I am a bit surprized that the herem of the Gra [that is, his signature on the famous letter of excommunication published in Villna] is so widely ignored. I mean to say that if people  do not pay attention to the law of the Torah--that I can understand though I can not agree. But if people  are interested in keeping Torah, why would ignoring that herem be considered to be ok? 

Now perhaps in previous generations, it was not so obvious. But nowadays it ought to be clear.--worship of dead corpses [even if they want to call the corpse a "tzadik"] ought to be easy to see that that has nothing to do with Torah.

The pretense of Torah is not Torah, no matter how many people that can be fooled. [ I learn and hold very much with Rav Nahman because I believe that the herem was not relevant to him. There was a book that contained  all the five herems and testimonies gathered that I read in a library in the old city of Jerusalem. According to what  the herem aid, Rav Nahman would not be included    ]

 the only reason to get married commitment and for having children. It doe not make sex holy not even allowed. For in Torah law sex with an unmarried woman i allowed. That is the  law of pilegesh.

For good children, I think sex ha to be Friday night after midnight. see the sidur of yaakov emden for this subject in detail 

bastard [ממזר]

A bastard [ממזר]is born from sex that is with guilt of Karet [כרת].  It has nothing to do with marriage.

An example would be a woman that is married to one man and then has sex with another, or any of the types of karet in Viyakra (Leviticus) 18 and 20. [There is an exception of nida [menstruating'--seeing blood  ] who is under penalty of karet and yet one born from a nida is not a bastard ]

There is an opinion of R. Akiva who holds a bastard can come from sex is merely prohibited by a prohibition, .but that is not the law.

 Guilt of Karet is a kind of prohibition that gets the death penalty if done on purpose in front of two witnesses or has to bring a in offering if done by accident. [e.g. idolatry]

sex with an unmarried woman is not prohibited at all Tothe Rambam it just i lacking a positive command of getting married. But to most Rishonim it is not prohibited at all.

see Chronicle I chapter 2. verse 46

[But I can see good reasons to be married in term of commitment..That is it tends to reinforce mutual  commitment. But it does not make sex holy ]

To the Rashbam [Bava Metzia 96] לרש''י ולרא''ש גנב יכול להחזיר רק כלים שלמים או בכסף. לרשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו]

 To Rashi Tosphot and the Rosh a thief can pay back only with whole vessels or money. To the Rashbam [Bava Metzia 96] even with anything that is worth money. But we also have a law that אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object. [That is the object that was stolen and broken according to the time it was stolen]. To the Rashbam it looks that this must mean one evaluate the object at the time he stands before the court. But to Rashi and the Rosh the meaning of "one does not evaluate" is to pay back whole vessels, for if one could   evaluate then he could give back teh broken pieces and jut pay for the damaged part.

However the Rambam might hold like the Rosh and Rashi  or like the Rashbam. But in any case, he holds the law "one does not evaluate" and the law of how the thief must pay are not related because he holds one does not evaluate refers to what value the object lost by being broken,--not the whole object and what it was worth.. I have written about this in my little book on Bava Metzia but I see Rav Shach  is explaining the subject according to the Rambam that the two laws are unconnected. At any rate, it is hard to see the difference between אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object or one does not evaluate the worth of the damage. The reason is the only way to evaluate the worth of the damage is by seeing what the object was worth at first before the damage. . 

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 To רש''י תוספות and the רא''ש a thief can pay back only with whole vessels or money. To the רשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו] even with anything that is worth money[שווה כסף]. But we also have a law that אין שמין לגנב one does not evaluate the worth of the object. [That is the object that was stolen and broken according to the time it was stolen]. To the רשב''ם it looks that this must mean one evaluate the object at the time he stands before the court. But to רש''י and the רא''ש the meaning of "אין שמין לגנב" is to pay back whole vessels, for if one could   evaluate then he could give back  broken pieces and  pay for the damaged part. However the רמב''ם might hold like the רא''ש and רש''י  or like the רשב''ם. But in any case, he holds the law "one does not evaluate" and the law of how the thief must pay are not related because he holds ''אין שמין לגנב'' refers to what value the object lost by being broken,,not the whole object and what it was worth..  רב שך  is explaining the subject according to the רמב''ם that the two laws are unconnected

