קטנות (צרורות) שבו הירי של צרורות הוא הדבר הנורמלי לחיה לעשות. במקרה זה שכן ר' אלעזר מחזיק כסומכוס שזהו תשלום מלא ושצריך להיות במזומן מלא אני בשלב זה, לא ברור מה רש''י עונה על השאלה הזו. עם זאת, אני יכול לראות משהו שרב שך אומר, שאזהרה ושינוי הם משתנים תלויים. לכן, לפי תוספות, שאלת השינוי שוות ערך לשאלת ההתראה. זאת מכיוון ששניהם תלויים, אם נגזרת של רגל יכולה להפוך לנגזרת של קרן. היינו אם תולדת רגל יכולה להפוך לתולדת קרן הערה מאוחרת > בסופו של דבר זכיתי לראות מה רש''י מתכוון כאן. הוא מחזיק שהתשובה היא שינוי ואזהרה יכולים לענות על השאלה של רב סמא, וזה המצב במקרה של הכלב עם הכיכר והפחם. לתשלום כפי ר' אלעזר, זה עולה לנזק מלא, כי זה נזק על ידי קרן, ולתנא של המשנה זה נשאר ב-1/2 כי זה צרורות. זה טוב כי זה אומר לנו במצב הזה לר' אלעזר, הנזק משולם ממזומן, ולתנא של המשנה הוא משולם מהגוף. הגמרא עושה קפיצת מדרגה ומציעה שלפי מה שאנחנו יודעים על שינוי ואזהרה, נוכל לדעת על אזהרה בלבד. [זו בעיה. ראשית אין סיבה לעשות את הקפיצה הזו. שנית, (שאלת התוספות) זה לא אומר לנו כלום על הסיבה המקורית שהתחלנו את הדיון הזה. האם צרורות רגילות משלמות מהגוף, לא אם המקרה הוא שיש שינוי ואזהרה.] בכל מקרה, הדיון ממשיך מאיפה שהפסקנו. זו תהיה שאלה של רבא ששאל מה הדין במקרה של צרורות עם אזהרה בלבד. למה לשאול אם התשובה ברורה? רבא עונה, "שאלתי לפי התנא (נגד סומכוס) מי שמחזיק צרורות זה חצי נזק. אבל אנחנו לא יכולים לדעת כלום על זה מהמשנה של הכלב עם הלחם, כי ר' אלעזר והתנא של המשנה הולכים עם דעתו של סומכוס שמחזיק צרורות זה נזק מלא, אבל זה לא המקרה של הכלב והכיכר. במצב של של הכלב עם כיכר ופחם יש שינוי ללא אזהרה, והשינוי הזה הופך צרורות לקרן התם (לנגיחה פעם ראשונה, שניה ושלישית שזה נקרא "קרן התם"). לר' טרפון תשלום לנזק הראשון הוא נזק מלא, בעוד שהחכמים (נגד ר' טרפון) מחזיקים הוא חצי נזק בכל מקרה, זו הגישה של רש"י עם זאת, התוספות היא שונה לגמרי.

