there occurred to me two simple axioms. One is that you need the third growth and smoothing of the stack to be in the hands of a Israel in order to be obligated in truma and maasar. That is however according to the opinion that a gentile has the ability to acquire land in Israel in such a way as to take away the obligation of truma. (That is R Elazar and the fact that Tosphot says R elazar can agree that you need both the third growth and the smooting to be in the possesion of a jew. tosphot in gitin 47a.) However according to the alternative opinion that a gentile cannot own land in such a way then even if he has acquired that land an the wheat has grown to a third of it final growth in his hands, even so that wheat is obligated in truma. The other axiom is that the land can be owned by one person, and what grows on it can be owned by another (as Rav Shach pointed out. E.g., land that is not owned by anyone, and yet someone sowed it, the crop is obligated in truma). So even if the land is in the hands of a Israel, but a gentile owns the wheat, it still is not liable unless both the third and the smoothing are when the Israel owns the wheat. Based on these two principles it is possible to understand the argument between the Gra and the Kesef Mishna about the intention of the Rambam in laws of truma where he says if land is owned by a gentile in Israel, and a Israel buys the land back, he is liable in truma from the Torah. The Keseph Mishna writes there that therefore if that land has not been bought back by a Israeli, the grain is not obligated in truma. The Gra wrote that this is a mistake as one can see in the next halacha that if one buys grain from a gentile, if the smoothing was done in the hands of a Israel it is obligated in truma. I think the Keseph Mishna means that if the third growth was in the hand of a gentile, the grain is not obligated in truma from the Torah, but rather derababan.-------------------------------- (two simple axioms. One is that you need the third growth and smoothing of the stack to be in the hands of a יהודי in order to be obligated in תרומה and מעשר. That is however according to the opinion that a gentile has the ability to acquire land in Israel in such a way as to take away the obligation of תרומה. However according to the alternative opinion that a gentile cannot own land in such a way then even if he has acquired that land and the תבואה has grown to a third of it final growth in his hands, even so that תבואה is obligated in תרומה. The other axiom is that the land can be owned by one person and what grows on it can be owned by other (as רב שך pointed out. E.g., land that is not owned by anyone, and yet someone sowed it, the תבואה is obligated in תרומה). So even if the land is in the hands of a יהודי but a gentile owns the תבואה, it still is not liable unless both the third and the smoothing מירוח are when the יהודי owns the תבואה. Based on these two principles it is possible to understand the argument between the גר''א and the כסף משנה about the intention of the רמב''ם in laws of תרומה where he says if land is owned by a gentile in Israel, and a יהודי buys the land back התבואה is חייב in תרומה from the תורה. the כסף משנה writes there that therefore if that land has not been bought back by a יהודי ,the תבואה is not obligated in תרומה. The גר''א wrote that this is a mistake as one can see in the next halacha that if one buys תבואה from a gentile, if the smoothing was done in the hands of a יהודי ,it is obligated in תרומה. I think the כסף משנה means that if the third growth was in the hand of a gentile, the grain is not obligated in תרומה from the Torah, but rather דרבנן.)--------------------------------I am being short here because I write after getting back from the sea and am tired. But now let me clarify. The Gra means to say that even if the land is owned by the gentile but the wheat is owned by a Jew when it gets to a third of its growth that is enough to make the obligation to be from the Torah. You do nor need the Jew to buy back both the land and the wheat in order for the grain to be obligated from the Torah. In this the Gra is disagreeing with the Keseph Mishna who say the obligation from the Torah can only be after the land has been bought back from the gentile.---------I am being short here because I write after getting back from the sea and am tired. But now let me clarify. The גר''א means to say that even if the land is owned by the gentile but the wheat is owned by a Jew when it gets to a third of its growth that is enough to make the obligation to be from the דאורייתא . You do not need the יהודי to buy back both the land and the תבואה in order for the grain to be obligated by the תורה. In this the גר''א is disagreeing with the כסף משנה who say the obligation from the תורה can only be after the land has been bought back from the gentile.