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לרש''י ולרא''ש גנב יכול להחזיר רק כלים שלמים או בכסף. לרשב''ם [בבא מציעא צ''ו] אפילו בכל דבר ששווה כסף אבל יש לנו גם חוק שלגנב לא מעריכים את ערך החפץ. [זה החפץ שנגנב ונשבר לפי הזמן שנגנב]. לרשב''ם נראה שזה מכוון שמעריכים את החפץ בזמן שהוא עומד בפני בית המשפט. אבל לרש''י ולרא''ש פירוש "אין שמין לגנב" הוא להחזיר כלים שלמים, שהרי אם היה אפשר להעריך אז הוא יכול להחזיר חתיכות שבורות ולשלם על החלק הפגום. אולם הרמב''ם עשוי להחזיק כמו הרא''ש והרש''י או כמו הרשב''ם. אבל בכל מקרה, הוא מחזיק בדין "אין מעריכים" ודין איך הגנב משלם אינם קשורים כי הוא מחזיק ''אין שמין לגנב'' מתייחס לאיזה ערך החפץ איבד בשבירה,,לא כל החפץ ומה שהיה שווה.. רב שךמסביר את הנושא לפי הרמב''ם ששני החוקים לא קשורים. בכל מקרה, קשה לראות את ההבדל בין "אין שמין לגנב" לא מעריכים את ערך החפץ או לא מעריכים את ערך הנזק. הסיבה היא שהדרך היחידה להעריך את שווי הנזק היא לראות מה היה שווה החפץ בהתחלה לפני הנזק. .

 The religious world bears only a superficial resemblance to Torah. But at least  those that follow the Gra get most things right. But not all.  They learn Torah in depth and love Torah for it's own sake.  They are aware that good character [to be a mensch] is the essence of Torah--. But by ignoring the herem [letter of excommunication] of the Gra, they tend to fall into the same Dark Side trap. [Sitra achra]

[I admit that I could be wrong about my particular liking of Rav Nahman of Breslov in that he might be thought to be in the category of te excommunication of the Gra. But I tend to believe that he stands outside of it. In fact I have seen that the Litvak world in general considers him to be a great tzadik.]

first night of pesach

 Next Tuesday night should be the first night of Pesach according to the approach of the gemara in Sanhedrin page 10 side b.--that is you go by the conjunction of the moon with the sun on the same longitude.[not the same latitude also because that would be  lunar ellipse]. And that is the first opinion of Tosphot over there. But if you go by the gemara in Rosh Hashana, there it is clear you go by the time when you can see the new moon, and that would be a day later. [That is the gemara that Tosphot bringc to argue on that first opinion. [ But in my opinion,  that Gemara in Sanhedrin disagrees with the Gemara in Rosh Hashana]  But none of that has anything to do with the calendar. All this means is if there would be a court that had authentic semicha from Sinai then they would go by one of these opinions the conjunction or when they see the new moon

 A lot of people that present themselves as ""talmidei hachamim" are actually from the dark side but there is a way to be rescued from them. That is by inviting true Torah scholars into one's home. That is--at any rate, what I gathered today by reading the Le.M. (Lekutei Moharan) of Rav Nahman of Breslov vol I chap 28in the local Na Nach place

 Even though I hold that the basic absolute Litvak path is correct and important, there are some issues where I disagree.  I..e. the Land of Israel, the State  of Israel, the approach to Rav Nahman, the calendar, the herem of the Gra.

Sitting in kollel

(1) Living in Israel is important as stated by all rishonim.

(2) the state of Israel also is important.

(3) Rav Nahman was an important tzadik-- but the insane world of Breslov is  different story, [and most of his advice is good and true, but some of it was given to individual people and not meant for everyone.]

