za59 F Major midi za59 in nwc format

Bava Mezia page 2 side B. the last Tosphot on the page

Let me present the Gemara Bava Mezia page 2 side B and the last Tosphot on the page. Our mishna says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The gemara asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox, or not. The gemara asked, “Then perhaps our Mishna is not like sumchos, because our mishna says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox, sumchos says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is derara demomona (so they divide without an oath). {Derara demomona means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The gemara asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is derara demomona, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the mishna is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." Tosphot says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that sumchos says to divide without an oath is that is a case of derara demomona. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about rav Nahman said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, derara demomona only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of derara demomona, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to-do with derara demomona. The question I have here I that the gemara say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of derara demomona, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of derara demomona. We see the gemara wants to say that in our case, the lack of derara demomona means we should divide without an oath The gemara is not asking here that we should divide like the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of derara demomna is what the gerama says should cause dividing without an oath—not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of derara demomona should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this mut be the reason of Rabbainu Tam who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment. However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have till found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the gemara says there is a "all the more so from derara demmona to lack of derara demomona".This is different from the way rabbainu tam is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it i a different kind of case of holding the object It occurred to me that this must be the reason of rabbainu Tam to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their pleas instead of the other opinion of the Rashbaam and Rabbaainu Jona that it means relevance of money. For if there is no doubt to the court then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind of holding onto the object, then stll it would be sensible to have each take an oath and all the more so if each has no relavance to the object. so the Gemara wouldmaake sence in either way _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב and the last תוספות on the page. Our משנה says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The גמרא asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox או not. The גמרא asked, “Then perhaps our משנה is not like סומבוס, because our משנה says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox סומכוס says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is דררא דממונא (so they divide without an oath). { דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The גמרא asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is דררא דממונא, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the משנה is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." תוספות says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that סומכוס says to divide without an oath is that is a case of דררא דממונא. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about רב נחמן said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, דררא דממונא only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of דררא דממונא, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to do with דררא דממונא. The question I have here I that the גמרא say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. We see the גמרא wants to say that in our case, the lack of דררא דממונא means we should divide without an oath The גמרא is not asking here that we should divide ץlike the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of דררא דממונא is what the גמרא says should cause dividing without an oath; not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of דררא דממונא should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this be the reason of רבינו תם who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the גמרא says there is a "all the more so from דררא דממונא to lack of דררא דממונא ".This is different from the way ר''ת is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it is a different kind of case of holding the object. Also if דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות then lack of דררא דממונא meaans there i a doubt only becaue of their טענות and so thee ought to be an a oath. It occurred to me that this must be the reason of רבינו תם to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות instead of the other opinion of the רשב''ם and רבינו יונה that it means שייכות of money. For if there is no doubt to the court, then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind ofשייכות onto the object, then stll it would be sensible that neither takes an oath and all the more so if each has no שייכות to the object. so the גמרא would make sence in either way ______________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב ותוספות אחרון בדף. המשנה שלנו אומרת ששני אנשים אוחזים בבגד מתחלקים עם שבועה. שואלת הגמרא ממקרה של שור דופק פרה, ונמצא עוברה בסמוך לה, ואין אנו יודעים אם היא הולידה מוקדם בגלל השור או לא. שאלה הגמרא "אז אולי המשנה שלנו לא כמו סומבוס, כי המשנה שלנו אומרת לחלק את ערך הבגד בשבועה, ואילו במקרה של השור סומכוס אומר לחלק בלי שבועה". תשובה: המקרה של השור הוא דררא דממונא (ולכן מחלקים בלא שבועה). { דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק לבית הדין גם בלי הטענות שלהם.} הגמרא שואלת "האם אין זה "על אחת כמה וכמה"? אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשיש דררא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה כשאין? תשובה: המשנה היא מצב של שבועה שנגזרה על ידי הסופרים. תוספות אומר שהטעם למקרה של שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שהם מחלקים בשבועה הוא בגלל שהם מחזיקים בו. פרשת שור שנגח פרה ונמצא סמוך לה העגל שטרם נולד ושסומכוס אומר לחלק בלא שבועה הוא בגלל הדין של דררא דממונא. במקרה של סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה רב נחמן אמר "מי שחזק מקבל אותה", כי שם אף אחד לא אוחז בסירה. כלומר דררא דממונא רק אומר לנו לחלק בלא שבועה. אם לא מדובר בדרא דממונא, הרי שהדין תלוי אם שני האנשים אוחזים בחפץ או לא, ואין לזה קשר לדררא דממונא. השאלה שיש לי כאן אני שהגמרא אומר אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשמדובר בדרא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה שיחלקו בלא שבועה כשאין זה דררא דממונא. רואים שהגמרא רוצה לומר שבמקרה שלנו חסרון דררא דממונא אומר שצריך לחלק בלי שבועה. הגמרא לא שואל כאן שנחלק כמו במקרה של שור שנגח כי בעצם כן מחלקים. ההבדל היחיד הוא השבועה. ולכן חסרון דררא דממונא הוא מה שהגמרא אומר צריך לגרום לחלוקה בלא שבועה; לא העובדה שהם מחזיקים את הבגד אולי תשיב שחוסר דררא דממונא לא צריך להיות כשלעצמו סיבה לחלוקה. אני חושב שזו הסיבה של רבינו תם שאומר שהסיבה לחלוקה היא שהם מחזיקים את הבגד עם זאת, אני מאמין ששותפי ללמידה היה מוצא את התשובה הזו כלא מספקת. הסיבה היא שהגמרא אומרת שיש "על אחת כמה וכמה מדררא דממונא לחסרון דררא דממונא". זה שונה מהדרך שבה ר''ת לומד שהסיבה שמחלקים את הבגד אינה ''על אחת כמה וכמה" סוג של היגיון, אבל בגלל שזה סוג אחר של מקרה של החזקת האובייקט כמו כן אם דררא דממונא משמע שיש ספק לבית הדין בלא טענותיהם אזי חסר דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק רק בגלל טענותיהם, ולכן צריך להיות שבועה עלה בדעתי שזו חייבת להיות הטעם של רבינו תם להחזיק דררא דממונא משמע יש ספק לבית הדין בלא מחלוקתם במקום דעתו האחרת של הרשב''ם ורבינו יונה שמשמעותה כמות גדולה של כסף. שהרי אם אין ספק לבית הדין, אז אין סיבה לגרום לאיש להישבע, עם זאת, אפילו אם זה אומר שלכל אחד יש סוג של שייכות על החפץ, אז עדיין יהיה הגיוני שאין צריכים להישבע שבועה, ועל אחת כמה וכמה אם לכל אחד אין זכות לחפץ. אז הגמרא יהיה הגיוני בכל דרך