----To the Keseph Mishna you need the crops to reach a third of their growth in soil that is owned by a Jew in soil that is in Israel. ---To the כסף משנה you need the crops to reach a third of their growth in soil that is owned by a Jew in soil that is in ישראל. -----------------------------------------According to the way Rav Shach understands this subject when the ground and the wheat is owned by a gentile, there is no obligation of truma. When the ground and wheat has been bought by a Jew, then all agree the wheat is obligated in truma. When the ground is owned by the gentile, and the wheat has been purchased by a Jew before it reached a third of its growth, this is the argument. To Raba it it is obligated in Truma and to R Elazar it is not. This is the meaning of the Keseph Mishna that the land and wheat needed to be bought by the Jew, because if only the crops were bought by the Jew, then the law is like R Elazar that there is no obligation in Truma. But to the opinion of the Gra the law is like Raba that the crops are obligated in truma.---------------------I would like to add here a subject that comes up in this context in Rav Shach's Avi Ezri on the Rambam Laws of First Fruits chapter two law thirteen. The Rambam wrote that if grain from outside of Israel comes into Israel are obligated in challah. And if it was established to be obligated in Maasar in the hands of a Jew after it entered Israel it is obligated derabanan. I think that produce from outside of Israel is not similar to crops that were grown in Israel, but on the property of a gentile. So, I think the reason that the crops are obligated derabanan, and not obligated by the Torah, is they are crops of outside of Israel. This is not related to the opinion of R Elazar that holds fruit grown on the property of gentile in Israel is not obligated in maasar. Rather I think the Rambam held the law is like Raba that fruit grown on the property of a gentile in Israel is obligated in maasar, and the reason for the crops coming from outside of Israel being not obligated is not related. Rather the reason they are not obligated is that they are from outside of Israel which is on a lesser level of obligation than if they had been crops grown in Israel. The reason I say this is that the gemara in Gitin page 47A is clear that you go by a third of the growth [R Eazar] of by the final smoothing of the stack as being the time that obligation begins. But not both. I think the Rambam decided like Raba. [This is not like I wrote up above when I was explaining the approach of the Keseph Mishna] However, I think most achronim think the Rambam held like R Elazar and to answer the apparent contradiction, they hold like Tosphot who wrote that R Elazar goes both by the third of the growth and the smoothing. I want to add that it is certainly true that crops become eligible to be obligated in maasar at a third of their growth but that does not mean that the law would be like R elazar that if they would be owned by a gentile at that point that they would be not obligated in maasar. These are two different unrelated things .============================== -----------------------------------------According to the way רב שך understands this subject when the ground and the תבואה is owned by a gentile, there is no obligation of תרומה. When the ground and תבואה has been bought by a Jew, then all agree the תבואה is obligated in תרומה. When the ground is owned by the gentile, and the תבואה has been purchased by a Jew before it reached a third of its growth, this is the argument. To רבה it is obligated in תרומה and to ר’ אלעזר it is not. This is the meaning of the Keseph Mishna that the land and תבואה needed to be bought by the Jew, because if only the crops were bought by the Jew, then the law is like ר’ אלעזר that there is no obligation in תרומה. But to the opinion of the גר''א the law is like רבה that the crops are obligated in תרומה.