(4)  The herem of the Gra is certainly still valid. but due to my reading of the several herems that were issued in Villna, I do not think they apply to Rav Nahman.

(5) The calendar was never instituted by Hillel II. If it had been, why would the Gemara have been silent about it?

(6) Kollel is a hard issue to determine.  My own path goes with the opinion that one should learn Physics and Math and make a living doing that. But those that learn Torah all day in the great Litvak Yeshivot are also doing well. 

 Among some mediaeval authorities, learning physics and metaphysics  is important, e.g. Chovot Levavot, Rambam, ibn Gavirol and the commentaries on the Guide who were also Rishonim [mediaeval authorities]. But later Musar [Ethics] books tended to leave that out. You must have noted this in the Ramchal. so when Rav Israel Salanter  took up the goal of reintroducing and revitalizing Musar, this emphasis was lost. My own experience was to be part of the great Musar yeshiva, the Mir in NY. But eventually, I did not find anyplace for me, so I depended on the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities] like Rambam to begin  Physics studies at NYU. [But that was interrupted]. However, I think the whole issue comes down to what is known as a ''מחלוקת ראשונים'', [an argument among mediaeval authorities]. אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים that is what the gemara says about an argument among tenaim. --''these and those are the words of the living God.''

[[the issue goes back to the geonim- saadia on one side [with ibn pakuda's chovot levavot ] and hai gaon on the other.]

 The news media reports what Ukrainian commanders in the field say to them--as if that has any connection with reality, Right! I am sure the Russians are beaten with their nuclear submarines off the coast of California and New York right now. Right. Keep up the self delusion.

People are sadlly unaware of the facts on the ground and under the sea, They mistake Russian restraint for  weakness.  Just like the last attempt to cripple the Russian economy which just boomeranged  backwards to cripple the economy of the USA and strengthen the ruble. People have no idea what they are dealing with. .

The religious world is based patrician against plebian the upper class superior beings against the common folk.

The religious world  is based patrician against plebian the upper class superior beings against the common folk. But it is in the interest of the patrician to hide this dynamic.     The problem with the religious is that they imagine that they are keeping Torah. The addition of endless rituals have of course, no root in Jewish Law. But more so, two of the major requirements of Torah are Monotheism which means belief in God alone, not the endless parade of phony "tzadikim". Another is Midot Tovot [good character]which means to be a mensch, not a backbiter. Not to be   forcing secular Jews to pay for their kollels against their will. They can make this happen by the form of government in Israel, but that does not mean secular Jews give willingly. And that comes under the category of "Hamas" [Yes, it is the same word] which means to force someone to give you money against their will. For example, to take something from someone and then offer to pay for it.   

something wrong with academia

 One reason to go with the Friesian school is this: imagine you are in an algebra class in high school. There is a problem on the blackboard that you are sure you have the right answer to. But right before you raise your arm to get called on, the smartest kid in the class gets called on before you, and gives a different answer. And then the teacher calls on you to give your answer. Are you so sure now? You might be a little hesitant to offer your answer.  ["The dog ate my homework."] After all that smart kid so far has gotten straight A's on every algebra test,

This is somewhat parallel. You might think Hegel the right answer. But Karl Gauss [the smart kid in the class ] raises his hand and says "Jacob Fries is the right approach." Then a hundred years goes by and the same question comes up. You think Husserl or Marx is the right answer. Then again the smartest kid in the class, David Hilbert, again raises his hand and says ''Leonard Nelson  --the founder of the Neo Friesian school has the right approach. so why are the smart kids ignored in academia,--Gauss and David Hilbert? It must be that there is something  wrong with academia

[ Nelson has still not been translated to English, but as an intro to his thought you might learn Plato and Kant. ]

I found out about Nelson on the web site of Kelley Ross when I was looking up Spinoza and saw the amazing analysis on Spinoza there. [At the time I had some questions on Spinoza, and had also seen Leibniz's critique on Spinoza]. One question of my own  was this. "Geometry or any exact science does not start with far fetched axioms. Take an example geometry. One axion is this: the shortest distance between two points is  a straight line. Almost too obvious to be stated.  To start with 'There only one substance in the universe' (as Spinoza does) sounds like something that needs to be proved, not taken a an axiom. "