za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format Music has been numbered from 1 to 100 in each series A to Z. Then started again from "za". However many files are missing or lost. Most were never put on line. There are however older files with names like black hole or anything I could think of at the time. There is a file by the name of mathematics and another by name "orchetra"--for that it was written for

misuse of a philosophy. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs

If every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory, but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed. Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular, the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently, and held that one need to learn the Organum of Aristotle (known by the name of the seven wisdoms). It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam are ignored. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs. To be clear, I prefer the distilled approach of Kelley Ross who combines Kant with Leonard Nelson and Schopenhauer. But, I still see great value in Hegel and a more modern great thinker, Michael Huemer of the Intuitionist approach. still I think the Kelley Ross approach is the best.{friesian.com.} Reichenbach had more sense than the Friesian school when it came to Relativity, so to be able to create a consistent system, the Friesian school did not have much to work with until Kelley Ross who managed to put together the various strands of thought into a consistent system. [However he is ignored in Germany, which is sad. For that approach needs modification.] Rav Nachman of Breslov dismissed learning philosophy completely, and there is a good point to that as we can see nowadays how crazy it can get. But still, I see great values in a few of them, e.g. the minor dialogoes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fries, Hegel,Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross.

the first mishna in Bava Batra המשנה הראשונה בבבא בתרא

Tosphot holds in first mishna in Bava Batra the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of derara demomona. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “We both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the gemara says openly that that is not a case of derara demomona. Now the case of derara demomona, Tosphot often says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their pleas, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the gemara in Bava Batra (page 35 side B) holds` derara demomona is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the gemara in Bava Metzia (page 3) says derara demomona is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in Bava Batra where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of derara demomona to be when they object could belong to both. later note: Rav shach brings Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 97b and the beginning of perek 10 that derara demomona is that each is considered to be holding the object. The Rabbainu Yona (bava batra page four and page 35) (who is brought by Rav Isar Meltzer) holds derara demomona is that the object is tied or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the rashbam and Tur as brought by Rav Nachum of the Mir ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of derara demomona in Bava Batra 35a that it means both might own the object. But if you hold derara demomona is like the gemara in Bava Mezia page 3a that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the ketzot HaChoshen that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two gemaras differ about derara demomona is possible to see in the language in Bava Batra 35 "it [the field that each claim that it belong to him] cannot be derara demomona because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so derara demomona means it can belong to both. In Bava Metzia page 3a it says "THE garment that both are holding cannot be derara demomona because it might belong to both" Thus if it can belong to both together then it cannot be derara demomona I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _______________________________ תוספות holds in first משנה in בבבא בתרא the case of a wall in a courtyard between two dwellers is divided evenly because it is a case of דררא דממונא. However if they would divide because the both are considered to be holding onto the wall, then if one says, ”I built the whole wall” and the other says, “we both built it,” then they would have to divide it three fourths and one fourth, as is the case with two holding a garment where they divide three fourths and one fourth (when one says “It all belongs to me” and the other says “We both own it.”) And there with two holding a garment, the גמרא says openly that that is not a case of דררא דממונא.. Now, the case of דררא דממונא, often תוספות