---------------------I would like to add here a subject that comes up in this context in האבי עזרי של רב שך on the רמב’’ם Laws of First Fruits chapter two law thirteen. The רמב’’ם wrote that if grain from outside of Israel comes into Israel are obligated in חלה. And if it was established to be obligated in מעשר in the hands of a Jew after it entered Israel it is obligatedגרבנן . I think that produce from outside of Israel is not similar to crops that were grown in Israel, but on the property of a gentile. So, I think the reason that the crops are obligated deרבהnan, and not obligated by the Torah, is they are crops of outside of Israel. This is not related to the opinion of ר’ אלעזר that holds fruit grown on the property of gentile in Israel is not obligated in מעשר. Rather I think the רמב’’ם held the law is like רבה that fruit grown on the property of a gentile in Israel is obligated in מעשר, and the reason for the crops coming from outside of Israel being not obligated is not related. Rather the reason they are not obligated is that they are from outside of Israel which is on a lesser level of obligation than if they had been crops grown in Israel. The reason I say this is that the גמרא in גיטין page 47A is clear that you go by a third of the growth [ר' אלעזר], OR by the final smoothing of the stack {רבה}as being the time that obligation begins. But not both. I think the רמב’’ם decided like רבה. [This is not like I wrote up above when I was explaining the approach of the מכסף משנה] However, I think most אחרונים think the רמב’’ם held like ר’ אלעזר and to answer the apparent contradiction, they hold likeתוספות who wrote that ר’ אלעזר goes both by the third of the growth and the smoothing.I want to add that it is certainly true that crops become eligible to be obligated מעשר at a third of their growth but that does not mean that the law would be like ר' אלעזר that if they would be owned by a gentile at that point that they would be not obligated in מעשר. These are two different unrelated things._______________________________________For the sake of clarity, I would like to bring the basic subject on page 47 of Gitin. Raba said there is no acquisition of a gentile in land in Israel in such a way as to absolve produce from truma and maasar; however, he does have acquisition in such a way as to allow him to dig. i.e., he has monetary possession. R Elazar said a gentile has acquisition in Israel in that if he owns land all the produce from that land is not obligated in Truma nor Maasar but he cannot dig ditches or wells. What is the reason for this? Raba learns from the verse your grain to refer to the smoothing of the grain stack at the end of all work on the grain. R. Elazar learns from that same verse that when a gentile owns the grain at the time of reaching a third of its growth, he is not obligated in truma nor maasar. Tosphot learns that R Elazar can agree that ownership of a gentile at the time of smoothing also disqualifies the grain from becoming truma. I think the rambam saw here that these are two mutually exclusive opinions and decided the law like Raba.--------------------------------------------------------- For the sake of clarity, I would like to bring the basic סוגיא on page מ''ז of גיטין. רבה said אין קנייןה לנכרי בארץ ישראל להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשר.; however, he does have acquisition in such a way as to allow him to dig. i.e., he has monetary possession. ר' אלעזר said a יש קניין לעכו''ם ארץ ישראל כדי לפקיע מידי תרו''ם אבל איו חופר בורות שיחין ומערות. What is the reason for this? רבה learns from the verse your grain to refer to the smoothing of the grain stack at the end of all work on the grain. ר' אלעזר learns from that same verse that when a gentile owns the grain at the time of reaching a third of its growth, he is not obligated in תרומהn nor מעשר., we can agree that ownership of a gentile at the time of smoothing also disqualifies the grain from becoming תרומה. I think the רמב''ם saw here that these are two mutually exclusive opinions and decided the law like אבג.

למעשה, עלתה בדעתי תשובה לשאלה ששאלתי על רב שך בתשובתו לרמב"ם. שאלתי מתוך דעתו של ר' נתן בדף נ''ג של בבא קמא. אבל אני זוכר עכשיו שזו לא דעתו של הרמב"ם כפי שאני חושב שגם הזכרתי בחוברת הקטנה שלי על ש"ס בבבא קמא דף י''ט. שם התברר שוויכוח בין הרא"ש לרמב"ם. אז, במקרה שלנו בדף ו' של בבא קמא, שבו אנו שואלים מדוע הרמב"ם אינו מביא את הדין של האבן שנפלה מהגג ובור הגלגול. תשובתו של רב שך היא שנבין את בור הגלגול מהעובדה שהאדם שבתחום שלו נמצאים העץ והקיר שנפלו אחראי אם לא הסיר אותם לאחר שהוזהר מבית המשפט. השאלה שלי בנושא היא שמי שאחראי לבור הגלגול אינו זה שהניח אותו ברשות הרבים, אלא זה שמבצע את הגלגול. זה שונה מהמקרה של האדם שבבעלותו העץ והקיר שאחראי. התשובה היא שלרמב"ם, למעשה האדם שבבעלותו הבור יהיה אחראי; כמו במקרה בדף י'ט שבו האדם שבבעלותו החוט המחובר לתרנגולת יהיה אחראי או מי שיש לו התרנגול, או זה או זה אבל לא שניהם.גם במצב שלנו אין שני בני אדם שאחראים.ולכן יש לחייב בעל התקלה או למי מזיז אותה.