Since the death of my son Izhak, I have accepted on myself to be doing four sessions in learning in my hope that they will go for his credit in Gan Eden where I hope and pray he is. But my original idea of doing lot of review does not seem to work in the sessions in math and physics. [I started this because Izhak held strongly of the idea of learning in depth (limud beiyun)]. For me it seems to work better to go one chapter forward, and then review to the beginning. Then one more chapter forward, and then again review to the very beginning. The only areas where review on that same chapter or section  works for me is in Tosphot or Rav Chaim of Brisk or the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach.

Leviticus 18 and 20 and in the book of Numbers, seeing blood means a woman can not sleep with her husband for 7 days.

[Introduction- the law as you can read in the Bible is that seeing blood means a woman can not sleep with her husband for 7 days. Leviticus 18 and 20 and in the book of Numbers. On the night after the7th day she dips into a river. But the custom became that all women think of themselves as  a woman who sees blood for more than 7 days. If that would be in fact the case, then she would need 7 clean days, and then go to a river. What I am suggesting  is that women ought to get back to the law of the Torah--that is that 7 days is enough. That means whether she sees one day or 2 or three or even 7 full days, she still goes to the sea or river on the night after the 7th day and that is that.]  

Seven days of nida seems to me to be enough. A woman  sees blood one day or two  or even seven straight days, that should count for the seven days of nida. She dips in a river after the 7th day at night and that is enough.   Ziva is just not prevalent [seeing blood for eight days or more], and even a straight prohibition from the words of the scribes does not apply unless the reason it was made is common place.--much less a custom that few people keep anymore. It is not that I am looking to be lenient. There are thing I think people should be strict in like going into a river or sea. The "mikve" nowadays is a solid block of concrete and thus a "vessel" and therefore not kosher. [I.e. it can be lifted out of the ground in one piece.]

reason and faith

Reason and faith, In the Middle Ages, "reason" meant Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and a few Muslim Philosophers. After the Renaissance, Reason  meant more than study of Aristotle. But what? Two approaches began. The Enlightenment  and the Anti Enlightenment [Gulliver's travels at Laputa],\

 So I have done a bit of sifting out what I think is not so great. In STEM fields I have no argument except my wish that pseudo sciences [like psychology] would be weeded out, In Philosophy, I go with Kant and in particular that school of thought of Leonard Nelson that is a sort of modification on Kant. [But I am not so dismissive  of Hegel.]

[ I am no expert, but I can point out that John Searle said about 20th century philosophy "It is obviously false"] [He was clearly referring to existentialism  and the Frankfurt neo Marxists, If one wishes to invest the time to go into this he or he might look at the lectures of James Lindsay]

the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more."

In the path of the Gra it is not clear what education ought to include. In the introduction to Euclid  in Hebrew by Baruch of Sckolev [disciple of the Gra] is brought the statement of the Gra that, "To the degree that one lacks any knowledge of the seven wisdoms, to that degree he will lack in understanding of Torah a hundred fold more." But in the Middle Ages "the seven wisdoms" meant the Quadrivium and Trivium [grammar, logic, and rhetoric, while the quadrivium consists of arithmetic, astronomy, music, and geometry],  Rhetoric is the subject of attack in Plato's Georgias and the Ion. Georgias was a famous sophist that prided himself (like  all the sophists] of being able to convince people of anything even falsehoods. Socrates does not like that. The Gra certainly would not hold by learning that. Rather this seems to refers to the 6 books of Aristotle, the Organon. During the Middle Ages, many Rishonim held one ought to have a secular education  which would mean what today would be known as STEM fields, Science, Tech, Engineering, Mathematics.[But this would not include pseudo science like psychology]