Bava Kama page 18

On the way back from the sea it occurred d to me what is the main problem in Bava Kama page 18 that both Rashi and Tosphot are struggling with. It is that the beginning and end of the discussion do not match. Rav Sama asked Ravina perhaps R. Judah said his law that tam stays in its place only when the animal started out docile and then became dangerous . There was a change in the animal, then there is a difference in the version of Rashi and Tosphot about the answer. To Rashi the answer is, “It is a case where the animal changed, and was warned. It started out docile and became dangerous”. This version answers the question of Rav Sama, but then the next question is. "If so, we have an obvious answer to the question of Rava if warning can apply to pebbles?" Clearly it does not answer that question. The question was, "If a warning applies to pebbles?" not "If warning and change applies to pebbles?" But then let us look at the version of Tosphot. Rava Sama said "Maybe R. Judah said his law only in a case where the animal was docile and became dangerous? Answer: our case of the dog with the loaf and burning coal is a case of when there was warning." Well, how does that answer the question of Rav Sama? The question was not, "If there was warning or not?" The question was, "If there was change or not?"I guess what Tosphot means is that this is a different answer that the one above where we said r elazar holds with sumcho that pebbles are required to pay full damage. On that opinion is Rav sama asked his question. But now we are saying that R Elazara holds a different opinion upon which the question would not be applicable. he holds there times warning about pebbles causes there to be required full payment and that is the case of the mishna with the dogs. I guess that might mean that he is saying that that full payment would be from the body of the animal like in case of half payment. Or he might mean that the tana that suggested the damage of the dog should be paid from the body of the dog only where there was no warning, and it was still the first or second time the even happened. That is think is what Tosphot means here. The Gemara starts out with Rava asking if pebbles pay from the body of the animal or cash. Answer: we learn from the mishna of the dog with the coal that burns the stack that is obligated in half damage for the stack and a Tosephta tells us that payment is from the body of the animal. We ask on that from R. Elazar who said one pays full payment for the stack. How can there be full payment that come from the body? Full payment that is always a case of paying in cash. After some discussion the Gemara answers that perhaps R. Elazar holds like R. Judah that the side of docile stays in its place. That means that even though he pays full payment, still half of it come from selling the animal [ which might be much less that if the whole damage was assessed and paid for without regard to the value of the animal] and from that money restitution is made. On this point, Rav Sama asked his question: "Maybe R. Judah said his law only in a case of change from docile to dangerous, not something like pebbles where the shooting up of pebbles is the normal thing for an animal to do;- so in our case of pebbles, (since R. Elazar holds with Sumchas) that would be full payment and that would have to be in full cash. I am at this point, unclear as for what Rashi answering about this question. However, I can see something that Rav shach says that warning and change are dependent variables. Therefore, according to Tosphot the question of change is equivalent to the question of warning. that is since both depend on if derivative or foot can become a derivative of horn later note > Eventually I got to see what Rashi means here. He holds the answer is change and warning can answer the question of Rav Sama and that is the situation in the case of the dog with the loaf and coal. To R. Elazar payment it goes up to full damage because it is damage by horn, and to the tana of the Mishna it stays at 1/2 because it is pebbles. This is good because it tells us in this situation to R Elazar the damage is paid from cash, and to the tana of the Mishna it is paid from the body. The Gemara make a leap and suggest that from