Actually, it occurred to me an answer for the question I asked on Rav Shach in his answer for the Rambam. I asked from the opinion of R. Nathan on page 53 of Bava Kama. But I remember now that that is not the opinion of the Rambam as I think I also mentioned in my little booklet on Shas in Bava Kama page 19. There it turned out to be an argument between the Rosh and the Rambam. So, in our case on page 6 of Bava Kama where we are asking why the Rambam does not bring the case of his stone that fell from the roof and the roiling pit. the answer of Rav Shach is we would know the rolling pit from the fact that the person in whose domain is the tree and wall that fell is liable if he did nit remove them after being warned by the court. My question n this tis that the one liable for the rolling pit is not the one who placed it in the public domain but rather the one doing the rolling. this is different that case of the person who owns the tree and wall who is liable. The answer is that to the Rambam it would in fact be the person who owns the pit that would be liable; as in the case on page 19 where the person that owns the string attached to the chicken would be liable--------------------------------------------------Actually, it occurred to me an answer for the question I asked on רב שך in his answer for the רמב’’ם. I asked from the opinion of ר' נתן on page 53 of בבא קמא. But I remember now that that is not the opinion of the רמב’’ם as I think I also mentioned in my little booklet on ש''ס in בבא קמא page 19. There it turned out to be an argument between the רא''ש and the רמב’’ם. So, in our case on page 6 of בבא קמא where we are asking why the רמב’’ם does not bring the case of his stone that fell from the roof and the roiling pit. the answer of רב שך is we would know the rolling pit from the fact that the person in whose domain is the tree and wall that fell is liable if he did nit remove them after being warned by the court. My question n this tis that the one liable for the rolling pit is not the one who placed it in theרשות הרבים ,but rather the one doing the rolling. this is different that case of the person who owns the tree and wall who is liable. The answer is that to the רמב’’ם it would in fact be the person who owns the pit that would be liable; as in the case on page 19 where the person that owns the string attached to the chicken would be liable or the owner of the chicken. This one or that one but not both, So on page 6 we can learn from the owner of the wall and tree that fell to either the owner of the owner of the rolling stone or the one who is moving it.

בבא קמא דף ו ע''א רב שך שואל מדוע הרמב"ם אינו מביא את דין סכין האבן או משאו שהשאיר על גג ונפלו ברוח מצויה וגרמו נזק לאחר שכבר נחו שהוא חייב. התשובה של רב שך היא שהגמרא חשבה בהווה אמינא שאדם צריך לעשות מעשה כדי שיהיה חייב על גרימת נזק. אך לאחר שאנו למדים על הכותל והאילן שנפלו וגרמו נזק שהוא חייב מבלי שעשה מעשה כלשהו, קל וחומר במקרה שלנו של האבן שעל הגג כאשר עשה מעשה בכך שהניח אותה על הגג. תשובה דומה סיפק רב שך מדוע הרמב"ם לא הזכיר את דין בור שבועטים ברגליים על אנשים ברשות הרבים-בור המתגלגל. הסיבה לכך שזה לא מובא ברמב''ם היא אותה תשובה. מדובר במקרה של רשלנות ולכן הוא אחראי בלי המכנה המשותף הדרוש מבור ושור. השאלה שיש לי בנושא היא השאלה מי חייב במקרה של בור מתגלגל? גם אם אומרים שמי ששם אותו שם הוא חייב, עדיין יש את האדם השני. התוספות למעשה אומרים שאדם הבועט בתקלה (בור המתגלגל) שהוא חייב. לכן אי אפשר ללמוד שהוא חייב ברשלנות מכיוון שהוא לא רשלן. בעיה שנייה היא ש (אפילו באופן שבו אנו לומדים לפני שאנו לומדים על הקיר והעץ שנפלו) שהחובה על האבן שעל הגג היא מהבור והאש. אז זה יכול להיות פער רחב מדי כדי ללמוד שאבן על הגג היא מכותל ואילן. עם זאת, אני חושב שרב שך אכן עונה על השאלה האחרונה הזו בעצמו. זו השאלה הראשונה שלדעתי יכולה להיות שאלה טובה אלא אם כן נניח בפשטות שרק מי ששם את הבור המתגלגל ברשות הרבים הוא חייב לבד. למרות שברור שהאדם השני שגורם לבעיה עושה זאת בצורה חמורה אף יותר ממקרה של רשלנות, מכיוון שהוא בבירור עושה זאת במכוון. עדיין יש לי בעיה מכיוון שהאדם הראשון שהתרשל והאדם השני שגרם לבעיה צריכים לחלוק את האחריות וכל אדם צריך לשלם חצי, לא רק הראשון

