There is a Kashe [an attack type of question] on Reb Chaim. He starts out his ideas in Tractate Shabat with a question of the Magid Mishna on the Rambam. But then he ignores the answer of the Magid Mishna and starts out immediately with a different approach of his own. This is at a time when the answer of the Magid Mishna seems satisfactory.
My answer to this question on Reb Chaim will be that in fact the answer of the Magid Mishna is seriously flawed.
The Gemara in Shabat 107b brings three opinions about the statement of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav. The Magid says that the Rambam throws out the second opinion. This in fact sounds very reasonable. Why not? We throw out "some say" all the time. This works well for the second "Some say." But once you get to the third everything falls apart. The third one refers to the Mishna, "a person traps a snake on Shabat not to be bitten is not liable."
The third "some say" says that this Mishna is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon [that a person that does work on Shabat not for its normal purpose is not liable]. [I.e he does not decide like Rabbi Yehuda.] [And Shmuel is posek [decides the law] like this Mishna and the Rambam also.] This presents a question on the Rambam who holds by Rabbi Yehuda that a work done not for its purpose is still liable.
Now this whole same discussion went on for the mishna about opening a wound on Shabat. Rav Judah in the name of Rav said this is like Rabbi Shimon. This is a question on the Rambam also because he holds one can open the wound and he still holds like Rabbi Yehuda. Not that question was easy for the Magid to answer. He said the Rambam simply throws out the second "some say." I.e. that that mishna is also like Rabbi Yehuda and it is allowed because it is not work at all. He does not open it like the doctors do. This fits perfectly. But when you get to the next "Some say," it falls apart.
I mean to say that in theory you could have the Rambam come along and say, "I say trapping the snake is A.O.K. even to Rabbi Yehuda because the reason one is not liable is not because of a work done not for its own sake, but because it is mitasek (i.e. not done in the normal way) exactly like Shmuel says about it. [And this works perfectly for Shmuel [who in fact holds by Rabbi Yehuda just like the Rambam and says it is a case of Mitasek]. But this is the place it all falls apart. The Rambam does not say it is mitasek (i.e. not done in the normal way) . He says he traps the snake in the normal way. [Not jut that he flips a vessel on it but he ties it up. That is not mitasek] This is why Reb Chaim had to throw out the Magid Mishna.]
The lesson from all this for Jews and Gentiles is simple: There is a place to go to relearn ethics. It is rigorous study of the Torah and Talmud.
As Pedro Blas Gonzalez wrote in "Schopenhauer on Conscience
as the Ground of Ethics":
"While the predominant notions of ethics today are totally devoid of any religious content, moral higher ground or the capacity for transcendence, ethics, as so many today like to think of this, essentially remains a tool at the disposition of those who are socially-politically "committed."
One clear-cut evidence for this is that nothing can be deemed ethical today that is difficult to embrace or live by. Our predominant rendition of "ethics" is conveniently and curiously geared to the exigencies of our hedonistic age. For this and other reasons, nothing ethical, according to our gurus today, can showcase an intrinsic aspect of resistance to our whims and desires."