says that it is a case where the court of law has a doubt even without their טענות, and therefore they both divide evenly without regard to their pleas. Now the גמרא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) holds דררא דממונא is when the object they are arguing over could belong to both, while the גמרא in בבא מציעא (page ג') says דררא דממונא is only when it cannot belong to both, but has to be only belong to one or the other, not both. so, I think the law in בבא בתרא where they divide the wall evenly must hold that understanding of דררא דממונא to be when the object could belong to both. note: רב שך brings תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ז ע''ב and the beginning of פרק י' הבית והעליה that דררא דממונא is that each is considered to be holding the object. The רבינו יומה (who is brought by רב איסר מלצר) holds דררא דממונא is that the object is שייך or related to each person. (This is also the approach of the רשב''ם and טור as brought by רב נחום of the מיר ) But, at any rate, I think the law of dividing the wall is clearly going with the idea of דררא דממונא in בבא בתרא (page ל''ה ע''א ) that it means both might own the object. But if you hold דררא דממונא like the גמרא in בבא מציעא page ג' ע''א that it means the object cannot belong to both, then the law of dividing the wall would have to be like the קצות החושן that is is because each one is considered to be holding the wall. I might mention here that the two גמרות differ about דררא דממונא is possible to see in the language in בבא בתרא ל''ה "it cannot be דררא דממונא because if it belongs to one it cannot belong to the other and if it belongs to the other it can not belong to the first" so דררא דממונא mean it can belong to both. In בבא מציעא ג' ע''א it says it cannot be דררא דממונא because it might belong to both" Thu if it can belong to both together then it cannot be דררא דממונא I would like to add here a point which is probably simple, but I still do not know the answer. What if the courtyard does not have enough room have a law where one can force the other to divide? {i.e., it does not have four cubits for each one.} Then if one puts a wall anyway, do you till divide the stones if the wall falls and the one that put up the wall has no proof that he did the work alone? _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ תוספות אוחז במשנה ראשונה בבבא בתרא דין חומה בחצר בין שני שותפים מתחלק שווה בשווה כיון שהוא דין דררא דממונא. אבל אם היו מחלקים כי שניהם נחשבים כמחזיקים בחומה, אז אם אחד אומר "בניתי את כל החומה", והשני אומר "שנינו בנינו", אז יצטרכו לחלק אותו שלושה רבעים, ורביעית, כמו במקרה של שניים אוחזים בבגד ששם מחלקים שלוש רביעיות ורביעית (כשאחד אומר "הכל שייך לי" והשני אומר "שנינו הבעלים שלו"). (ושם עם שניים אוחזים בבגד, הגמרא אומר בגלוי שזה לא דין דררא דממונא.) עכשיו, במקרה של דררא דממונא, פעמים רבות תוספות אומרים שזה מקרה שלבית הדין יש ספק גם בלי ההסבר שלהם, ולכן שניהם מחלקים שווה בשווה בלי בהתייחס לטענות שלהם. כעת הגמרא בבבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''ב מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא כאשר החפץ שהם מתווכחים עליו יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, ואילו הגמרא בבא מציעא (דף ג') אומר דררא דממונא הוא רק כאשר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אלא צריך להיות שייך רק לאחד או לשני, לא לשניהם. לכן, אני חושב שהחוק בבא בתרא שבו הם מחלקים את הקיר באופן שווה חייב לקבוע שההבנה של דררא דממונא היא כשהחפץ יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. הערה: רב שך מביא תוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ז ע''ב ותחילת פרק י' הבית והעליה שדררא דממונא הוא שכל אחד נחשב מחזיק את החפץ. רבינו יונה (בבא בתרא דף ד' ול''ה) (שהביאו רב איסר מלצר) מחזיק דררא דממונא הוא שהחפץ הוא שייך או קשור לכל אדם.(זו גם גישתם של הרשב''ם וטור כפי שהביאו רב נחום מהמיר) אבל, בכל אופן, אני חושב שדין חלוקת החומה הולך בבירור עם הרעיון של דררא דממונא בבא בתרא (דף ל''ה ע''א) שפירושו של שניהם יכולים להיות בעל החפץ. אבל אם תחזיק דררא דממונא כמו הגמרא בבבא מציעא דף ג' ע''א שזה אומר שהחפץ לא יכול להיות שייך לשניהם, אז דין חלוקת הכותל צריך להיות כמו קצות החושן כלומר משום שכל אחד מהם נחשב כמחזיק את הקיר אציין כאן שזה ששני הגמרות נבדלים לגבי דררא דממונא אפשר לראות בלשון בבא בתרא ל''ה "לא יכול להיות זה דררא דממונא כי אם זה שייך לאחד זה לא יכול להיות שייך לשני ואם זה שייך להאחר זה לא יכול להיות שייך לראשון". אז דררא דממונא מתכוון שזה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם. בבבא מציעא ג' ע''א כתוב "שזה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא כי זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם" לכן אם זה יכול להיות שייך לשניהם יחד אז זה לא יכול להיות דררא דממונא אני רוצה להוסיף כאן נקודה שהיא כנראה פשוטה, אבל אני עדיין לא יודע את התשובה. מה אם בחצר אין מספיק מקום שיש חוק שבו אחד יכול להכריח את השני לחלק? {כלומר, אין לו ארבע אמות לכל אחד.} אז אם בכל זאת ישים חומה, האם אתה מחלק את האבנים אם החומה נופלת ולמי שהעמיד את החומה אין הוכחה שהוא עשה את העבודה לבד