what we know about change and warning, we can know about warning alone. [This is a problem. First there is no reason to make this leap. Second, (the question of Tosphot) it does not tell us anything about the original reason we started this discussion. Does normal pebbles pay from the body, not if the case is there is change and warning] At any rate, the discussion continues from where we left off. That would be a question of Rava who asked what is the law in a case of pebbles with warning alone. Why ask it if the answer is obvious?. Rava answers, “I was asking according to the tana against Sumchos who holds pebbles is half damage. But we can not know anything about that from the mishna of the dog with the loaf because R Elazar are going with the opinion of Sumchos who holds pebbles is full damage, but that is not the case of the dog and loaf. There is change with no warning, and that change turns the pebbles into first time damage by horn. And R Elazar holds like R Tarphon that first time damage by horn is full damage, while the sages (againt R Tarffon )hold it is 1/2 damage. At any rate, thi i the approach of Rashi. Tosphot is quite different ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ On the way back from the sea it occurred to me what is the main problem in בבא קמא page 18 that both רש''י and תוספות are struggling with. It is that the beginning and end of the discussion do not match. רב סמא asked רבינאperhaps ר' יהודה said his law that תם stays in its place only when the animal started out תם and then becameמועד . There was a change in the animal, then there is a difference in the version of רש''י and תוספותabout the answer. To רש''י the answer is “It is a case where the animal changed and was warned. It started out תם and became מועד”. This version answers the question of רב סמא but then the next question is if so, we have an obvious answer to the question on of רבא if warning can apply to צרורות. Clearly it does not answer that question. The question was if a warning applies to צרורות not if warning and change applies to צרורות. But then let us look at the version of תוספות. THEN רב סמא said maybe ר' יהודה said his law only in a case where the animal was תם and became מועד? Answer: our case of the dog with the loaf and burning coal is a case of when there was warning. Well, how does that answer the question of רב סמא ? The question was not if there was warning or not. The question was if there was change or not. The גמראstarts out with רבא asking if צרורות pay from the body of the animal or cash. Answer: we learn from the משנהof the dog with the coal that burns the stack that is obligated in half damage for the stack and a תוספתא tells us that payment is from the body of the animal. We ask on that from ר' אלעזרwho said one pays full payment for the stack. How can there be נזק שלם that come from the body? Full payment that is always a case of paying in cash. After some discussion the גמראanswers that perhaps ר' אלעזר holds like ר' יהודה that the side of תם stays in its place. That means that even though he pays בזק שלם, still half of it come from selling the animal [ which might be much less that if the whole damage was assessed and paid for without regard to the value of the animal] and from that money restitution I made. On this point רב סמא asked his question maybe ר' יהודה אמרhis law only in a case of change from docile to dangerous, not something like אבנים קטנות צרורות where the shooting up of צרורות is the normal thing for an animal to do in that case since ר' אלעזר hold with סומכוסthat that is full payment that would have to be in full cash I am at this point, unclear as for what רש''י answering about this question. However, I can see something that רב שך says. warning and change are dependent variables. Therefore, according to תוספות the question of change is equivalent to the question of warning. That is since both depend on if derivative or foot can become a derivative of horn later note > Eventually I got to see what רש''י means here. He holds the answer is change and warning can answer the question of רב סמא and that is the situation in the case of the dog with the loaf and coal. To ר’ אלעזר payment it goes up to full damage because it is damage by horn, and to the תנא of theמשנה it