[In the world of Litvak yeshivot, yeshiva was only for seven years==that is to go through the even basic tractates--one per year. [Three bavot: Bava Kama Bava Metzia Bava Batra and 4 Nashim: gitin kidushin yevamot Ketuboth.] 

tendency to add restrictions

 There is a kind of tendency in the religious world to add tons of restrictions that the Torah does not require and to ignore plenty of prohibitions that the Torah forbids. This, of course, is against the verse in Deuteronomy chap. 4 verse 2 that commands us not to add nor subtract from the commandments. And it is also against the approach of the Gra and the general Litvak world. However,  this tendency has seeped in the Litvak world today. And while I was   in the Mir in NY, I barely noticed this tendency because at that time I was interested in following the stricter opinion about any question in halacha--law.  But after some time, I began to notice this. Of course, there is nothing wrong with taking the strict opinion about any particular law. But the problem is that lots of restrictions are made up out ''of whole cloth'' [as the expression goes].

 Philosophers (whether in academia or outside) seem determined to disagree with each other even when their positions are close. Michael Huemer basing himself on the Intuitionalists like Prichard see that reason recognizes universals. Is that  all that far away from the Friesian school of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross where first principles are known but not by reason or the senses? They are reasonable (not infallible). Greta Hermann thought that Nelson meant "infallible" and thus went away from the immediate non intuitive approach(-and it might be that in fact that is what Nelson thought). But that its not implied by the Friesian doctrine as Kelley Ross point out.

And while I am at it, is this all that far from Hegel who reaches absolute knowledge by a dialectical process. [This may not be obvious to people unless, you read the Logic of Hegel that was part of his Encyclopedia.]

I mean where would Physics be today if Einstein had decided to attack the concept of the quantum? Or even more striking is that in Quantum Mechanics every incremental step was done by a different person building on the result of some previous person.][not attacking previous results]

[i might mention here that all of this is post Kant and all these people did not ignore Kant but rather tried to deal with the difficulties he raised. Huemer is from  the Analytic tradition starting with Frege. Nelson and Fries is a modification of Kant. Hegel is sort of his own category  but still does try to answer the problem raised by Kant. 

furthermore i must mention that at least a significant number of Rishonim did not ignore philosophy not Plato nor Aristotle or Plotinus nor the later Muslim Philosophers and so I think the great Post Kant Thinkers are important--but not all. After all I do agree that most post Kant philosophy is worthless--but I do know that to see the flaws takes a certain amount of experience and expertise.

Bava Batra page 35a in Tosfot and page 70a. Rambam chapter 4 halacha 14.

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". R. Aba said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness, and so he must give back the piece. Tosphot asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document, and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen. Here too let him be believed because he could have said ''I did not take it'' and be believed with an oath.  

 In the subject of the bar of metal of R. Aba, Rav Shach suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the Torah believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in Bava Batra page 70a where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a migo that he could have said the object was stolen and be believed with an oath, Rav Shach explains  that the case of, "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard is in fact is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, and that case in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath. The Torah is not believing him because of a migo, but because that in itself is a plea that the Torah believes with an oath (and yet the gemaras says the guard is believed because of a migo that he could have said it was neenas) The other question is that if Rav Shach is right then the owner is trying to steal the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" which we only say in certain cases like kidushin or the amount of money that a Hebrew slave can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of Tospfot in Bava Batra 35a. Rav Shach is mainly coming to answer this question in the Rambam because other answers do not seem to work so well in the Rambam.   