za57 E minor midiza57 E minor nwc format

za56 E Flat Major midi za56 nwc

Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot. I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam

There was a great scholar in the Mir who I have just discovered, a Rav Nachum. I  can see great importance in learning his ideas and I might mention here that while Rav shach and Rav Isar Zalman Meltzer generally concentrated their efforts in understanding the Rambam, Rav Nachum is more focused on Tosphot as was my learning partner, David Bronson in Uman, and also Rav Naftali Yegger in the yeshiva shar Yashuv in New York.  I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David bronson took a definite I have to add that I have not taken sides among these giants. shar yashuv and david bronson were certainly on the side of Tosphot, while apparently Rav Chaim of Brisk, Rav Isar Meltzer and Rav shach were concentrating their efforts in understanding the Rambam. David Bronson took a definite stand that, "Tosfot is always right." Period. But I think that I would rather not take sides between Tosphot and the Rambam. I think that both Rambam and Tosphot are important. I would like to take use this internet platform to suggest to learn Rav shach and Rav Nachum in each subject, and I also believe that there is a connection between their approaches. however i recommend the approach of balance with a combination of learning in depth along with quike learning--doing the review many time.

za555 midi in A Minor za55 in nwc

za54 midi same file in nwc

to combine tea and coffee

It is obvious` that the rise of the ancient Chinese empire was due to tea. and it was` that same thing that gave rise to the British empire. however, it was coffee that was the direct cause of the rise of Germany in the 1700's and 1800' because obviously coffee is better than tea in giving that first punch. However, I believe that we all should learn from the English custom of having a set tea time every day and in fact having a "nice tea often." The first thing the English did on D-day when they were part of the advance on Nazi Germany was to boil a pot of tea until their commanding officer told them first to fight the Nazis, and then have tea. But, I think the best idea is to combine tea and coffee in the same cup since each one gives a specific and different kind of energy. However, I must also add that immediately after having tea with any kind of sugar, one must brush his or her teeth since bacteria in the mouth love sugar.

Without a doubt Nietzsche is the most powerful prose writer in the German language, and possibility in any language [much beyond any writer that I have seen]. However powerful and convincing he is, every jot and tittle of his writing` is philosophy for angry adolescents, not a word of truth. Instead, I recommend reading Chesterton, the Anti-Nietzschean. [Convincing and powerful does not equal True--as any lawyer or politician can tell you.] ll

Where is Marxism? Argentina was plunged into a devastating economic crisis in December 2001/January 2002, from communist policies that led to a collapse in output, high levels of unemployment, and political and social turmoil? In the cannibalism Venezuela? In the millions of murdered people under Stalin and Meo Zedong? Or is in books?? Of course, if you ask a Marxist, they will tell you true communism has never been tried. However, if you compare anything in this world to paradise, and claim that true paradise is what Marxism promises, well then, Marxism will win. But, if you compare anything in the world to paradise, then nothing will win