stays at 1/2 because it is צרורות. This is good because it tells us in this situation to ר’ אלעזר the damage is paid from cash, and to the tana of theמשנה it is paid from the body. The גמרא make a leap and suggest that from what we know about change and warning, we can know about warning alone. [This is a problem. First there is no reason to make this leap. Second, (the question of תוספות) it does not tell us anything about the original reason we started this discussion. Does normal צרורות pay from the body, not if the case is there is change and warning] At any rate, the discussion continues from where we left off. That would be a question of רבא who asked what is the law in a case of צרורות with warning alone. Why ask it if the answer is obvious? רבאanswers, “I was asking according to the תנא against סומכוס who holds צרורות is half damage. But we cannot know anything about that from theמשנה of the dog with the loaf because ר’ אלעזר are going with the opinion of סומכוס who holds צרורות is full damage, but that is not the case of the dog and loaf. There is change with no warning, and that change turns the צרורות into first time damage by horn. And ר’ אלעזר holds like ר' טרפון that first time damage by horn is full damage, while the חכמים (against ר' טרפון) hold it is 1/2 damage. At any rate, this is the approach of Rashi. HOWEVER תוספות is quite different

Mathematics and Physics

I think that learning Mathematics and Physics is important even for us dumb people because I consider this learning to be a second degree mitzva. There I such a thing as second degree as you can see in the Rambam that learning Gemara is delving into the depths of the Mishna. In psalms 77 (which is one of the ten that Rav Nachman said were a tikun/correction for damage to the holiness of the brit) it says, “I will recount all Your amazing works.” How to go about learning? The best idea is to say the words in order and go on, until the end of the book and then review the same book four times. Don't worry if you do not understand at first for eventually you will understand by doing much review. And even if you do not, so what? At least you get the mitzvah of learning the works of creation as mentioned in the Mishna Torah

על מנת לענות על מה ששאלתי אני רוצה להציע שיש ויכוח בין הגמרא הכתובה בבבל לזה הכתובה בישראל. אני חושב שהגמרא שלנו (התלמוד שנכתב בבבל) גורסת שצרורות הן תולדת נזק על ידי ברגל, אבל שאם מתרחש מקרה חריג של צרורות (למשל חיה בועטת וצרורות נורות למעלה וגורמות נזק), זה ספק אם מדובר ב תולדת רגל או תולדת קרן. אם זה עדיין תולדת רגל, אז להיות חריג לא משנה, וזה נשאר בחצי נזק. אם השינוי גורם לו להפוך לנזק על ידי קרן, אז זה חצי ממה שהיה נדרש, וזה רביע נזק. אותו ספק חל על אזהרה. אם המעשה החריג גורם לו להיות קרן התם, אזהרה חלה עליו, ואם נעשה שלוש פעמים הוא חוזר עד חצי נזק, או אולי הוא נשאר רגל ולא יורד כלל לנזק רביע. יתר על כן, רבא שואל אם אזהרה יכולה לחול על צרורות גם אם נעשות כרגיל, כך שגם אם זה נשאר רגל, עדיין יכול להיות שאזהרה שייכת. לרבא יש ספק לגבי צרורות, אם הן משולמים על ידי גוף הבהמה או מזומן רגיל או אדמה טובה. זה אומר שהוא תוהה אם אפילו חלוקי נחל רגילים הם רגל או קרן. רב פפא אומר משלמים במזומן או בקרקע טובה, ולכן אין זה ספק כלל לרבא. זה רגל. שינוי שייך רק לקרן התם אולם הירושלמי בבא קמא פרק ב' הלכה א' קובע כי חלוקי נחל נתונים לוויכוח בין ר' זעירא ור' אילא שכן שם כתוב ר' לעזר אמר אם נזק נגרם על ידי בעל חיים במגע עקיף, הוא אחראי הן ברשות הפרטית והן ברשות הרבים ב-1/2 כופר. ר' זעירא אמר שזה אפשר לקבל אזהרה, ור' אילא אמר שלא. אני חושב שהטיעון הזה אם חלוקי נחל רגילים הם רגל או קרן. למרות שהגמרא שלנו מחזיקה שהם רגל, הירושלמי הוא מחזיק שהם ספק. מכל מקום נוכל כעת לראות למה התכוון רב שך בתשובתו לשאלה מדוע הרמב''ם הוציא את הספק אם חלה אזהרה על חלוקי נחל. הסיבה פשוטה. הרמב''ם כתב ששנו ספק, ולכן גם האזהרה היא בספק. הם משתנים תלויים זה בזה, לא משתנים בלתי תלויים. הם תלויים אם חלוקי נחל הם רגל או קרן. אם רגל, לא שינוי ולא אזהרה חלים. אם קרו, גם אזהרה וגם שינוי חלים. עם זאת, רב פפא סבור שהם בהחלט רגל וזה הדין. אז איך יכול הרמב''ם להחליט הן כרב פפא למי הם בהחלט רגל, וכפי רבא שזה ספק? למעשה, אתה יכול לראות זאת ישירות ברמב''ם וברב שך. הרמב''ם כותב את הביטוי שנוי הוא ואינו תולדת רגל (זה שינוי ולא נגזר מרגל.) ורב שך כתב שינוי הוא ונחשב גוף ההיזק למשונה וקרן הוא פשיטא ששייך ביה שם העדה

Yeruhalmi bava kama chapter 2. halacha 1. our gemara bava kama, pg 18.