Bava Kama page 6a. Rav Shach asks why the Rambam does not bring the law of his stone knife or burden that he left on top of a roof and they fell in a common wind and they did damage after they were already abandoned that he is liable. The answer is that the gemara originally thought one must to to do and act in order that he be liable for causing damage. But after we learn about the wall and tree that fell and did damage that he is liable without his doing any deed, all the more so in our case of the stone on the roof when he did a deed by putting them on the roof. A similar answer Rav Shach provided about why the Rambam did not mention the law of a pit that is being kicked around by the feet on people in a public domain. The reason this is not brought is the same. The question I have on this is the question who is liable in the case of a rolling pit? Even if you say the one who put it there is liable, but still there is the second person. Tosphot in fact says it is the one kicking the pit thar is liable.So you cannot learn that he is liable by negligence since he is not negligent. A second problem is that even in way that we learn before we learn about the wall and tree that feel that the obligation for the stone on the roof is from pit and fire.so that might be a gap too wide to cross to learn that the stone of the roof from the wall and tree. however, I think Rav Shach does answer this last question himself. It is the first question that I think might be a good question unless we assume it simple that only the one who put the rolling pit in the public domain is liable.Although it is clear that the second person who is pushing the pit is doing it in an even more serious way than a negligence, and that he is clearly doing it intentionally, I still have a problem because it is the first person who committed the crime and the second person who caused the problem who should share the responsibility and each pay half. Not just the first person------------------------------------בבא קמא דך ו ע''א רב שך asks why the רמב''ם does not bring the law of his stone knife or burden that he left on top of a roof and they fell in a common wind and they did damage after they were already abandoned that he is חייב. The answer is that the גמרא originally thought one to has to do an act in order that he be חייב for causing damage. But after we learn about the כותל and אילן that fell and did damage that he is חייב without his doing any deed, all the more so in our case of the stone on the roof when he did a deed by putting them on the roof. A similar answer רב שך provided about why the רמב''ם did not mention the law of a pit that is being kicked around by the feet on people in a רשות הרבים. The reason this is not brought is the same. It is a case of negligence and so it is liable with needed the common denominator from pit and ox. The question I have on this is the question who is חייב in the case of a rolling pit? Even if you say the one who put it there is חייב ,but still there is the second person. תוספות in fact says it is the one kicking the pit that is חייב. So you cannot learn that he is חייב by negligence since he is not negligent. A second problem is that (even in the way that we learn before we learn about the wall and tree that fell) that the obligation for the stone on the roof is from pit and fire. So that might be a gap too wide to cross to learn that the stone of the roof from the כותל ואילן. However, I think רב שך does answer this last question himself. It is the first question that I think might be a good question unless we assume it simple that only the one who put the בור המתגלגל in the רשות הרבים is חייב. Although it is clear that the second person who caused the problem is doing it in a way that is even more serious than a case of negligence, since that he is clearly doing it intentionally, I still have a problem because the first person who was negligent and the second person who caused the problem should share the responsibility and each person should pay half, not just the first.

zb4 F Minor midi file zb4 nwc file

בבא בתרא כ''ו. אני חושב שכדאי להזכיר את גישתו של רב שמואל רוזובסקי בנוגע לאמירת עולא. עכשיו עולא אמר שמי שיש לו עץ שש עשרה אמות משכנו אינו יכול להביא ביכורים משום שהוא גזלן. הדרך שבה רב שמואל רוזובסקי מסביר זאת בזכרון שמואל פרק י"ד היא שהחלק העיקרי של עץ הוא השורש. מכיוון שהשורשים הולכים לשדה השכן, לכן העץ העיקרי נמצא בשדה השכן, ולכן לפרי שהעץ נושא יש לפחות חלק כלשהו בו השייך לשכן. (רב שך אומר שהעניין העיקרי הוא שהשורשים שואבים הזנה משדה השכן) השאלה שיש לי בנושא זה היא מהמשנה בדף פ''א ע''א (נפסק להלכה ברמב''ם, טור, ושלחן ערוך). המשנה אומרת שאם אדם קונה שני עצים בשדה, הוא אינו הבעלים של האדמה שהם עליה. מה שיוצא מהעץ הראשי שייך לו. מה שיוצא מהשורשים שייך לבעל האדמה. אבל אם אדם קונה שלושה עצים באותו שדה, אז הוא הבעלים של האדמה שהם עליה ביניהם וסביבם. לכן, מה שיוצא מהעץ או מהשורשים שייך לבעל העץ. לכן, יש שאלה. ברור שמה שיוצא מהעץ שייך לבעל העץ. גם אם יש רק עץ אחד במקרה של עולא, עדיין הדבר היחיד ששיייך לבעל הקרקע הוא מה שיוצא ישירות מהשורשים. אבל גם במקרה כזה, הפרי שהעץ נושא שייך לבעל העץ. אני יכול לחשוב שרב שמואל רוזובסקי יענה על כך באופן הבא. המשנה מדברת על כך שהעץ נמצא על אדמתו של האדם שמכר לו את העץ. המקרה של עולא שונה. המקרה של עולא הוא כאשר השורשים משתרעים לשדה של מישהו אחר. אבל איך זה יענה על השאלה אין לי מושג.