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 In the subject of the bar of metal נסכא of ר' אבא, Here רב שך suggests the reason the person that grabbed it is not believed because the oath that he would like to take is not the oath of a guard where the תורה believes an a oath. That means to say that there are claims that a person is not believed even with an oath. In certain cases the Torah believes an oath, but this is not one of them. This is different from the case in בבא בתרא ע' ע''א where  person is a guard of an object with a document. [The person that gave him the object to guard has a document to that effect.] There the guard is believed that he gave back the object because he has a מיגו that he could have said the object was נגנב and be believed with an oath,  רב שך explains  that the case of "I gave it back to you " is a case where the  guard  is saying that the object was stolen because now that the  owner is saying he never got back the object that is a case where the owner is trying to steal the object. Two questions. One is that if so, then the fact that the guard is saying "I gave it back" is a case of it being stolen, And that case in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath. The תורה is not believing him because of a מיגו, but because that in itself is a plea that the תורה believes with an oath (and yet the גמרא says the guard is believed because of a מיגו that he could have said it was נאנס). The other question is that if  רב שך is right, then the owner is trying to גונב the amount of money the object is worth, not the actual object. That would seem to depend if "the the value of money is like money" שווה כסף ככסף which we only say in certain cases like קיושין or the amount of money that a עב עברי can be redeemed with.

I am being short here because there a a few answers to this question of תוספות in בבא בתרא ל''ה ע''אa. Here רב שך is mainly coming to answer this question in the רמב''ם because other answers do not seem to work so well in the רמב''ם.   

An introduction to the subject, A person grabbed a piece of metal from someone and a witness says so. And the person says, "Yes I took it because it is mine". ר' אבא said he can not take an oath because he is not disagreeing with the witness and o he must give back the piece. תוספות asks why is this different from a case where one is a guard of an object with a  document and there he  is believed with an oath   because he could have said it was stolen.

בנושא  נסכא של ר' אבא, כאן רב שך מציע את הסיבה לכך שהאדם שתפס אותו אינו נאמן כי השבועה שהוא רוצה להישבע אינה שבועת שומר במקום שבו התורה מאמין שְׁבוּעָה. כלומר שיש טענות שלא מאמינים לאדם אפילו בשבועה. במקרים מסוימים התורה מאמינה בשבועה, אך זו אינה אחת מהן. זה שונה מהמקרה בבא בתרא ע' ע''א שאדם הוא שומר על חפץ עם מסמך. [לאדם שנתן לו את החפץ לשמירה יש מסמך על כך.] שם השומר נאמן שהוא החזיר את החפץ כי יש לו מיגו שיכול היה לומר שהחפץ נגנב ולהאמין עם שבועה, רב שך מסביר שהמקרה של "החזרתי לך" הוא מקרה שבו השומר אומר שהחפץ נגנב כי עכשיו כשהבעלים אומר שהוא לא החזיר את החפץ זה מקרה שבו הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את החפץ. שתי שאלות. האחת היא שאם כן, אז העובדה שהשומר אומר "החזרתי" היא מקרה של גניבה, והמקרה הזה כשלעצמו הוא טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה. התורה לא מאמינה לו בגלל מיגו, אלא בגלל שזו כשלעצמה זו טענה שהתורה מאמינה בשבועה (ואף על פי כן הגמרא אומרת שהשומר מאמינים בגלל מיגו שיכול היה לומר שזה נאנס). השאלה הנוספת היא שאם רב שך צודק, אז הבעלים מנסה לגנוב את סכום הכסף ששווה החפץ, לא החפץ בפועל. נראה שזה תלוי אם "ערך הכסף הוא כמו כסף", שם שווה כסף ככסף אנו אומרים רק במקרים מסוימים כמו קידושין או כמות הכסף שאיתו ניתן לפדות עבד עברי. אני מקצר כאן כי יש כמה תשובות לשאלה זו של תוספות בבבא בתרא ל''ה ע''א. כאן רב שך בא בעיקר לענות על שאלה זו ברמב''ם כי נראה שתשובות אחרות לא כל כך עובדות ברמב''ם

הקדמה לנושא, אדם תפס חתיכת מתכת ממישהו ועד אומר כך. והאדם אומר, "כן לקחתי את זה כי זה שלי". ר' אבא אמר שאינו יכול להישבע כי אינו חולק על העד ועליו להחזיר את החתיכה. תוספות שואלים למה זה שונה ממקרה שבו שומר על חפץ עם מסמך ושם מאמינים לו בשבועה כי יכול היה לומר שהוא נגנב.