Bava Batra page 3a. Rambam laws of neighbors chapter 2 halacha 10

I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of Rav Isar Meltzer about the Rosh [rav ]. The Rosh holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners) they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the Rosh entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the Rosh. The question then what is the reason for the Rambam? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both Rav shach and Rav Isar meltzer explain the reason is that to the Rambam this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of Rav Isar Meltzer that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” [so to the Rambam there is no need to say Go and acquire (which is a command, and command is not needed when there is anyway implicit agreement) but both need to go and take pessession since both already have the property jointly. so it is not aqcuiring by barter exchange but by division] ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to answer the question I asked yesterday about the approach of רב איסר מלצר about the רא''ש. The רא''ש holds with this courtyard (that does not have four cubits for each of the partners), they agree to divide by exchange. That in itself explains the רא''ש entirely. With an exchange, neither has to say, “Go and acquire” and you only need one to go and take hold of his half. so there is no ambiguity about the רא''ש. The question then what is the reason for the רמב''ם? Why both need to take possession, but neither needs to tell the other “Go and acquire?” For this both רב שך and רב איסר מלצר explain the reason is that to the רמב''ם this is not acquisition by exchange, but rather division of what both already own. Therefore, neither need to say “Go and acquire,” however both need to take possession of their half. Now you might ask why do they not need to say, “Go and acquire?” הטעם הוא Because you only need that when one sells property to the other, and the other takes possession not in front of the seller. That goes according to the idea of רב איסר מלצר that to say “Go and acquire” means a direct command which we would need in case of acquisition. But even without that command, there is still an implicit agreement to acquire. But if in those words there is only the meaning of agreement to acquire, then even with division of property we would need one to tell the other “Go and acquire.” [so to the רמב''ם there is no need to say לך חזק וקקני (which is a command, and command is not needed when there is anyway implicit agreement) but both need to go and take בעעלות since both already have the property jointly. so it is not aqcuiring by חליפין but by חלוקה] הברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי אתמול לגבי גישתו של רב איסר מלצר לגבי הרא''ש. הרא''ש מחזיק בחצר זו (שאין בה ארבע אמות לכל אחד מהשותפים), הם מסכימים לחלוקה לפי החלפה (קנין חליפין). זה כשלעצמו מסביר את הרא''ש לגמרי. עם החלפה, אף אחד לא צריך להגיד "לך ותרכוש" (לך חזק וקני) ואתה צריך רק אחד שילך ויאחז בחצי שלו. כך שאין אי בהירות לגבי הרא''ש. השאלה אם כן מה הסיבה לרמב''ם? למה שניהם צריכים להשתלט, אבל אף אחד לא צריך להגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש?" לשם כך מסבירים גם רב שך וגם רב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שלרמב''ם זו לא רכישה על ידי החלפה, אלא חלוקה של מה שכבר יש לשניהם. לכן, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש", אולם שניהם צריכים להשתלט על המחצית שלהם. עכשיו אתה יכול לשאול מדוע הם לא צריכים לומר, "לך לרכוש?" הטעם הוא כי אתה צריך את זה רק כאשר אחד מוכר נכס לשני, והשני משתלט לא מול המוכר. זה הולך לפי הרעיון של רב איסר מלצר שלומר "לך ורכש" פירושו פקודה ישירה שנצטרך במקרה של רכישה. אבל גם בלי הפקודה הזו, עדיין יש הסכמה מרומזת לרכישה. אבל אם במילים האלה יש רק משמעות של הסכם לרכוש, אז גם עם חלוקת רכוש נצטרך שאחד יגיד לשני "לך ותרכוש לכן לרמב''ם אין צורך לומר לך חזק וקני (שזה פקודה, ואין צורך בפקודה כשממילא יש הסכמה מרומזת) אלא שניהם צריכים ללכת ולקחת בעלות שכן לשניהם כבר יש את הקניין ביחד. אז זה לא נרכש על ידי חליפין אלא על ידי חלוקה