in order to answer what I asked in my previous blog entry I would like to suggest that there is an argument between the Gemara written in Babylon and the one written Israel. I think the our Gemara (the Talmud written in Babylon) holds that pebbles are an a extension of damage by foot, but that if there occurs an unusual case of pebbles (for example an animal kicks and pebbles are shot up and cause damage), that is a doubt if it is an extension of damage by foot or damage by horn. if it is still damage by foot, then being unusual does not matter, and it remain at 1/2 damage. If the change causes it to become damage by horn, then it is half of what would have been required with that change and it is 1/4 damage. The same doubt applies to warning. If the unusual act makes it horn, then warning applies to it, and if done three time it goes back up to 1/2 damage, or perhaps it remains foot and never goes down at all to 1/4 damage. Furthermore Rava is asking if warning can apply to pebbles even if done normally, so that even if it remains foot, still warning might be applied. Rava has a doubt about pebbles if they are paid by the body of the animal or plain cash or good land. That means he Is wondering if even plain pebbles are foot or horn. Rav Papa says they are paid by cash or good land, and therefore this is not a doubt at all to Rav Papa. It is foot. The Yeruhalmi however is holding that pebble are subject to an argument between R, Zeira and R Ila for there it is written R. Lazer said if damage is caused by an animal by indirect contact, it is liable both in a private domain and public domain o 1/2 penalty. r Zeira said it can receive warning and R. Ila said it cannot. I think this argument if regular pebbles are foot or horn. even though our Gemara hold they are foot the Yeruhalmi is hold they are a doubt. at any rate we can now see what Rav Shach meant in his answer to the question why the Rambam left out the doubt if warning applies to pebble. the reason is simple. The Rambam wrote that change a doubt and therefore warning is also a doubt. they are interdependent variables, not independent variables. they depend on whether pebbles are foot or horn. if foot neither change nor warning applies. if horn both warning and change apply. however, Rav Papa holds it they are definitely foot and that is the law. So how can the Rambam decide both by Rav Papa to whom they are definitely foot and by Rava that it is a doubt? Actually, you can see this directly in the Rambam and in Rav Shach. The Rambam writes the phrase It is a change and not derived from foot [toldat regel]. That is, it became derivative of horn [toldat horn] and rav shach writes also it is toldat horn. [I was looking at reb aaron kotler's book on shas and he also brings this Yerushalmi and from there I got the idea of how to explain Rav shach. What I wrote i not from reb aaron, but it occurred to me while reading his ideas on Bava Kama. ] _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In order to answer what I asked in my previous blog entry I would like to suggest that there is an argument between the גמרא written in Babylon and the one written Israel. I think the our גמרא (the תלמו written in Babylon) holds that צרורות are an a extension of damage by foot, but that if there occurs an unusual case of צרורות (for example an animal kicks and צרורות are shot up and cause damage), that is a doubt if it is an extension of damage by foot or damage by horn. if it is still damage by foot, then being unusual does not matter, and it remain at חצי damage. If the change causes it to become damage byקרן , then it is half of what would have been required with that change and it is רביע damage. The same doubt applies to warning. If the unusual act makes it horn, then warning applies to it, and if done three time it goes back up to חצי damage, or perhaps it remains foot and never goes down at all to רביע damage. Furthermore רבא is asking if warning can apply to pebbles even if done normally, so that even if it remains foot, still warning might be applied. רבא has a doubt about pebbles, if they are paid by the body of the animal or plain cash or good land. That means he Is wondering if even plain pebbles are foot or horn. רב פפא says they are paid by cash or good land, and therefore this is not a doubt at all to רבא. It is foot. שינוי שייך רק לקרן התם The ירושלמי however is holding that pebble are subject to an argument between ר' זעירא and ר' אילא for there it is written ר' לעזר said if damage is caused by an animal by indirect contact, it is liable both in a private domain and public domain o 1/2 penalty. ר' זעירא said it can receive warning and ר' אילא said it cannot. I think this argument if regular pebbles are foot or horn. Even though our גמרא hold they are foot, the ירושלמי is hold they are a doubt. At any rate, we can now see what רב שך meant in his answer to the question why the רמב''ם left out the doubt if warning applies to pebble. The reason is simple. The רמב''םwrote that change a doubt and therefore warning is also a doubt. They are interdependent variables, not independent variables. They depend on whether pebbles are foot or horn. If foot, neither change nor warning applies. If horn, both warning and change apply. However, רב פפא holds it they are definitely foot and that is the law. So how can the רמב''ם decide both by רב פפא to whom they are definitely foot and by רבא that it is a doubt? Actually, you can see this directly in the רמב''ם and in רב שך. The רמב''ם writes the phraseשנוי הוא ואינו תולדת רגל "It is a change and not derived from foot.ורב שך שינוי הוא ונחשב גוף ההיזק למשונה וקרו הוא פשיטא שייך ביה שם העדאה