page 3a of Bava Batra

There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page 3a of Bava Batra. Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief, or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the Rosh, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the Rosh this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the Rambam both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “Go and make an acquisition.” To Rav Isar Meltzer, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “Go and acquire”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “Go and acquire” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to Rav Shach the reason of the Rosh is that the Rosh considers this a case of acquisition by exchange where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “Go and acquire.” But Rav Shach and Rav Isar Meltzer agree that the reason for the Rambam is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “go and acquire,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what Rav Isar Meltzer holds here about the opinion of the Rosh, it is from exchange or from agreement?" Rav Shach mentions that the law is that even in dividing, you only need one to take his share. He however does mention that that might be only in a case when the courtyard is big enough for four cubits to come to each one. But from this we can understand the Rosh, who says even if just one divides that is enough. __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________]_________________________ There Is a subject I would like to introduce on page דף ג' ע''א of בבא בתרא Two people own jointly a courtyard and want to divide it, even though it is small. In fact, it is so small that four cubits would not go to both. And in fact, in this case, they cannot force each other to divide. But they want to divide anyway. They can make an acquisition by a handkerchief (סודר), or even without an acquisition by handkerchief each one can go into the part he wants and make there an acquisition by making a fence or locking or tearing down a fence. To the רא''ש, only one needs to make an acquisition. The reason is that since they both own it jointly, after one takes one part, the other gets the other part automatically. To the רא''ש this is similar or perhaps the same as acquisition by exchange. To the רמב''ם both need to make an acquisition. But to both, neither needs to say to the other, “לך חזק וקני.” To רב איסר מלצר, the reason is that in general cases of acquiring land, one needs to say, “לך חזק וקני.”, but here this is not a regular kind of acquisition, but rather dividing up what they already own jointly. And in the phrase, “לך חזק וקני” there is implicitly the meaning of giving possession directly, not just agreeing to let the other acquire. (And in our case, there is no need to say, “Go and acquire” since they both own it, but there does need to be an agreement of letting the other acquire.) However, to רב שך the reason of the רא''ש is that the רא''ש considers this a case of acquisition חליפין where when one partner acquires, the other automatically acquires without having to say, “לך חזק וקני.” But רב שך and רב איסק מלצר agree that the reason for the רמב''ם is this this is dividing what they already own, and so do not have to say “לך חזק וקני,” but each does need to take hold of his half. As you can tell, I am not sure what רב איסר מלצר holds here about the opinion of the רא''ש, it is from exchange or from agreemenT? ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ יש נושא שארצה להציג בדף דף ג' ע''א בבא בתרא. שני אנשים מחזיקים יחד חצר ורוצים לחלק אותה, למרות שהיא קטנה. למעשה, הוא כל כך קטן שארבע אמות לא ילכו לשניהם. ולמעשה, במקרה זה, הם לא יכולים להכריח זה את זה להתחלק. אבל הם רוצים להתחלק בכל זאת. הם יכולים לעשות רכישה על ידי מטפחת (סודר), או אפילו בלי רכישה במטפחת על ידי שכל אחד יכניס לחלק שהוא רוצה ולעשות שם רכישה על ידי עשיית גדר או נעילה או פירוק גדר. לרא''ש רק אחד צריך לעשות רכישה. הסיבה היא שמכיוון ששניהם מחזיקים בו במשותף, לאחר שאחד לוקח חלק אחד, השני מקבל את החלק השני באופן אוטומטי. לרא''ש זה דומה או אולי זהה לרכישה בהחלפה (חליפין). לרמב''ם שניהם צריכים לעשות רכישה. אבל לשניהם אין צורך לומר לשני "לך חזק וקני". לרב איסר מלצר הסיבה היא שבמקרים כלליים של רכישת קרקע צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כאן אין מדובר ברכישה רגילה, אלא בחלוקת מה שכבר מחזיקים במשותף. ובביטוי "לך חזק וקני" יש במרומז את המשמעות של נתינת חזקה ישירות, לא רק הסכמה לתת לאחר לרכוש. (ובענייננו, אין צורך לומר "לך ורכש" כיון ששניהם מחזיקים בו, אבל צריך להיות הסכם לתת לשני לרכוש.) אולם לרב שך טעם הרא''ש הוא שהרא''ש רואה בזה מקרה של רכישה על ידי חליפין כאשר וכאשר שותף אחד רוכש, השני רוכש אוטומטית מבלי לומר "לך חזק וקני". אבל רב שך ורב איסר מלצר מסכימים שהסיבה לרמב''ם היא שזה חלוקת מה שכבר יש להם, ולכן לא צריך לומר "לך חזק וקני", אבל כל אחד צריך להחזיק בחציו כפי שאתה יכול לדעת, אני לא בטוח מה רב איסר מלצר מחזיק כאן לגבי דעת הרא"ש, זה מחילופין או מהסכמה רב שך מזכיר שהדין הוא שגם בחלוקה צריך רק אחד שייקח את חלקו. עם זאת, הוא מזכיר שזה יכול להיות רק במקרה שבו החצר גדולה מספיק כדי שארבע אמות יגיעו לכל שותף. אבל מכאן אפשר להבין את הרא''ש, שאומר גם אם רק אחד מחלק די בכך.

za53 B minor in midi za53 in nwc